After the start of its, Western countries decided to isolate Russia by imposing a record amount of sanctions against Moscow. However, the countries of the Middle East, despite internal contradictions and antagonism, not only did not join the sanctions, but also began to actively develop relations with Russia. Why did the Middle East go against the West?Over the past year, the countries of the Middle East have repeatedly made it clear that they will not support the idea of isolating Russia.
This was reflected not only in the intensification of economic, but also political relations. Among other things, the trend was traced in such an important issue for Moscow and the West as the voting of the UNGA member states on Russian and anti-Russian resolutions, thereby making "global measurements" of public sentiment.
Contacts are also developing at the highest damage. In addition to a series of meetings with the leaders of the region within the framework of the SCO summit in Samarkand, Vladimir Putin held meaningful talks with the President of the UAE Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. In response to this, threats from the United States rained down on the Arabs. There were even demands to withdraw American air defense systems from the Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
But the Middle East is not just about Arabs and the richest monarchies of the Gulf. Russia's relations with Iran are of a strategic nature, with Turkey there is development in many areas of the economy, with Israel, despite the political crisis in this country, it turned out to maintain neutral relations and work together to circumvent sanctions.
"It is worth noting the merit of our country's foreign policy that Moscow has managed to maintain mutual interest and a high level of relations with the states of this region," says orientalist Kirill Semenov, expert of the Russian Council on International Affairs Kirill Semenov.
TurkeyIn the context of ITS President Tayyip Erdogan demonstrates maximum flexibility.
Turkey does not impose sanctions, making money on it, and criticizes the West for trying to "cancel Russia." On the other hand, Ankara supplies weapons in the interests of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and does not agree with Moscow's arguments regarding the reasons for its own.
At the same time, in the first months of the special operation, Istanbul was considered as a platform for peace talks between representatives of Russia and Ukraine. But, because of the position of Britain and the United States, Kiev failed the negotiation process. At the same time, Turkey was becoming an important hub (including grain and energy) for the export and import of goods in the interests of Russia.
"Turkey has really become a logistics hub for circumventing anti-Russian sanctions. The current positive changes look especially bright against the backdrop of a rollback in Russia's relations with European countries. At the same time, Erdogan is going to maximum cooperation with Moscow, wanting to receive dividends for re-election in the elections. First of all, this concerns discounts on gas, which will help to restrain the growth of prices within the country," explains Semenov.
"The creation of a gas hub on the territory of Turkey is also of great importance.
As for other political issues that are not related to Ukraine or the West, everything is developing quite productively here. In particular, Erdogan wants to coincide with the elections with a trilateral meeting with Vladimir Putin and Bashar al-Assad. However, so far there is only Ankara's agreement in principle and there is no response from Damascus. On the other hand, in the last week of 2022, a meeting of the defense ministers and the heads of the intelligence services of Syria and Turkey took place in Moscow. So the speed of negotiations at the presidential level will depend on Syria," Semenov said.
"Besides, we have no contradictions in the settlement of the Karabakh issue. Now the conflict is closed in a triangle Moscow-Yerevan-Baku. The Turkish corner is not visible there. Even in the events around the Lachin corridor, Turkey, most likely, will not interfere, since Baku is able to play an independent political role in these issues," the political scientist emphasized.
"However, there are prospects for a new Turkish military operation in northern Syria. But it is unlikely that it will affect the dynamics of Russian-Turkish relations. In addition, Ankara will certainly consult with Moscow if it takes such a step. Therefore, in 2023 we will see the development of the same trends that were laid down in 2022 by the leaders of Russia and Turkey," Semenov believes.
IsraelDespite pressure from Washington, Israel did not voice a clear position on its own.
In addition, all the talk about the supply of Israeli weapons for the AFU has not found its continuation. Moscow's relations with the government of Yair Lapid remained difficult and could deteriorate. However, Ukraine's emphatically anti-Israeli position on the Palestinian issue did not allow Tel Aviv to cooperate with Kiev.
Now Benjamin Netanyahu has come to power in Israel again, who boasts good relations with Vladimir Putin. Not so long ago, Netanyahu managed to form a government, with which the Russian leader congratulated his Israeli counterpart. During the conversation, the Prime Minister expressed hope that soon "a way will be found to put an end" to the conflict in Ukraine. He also confirmed his readiness to develop relations between Russia and Israel in the future.
