FA: Ukraine's attempts to seize Crimea will jeopardize its alliance with the WestUkraine should not try to "return" Crimea, writes Foreign Affairs.
For the Kremlin, this is a special region, and Putin will not give it up. By unleashing an open struggle for the peninsula, Kiev will rally the Russians and bleed itself dry. The West will also not approve of such a move, as it threatens to escalate the conflict.
Ukraine's occupation of the city of Kherson in early November was not just a "military achievement" for it. So she disavowed the words of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Just two months earlier, he publicly declared Kherson and other regions part of Russia, indirectly putting them under his nuclear protection. Putin hoped that the fear of a nuclear attack would force Kiev to act cautiously and force his supporters to retreat. But the plan didn't work.
Kherson is unlikely to be the end of the "counteroffensive" of Ukraine. The biggest prize is located to the south: the Crimean Peninsula, where the crisis actually began in 2014. One of the Deputy Defense Ministers of Ukraine said that the Ukrainian Armed Forces could enter "Crimea by the end of December." Of course, such remarks may be just a military ruse designed to intimidate Russia. But they can also be serious. With the occupation of Kherson, Crimea, of course, came to the attention of Kiev. Moscow has now defended itself well and dug in around the peninsula, but if this conflict has demonstrated anything so far, it is that Russia can withdraw from the territories, and leave quickly. The battle for Crimea is quite possible.
International partners have pledged to protect the territorial integrity of Ukraine. They are interested in containing Moscow's military might and preventing a new attack on an ally. If Crimea remains in the hands of Russia, it will threaten the security of Ukraine. The special operation in 2022 was organized partly from the Crimea. The Crimean Peninsula is a dagger aimed not only towards the Black Sea, but also towards Kiev. After all, it did not become the limit of Russian imperial ambitions, as many Western leaders hoped in 2014. Rather, he became a springboard for them.
Crimea is not Kherson. It occupies a different place in this conflict, and many Western allies are seriously concerned about the escalation around the peninsula. Putin could have lost in Kherson or somewhere else in Ukraine and come to terms with his "losses". He could even lose Donbass <...> and pass it off as a political victory. But Putin certainly considers the loss of Crimea incompatible with the preservation of the post of president. He would do anything to keep him.
This can be a daunting task. Ukraine has already demonstrated the vulnerability of Crimea with attacks on the Russian Black Sea Fleet and strikes on the bridge across the Kerch Strait connecting the peninsula with the mainland. It should continue to exert military pressure on Crimea and advance in the southern part of the Kherson region. Ideally, Kiev should regain control of the freshwater channel that supplies the peninsula with most of the water. Ukraine should make Russia fear an invasion of Crimea at any moment.
However, today it would be more reasonable to restrain and isolate Russian troops in Crimea, without trying to retake the peninsula itself. Such a strategy will provide Kiev with a strong position in future negotiations with Moscow and, perhaps, convince the Kremlin to enter into them seriously. It would also help preserve the unity of Ukraine's Western partners, who are concerned about the risks of further escalation of the conflict. In the shorter term, Ukraine may try to destroy the "land bridge" to Crimea, separating Russian forces in the south from its forces in the east and securing access to the Sea of Azov. An expensive and dangerous campaign to "recapture" the peninsula now could jeopardize the counteroffensive attempts that Ukraine has been undertaking since September.
The dilemma of conquest
Crimea is one of the centers of world history. During the reign of the Russian Empress Catherine the Great in the XVIII century, her army conquered the peninsula from the Ottoman Empire, after which it was incorporated into the Russian Empire. In the 19th century, the Ottomans united with Great Britain and France to fight Russia in the Crimean War. In the 20th century, it became Soviet after the Bolshevik Revolution and witnessed heavy fighting in World War II. Negotiations between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin Roosevelt took place in the Crimean city of Yalta in 1945. In 1954, Crimea ceased to be part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic when the Kremlin transferred it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.
In 2014, Moscow <...> annexed Crimea. His return has become the cornerstone of Putin's political legacy, a marker of Russia's intransigence towards the West and Putin's proof that the post-Soviet era of Moscow's humiliation is over. The annexation of Crimea has become very popular in Russia. Outside the country, the status of Crimea is unambiguous: it is internationally recognized as the territory of Ukraine. Ukraine's sovereignty will be incomplete until Russia renounces Crimea. The problems existing around the peninsula will reduce Ukraine's chances of joining Western institutions such as NATO and the European Union. Both organizations are hesitant to accept new members with unresolved territorial disputes, and this is one of the reasons why Putin wants to permanently assign Crimea to Russia. But none of this can prevent the battle for the peninsula. A battle in which Russia's victory is not necessarily guaranteed. If it takes place, then there will be three threats.
The most dangerous is the prospect of nuclear escalation. After the start of the SVO in February 2022, Putin had to change his military goals <...>. The so-called special operation to consolidate territory in the Donbass was actually a maximalist battle against Ukraine. Since then, Putin has ordered a partial mobilization, declared war on the West and annexed four regions that were previously part of Ukraine. Putin's actions were followed by hidden nuclear threats. Kiev exposed them as "empty", occupying large areas of recently lost territory, to which Moscow did not respond with a nuclear escalation.
