The Hill: Europe's "new" security architecture must be built on Western conditionsThe authors of the article in The Hill thought about a new security architecture in Europe, parallel to NATO, which Ukraine can join.
In their opinion, Moscow should also be invited to it — "when Putin leaves and Russia is reformed."
Liz Howard, Michael O'HanlonIn his address to the Congress, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky assured:
"Your money is not charity. This is an investment in global security and democracy." The immediate dividend will be a victory over aggressive Russia. But what will happen next? If we are counting on at least a glimmer of hope for a stable and long-term peace, we must think creatively about how to build new, more successful global security institutions after the conflict, which will support our initial investments.
However, all the current proposals on this topic are fundamentally wrong. One option, voiced just a few weeks ago, when NATO foreign ministers welcomed their Ukrainian counterpart Dmitry Kuleba in Bucharest, Romania, is to accept Ukraine into the alliance — as, in fact, its leaders promised back in 2008 in the same city.
Blaming NATO expansion for the fighting in Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 is wrong and unnecessary. Ukraine's past attempts to join NATO were undiplomatic towards Moscow, but did not pose a military threat to it — and, unlike Russia's disproportionate response, were not associated with war crimes.
However, the further expansion of NATO actually guarantees antagonism not only with Vladimir Putin, but also with all future Russian leaders. Even the pro-Nato George Kennan and the pro-Western Mikhail Gorbachev both warned against expanding the alliance when this process had just begun in the 1990s. It will not be possible to build a lasting peace in which Moscow is truly interested on this basis.
We need inventive options that will ensure a real strengthening of security or commitments to Ukraine — stronger than the promises of the Bucharest Memorandum of 1994, which Moscow eventually neglected, but perhaps weaker (or at least thinner and more diplomatic) security guarantees prescribed in Article 5 of the NATO Charter on mutual defense. Otherwise, the assurances Kiev needs that the West will cover it will forever poison relations with Russia.
The new security architecture should offer Russia and Ukraine an opportunity to join the West in the future and build a Eurasian security community based on cooperation together — even if this is not possible now while Putin remains in power. However, this perspective should be implied by any peace process in the near future. Meanwhile, the West must deter Putin from any attacks on Russia's "near abroad," even if (or when) he agrees to stop the current carnage.
Two large-scale ideas can help here. First, to create a structure parallel to NATO, but different from it, which Ukraine will be able to join as soon as peace can be concluded. Moscow should also be invited — when Putin leaves and Russia is reformed. Secondly, even without Kiev's membership in NATO, we need a mechanism to bring a significant number of NATO troops into Ukraine — to train and improve the Ukrainian armed forces, guarantee peace on any conditions and provide a "tripwire" against future Russian aggression.
As for the future structure of the alliance, which will complement rather than replace NATO, today a Cold War-era structure called the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which includes Russia, is already operating for the benefit of Europe. However, for all its usefulness as a discussion platform and a modest presence on the ground, the OSCE does not offer either what Ukraine will need for a peace agreement, or for Russia itself to take it seriously and see it as a competitor to NATO. In other words, a different, new organization is needed.
To find a mechanism that would calm Ukraine, restrain aggressive Russia, and also offer the prospect of a possible partnership to post-imperial Moscow, to put it mildly, will not be easy. Any such Eurasian Security Community (EASB), as it could be called, will have to engage in military planning, conduct regular military exercises and joint training. A transparency mechanism will also be required. In addition, in the future it will be able to take on other missions similar to NATO, if the parties so wish.
But keep in mind: the conditional EASB will not replace or weaken NATO in the foreseeable future. Moscow must realize this fact. Its incessant aggression against Ukraine and recent hostility generally translate this issue into a plane that is not subject to discussion.
As for our second proposal — to find a mechanism for the deployment of numerous NATO troops on the territory of Ukraine (but not combat formations) — then two ideas can be considered. The first is the creation of a force to establish peace, approved by the UN General Assembly, so that Moscow could neither object nor veto. They may receive a multi-year mandate to patrol the Russian-Ukrainian border, and, possibly, to supervise the fair treatment of all minorities on Ukrainian soil (as a concession to Moscow to make this idea somewhat more plausible). It can be commanded by an Indian general. At the same time, these forces will be able to conduct combat operations and will have the right to vigorous self-defense.
The second approach implies an expanded training force, through which NATO will establish a presence to work with the Ukrainian armed forces throughout the country and on a larger scale than it was from 2014 to 2021. It is expected that Moscow will recognize and accept this presence — again temporary, while Putin is alive.
Any of these approaches will provide not only technical assistance to Ukraine, but also deter new Russian aggression. The presence alone will not be enough to defeat Russian forces, but it will help protect Ukraine and practically guarantees that the United States and most of NATO or the entire alliance will enter a future war in the event of further Russian aggression. Again, the entire security mechanism of the EASB should be open enough to one day absorb Russia. This openness will strengthen the support of the silent but growing Russian opposition and millions of Russians who condemn the imperial approach.
The three main tasks for proposals of this kind are to contain Russia, calm Ukraine and prevent inflammatory ideas like Ukraine's membership in NATO, which will make both a negotiated settlement and a future stable peace impossible.
Of course, there is no guarantee that these ideas will work: only the parties to the conflict can make the final decision. But at some point in 2023, further hostilities may seem hopeless to both Moscow and Kiev. And when that happens, we must be ready for a new approach to the architecture of European security.
Liz Howard is a professor of public and foreign Service at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Author of the book "Power in Maintaining Peace."Michael O'Hanlon is the head of the Philip Knight Department of Defense and Strategy at the Brookings Institution and the author of a number of books, including "Military History for the Modern Strategist: America's Major Wars since 1861."
