Foreign Affairs: Russia will conduct a new offensive taking into account mistakes Russia can launch a successful offensive in the winter, and General Surovikin knows how to do it with fewer losses, Foreign Affairs magazine reports.
In these circumstances, the author advises Zelensky not to rush with adventurous plans for the Crimea, but to wait for help from the West.
Christmas will be a dark milestone in the life of the Ukrainian people. On this day, it will be almost ten months since Russian troops entered the country of Ukrainians, bringing destruction on a scale that has not been seen here since the Second World War. Tens of thousands of Ukrainians were killed. Millions have left their homes. Most of the state has lost electricity, which makes Kiev worry that with the onset of winter, many citizens of the country may freeze.
But Christmas will also be a dark day for Russia. Moscow was counting on a short victorious campaign. Instead, Ukraine has taught her a bitter lesson of modern warfare and national resilience. Ukrainians are damaging Russia's military potential by acting on the battlefield and striking with long-range weapons of destruction obtained thanks to allied support. They have undermined Russia's reputation both around the world and in the minds of its own soldiers, commanders and citizens. Ukrainians avoid fighting with a large number of losses as much as possible, but engage in close combat when they have the opportunity to strike from cover. All this has borne fruit. Ukraine pushed Russia away from Kiev, regained the territory of part of the Kharkiv region and liberated part of Donbass from the Russians. Most recently, it liberated Kherson, the only new regional center that Russia has managed to seize since Putin's February decision.
It's too early to consider Russia a loser
However, it is too early to consider Russia a loser. Russian President Vladimir Putin has appointed a new military commander, General Sergei Surovikin, to lead troops in Ukraine, and Surovikin looks tougher and more effective than his predecessors. One of his first actions was an active series of aerial bombardments that destroyed most of Ukraine's energy infrastructure — a tactic aimed at reducing the fighting mood of the civilian population. This is the same tactic that Surovikin honed while leading Russian troops in Syria. Surovikin assumed responsibility for Russia's retreat from Kherson, but unlike the retreat from near Kiev or from the vicinity of Kharkov, this retreat was well organized and well conducted - Surovikin took care of it.
The arrival of Surovikin foreshadows another adaptation of the Russian strategy in Ukraine to new conditions. Although Putin may understand that he will not be able to take Kiev, the Russian president seems to still believe that he can, having conquered, hold all four regions that he recently (and illegally) declared Russian — Donetsk, Kherson, Lugansk and Zaporozhye. Surovikin is the key executor of these plans. Putin hopes that as the fighting drags on and winter sets in, Europe will stop providing serious assistance to Ukraine. Perhaps Putin hopes that Europe will try to restore Russian gas imports. He believes that such a potential reduction in Western support will pave the way for a new, this time completely successful offensive by Russia. To carry out such an offensive, he expects that Surovikin will reorganize the armed forces so that they act more smoothly, consistently and effectively.
It will be difficult for Surovikin to succeed, given the numerous problems of the Russian armed forces. But Surovikin is working on uniting the army under his command. He almost certainly develops combat plans that are clearly focused, unlike past offensives. If Kiev wants to maintain its advantage, it needs to anticipate Surovikin's strategy while maintaining Western support, which means continuing innovation on the battlefield.
To resist, not to retreat
For those who have followed the course of the war, much of what awaits Russia in 2023 will seem familiar. For example, Moscow will continue to use propaganda about NATO aggression to deter China, India and other neutral states from joining Western sanctions. It will also use disinformation and deception to ensure that the Russian population continues to support its army. Keeping Russians in line will be especially important if Moscow has to carry out additional mobilizations. Even dictators are forced to pay attention to domestic politics.
Similarly, Putin will support his energy war. He will continue to deprive Europe of gas in the hope that the continent will force Kiev to agree to a cease-fire while reducing the temperature of the confrontation. The Russian Aerospace Forces will receive orders for new attacks on the energy supply of the Ukrainian armed forces. According to Putin's calculations, Russian strikes on Ukrainian power plants will not only freeze the country's population, but will also cost Ukraine foreign aid; after all, foreign investors are unlikely to return to the country with unreliable energy supply. Even if the strikes do not scare off investors, they will still be economically costly for Kiev, since they will stop the export of Ukrainian electricity, which began in July 2022.