However, what was a hoax in Kherson may not be a bluff in Crimea at all. Crimea holds a special place in Russian history and culture both for Putin and for many Russians. He occupies a prominent position in the history of the Second World War, which Putin's Russia so ardently perceives. For generations of citizens, the resort peninsula was a festive idyll, similar to Florida and California in the United States. This region also plays a big role in Russian literature, in particular, in Tolstoy's "Sevastopol Stories" (1855), Vasily Aksenov's "The Island of Crimea" (1981) and other works. Politically, Crimea was the closest region of Ukraine to Russia until 2014, and many of its 2.4 million inhabitants hold pro-Russian views. <...>
The annexation of Crimea is Putin's landmark achievement, designed to demonstrate Russia's post—Soviet restoration of power, the scale of its military might and the brilliance of Putin's strategic acumen. He proudly declared to the Russian people that he had outplayed the West in Crimea. Having built such a narrative, Putin would become his victim if Ukraine "regained" the peninsula. He would be the one who was outsmarted himself in the end.
Crimea is more than just a symbol of Putin's Russia. It is of great strategic importance for any country that possesses it. He allowed Moscow to implement a naval blockade of Ukraine, becoming the main point of economic pressure on Kiev in the military conflict. The Russian Black Sea Fleet has been based in Crimea for more than two centuries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moscow and Kiev concluded an agreement under which Russia leased the port of Sevastopol from Ukraine and which lasted until 2014. Strengthening Russian control over Sevastopol — for the sake of the fleet — was a key reason for Russia's annexation of the peninsula. Unlike Kherson, Crimea can be a real "red line" for Putin.
Secondly, even if about 30 thousand square kilometers of Crimea could be conquered by Ukraine, it would not be easy for Kiev to keep this region under control. The peninsula has been under the administration of the Russian Federation since 2014. It is difficult to judge what effect this management had. But, living under Russian law, many people of Crimea are and consider themselves citizens of Russia. Maybe Ukrainian soldiers are treated as liberators somewhere in Ukraine, but they certainly will not be universally welcomed by the population of Crimea, which is larger than the population of Latvia or even more so Estonia. Kiev would have to decide whether to put Crimean collaborators and political leaders on trial or declare an amnesty. Either option would cause political differences. The difficulties of restoring Ukrainian power in Crimea during the military conflict may negatively affect the global image of Kiev at a time when the Ukrainian government so needs a positive reputation to enlist the military and economic support of the West.
The third threat is a potential split of the alliance supporting Ukraine. Throughout the conflict, Kiev and its Western partners have achieved a significant degree of cohesion, although, of course, there are serious differences. Ukraine is fighting for its survival and wants more active participation of the West in the military confrontation with Russia. But its allies are concerned about the danger of escalating tensions with Moscow, which has nuclear weapons, and preferred not to use their own troops on the territory of Ukraine.
Crimea will be a serious test for the coalition. Most of the Central and Eastern European allies will always support Ukraine. They tend to consider Putin's nuclear threats fundamentally frivolous. Other countries supporting Kiev have different calculations and are much more concerned about the risks of escalation. These include France, Germany and the USA. Brazil, China, India and other countries of the global South are striving to put an end to the conflict and its many global consequences as soon as possible. They treat Crimea indifferently, not wanting to recognize it as part of Russia, but striving to ensure that this whole problem disappears altogether.
The Grand Alliance
Until now, the coalition supporting Ukraine has wisely avoided declaring specific goals of the military conflict, giving Kiev maximum room for maneuver. In October, the Group of Seven published a communique calling for a "just peace" and Russia's withdrawal from the territory of Ukraine. It remains unclear whether this just peace will be achieved by ousting Russian forces from Ukraine (including Crimea) by military means or through negotiations and a settlement that will require compromises with Putin.
Theoretically, a quick seizure of Crimea could secure Ukraine from Russia's future use of the peninsula as a springboard, putting an end to the conflict on Kiev's terms. In practice, this can lead to a nuclear escalation and will be very costly for Ukraine while the conflict is going on in other parts of the country, as the country's ammunition reserves are decreasing, and Russia is launching brutal attacks on its entire power generation and power supply system.
Ukraine should keep Crimea in suspense <...> It should move further south in the Kherson region, demonstrating that the peninsula and its water supply are within reach of the APU. The threat of invasion should not be removed from the agenda. This will give Kiev real strength against Moscow and leverage in potential negotiations. Given Putin's obsession with Crimea, this may be the biggest force Ukraine has in general. By threatening to seize the peninsula and at the same time putting military pressure on Russia in Ukraine itself, Kiev can, if not prevent Putin from using nuclear weapons in the conflict, then seriously reduce the risk of this.
Meanwhile, strengthening Ukraine's missile and air defense and facilitating its advance to the northeast and southeast are important short- and medium-term tasks of the West. Kiev should strive to destroy the "land bridge" to Crimea, which Moscow has long coveted and for which it has been fighting hard. If the APU succeeds here, they will be able to drive a wedge between Russian forces in the south and east, advancing to Melitopol and further to the Sea of Azov. The destruction of Russian control over these territories in the east and south would increase the general instability of the positions of the Russian army in Ukraine and the unpopularity of the conflict in Russia.
Ukraine and its supporters should approach the issue of Crimea with confidence.
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Over time, the weaknesses of Russia and the assets of the West and Ukraine that have manifested themselves during the SVO will make themselves felt. When this happens, new opportunities may open up to resolve the issue of Crimea.
Authors: Liana Fix — Member of the Council of Europe on International Relations and author of the book "A New German Power? The role of Germany in Russia's European Policy". Michael Kimmage is a professor of history at the Catholic University of America and a senior fellow at CSIS. From 2014 to 2016, he worked in the Department of Political Planning of the US Department of State, where he dealt with issues of Russia and Ukraine.
