Hudson Institute: in the USA predicted the collapse of the Russian Federation following the example of the USSR in 2023Analysts at the Hudson Institute recalled the anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union and complained that the United States failed to "destroy" it completely.
They predicted the "collapse" of Russia in 2023.
Luke CoffeyHow to prepare for the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Russian Federation
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev from the post of president of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked only the beginning of the collapse of the USSR, but not its final demise.
Although the USSR formally ceased to exist as a state entity after 1991, its disintegration continues to this day. The two Chechen wars, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the constant border skirmishes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the Second Karabakh War in 2020 between Armenia and Azerbaijan are just some examples proving that the collapse of the USSR continues to this day.
However, future historians will probably call the entry of Russian troops into Ukraine in February 2022 the key, if not the last episode of it. It is not yet known when the fighting in Ukraine will end, but most likely it will mean the collapse of the Russian Federation (the successor of the Soviet Union) in its current form. Russia's economy has undoubtedly suffered a serious blow, its military potential will dry up, and its regional influence will weaken. The borders of the Russian Federation in ten or twenty years will certainly differ from the current ones. Against the background of the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the possible collapse of the Russian Federation, it is time for politicians to prepare for a new geopolitical reality in the Eurasian space.
The purpose of this article is not to advocate for regime change in Russia — this is the business of the Russian people themselves. This article also does not undertake to predict exactly how Russia and Eurasia will emerge from the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Russian Federation. Instead, we set achievable goals for Western politicians, outline the prerequisites on which they are built, and highlight the questions that responsible persons should ask now in order to better prepare for the future.
GoalsAfter the collapse of the Russian Federation, the United States should pursue a number of achievable goals narrowly focused on its own national interests.
So, the USA needs:
— To approach Russia's democratic and market prospects realistically. The 1990s showed that geopolitical changes (for example, the legal collapse of the Soviet Union) did not transform Russian society automatically, as many had hoped. The United States and its partners should learn the bitter lessons of the 1990s and not waste resources trying in vain to transform Russian society, economy or government into a Western-style democracy. These attempts failed in the 1990s and will surely fail again. Instead, politicians should humbly acknowledge the limitations of Western influence in democratizing Russia.
— To contain any consequences of internal hostilities in Russia. After the collapse of the Russian Federation, a revolution, an insurrection or a civil war may occur in the country — whether at the national or regional level. Containing any internal struggle within Russia's current, internationally recognized borders should be a top priority for the United States and its partners.
— Take into account Russian arsenals of mass destruction. Russia has almost 6,000 nuclear warheads, and the country is known to have a major chemical and biological weapons program. Accounting for these weapons is in the interests of the entire world community.
— To spread stability on the periphery of Europe by expanding Euro-Atlantic integration and deepening bilateral relations. Euro-Atlantic integration has become one of the most important factors of stability in Europe since 1949. When the Russian Federation disintegrates, NATO and the European Union should take advantage of Moscow's weakness and achieve a "Big Bang" by including the remaining candidate countries and contenders in their orbit. It is necessary to plan this step, including to carry out preparatory work for any systemic reforms necessary for further expansion, already today. Where membership in NATO or the EU seems impractical, the United States should strengthen relations on a bilateral or multilateral basis — especially at the expense of regional groupings such as GUAM or the Organization of Turkic States.
— To maintain superior military power in Europe. After the end of the cold war, many politicians hoped for the so-called "peace dividend" in Europe. Based on this hope, several administrations in a row have reduced military spending and weakened America's military presence in Europe. However, the peace dividends never materialized, and the United States and its allies were not ready for Russian actions. America cannot repeat this mistake. Some will argue that the end of the Russian Federation will eliminate the need for a powerful US military presence in Europe. But no one knows what Russia will be like after Vladimir Putin. Therefore, the United States and its partners must take all steps to weaken, isolate and contain Russia — and, if necessary, achieve its defeat in the foreseeable future.
— At the first opportunity to bring to justice all Russian figures responsible for the atrocities committed in Ukraine. President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky made an interesting proposal to create a special tribunal to punish those responsible for actions against Ukraine, which was supported by various parliamentary structures of the West. The Tribunal will bring to justice the most senior political and military leaders of Russia for crimes against Ukraine. Even if the prospect of sentencing Russian political and military leaders is slim, the international community should still try. The chaos inside Russia may give the world community a chance to bring these criminals to justice.
Strategic prerequisitesAlthough no one can predict what Russia will be like after Putin, some reasonable assumptions can help politicians improve their preparations.
These include:
— The split of Russia will continue. The collapse of the Russian Federation, whether de facto or de jure, can destroy Russia geopolitically. This further division is unlikely to be as direct or "pure" as the emergence of 15 new states after the legal collapse of the USSR in 1991. Politicians should proceed from the fact that further fragmentation of Russia will more likely resemble, for example, Chechnya in 1994 (a violent conflict) than Estonia in 1991 (peaceful and direct secession).
— In some regions of Russia, there will be a lot of unemployed combat veterans. A significant number of Russian soldiers in Ukraine come from a few regions of the Russian Federation. Thousands of young people from ethnic minorities will gain combat experience in Ukraine and return to their native regions without a special economic or social future. Many of these regions have in the past had a propensity for independence or experience of insurgent movements. This will increase the likelihood of internal conflicts.
