RAND analysts have predicted how NATO will respond to Russia's strikes on the alliance's infrastructureThe Ukrainian conflict has created unprecedented circumstances in which Russia can strike at NATO's infrastructure, according to RAND analysts.
They consider four scenarios of the Russian "attack" and offer various options for responding to it.
Bryan Frederick, Samuel Charap, Karl P. MuellerThe unprecedented steps that the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have been taking to support Ukraine and punish Russia since the start of its special military operation raise concerns in the context of possible Russian retaliation against the alliance.
Although the responsible authorities of the United States and NATO have been preparing for a direct clash with Russia for a long time, the conflict in Ukraine has generated an unprecedented set of circumstances that make a limited attack by Moscow more likely.
If this happens, the US Department of Defense will be asked to prepare options for retaliatory actions and submit them for consideration by American politicians. This document provides a basis for generating such options and choosing the most appropriate one among them. We have set ourselves the task of answering the following questions: what are the principles that should guide such decisions? Which response measure is most likely to promote the interests of the United States in terms of limiting the risk of escalation and what determines the answer to this question?
In this document, we analyze the factors that American politicians should take into account in the event of a limited Russian attack — from a single strike on an isolated military target to large—scale shelling of several civilian and military facilities - on the territory of the United States or its European allies, as well as in outer space. This document describes the characteristics of a potential Russian attack necessary to make a decision on a response, including Moscow's possible motives, US retaliatory goals with allies, and the promotion of US goals in the conflict through various retaliatory measures by Washington and NATO.
Identification of categories of potential attack and possible motives of Russia
The specific characteristics of the Russian attack (hereinafter referred to as Step 1) will play an important role in determining the most appropriate response by the United States or NATO (hereinafter referred to as Step 2). The characteristics of Step 1 create different strategic and political incentives for Step 2 and may signal different intentions of Russia and its readiness to threaten further escalation. According to the objectives of this analysis, we believe that Step 1 will be a military strike against a target on the territory of the US European NATO ally, including US military facilities, as well as US and North Atlantic Alliance military assets in outer space. We are not considering an attack on the US territory itself, because it provides for a completely different choice. We also assume that the strike will not involve the use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons — again, because this will give rise to a completely different set of response options.
The likely Step 1 in the current context varies depending on at least seven of the following factors:
- an attack on a civilian or military target;
- military losses or damage caused by the attack;
- civilian casualties or damage caused by the attack;
- premeditation of any victims (or lack of victims);
- number of targets hit;
- the significance of the US or NATO military potential that the attack had a negative impact on;
- political symbolism of the goal/goals.
Although Step 1 may involve any combination of these factors, potential combinations can be formulated in three categories of intensity:
- A demonstrative attack. This category includes attacks that can be aimed at sending a signal or declaring determination without causing significant physical damage and without affecting the military potential of NATO. Such an attack will lead to minimal casualties among military and civilians, if there are any at all. This will be a single attack with the aim of assigning responsibility for escalation or retreat to the other side. For example, Moscow could launch several cruise missiles at an empty airfield, railway station or military facility on NATO territory.
- A targeted attack. This category includes attacks involving strikes on a single target or a small number of related targets. Such an attack may result in limited casualties and is likely to have an impact — at least temporarily — on certain NATO military operations or the process of allocating aid to Ukraine. This may well become part of Russian intentions. However, the selected facilities will not be key from the point of view of the overall military potential of NATO. For example, Russia could launch simultaneous strikes inside the borders of the alliance against several targets involved in providing assistance to Ukraine.
- A less restrained attack. This category includes attacks on military and civilian targets with a significant number of victims, both among the civilian population and among the military, or causing significant damage. These goals may be of particular importance in terms of military operations and/or civilian life. Such Step 1 is between a limited one, which provides for a targeted attack, and an unlimited attack on a number of different targets. For example, Russia could strike several key NATO air bases and port facilities across Europe in order to reduce the capabilities or potential of NATO reinforcement, or both.
The higher the Russian attack turns out to be on this scale, the more difficult it will probably be for the United States or NATO to structure a response that will avoid escalation and a full-fledged war. A more destructive and prolonged Russian attack directed against politically and militarily sensitive targets will create prerequisites for a meaningful military response from the United States or NATO, as will be shown below. Also, given the circumstances of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the more destructive Step 1 is, the more desperate Russia will behave to Ukraine. Therefore, the US or NATO will have to find a balance between a number of competing goals, including preventing further escalation and preventing the encouragement of Russian coercive efforts.
