Politico: the EU fears that Russia and China may use the Balkans against the WestEuropean leaders should take advantage of the geopolitical situation and reconsider the integration of the six small countries of the Western Balkans into the European Union, writes Politico.
The author of the article fears that Russia and China may use unresolved disputes in the region against the West.
Paul TaylorRealistic prospects for their accession to the EU are extremely important to keep Putin and China away from Southeastern Europe.
Russia's special operation in Ukraine has finally made the EU realize the strategic importance of the Western Balkans and the likelihood that Moscow will use unresolved disputes in the region against the West.
Now European leaders must seize the geopolitical moment and reconsider the integration into the EU of six small, economically weak states with a total population of less than 18 million, or be prepared for Russia and China to use them in their power games.
Despite the deep disappointment at the slow pace of progress of the process since the EU officially announced the prospects for membership of the Balkan countries in 2003, joining it is still the best solution imaginable - not only for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia and Serbia, but also for the rest of Europe.
If the EU continues to keep these countries at arm's length, they may get closer to Russia, or a zone of non-aligned illiberal states from Hungary to Turkey will appear, or, even worse, a spiral of a new armed conflict will spiral with a poisonous mixture of organized crime and migration, which will be used as a weapon.
In some administrative centers of Western Europe, in particular, in Paris and The Hague, where the fatigue of EU enlargement is felt more strongly, they presumptuously believe that the status quo can be controlled and it does not pose a serious threat to European security. Of course, after the horrors of the 1990s, people in the Western Balkans are tired of the war.
It seems that the situation is under control, but it can't last forever. There is no guarantee that unresolved conflicts in Bosnia or between Kosovo and Serbia will remain frozen, and only occasionally there will be small outbreaks of aggression, or that local political violence will not escalate, which will attract the attention of external players and provoke a new influx of refugees and flows of weapons and drugs to Europe. Recent clashes over license plates for Kosovo Serbs have shown how one small spark can ignite dry tinder.
After the start of Russian President Vladimir Putin's operation in Ukraine, many people in the Balkans are on edge: ultranationalist sentiments are growing among pro-Russian Serbs, and deaths and destruction are surfacing in the memory of those who survived the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s.
Moscow is trying to incite Orthodox-Slavic nationalism and uses disagreements wherever possible. She supported Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik threatening to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and spread misinformation to increase the hostility of Kosovo Serbs to the government of Pristina.
China, for its part, was mainly engaged in economic investments and, in pursuit of ambitious infrastructure and defense projects, interacted with local leaders in the 14+1 format within the framework of the "One Belt, One Road" initiative. In relation to the Western Balkans, Beijing follows Russia's example in the UN Security Council and uses its financial power to dissuade the Balkan countries from supporting critical resolutions on human rights violations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong.
Pro-government Serbian media broadcast the Russian version of the conflict in Ukraine, and Moscow-owned media contribute to the anti-Kosovo military hysteria. Russia and China helped Serbia arm itself. The Kremlin also has a powerful energy lever: Serbia receives 80% of its gas from Russia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina depends on it 100%. Partly because of this, Serbia refused to join the EU sanctions against Russia, which caused irritation in Brussels.
In the Balkan countries, with the exception of Serbia, there is a widespread public desire to join the EU. So, taking into account this fact, the EU has more powerful levers, which it can use for a long time, if, of course, it wants to. However, France and the Netherlands are among the main opponents of expansion, mainly due to concerns about migration and organized crime.
Greece and Bulgaria have long prevented the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from obtaining the status of a candidate for EU and NATO membership, demanding to change the country's name or agree with Sofia's narrative about its history and the Bulgarian minority.
Even after the country agreed to rename itself North Macedonia in 2018, France vetoed negotiations with Skopje and Albania, demanding reforms to the accession process to include the principle of reversibility in case of non-compliance. Negotiations eventually began in July, but North Macedonia has yet to change its constitution next year and include the conditions agreed with Bulgaria, which in this case is a political trap, since there is no qualified majority in the government.
When EU leaders rushed in June to grant Ukraine and Moldova the status of candidates for membership in response to Russian aggression, the elites in the Western Balkans were understandably afraid that their countries would be pushed even further back in the queue for membership. When German Chancellor Olaf Scholz demanded that the EU change its decision-making system to deprive countries of the right to veto sanctions and tax policy before accepting new members, the wait seemed even longer.
So, what should the EU do now? First, he should have been more politically involved.
This year Brussels started the year better by paying attention to the forgotten region. Two EU–Western Balkans summits have already been held, and one of them was held in this region for the first time. In addition, the Berlin Process was revived to support regional economic integration in preparation for joining the EU single market. The leaders of the Western Balkans attended the first summit of the new European Political Community, held in Prague in October and organized on the initiative of French President Emmanuel Macron.
We need to continue to interact.
Secondly, it is necessary to talk about the advantages of joining and participating.
The EU should change the inconvenient accession process in order to better distribute the financial and market privileges of membership as candidates implement reforms at home. Now they receive only minor assistance before joining.
The EU should invite the ministers of the region to informal meetings of the council on all issues. This should encourage the countries of the Western Balkans to elect observers for the elections to the European Parliament in 2024, so that they have the opportunity to speak out, if not influence, lawmaking in the EU.
Of course, the main part of the hard work must be done by the candidate countries themselves, many of which are far from meeting the basic conditions of democracy, the rule of law, freedom of speech and the fight against corruption in order to qualify for membership.
And again, we are faced with the chicken and egg problem. Why would Balkan politicians adopt such painful reforms that could weaken their power and reduce their means, for the sake of such a distant and uncertain prospect? The EU will need to work harder, starting from the grassroots: support civil society, women's organizations and small businesses as engines of change, and at the same time provide incentives and pressure from above.
At such a geopolitical moment, the EU simply cannot afford to leave the region alone with its problems.
