War requires unity, victory reveals contradictionsAn analysis of the structure of the Taliban movement (banned in the Russian Federation) a year after it came to power in Afghanistan makes it clear that its leadership is facing a large number of internal challenges that threaten its integrity.
The current Taliban is characterized by two distinct elements. The first is a rigid hierarchy within the official government, known as the Islamic Emirate. The highest body in it is the Rahbari Shura (also known by the more common name Quetta Shura), headed by Haibatullah Akhundzade, who has the status of the supreme leader of the movement and directs the main departments, including the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Finance, justice and information.
Another element that defines the structure of the Taliban and is crucial for understanding its essence is the umbrella nature of the organization. Under the control of Akhundzade and Quetta Shura are ministerial posts with nominal powers. Among them is the Office of the Prime Minister, which is responsible for the activities of all other ministries. Including the Ministry of Information, which is officially responsible for the state media, but in practice is the propaganda body of the state.
In addition to the central leadership of the Taliban, there are several partially separate groups within the movement.
Some of them are split into factions that have been under the leadership of the Taliban since the formation of the new government.
With the coming to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan and beyond, rumors began to appear that the new government structure would include tribal elders who traditionally were not associated with the movement. The idea was that this inclusiveness would ensure the long-term stability of the regime of the Islamic Emirate. But the rumors did not come true and no signs of the inclusion of elders in the structure of the government were subsequently observed.
So, in addition to the main leadership of the Taliban in the person of the Quetta Shura and its loyal fighters, there are three more groups operating under the auspices of the Taliban
HIZB-E-VALAYATIThe group first appeared in Kandahar province.
Its leader is a long-time member of the Taliban movement, known as Dr. Anwar, originally from Uruzgan province. Anwar maintained close ties with the Taliban's top leadership for three decades, including the movement's founder and first supreme leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar.
When evidence of his moral misconduct was discovered, Anwar was removed from office by the Taliban civilian commission in Uruzgan and forced to flee to Pakistan. However, after the withdrawal of the international coalition troops from Afghanistan in 2021, Anwar found an opportunity to return to the country, after which he managed to rally supporters in the government of the Islamic Emirate, as well as a large number of militants. It is assumed that Anwar's center of influence is currently located in Kandahar.
KHAN 'S FACTIONThe faction is headed by General Tadin Khan, the former police chief of Kandahar Province.
Khan has been one of the most influential figures in Afghanistan for many years and maintained his authority throughout the period when the Taliban fought against the forces of the international coalition present in the country. The broad popular support was due to his competent actions in the field of management, as well as the family ties of his Achakzai tribe.
At a time when Afghanistan was under the rule of the government of Hamid Karzai and his successors, Khan organized the training of a large group of militants in Balochistan. Various sources indicate that Khan gathered his current forces from this group. It is reported that he continues to maintain close ties with the anti–Taliban resistance, including groups that are formally associated with the Northern Alliance.
So, both of these groups within the Taliban movement have their own leadership, but their followers are loyal to the Taliban and their central leadership. Each of them has commercial projects that provide their leaders with private income. At the same time, their leadership has official authority in one or more departments of the Islamic Emirate – either at the provincial level or at the level of ministries.
"HAQQANI NETWORK"
The same applies to the third group.
Currently, the Haqqani Network (banned in the Russian Federation) is headed by Sirajuddin Haqqani, the son of its founder Jalaluddin. While serving as the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Taliban government, Sirajuddin is also a member of the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda (banned in the Russian Federation) and has publicly called for suicide attacks in the past.
Foreign analysts believe that the Haqqani Network is supervised by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Service (ISI) of Pakistan, which provides it with extensive financial and logistical support from outside, which allows it to maintain an autonomous status within the Taliban movement.
Since Sirajuddin currently holds the post of Interior Minister, the Haqqani Network also has power at the official level, dominating the internal security sector, which, for example, allowed it for some time to protect the emir of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul.
In addition to the aforementioned groups, there are at least two factions that broke away from the main body of the Taliban movement after the formation of the Government of the Islamic Emirate.
ZAKIR 'S FACTIONMullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir was one of the most respected military leaders of the Taliban.
He maintained close ties with the founder of the movement, Mullah Omar, and then with his son, Mullah Mohammed Yaqub Omar.
Under the first Islamic Emirate, Zakir held the positions of Deputy Commander of the army, Commander of the Northern Front and Minister of Defense. Already in this status, Zakir earned a reputation as a hard-line supporter in the leadership of the movement.