In addition to the military factors of the Russian attack, it is important to consider the motives of Step 1. The attack may or may not be accompanied by an appropriate unambiguous statement, or it may not reflect the true goals of Russia. In the current circumstances, three potential motivations for Step 1 seem to be the most plausible:
- Forcing the termination or restriction of US and NATO support for Ukraine or punishing Russia. The efforts of the United States and NATO to provide Ukraine with military and other assistance while directly punishing Russia by economic and diplomatic means seem to have had a significant effect. Kiev is effectively using the aid received, and anti-Russian sanctions have become one of the most consistent campaigns of economic retaliation against a large economy for many years. Thus, Russia has a personal interest in forcing the United States and its allies and partners to stop or limit these efforts, which, according to Moscow, undermine its chances of winning, continuing military operations in Ukraine or ensuring internal stability. Russian strikes on targets used in providing assistance to Ukraine will be the most transparent hint that the Kremlin was guided by these considerations.
- Forcing the United States and its allies to exert pressure on Ukraine in order to resolve the ongoing conflict on favorable terms for Russia. Moscow may attack a NATO facility and use the threat of escalation to convince the United States and its allies that the risks of continuing hostilities are too great, and therefore they should force Ukraine to settle. That is, Russia will seek to use Ukraine's dependence on the West and the latter's concern about escalation to encourage the United States and its allies to put pressure on Kiev and force it to moderate its military ambitions or go for a complete cessation of hostilities. Based on these aspirations, Russia would most likely focus on large-scale sanctions or the threat of their use against NATO, for example, by targeting important economic assets or some sensitive elements of its military potential.
- A symmetrical response to specific US or NATO actions that will lead to a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Russia may also target NATO assets in response to its involvement in Ukrainian attacks. For example, if the United States transfers intelligence to Ukraine that allows it to strike a particularly important Russian target, Moscow may consider Washington involved in the attack and respond with a blow to the American platform that provided this data (for example, a US military satellite). In this case, Russia's goal would be to deter similar actions by the United States or NATO in the future. The corresponding attacks will be of a definitively identifiable nature, since they will most likely occur in response to specific assistance from the United States or its allies during a specific Ukrainian offensive.
Identifying potential U.S. targets in response to a limited Russian attack
In determining the response to Step 1 in the current context, American policymakers are likely to have five key goals in mind. In particular, in response to more intense Russian attacks, there may be significant tension between these targets, and politicians will probably have to make difficult decisions about which ones to prioritize.:
- Deter any further Russian attacks. The main purpose of Step 2 will probably be to ensure that Moscow does not attack NATO in the future — neither during nor after the crisis caused by Step 1.
- Avoid further escalation. The related goal of Step 2 is to avoid escalating the conflict into a larger or total one due to the crisis caused by Step 1. As noted above, the United States and its allies will seek to respond in such a way as to prevent Step 3 [a potential Russian response to US/NATO actions] by deterring any further attack. However, if this proves impossible, the United States will continue to be as interested as possible in limiting the severity of the consequences of any potential Step 3. To date, US policy adheres to a clear imperative to avoid a NATO war with Russia. Russia's limited attack on NATO does not cancel this goal. The consequences of escalation to a full-scale conflict with the potential use of nuclear weapons can turn into a catastrophe. Thus, US politicians are likely to use Step 2 as a guarantee that any Step 3 will not lead to further escalation in the direction of a general conflict. To achieve this goal, it is especially important to understand the motive behind the Russian Step 1.
- Undermine Russia's ability to commit new attacks. In particular, if Step 1 negatively affected the potential of the United States or NATO, Step 2 may be aimed at reducing the threat of further such attacks by taking retaliatory measures against the unit or contingent that carried out Step 1.
- Maintain confidence in US security guarantees. In the current circumstances, a limited Russian attack on a NATO facility is likely to affect not only the United States, but also one of its allies, to whom they have clearly stated security obligations in accordance with Article 5 of the NATO Charter. It is in the vital national interest of the United States that such commitments continue to be considered credible among adversaries, since they underpin American alliances around the world. Thus, the United States has a strong incentive to exclude the conviction of Russia and other adversaries that they will be able to avoid significant costs or punishment from the United States if they attack one of their allies.
