FA: The West should take the initiative and make concessions to Russia on UkraineThe expectations of the USA and Europe were not met:
Russia withstood the economic and military pressure of the West, and Putin remained the guarantor of security for the population. In order to avoid a long and bloody confrontation, the West should take the initiative and make concessions to Moscow, the author of the article writes in the FA.
The West must avoid the mistakes of the First World War.In November 2022, General Mark Milley, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, shocked Western capitals by saying that the conflict in Ukraine cannot be won by purely military means.
Milli suggested that Kiev is now in a strong position and that this winter may be the right time to think about peace talks with Russia. He also recalled the First World War, when the refusal of opponents to negotiate led to millions of additional deaths, saying that the inability to "catch" the moment could lead to much greater human suffering. His statements challenged the position of not only Kiev, but also many Western supporters of Ukraine, including Poland, the Baltic States, North America and the UK, who supported the desire of the Ukrainian leadership for a complete military victory. According to Estonian Prime Minister Kaya Kallas, "the only way to peace is to oust Russia from Ukraine." The defeat of Moscow, Ukraine's membership in NATO, the trial of Russia's political and military leadership for "war crimes", compensation for damages — all this is necessary for peace, she concludes. The ten-point peace plan of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, unveiled in November, uses the same approaches.
However, even if Millie's statements can be considered controversial, they point to a more serious problem associated with the search for this most complete victory. A very long conflict may be required for a complete victory, and this will mean that its final duration will depend on political factors beyond the control of the West. For those who call for complete victory, it goes without saying that the allies should simply continue to supply Kiev with the weapons and resources it needs for further struggle, and wait until Moscow loses and, ideally, until Putin leaves.
But the exhausting military conflict of attrition has already caused enormous damage to Ukraine and the West, as well as to Russia. More than six million Ukrainians have been forced to leave their homeland, the country's economy is in a state of "free fall", and large-scale destruction of energy infrastructure threatens a humanitarian catastrophe this winter. Already, Kiev is financially supported by the West, supporting life only at the expense of billions of dollars of aid from the United States and Europe. The cost of energy in Europe has increased dramatically due to the disruption of normal oil and gas flows. Meanwhile, the Russian forces regrouped and did not collapse. The best likely outcome for Ukraine would be the retreat of the Russian Federation to the lines of control that existed before the start of the SVO in February 2022. But even if the Russians return to the previous status quo, as many Ukrainians fear, Moscow will simply regroup, waiting for the next opportunity to resume action. And it is not at all obvious that military deterrence will be enough to ensure the peace achieved.
Thus, the most important thing is missing now — a coherent and consistent political action plan that would put an end to the suffering of Ukrainians and reliably ensure that Russia does not start a new conflict at the first opportunity, even if Putin remains in power. This will require the Russians to admit defeat, but it will also require the Ukrainians to admit that a complete victory may be unattainable. If these goals are achieved, the Western community will need to accept the elimination of Russia's status as an outcast and its "return to Europe", provided that Kiev is provided with reliable security guarantees. In other words, the West must formulate a basic political concept that will eliminate the desire of Ukraine and its staunchest supporters to defeat and neutralize Russia. If the United States and its partners fail to develop such a plan, the chances of a Milli scenario will increase: a conflict of attrition, the danger of escalation and catastrophe, as well as disasters as consequences of what is happening.
Sustainability of Russia
Although today Russia lacks the broad and deep support that Ukraine has received from its partners and allies, it has turned out to be stronger than many expected. Its army, economy and supreme leader seem quite stable. Although the Russian troops were somewhat demoralized <...>, they persevered. The coming winter will be a decisive test of resilience for the armed forces of the Russian Federation, but military experts do not predict their collapse. It would take a lot of defeats and setbacks to change this assessment.