The role of Surovikin
However, other elements of the Russian strategy will be new, and Surovikin plays a crucial role in these changes. The general has become the first military leader Putin explicitly supports, and — according to a recent speech by US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines — the Russian president is now better informed about the day-to-day operations of the armed forces. If Putin is sure that he is being informed better than before October, he will most likely turn his attention to many other problems that Russia is currently facing. In this case, Putin will grant Surovikin greater autonomy in using a wide range of Russian forces on the territory of Ukraine. Surovikin can use this relative freedom of action to bring disparate Russian military and mercenary groups under more unified control. He will certainly use it to better integrate Russia's air and ground operations and to ensure better coherence between his country's combat operations and information operations.
Consolidation by itself does not mean greater combat readiness of Russian troops. Surovikin commands an army that continues to lose people and the best equipment.
So far, there is reason to believe that the troops mobilized by Russia to replace the dead and wounded are not receiving the necessary training that they need to succeed. At least during the winter, Surovikin will be on the defensive, doing everything possible to preserve his strength under the onslaught of the Ukrainians.
The Russian offensive — later and with fewer losses
But he will prepare Russian troops for new operations. For example, Surovikin will work on the restoration of battered units, transferring tens of thousands of newly mobilized servicemen to Ukraine. If (and this will almost certainly happen) these troops will turn out to be of poor quality, he can improve their training in Russia. He will try to take advantage of the ongoing industrial mobilization in Russia to acquire more advanced weapons. He will also create security systems for key supply routes, build a more stable logistics network, and create stocks of ammunition and materials for future offensive operations.
Surovikin is likely to take a more thorough approach to planning and executing attacks. He will strive to ensure the coherence of the actions of Russian troops on the battlefield and improve the tactics of his country in order to avoid a repetition of the often disparate and uncoordinated actions of his predecessors. And the general will continue to work to make it difficult for Ukraine to advance. For example, Surovikin will continue the campaign against the Ukrainian infrastructure — this is a tactic that diverts the resources of both Ukraine and the West from offensive operations. (These strikes also serve as propaganda for the Russian domestic audience, no matter how vile it may seem). Such strikes have few disadvantages for Russia; they are an asymmetric advantage. As historian Lawrence Friedman recently noted, Ukraine does not have the ability to similarly destroy the infrastructure inside Russia — despite Ukrainian strikes on Russian air bases. "Ukrainians are winning on the battlefield," he wrote, "but they cannot strike back at the Russians on a strategic level."
Surovikin will probably seek to conduct more "force-saving" missions: military operations in which one side tries to deceive the enemy in such a way as to force him to spend a large number of soldiers on unproductive tasks.
For example, Russia has deployed small contingents of soldiers in Belarus to force Ukraine to keep larger contingents around Kiev, depriving the Ukrainian military of the opportunity to advance elsewhere. Surovikin will probably hold more similar events to give his military a better chance of success while he plans his next steps. If Russia is not completely defeated, Surovikin will want to launch offensive ground operations, which, if completed, will give Russia all or most of the provinces painted by Putin as "Russian".
The General, of course, knows that Ukraine may try to regain the lost territories again. Therefore, he has already ordered the military to build more defensive positions throughout the territory controlled by Russia. Surovikin is also likely to carry out political measures to "Russify" the parts of Ukraine occupied by Russia. This process will resemble what Russia did in Kherson: the transfer of the local economy from the Ukrainian hryvnia to the ruble, changing the school curriculum. They also report on the disgusting practice of stealing Ukrainian children and sending them to Russia for adoption. It is not yet clear whether these measures will be more effective than in Kherson.