- To maintain the cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO makes important decisions based on consensus. Therefore, maintaining cohesion between its member States - especially on key tasks, such as countering Russia — is extremely important. If the alliance does not respond to Russia's attack on one of its member countries to the extent deemed sufficient to prevent such incidents in the future, the readiness of the allies to continue to adhere to the principle of collective security will be threatened, and this, in turn, is fraught with destabilizing consequences. At the same time, some members of the alliance may oppose retaliatory measures that they consider too aggressive or aimed at aggravation, which makes it difficult to determine the appropriate Step 2.
Defining options for Step 2
Outlining the possible options for Step 2, we consider both forceful and non-forceful measures that politicians can resort to. We classified the power component of Step 2 in proportion to Step 1. If Step 2 provides for it, it can be formulated so that it is less, more or directly proportional to Step 1.
The non-forceful components of Step 2 may include various coercive measures and diplomatic obligations. Coercive non-forceful steps may include, for example, cyberattacks (against military facilities or civilian infrastructure), economic sanctions or the provision of additional weapons to Ukraine. Diplomatic commitments will be directed to negotiations on relevant issues. In principle, one can also consider unilateral steps to address Russia's concerns (for example, a promise to reduce the provision of assistance to Ukraine). Of course, coercive steps and diplomacy may well coexist within the same Step 2.
Next, we analyze how the differences between these two aspects of Step 2 — the proportionality of a possible forceful response and the nature of non—forceful measures - can lead to compromises in achieving various US goals. To do this, we have developed four hypothetical scenarios of Step 1, which cover various combinations of three possible motives for the attack from Russia and the three categories of its intensity described above. Next, we will demonstrate how Steps 2 that differ in these indicators can lead to different results.
Scenario AA night strike by several cruise missiles hits a military warehouse near the airport in eastern Poland, which is a key transit and storage hub for arms supplies to Ukraine.
As a result of the attack, part of the military equipment was destroyed, but there were no casualties, and the airfield itself is quickly restoring functioning. Russia publicly declares that it is acting on the basis of self-defense considerations to resist Ukrainian "aggression", which is fueled by the supply of weapons by NATO allies. Russia says it does not intend to launch further strikes against NATO if the alliance stops supplying weapons to Ukraine. From the point of view of its intensity, this attack can be qualified as demonstrative.
Key considerations:
• Russia's deliberately limited Step 1 provides a unique set of capabilities. On the one hand, Moscow is crossing a critical threshold and directly attacking a US ally under the treaty — an unprecedented step that requires a decisive response to maintain the confidence of the allies in the United States. On the other hand, the limited nature of the attack leaves open the possibility of an equally restrained or even completely non-forceful response that could simultaneously pursue other US goals.
• If NATO does not succumb to coercion to stop supporting Ukraine, the motives that Russia had for carrying out such an attack will remain in force. Therefore, if American politicians want to avoid further such strikes, it is likely that other steps will need to be taken to change Russian calculations.
• A more than proportional military response may signal the determination of the United States and NATO and limit Russia's incentives for further escalation, given the alliance's advantage in conventional weapons.
• In addition, a more intensive military response by the United States or NATO could open up a political space within the alliance for diplomatic interaction with Russia, if the United States and NATO want it.
• In itself, a proportional military response — even on the territory of Russia — is likely to be less dangerous from the point of view of conflict escalation than extremely coercive non-military measures, such as destructive cyber attacks, given the much more limited effects of a proportional military response.
• Accordingly, the US government can be more confident in its assessment of both the physical and political consequences of a retaliatory cruise missile strike, which may be less critical than a massive cyberattack or extreme economic sanctions – their consequences may be more unpredictable for both Russia and other states.
• However, if the United States chooses to respond completely by non—forceful methods - either because they want to avoid the risk of escalation of the conflict with their attacks on Russian territory, or for other reasons — these non-military retaliatory steps probably need to be very significant in scale or effect in order to maintain the cohesion of the alliance. Allies — and especially the ally whose territory has been hit — who prefer to respond with military force are likely to demand a stronger signal of resolve.