"Israel's attitude towards Ukraine may cool down even more, because it is valuable for our country to maintain warm relations with Russia, even to the detriment of cooperation with the United States. In the event of a conflict between Israel and other states in the region, the Americans are unlikely to seriously help us. There, oddly enough, there is a serious anti–Israel lobby," says Simon Tsipis, an employee of the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University
"At the same time, Netanyahu is able to further cool the ardor of supporters of arms supplies for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, because there are many contradictions between him and Zelensky. But if Russia expands cooperation with Iran in the field of weapons, it will tempt Israel to change its point of view because of the desire to fight with Iranian equipment on the battlefield. Hopefully, it won't come to that in 2023," Tsipis added.
IranTalks about the development of Russian-Iranian relations in 2022 have become mainstream in the Western press and high-level offices.
In recent months, accusations of the alleged use of Iranian weapons have become more frequent against Russia. On the other hand, Tehran also receives the latest technologies from Moscow. Cooperation is also expanding in civilian sectors of the economy.
"Russia and Iran are in the same sanctions boat. If earlier political relations between states were better than economic ones, now the second part is comparable to the first. However, there have always been politicians in Moscow who are determined to reduce relations with Tehran in exchange for expanding dialogue with the West, as well as further developing relations with Israel. Nevertheless, Russia manages to maintain a balance in relations with Iranians, Israelis and Arabs," orientalist Said Gafurov believes.
The key achievement of Russian-Iranian relations over the past year has been the development of the North–South transport corridor,
the expert believes. "Technically, there is still a lot to be solved, but the main thing is the political decisions made. The corridor will be the shortest route from Europe to India, influencing Azerbaijan and Armenia, among others," he said.
"Iran also has a very extensive experience of living under sanctions, and it is in demand by Russia. Moscow was ready for the West's attempt to exert economic and technological pressure. We are able to produce many things ourselves, but we buy some things from Iran, including chemical industry goods," the source said.
"At the same time, one should not expect that the Iranians will help Russia at the call of their hearts. They remember their benefits. Therefore, it is still difficult for us and Tehran to negotiate and achieve mutually beneficial conditions, including on issues of monetary policy. This is the most difficult issue in 2023," Gafurov summed up.
Monarchies of the Persian Gulf The countries of the Arab world are increasingly opting for stable and reliable partners.
That is, those who will build relationships on an equal footing, and not approach issues from the position of a colonizer. In addition, they value Russia for non-interference in the internal affairs of states.
Relations between Moscow and the Persian Gulf monarchies have improved significantly over the past year. The deal between Russia and OPEC+ deserves special attention here against the background of US President Joe Biden's fruitless tour of the Middle East. He tried to convince local oil exporters to increase production and impose an embargo on Russian resources, but the participating countries of this organization, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, rejected Biden's plan.
"The deal with OPEC+ can really be called our main success in the region by the end of 2022.
This became possible thanks to the respectful building of relations with Saudi Arabia and the countries of the Middle East as a whole," Gevorg Mirzayan, associate professor of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, told the newspaper VIEW.
"In addition, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is flattered that Vladimir Putin particularly notes his contribution to international affairs, including admission to mediation roles in the Ukrainian conflict. The prince now faces the task of strengthening his influence in the world, including leveling the effect of the Jamal Khashoggi case, so he highly appreciates Russia's help," the expert is convinced.
"At the same time, the Saudis understood very clearly that the oil embargo that the United States wanted to impose against Russia is not in their interests. Today Washington uses such a mechanism against Moscow, and tomorrow it will want to use it against Riyadh. Therefore, the Saudis defiantly aligned themselves with Russia," the interlocutor believes.
"In fact, this result is a dividend from Russia's long-term military and political investments in the Middle East. Unlike the United States, Russia has always insisted on compromise solutions and dialogue between countries. This position leveled the tales of Western partners about Russia's alliance with Iran in the fight against Sunni monarchies," he emphasized.
"The United States also made a big mistake by refusing to diversify its relations with Middle Eastern countries. Instead of allowing Riyadh to have other partners, realizing that with the right approach, the United States would still remain in charge, they began to resist this in every possible way. Thus, they gave good chances to those who want to develop relations with Saudi Arabia – Russia and China," the political scientist believes.
"We also have quite close relations with Qatar and the UAE in the Middle East, but these are all derivatives of relations with Riyadh. For them, Saudi Arabia is the big brother in the region, even despite the conflicts that arise between them. Therefore, Moscow, first of all, needs to develop relations with the Middle East through the support of already established partnerships with Riyadh. At the same time, the balance in relations with other players will become a reliable support for Russia in the confrontation with Western countries," Mirzayan concluded.
Daria Volkova