Moves and counter-moves
At the moment, the Ukrainian military still has the advantage. Unlike the beginning of the Russian "military operation", it is the Ukrainian leaders who now decide where and when the battles will take place. They determine how campaigns will be conducted on the battlefield. They have momentum and they don't want to miss it. But this does not mean that Ukraine will own the initiative indefinitely. To stay on top, Ukrainians need to understand and then undermine the plans of Putin and Surovikin.
Firstly, it means that Kiev must continue to counteract Russia's information war. Moscow is trying to convince Europeans that the increase in their heating bills is caused by the support of Ukraine from their countries, hoping to convince these states that the costs are not worth it. He is also trying to undermine Washington's support by fomenting bipartisan divisions in the United States. If the Kremlin manages to dissuade NATO countries from supporting Kiev, it could be devastating: for Ukraine, military and economic support from the United States and Europe was necessary for success on the battlefield.
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky and his talented team are working on messages aimed at preserving the sympathies of the international community. But they also need the fights between Russians and Ukrainians to remain on the front pages of Western newspapers and in the spotlight of the West. And the best way to achieve this is to do what Ukraine has been doing for the last six months: declare its victories. The more victories Kiev can point to, the more funding and weapons it is likely to receive from the West (instead of calls for negotiations).
Kiev can defeat even the revived Russian army
But in order to continue to achieve success, Ukraine's military strategy must evolve. She will have to anticipate Surovikin's actions on the battlefield and resist them. To do this, the country is likely to strengthen surveillance of the front line, logistics hubs and command posts of Russia, which will help identify weaknesses that can be exploited.
Ukraine should also expand its program of sending soldiers and junior military commanders to Europe for more intensive training, which will make its already excellent troops even better than the mobilized Russian ones. Ukraine also needs to continue to look for ways to weaken Russian capabilities that will help carry out the invasion, including Russian logistics, transport and command centers. Ukraine recently attacked two Russian air bases more than 400 miles away from Ukraine — strikes it will probably want to repeat. Such deep attacks have a psychological impact on Russians, affect Putin's domestic political situation and put Russia in a strategic dilemma: how to measure your military efforts in Ukraine with the protection of your own bases.
Return Crimea?
By taking these steps, Ukrainian leaders and strategists can prevent the emergence of a more energetic, integrated and inventive Russian army. And if Ukraine can continue to win on the battlefield, Kiev may try to isolate and possibly even capture the entire Donbass and Crimea. The reconquest of both territories is the stated goal of the Ukrainian government. But a successful advance into these territories will prove to be a very difficult task. The seizure of Crimea will be especially difficult, which will require Ukraine to conduct new types of naval operations in order to keep Russia's powerful Black Sea Fleet from hitting Ukrainian troops when they enter the peninsula. Ukrainians will have to simultaneously coordinate the operations of the Marine Corps, airborne, ground and other operations. This task, although not unsolvable, is difficult. And some Western governments may consider the campaign for Crimea to go beyond what they promised to support — despite the fact that the peninsula legally remains part of Ukraine, and Zelensky constantly signals his intention to return it back.
But Ukraine has a long way to go before it reaches the point where it can invade Crimea. Now it is facing more pressing crises and problems. For example, the country needs to find ways to quickly restore and strengthen its electricity and heating network in the face of ongoing air strikes, including by receiving additional Western assistance. (The US State Department's promise to spend more than $53 million on energy equipment will contribute to this.) Kiev will also have to carefully consider the sequence and priority of ground, air and information operations for 2023, just as it has organized its counter-offensives over the past few months to force Russia to simultaneously conduct military operations in the north, east and south.
Fortunately, there are many reasons to hope that Kiev will be able to defeat even the revived Russian army. Ukraine's international influence campaigns have become an example for other democratic countries. Ukrainians have proven that they are superior to Russians in adapting and updating their tactics and military institutions. There is hope that their morale is much higher. However, in any war there is nothing certain, regardless of previous victories. But if Ukraine can maintain the support of the West, it will certainly be able to prove that Putin's new theory of victory is just as wrong as the previous one.
Mick Ryan