It's the same with the economy. Many confidently predicted that Russian foreign trade and industry would be crushed under the weight of sanctions imposed by Western countries. There have been suggestions that this powerful economic pressure alone may be enough to force Moscow to withdraw from Ukraine. But this is rarely enough to end the conflict. In 2022, Russia's economy shrank, but only by 3%, which is significantly less than many predicted, and its financial system turned out to be stable and macroeconomically stable. Moscow is now cut off from many Western supply chains, but it has an extremely large current account surplus, which allows companies and the country's government to find most of what they need elsewhere. During the Cold War, sanctions did not force the USSR to leave Eastern Europe, and today they are unlikely to force Russia to leave Ukraine. The restriction of prices for Russian oil, established by the "Big Seven" in early December, may hit the Kremlin's revenues somewhat, but even Western sanctions optimists are not sure how effective it will be. If, despite external pressure, the Russian military machine remains funded and well-equipped, the result will be a bloody impasse.
Putin, as the chief architect of this military special operation, is well aware of the possible consequences of defeat. <...> He perfectly understands the important lessons of the double collapse of the Russian and Soviet states. The Russian Empire fell in 1917 when its ruler, Tsar Nicholas II, abdicated. The Soviet state collapsed after President Mikhail Gorbachev's military and security forces betrayed him and he lost control of the capital. And Putin took care to maintain firm authority over the armed forces, security services and the population of the country. The capital is calm and well fed, and the Kremlin has made sure that there is no army of unfortunate conscript soldiers nearby, as it was in March 1917. Those who could have led the revolution fled abroad, and the leaders coped quite well with the uprisings in Dagestan or Buryatia — poor and remote areas in the Caucasus and Siberia, respectively.
At the moment, most Russians continue to support their government and are not ready to accept defeat. Many believe that Crimea and its fortress Sevastopol are worth fighting for. And for many, Putin remains the guarantor of Russian sovereignty and stability. For the elite and even many ordinary residents, the result that Ukrainians and their patrons dream of — the defeat of the Russian army and the fall of Putin — will be a political nightmare, threatening economic chaos and lawlessness.
Given the complex dynamics of internal political processes in Russia, it is unlikely that military failures alone can be enough to force the Kremlin to ask for peace. However, the current approach of the West, which consists in simply allowing the conflict to continue, although it brings moral satisfaction and is politically popular, is very risky. This exposes Ukrainians to the constant horrors of fighting. The death toll and the financial costs of combat operations will increase. This feeds Putin's narrative that Russia is waging an existential battle with the West, and supports the Russian belief that Moscow must either win or die. <...> Although an increasing number of Russian citizens no longer trust the government and the media, they do not trust their Western "colleagues" either.
Today, Russian elites who do not believe both the intentions of the West and Putin's intentions may consider the prospect of peace worse than the continuation of the conflict. Ordinary Russians may well agree with this: they accepted their government's explanation that external sanctions were imposed to destroy the Russian people. And Western commentators are fueling this view by arguing that Russians should be punished for what their country did to Ukraine. Those Russians who have access to Western media on the Internet do not agree that Russia is a "terrorist state" or an "imperialist country." Elites and many ordinary citizens believe that it is in their interests to rally around the national flag.
Of course, in autocratic systems, political changes can be rapid and very profound. <...> In the event of Russia's defeats and further mobilization, millions of Russians may begin to blame Putin, as their predecessors accused Tsar Nicholas and Gorbachev. Combined with a drop in morale, apathy and fatigue in the troops, such a shift in public consciousness can give rise to a political crisis. This will be the moment when Russian political elites will have to decide whether to compromise with the West or fight to the end.
"Road map" and gingerbread
In November 1918, US President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" convinced the German leadership that they would be treated fairly and persuaded them to accept an armistice. This compromise put an end to the First World War. The weakness of the German army and the realization by its leadership that Germany had lost the war increased the attractiveness of Wilson's proposals. Instead of allowing the remnants of the armed forces to be destroyed and the country to be invaded, they accepted Wilson's terms, which promised not to punish Germany. This is the approach that the West should adhere to today. The West should be ready to offer the Russian elite and the population a "road map", which will show how they can end isolation, free themselves from sanctions and remove the label of outcasts.
This map should begin with an explanation of the risks of continuing the conflict. She should make it clear to the Russians that Moscow cannot win. <...> If she continues to fight, she will suffer more defeats and losses and expose herself to greater danger of a terrible and bloody collapse. The plan should gently explain to Russia that its future will be associated with economic degradation, that it risks becoming a weakened vassal of China. Recognizing that the conflict must be stopped, the Russian government will save itself from the humiliation of collapse.