• At the same time, our actions, completely limited only by coercion, can be interpreted in Moscow as a demonstration of our lack of determination to respond militarily, which may encourage Russia to escalate the conflict.
Scenario BAn American reconnaissance satellite was destroyed by a Russian anti-satellite direct guidance system from the ground.
The destruction of the satellite has limited immediate consequences for U.S. operations because other satellites are quickly switched to compensate for the loss. However, as a result of the attack, thousands of fragments are formed in low Earth orbit, which can lead to damage to other American and non-American vehicles. Moscow says it took this step as direct retaliation for providing Ukraine with operational data for use in targeting Russian forces and that if this assistance continues, it will take additional steps to curb this practice. According to the intensity scale, this attack could be qualified as targeted, since it will still affect our military operations and cause significant material damage to the United States.
Key considerations:
• Responding by conducting a similar military attack against a Russian satellite is problematic due to the possibility of additional orbital debris, which may begin to affect the suitability of low-Earth orbit for both commercial and reconnaissance use.
• The relative asymmetry of the dependence of the United States and Russia on space creates additional problems for any symmetrical response of the United States. The US reaction with the use of military means to disable one Russian satellite may well be considered by Moscow as an acceptable price and will not deter it from future attacks on American space-based facilities. Indeed, Russia may believe that the tit-for-tat satellite exchange with the United States will work in its favor both in terms of military results and in terms of obtaining additional coercive levers. Therefore, Washington may have to focus its response on other areas to deter Russia from continuing such attacks.
• In this case, the United States could react with a military strike against Russian ground targets, despite the potential threat of escalation, in order to emphasize for Moscow the price that the United States is ready to pay in response to further attacks on their space objects. However, despite the fact that such a Russian attack will cross an extremely important threshold of escalation, it will most likely not lead to casualties or ground damage, which potentially complicates determining the scope of a proportional response to it if a similar strike on a Russian satellite is excluded. For example, forceful strikes on Russian platforms that carried out this step are likely to lead to casualties and will constitute an attack on targets in Russia. Consequently, such steps may be perceived by Moscow as an escalation. Retaliatory attacks against other, less directly related to the space strike of Russian ground targets will involve similar or more serious problems with regard to escalation risks and considerations of proportionality.
• A Russian strike on a satellite is likely to provoke widespread condemnation — perhaps even from States that have previously avoided condemning Russia's actions in Ukraine — given the risks to all countries' space activities posed by the attack and any further escalation in space. The United States may see that attempts to use this condemnation to increase economic and diplomatic pressure on the Kremlin to end the conflict in Ukraine will be more effective than in the past. Therefore, one can imagine that a non-military coercive reaction, such as much broader sanctions, could have a significant impact on Russia.
• The Russian attack hits an American target, not a target belonging to a US ally. The nature of Washington's reaction will be carefully examined to confirm the determination and authority of the United States, but, unlike other scenarios considered here, it will not directly affect the perception of the US commitment to Article 5 and allied obligations in a broader sense. Although the United States could have applied Article 5 itself in response to the attack, this decision, as well as other aspects of Step 2, could probably have been approached by Washington with a greater degree of autonomy from NATO compared to other scenarios that we are setting out.
• Since such an attack on a US space object would be carried out in retaliation for what Russia said was the actions of the US itself, concerns about alliance cohesion are also likely to be more limited here, except in cases where the response of the United States may cause concern or disagreement among allies.
Scenario BRussia is launching coordinated daytime missile strikes on three air bases in Poland and Romania, which are involved in the supply of weapons to Ukraine.
Most of these attacks reach their targets, resulting in the death of dozens of soldiers and some damage to the functioning of the bases, although work is mostly restored within 48 hours. However, some missiles fall past targets, resulting in dozens of civilian casualties in nearby areas. Russia publishes a statement calling the attack a necessary response to NATO's involvement in Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory. It calls for an end to NATO's support for Ukraine and pointedly notes that similar strikes are possible in the future if this support does not stop. This Step 1 on the intensity scale can be qualified as a targeted attack.
Key considerations:
• The scale of the attacks and the resulting losses are likely to require a military response from the United States or NATO. Non-forceful actions may also be part of the response, but most likely they will not be enough on their own to dispel concerns about the reliability of Article 5 or the cohesion of the alliance.