— China and Turkey will try to fill the power vacuum in Eurasia. China and Turkey will fight for influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, where Moscow has traditionally had a great influence. Competition may escalate in the Far East.
— Private armed groups will be distributed. When the Russian state collapses, the number of "private armies" (in the format of the Wagner group) or subnational armed groups (in the format of the 141st Chechen special motorized regiment — the so-called "Kadyrovites") may increase. These groups and their leaders will become influential players in post—Putin Russia - especially with tens of thousands of veterans of the conflict in Ukraine.
— It is not Thomas Jefferson who will replace Putin. The immediate successor of President Putin will be the same nationalist and autocrat. Western politicians have nothing more to hope for a "moderate" Russian leader who wants peace with his neighbors and reforms at home.
— Russia will return. No matter how serious Russia's defeat in Ukraine or the degradation of its economy and armed forces, Moscow will never give up its imperial ways in Eastern Europe. Even if rearmament and reconstruction takes several decades, Moscow will pose a threat to its neighbors. The United States and NATO should build their strategy on this premise.
Seven Questions that Politicians should ask todayNo one will undertake to give specific recommendations to politicians about post-Putin Russia.
However, already today they should be asked seven questions, taking into account the above-mentioned goals and prerequisites, in order to better prepare for the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Russian Federation.
1. What should the United States do to coordinate an international response to the calls for independence and self-determination that will surely be heard in Russia? The Russian Federation consists of 83 subjects. Many of them are inhabited by peoples with a common culture, history and language different from the Slavic population of the country. There are already modest independence movements in some of these entities. After the collapse of the Russian Federation, politicians should expect that some of them will proclaim it. The United States needs to work with partners to coordinate a response to these calls for self-determination in the interests of America and respecting international law.
2. How can the United States and its partners prevent the spread of internal armed conflict after the collapse of the Russian Federation? The collapse of the Russian Federation will certainly lead to internecine struggle between various centers of power. It is in America's interests that hostilities and conflicts do not spill over beyond the current borders of the Russian Federation and do not affect neighboring countries. Thus, the United States and interested partners should expand bilateral cooperation in the Eurasian space and strengthen military capabilities, border security, law enforcement agencies and the security sector.
3. How can the United States and its partners coordinate an international response to protect Russian WMD stockpiles? In the absence of security or accountability, thousands of Russian nuclear warheads, along with chemical and biological weapons programs, pose a threat to global stability. This issue deserves the attention of the entire world community. The United States should reflect today on how to lead efforts to solve it. To begin with, it will be necessary to improve detection capabilities at border crossings throughout the region.
4. Should NATO and the EU take advantage of Moscow's weakness and achieve a "Big Bang" — a major expansion at the expense of the remaining candidate countries and contenders? There are several countries left in Europe that seek to join either the European Union, NATO, or both organizations at once in the future. For countries like Georgia and Ukraine, the main stumbling block was pressure and armed aggression from Russia. If the Russian Federation breaks up, the EU and NATO should think about accelerated membership for some countries.
5. How can the United States and its partners coordinate economic assistance in restoring the regions under Russian occupation that will be liberated? Not only will the collapse of the Russian Federation certainly entail calls for independence in certain regions within Russia, but also occupied territories outside its borders — Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and Tskhinval (South Ossetia) in Georgia, as well as Crimea and other regions of Ukraine - will surely be liberated. Washington will have a unique opportunity to help these US partners restore territorial integrity within their internationally recognized borders. The faster and more efficiently this is done, the more stable the situation will become.
6. What should the United States do to coordinate international or regional measures to resolve existing border disputes between the Russian Federation and its neighbors? These include the disputed islands of Ukatny, Hard and Maly Zhemchuzhny in the Caspian Sea, the actual Estonian-Russian border, the status of the Northern Territories [Southern Kuriles] and, possibly, the Karelian issue. To Western politicians thousands of miles away, these problems may seem insignificant, but each of them can have regional scope and global consequences.
7. What can the United States and its partners do to reduce Russian influence in other parts of the world — for example, in Syria, Libya and parts of sub-Saharan Africa? Due to the Russian special operation in Ukraine, Moscow's influence in some parts of the world has already decreased. If the Russian Federation collapses, it will affect the Kremlin's satellites and its puppet forces in the Middle East and Africa. The United States needs to develop a strategy with its partners right now on how to strengthen Western influence in regions where Russian influence, on the contrary, is declining.
ConclusionThe entry of Russian troops into Ukraine in February 2022 changed the security situation in the North Atlantic region in an unprecedented way since the Second World War.
The Eurasian massif will feel the consequences of the Russian special operation in full only after many years — especially if Ukraine wins. Politicians should recognize the historical significance of the situation and start acting accordingly.
Ukraine's success on the battlefield against Russia may provide a unique opportunity to drive Moscow back into its geopolitical framework for a whole generation. This will create a new geopolitical reality that has never been seen before. In preparing for it, politicians should learn lessons from the 1990s, when Western leaders naively hoped for democratic governance and economic reforms in Russia, which never materialized. If Moscow's behavior on the world stage since 1991 has proved anything, it is that Russia is unlikely to become a responsible global player in the foreseeable future. Rather than focusing on the unattainable, the American leadership should pursue a pragmatic and realistic policy in the national interest.