After the start of the operation of the international coalition forces in Afghanistan, Zakir, who surrendered to American troops, was interned in Guantanamo, from where he was subsequently transferred to the Afghan prison of Puli Charki, and then released.
By 2014, Zakir's radical position, including his unwillingness to negotiate with Western powers, as well as his alleged ties with Iran, forced him to vacate the post of minister. Although he continued to play an active role in solving military issues.
After the Taliban returned to power in 2021, Zakir quickly became disillusioned with the leadership of the Islamic Emirate and its position on issues such as its willingness to cooperate with foreign powers and negotiate with the United States. In September of the same year, Zakir openly defected to the terrorist organization "IG-Khorasan" (banned in the Russian Federation), but his close confidant Amir Khan Muttaki, currently serving as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Emirate, convinced him to return to the ranks of the Taliban.
However, in November 2021, Zakir left the Taliban again, allegedly after witnessing unscrupulous behavior on the part of the leadership of the Quetta Shura, which he perceived as compromising the principles of the movement. Having secured the full loyalty of former militants, Zakir formed his own group, which is currently stationed in Helmand province.
The exact nature of Zakir's faction is disputed. According to some sources, Zakir has once again sworn allegiance to IG-Khorasan and coordinates actions with its leadership. But other reports indicate that Zakir's faction is completely independent and does not remain loyal to either the Taliban or any other terrorist groups.
In any case, Zakir still has a huge influence on his troops and the ability to deploy fighters independently to achieve his main goal - to weaken and undermine the current leadership of the Taliban. Zakir continues to organize anti-Taliban demonstrations in Helmand and attract more and more militants to his faction.
DADULLA 'S FACTIONIt is headed by Mahmoud Dadullah, the eldest son of Mullah Mansur Dadullah, a former major Taliban commander in southern Afghanistan.
Mahmoud Dadullah's discontent with the Taliban leadership intensified after the death of his uncle, the infamous Mullah Dadullah Akhund, the head of the southern Taliban forces, who was a rival of Mullah Omar, as well as one of the most famous hardliners in the ranks of the Taliban.
Dadullah Akhund was killed during an operation by international coalition forces in 2007, which led to an escalation of pre-existing tensions between his supporters and the Quetta Shura. As a result, a compromise was reached that allowed his younger brother Mansur Dadullah to succeed him as commander in Southern Afghanistan.
In the end, Mansour was killed during clashes with militants loyal to the Quetta Shura in 2015. Until today, the top leadership of the Taliban claimed that at the time of his death, Mansour was cooperating with the Islamic State (IS, banned in the Russian Federation). Reports have recently surfaced that Mahmoud has formed his own anti-Taliban group, consisting of supporters of his father and uncle and based in the southern provinces of Afghanistan. The reports also indicate that Dadullah's faction is cooperating with IG-Khorasan.
and othersThere are reports of other factions emerging within the overall structure of the Taliban.
Like the groups mentioned above, they seek to isolate themselves and preserve their personal interests. These include the Niazi Faction under the leadership of Mullah Abdul Manan Niazi (a major official involved in the transfer of power after the death of Mullah Omar), and the Group of Mullah Nasrullah. But at the moment it is difficult to confirm the information and clarify details about the structure and activities of these new factions.
The emergence of numerous groups inside and outside the Taliban movement indicates the fundamental fragility of the Islamic Emirate. Factions that are still officially part of the Government, although they operate independently of the Taliban leadership, create bureaucratic and logistical barriers for the Quetta Shura, hindering the implementation of its strategy in various areas, from economic policy to internal security.
Splinter groups from the Taliban, which have completely separated from the Government, pose a serious threat to the sovereignty of the Islamic Emirate and its ability to exercise full control over certain regions, especially in the southern regions of Helmand and Kandahar. In addition, if these breakaway groups persist, the central leadership of the Taliban will have to throw significant resources to fight them. Which will further increase the burden on the Islamic Emirate, which is already experiencing difficulties.
Finally, the constant proliferation of factions by division within the Taliban movement calls into question the ability of the central leadership to make commitments to foreign organizations. Even when the Quetta Shura undertakes obligations in good faith, it is unclear whether it will be able to fulfill them – especially with regard to internal security and the protection of infrastructure projects in Afghanistan sponsored by external states.
Larisa ShashokLarisa Aleksandrovna Shashok is a teacher at MGIMO (U) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
