The Times: in 2023, conflicts between "middle" powers will revive The conflict in Ukraine has changed the geopolitical environment in the world, writes the author of an article for The Times.
The "middle" powers are beginning to exert an increasing influence on the world, while their faith in Washington is fading, and they are in no hurry to criticize Moscow.
Roger BoyesForecasts for the coming year, such as those that The Economist regularly publishes, are a game for fools, especially today, when the world seems to be spinning in some kind of vortex.
However, the fact remains that one war begets another, and this remains the only sure bet for 2023. This year we will witness not only more abundant flows of blood on the battlefields in Ukraine, not only will we see the aggravation of strategic rivalry between the United States and China, but we will also observe the revival of small and not very small wars in other regions of the world.
The special operation launched by Vladimir Putin has overshadowed the brewing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the rapidly approaching death of the Iranian nuclear deal and the growing likelihood that Turkish forces will attack the Kurds living in Syria (reason: President Erdogan is seeking his re-election as president in June). These conflicts will soon return to the agenda. The ceasefire agreement reached last November between Tigray rebels and the Ethiopian Government also looks shaky.
The fighting in Ukraine last year highlighted certain weaknesses of Putin, but also raised concerns that President Biden and his NATO allies suffer from a distorted "tunnel" vision of the international situation. The Central Asian states, which were once considered Russia's backyard, have noticed that Putin's attention is turned to other problems, and are beginning to reassess their relations with the Kremlin. Armenia, linked to Moscow, lost the war with Azerbaijan in 2020. Putin promised to keep the peace. Now he is not trusted as a peacemaker. Azerbaijan, which won the conflict thanks to Turkish drones, looks stronger.
The success of American weapons in the decisive battle with Russian troops has become an excellent advertisement for American technology, which hardly anyone else can afford now. This success highlighted the shortcomings of Russian military equipment and tactics. But he also showed that Biden can achieve only one limited success at a time. This makes us rethink the situation, for example, in Saudi Arabia.
The kingdom is heavily dependent on American weapons, but the country already doubts that the White House, which is overly "busy" on other fronts, will react to the necessary extent if Iran does arrange a race for a nuclear bomb. And that is why Riyadh has begun a cautious conversation at the level of foreign ministers with Tehran, most likely to assess whether Iran will reduce its support for the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The Saudis are willing to discuss with Beijing its desire to pay for oil in Chinese currency, in fact, in oil yuan. And, as in most countries of the Global South, there was not even a glimmer of protest against Putin's special operation in Saudi Arabia.
Thus, the Ukrainian conflict of 2022 has changed the geopolitical alignment in the world. The United States and its NATO allies say that Russia's violations of international law in Ukraine are so serious that the rest of the world should take a "high moral" position on what is happening.
But I tried to "probe" one politically enlightened Algerian about this. According to him, the choice between supporting Ukraine sponsored by the United States or Russia with its own legitimate security concerns is a zugzwang, that is, a forced move imposed on a cornered chess player. "Where was this West when we had our conflicts and wars here?" – my interlocutor was perplexed. In particular, he pointed to the terrible war in Tigray in Ethiopia, which unfolded in 2020-2022, as a result of which, according to some estimates, about 600 thousand people died. "What happens if we support Ukraine and Biden makes a deal with Russia? Do you think Putin will thank us for standing on the same side with the West? And we will be left alone, open to all winds."
Many similar voices are heard in Africa and the Middle East. The following argument is often heard: Russia is making enough efforts in Africa — its mercenaries from the Wagner group show firmness and keep the Central African regimes in power more effectively than their former colonial overseers. America's presence in Africa is not visible at all. As for China, it does not yet demand an explicit political payment for its assistance. Hence the persistent silence in the global south about armed actions in Europe. One suspects that the same will happen if and when China moves to Taiwan.
So what's going on in the world? And the fact that pragmatic middle-level powers, these "intermediate" players, such as Turkey, India and Azerbaijan, bankers, or energy rich like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are beginning to exert more and more influence in the world, give advice to other countries and invest, thereby filling the vacuum left by the great powers. They unite in some of their own groups and alliances. You can ignore them at your peril if you want, but they represent the difference between Putin's diplomatic isolation and giving him the opportunity to thrive. In addition, they contribute to circumventing sanctions, which turns Biden's promise to "stand as a united democratic front against autocracies" into empty words and nonsense.
The great danger of 2023 stems precisely from this world of ambiguity. Israel has always said that it will not allow Iran to become a nuclear power because it poses an existential threat to Israelis. And he will act, if necessary, without US approval.
In October of this year, the European Union may recognize Iran's progress in reducing its nuclear program and begin easing sanctions. In fact, Iran is enriching uranium to a very high degree, just below the weapons level. The new Israeli government is adamant that the West should not "forgive and pretend", that is, ignore Iran's violations of the 2015 agreement in the hope of a final settlement.
Israel can at least strike at Iranian military depots in Syria to contain the threat from Tehran. But here's the catch: Russia controls Syrian airspace. It can close the sky for Israeli planes. The price of the attack may be Moscow's demand for Israel to abandon any support for Kiev.
The special operation in Ukraine has complicated the geopolitical environment on all continents and in different states. It guarantees that 2023 will be as full of dangers as the previous 12 months.