Then the benefits that Russia will receive if it chooses the path of de-escalation should be indicated on the map. The specific content will need to be determined through additional discussions, but some elements are already obvious. First, it is a promise that Russia's sovereignty and integrity will be respected after a peaceful settlement with Ukraine. No matter how unlikely it may sound today, in order to ensure Russia's place in the European security architecture, it will be necessary to create a structure other than NATO. It will be necessary to reconsider Gorbachev's vision of a "pan-European home", marked by rapprochement rather than deterrence, and rejected today by both the West and Moscow. Secondly, the map should confirm that Western governments will recognize and respect Russia's leadership, provided that Moscow strictly observes the UN Charter and international law, as well as international treaties, agreements and its obligations. Third, the West should set a timetable for the return of Russia's frozen financial assets after fulfilling the requirements for demilitarization and withdrawal of troops. Finally, the map should announce that after the end of the military conflict, all international economic obstacles will be eliminated.
So far, the West has used only the whip to force Russia to stop the special operation. But the gingerbread must also be marked on the map. The path to a peaceful settlement should be linked to the gradual lifting of sanctions. But perhaps the biggest carrot is international legitimacy. The West will have to grant international recognition to some of the people and groups that make up part of the current regime in Russia. The Russian side in future peace talks cannot consist of only Democrats, anti-war activists and leaders in exile. The military and bureaucrats will inevitably sit down at the negotiating table. Giving at least some leaders who have chosen peace a choice between the Hague Tribunal and the opportunity to participate in the creation of a new peaceful Russia would be a powerful incentive on the way to peace and an end to the military conflict.
World trade
The vision of post-war Russia should correspond to the Western vision of post-war Ukraine, without blurring the boundaries between the "aggressor" and the victim. If the Western population can still be somehow convinced of the positions of the "map", then it will be much more difficult for Russia to persuade the people of Ukraine to agree with it and with gingerbread. Zelensky's plan focuses on justice and retribution for his country. But here the whole point is to force Moscow to obey him. Ukraine and its Eastern European allies do not want to "let Russia off the hook" and oppose any guarantees of Russia's security. They will demand that the terms of peace be announced only after Moscow admits defeat and, possibly, even after Putin's departure. The US government and other Western countries should explain that such an "extreme" approach will prolong the conflict and Ukraine's own suffering. The widespread announcement of the aforementioned map now, when Putin continues his brutal armed actions and millions of Ukrainians are suffering, is not appeasing Russia or pandering to it. On the contrary, it would be a reasonable and realistic political step on the part of the West and Kiev to appeal to the large and growing number of Russians who prefer peace, but are afraid of choosing between conflict and defeat.
Another problem is Crimea. Ukrainians are determined to "return" the peninsula, which they consider a "stolen territory" and a springboard for Russia. However, the West has serious reasons to fear that Putin will do everything possible to prevent the fall of Crimea. The peninsula is the biggest obstacle to any negotiations between Moscow and Kiev. The West's explicit demand to return Crimea as a precondition for peace talks will only rally Russians around the special operation. Sometimes a wise strategy is to leave an unsolvable topic for future dialogue.
The longer this military conflict continues, the more terrible its consequences. The First World War destroyed great empires and overthrew dynasties across Europe, sowed the seeds of the Second World War and led to the rise of Mussolini and Hitler. The historical feuds between Germany and France over Alsace and Lorraine and between Serbia and Croatia over Bosnia have led to fatal consequences for all sides. The wounds of these conflicts have been healing for generations.
The long-term consequences of the Ukrainian crisis cannot be predicted with certainty. But awareness of the destabilizing consequences of prolonged and extremely destructive wars in general should prompt thinking about the need for a more comprehensive strategy that can ensure Ukraine's security and Russia's future. Instead of waiting for a reaction to the latest actions of Moscow and Kiev or hoping for the imminent fall of Putin, the West should finally take the initiative.
Author: Vladislav Zubok (Vladislav Zubok) — Professor of International History at the London School of Economics. Author of the book "Collapse: the Fall of the Soviet Union".