• A power response that is clearly insufficient in proportionality will pose similar, albeit smaller risks to the credibility of the United States on the part of allies. Although American politicians can still use this option if they believe that Russia is likely to mistakenly perceive a larger response as a possible prelude to a general war
• Non-forceful options that accompany US or NATO military responses can act as a "risk buffer", modulating the overall expected intensity of the response. For example, a smaller-scale military strike may be accompanied by more intensive coercive non-military actions if the United States wants to limit the risks of escalation, but at the same time force Russia to bear the costs to deter further Russian attacks. Alternatively, a larger-scale military strike may be accompanied by fewer coercive non-forceful measures or even diplomatic interaction on issues related to Ukraine. The United States may be interested in distinguishing between the dimensions of the conflict related to Russia and NATO and those related to Ukraine, and establishing a dialogue with Russia on the latter issue, while responding sharply to the attack on the alliance. This can help the United States achieve its goals.
• Nevertheless, Russian attacks resulting in casualties among the military and civilian populations of NATO countries are likely to limit opportunities for diplomatic initiatives. Political pressure from the affected countries may lead to stronger retaliatory measures and require consensus on options for maintaining the cohesion of the alliance.
• However, retaliatory actions by the United States or NATO should not give Moscow the impression that any forceful or non-forceful actions by the United States or NATO can become a prelude to a larger military campaign against Russia. To this end, the United States should avoid targeting command and control centers, bomber bases, or early warning radars.
Scenario DRussia is launching missile strikes at six key air and sea ports across Europe that are used by the US armed forces, including Ramstein Air Base and the port of Rotterdam.
Although the military impact of the strikes is limited, and most of the affected areas can resume operations at least in a limited mode within a few hours, there are about 200 military and civilian casualties, some of which appear to be related to errors in the guidance of Russian missiles. Moscow says the attacks were launched in response to ongoing strikes on what it calls its own territory, including regions within Ukraine's 1991 borders, using weapons and target information provided by NATO forces. Russia reserves the right to use all means of military power to protect its sovereignty. This Step 1 on our scale could be qualified as a restrained attack.
Key considerations:
• The range of likely Steps 2 in response to this Step 1 will be more limited, given the combination of alliance cohesion issues, domestic political pressure and escalation risks.
• Ideally, Step 2 would make Moscow, while considering Step 3, believe that it is being forced to choose between defeat in the war with NATO (by further escalation) and defeat in the conflict with Ukraine (by abandoning its efforts to force the termination of the support that the alliance represents to Ukraine). In other words, it is best to raise the acceptable price of Step 3 (that is, the reaction of the United States or NATO that it can cause) higher than the price of Russia losing to Ukraine. Creating such a choice for Moscow will probably require both a reliable power Step 2 and the willingness of the United States and NATO to accept a certain level of escalation risks.
• It is difficult to imagine diplomatic measures that would address Russia's concerns and would be feasible and desirable in the circumstances.
• Article 5 reliability issues will become increasingly important compared to other U.S. objectives. What is needed to maintain this trust in terms of proportionality? Are strikes on the territory of Russia required? Or do you need a similar level of some other damage? Or will both options work? American politicians will need to assess not only how Russia is likely to perceive the credibility of Step 2, but also the point of view of China and our other potential opponents in the future.
• The political reaction among the now wider range of directly affected NATO allies will also determine the options for the US and NATO response. Even individual states that have become targets of these attacks may require different types of response from the alliance. Reconciling these requirements into a single position is likely to be a serious problem.
• The presence of Russian forces outside Russia offers an alternative answer. Striking Russian troops in Ukraine — even territories that Moscow calls its own — could reduce escalation, reducing the threat of striking sensitive military targets on Russian territory and signaling a desire to continue fighting within Ukraine. Despite the fact that the Russian government is likely to officially condemn the strikes as attacks on its territory, the US statement that the strikes were deliberately targeted at forces outside the country will signal its restraint. The political consequences for Moscow will also be more limited, since the occupied areas have been under attack from Ukraine for several months. However, such an approach may also signal the unwillingness of the United States or NATO to risk a direct attack on Russian territory, which may undermine the credibility of Article 5 in the minds of some opponents or allies of the United States.
• The level of escalation that Russia will demonstrate in these attacks will significantly increase the tension between the US desire to avoid further escalation and the need to continue allied support for Ukraine. Will US and NATO politicians continue to assume the risks of further escalation by refusing to analyze Russia's stated motives for the attack? Or will they consider finding compromises? Or, continuing to support Ukraine, will they take less harsh military actions, or, on the contrary, will they combine them with stronger retaliatory actions and a reduction in support for Ukraine from the United States or NATO?
• Unlike the Cuban missile crisis, when the withdrawal of American Jupiter missiles from Turkey was kept secret for decades, any concessions to Moscow in US policy towards Ukraine are likely to be very noticeable. Thus, in addition to the concerns regarding Article 5, a change in US policy towards Ukraine as part of retaliatory measures is likely to cause broader concerns among American politicians about the loss of confidence of allies.
• The prominent role of nuclear weapons in the current Russian military doctrine underscores the importance of preventing potential Russian nuclear "tripwires" that lie in wait for even proportional retaliatory actions by the United States or NATO, which will inevitably entail attacks on militarily important targets. Therefore, attacks on the means involved in the management of troops should be subjected to the most careful consideration.
• As in Scenario B, the US or NATO response actions should not give Moscow the impression that any of their forceful or non-forceful actions are a prelude to a larger military campaign against Russia. To this end, the United States should consider avoiding targeting command and control nodes or early warning radars. But it will be even more difficult to walk this fine line in Scenario D, given the larger scale and greater military effect of this Step 1.
Conclusions
Many of the conclusions that we formulated for the reaction of the United States or NATO were calculated on the circumstances of specific scenarios of Russian attacks that we evaluated, emphasizing the conditional nature of such an analysis. Nevertheless, we have also made several conclusions that may have wider application in US military planning:
• The intensity of Step 1 determines the range of options available to U.S. policymakers. More intense Russian attacks leave the United States with fewer opportunities to achieve its goals. Demonstrative Step 1 gives much more freedom of maneuver to choose Step 2, which will help the US achieve its goals.
• If the motivation for Russia's attack is to force a change in US or NATO policy towards Ukraine, then the decision on whether to make any changes to this policy or not should be balanced by other elements of Step 2. Any Step 1 aimed at coercion is a deliberate increase in the stakes, in fact an attempt to put NATO before choosing between a war with Russia and continuing its policy towards Ukraine. The ideal Step 2 would be to avoid an open war with Russia while continuing our previous policy. But this may prove to be a difficult task, given the risks of escalation associated with it.
• If American politicians decide not to change their policy towards Ukraine, then other aspects of Step 2 should show Russia the determination of the United States so that it does not believe that it will be able to change America's policy at a higher level of escalation.
• If, on the other hand, American politicians decide to change their policy towards Ukraine in the context of a Russian attack, it will probably be necessary to balance any such concessions by placing costs on Russia so that Moscow and Beijing do not get the impression that future violent attempts to coerce the United States may be generally beneficial to them. Developing a Step 2 that balances these concerns will be a major challenge.
• Russian strikes on targets in Ukraine have demonstrated that they are not always accurate. If Russia continues to have these problems, it may be difficult to draw a conclusion about its intentions and motives based on the location of the objects that were hit. These may be erroneous hits.
• Effectively determining the proportionality of Step 2 will be a difficult task. In Russia or Ukraine, there may be no clear analogue of the targets attacked in Step 1, international law regarding armed conflicts may prohibit such attacks, or Russia and NATO may have different points of view regarding the parameters of proportionality (for example, the scale of damage, the type of target or the location of the target). Clear statements of intent to take Step 2 with appropriate proportionality may be useful, but in the end Moscow will adhere to its own understanding of proportionality when deciding on possible Steps 3.
• These assessments focus on the use of conventional weapons by the parties in their attacks and retaliatory actions. Nevertheless, the possibility of using nuclear weapons in Step 3 and beyond is likely to be crucial in responding to any escalation by Russia against NATO, especially given the role of nuclear weapons in Russian doctrine and the level of desperate determination that is likely to be felt in Moscow in order for it to be the first launched an attack on NATO. The possibility of using nuclear weapons adds weight to the US goal of avoiding further escalation. This goal may seem increasingly important after a limited Russian strike using conventional weapons.
