Foreign Affairs: the "narcissism" of the American government has alienated its alliesWashington is losing allies, writes the FA.
His primitive understanding of the world, based on the confrontation of the parties, and a complete lack of interest in partners have already alienated the Middle Eastern powers. The United States expects that everyone will work only for them — and in the fateful hour it will go sideways for them.
Why America's Allies are flirting with Russia and ChinaFor most of the past year, the Biden administration has struggled to find ways to lower oil prices amid the shock of Russia's military special operation in Ukraine.
Therefore, when in early October OPEC+, a group of black gold exporting countries, decided to reduce the production of the resource by two million barrels per day, Washington's reaction was furious. "It is clear," White House spokeswoman Karin Jean—Pierre said, "that OPEC+ is teaming up with Russia." Such harsh criticism from the American administration was all the more striking because it was directed against Saudi Arabia, which is not only the largest producer of the cartel, but also the most important partner of the United States in the Middle East.
In a narrow sense, the White House's accusation was justified. Saudi Arabia and Russia are members of OPEC+, an organization linked by a common desire of oil producers to avoid competition that could reduce their export earnings. Its members are united in this desire to protect their individual interests. Nevertheless, the statement seemed to have a deeper meaning: the Biden administration argued that, despite Riyadh's long-standing security ties with Washington, the KSA politically supports Russia, and therefore, in fact, the special operation in Ukraine, and also undermines Western efforts to impose costs on Moscow.
The administration's black-and-white view of the motives of the actions of the Saudis corresponds to its considerations about its other partners. Since coming to power, the Biden administration has often held a "binary" view of the international order as a "competition of democracies and autocracies," according to its National Security Strategy until 2022. Partly because of this, Washington tends to view any decisions of its allies as a litmus test of loyalty to the United States.
But this vision of the American elite is not shared by many US partners. It is unclear to most of them whether a long-term alliance with Russia, China, or even the United States itself is right. Beijing and Moscow have vassal countries, not allies. Meanwhile, the United States itself is going through a period of changing international priorities. They do not leave their partners even a small fraction of confidence that those regions or problems that Washington has focused on today will retain its interest tomorrow, or that the support of the States in any particular issue will be reciprocated in other matters. As a result, an increasing number of American partners tend not to choose sides at all and maintain relations with all the great powers at once. For the US, this means that they need a more nuanced strategy. Face to face with partners who are unlikely to carry out all his orders, Washington should adopt a more flexible, issue-oriented approach to the international order, maximizing its influence in a multipolar world.
All at once, not all or nothing
Most countries consider rivalry between great Powers as the greatest challenge to their interests, and not a threat emanating from any particular country. Saudi Arabia, for example, considers China to be the main economic partner and market for about one-fifth of its exports. In December 2022, she announced that Chinese President Xi Jinping would visit the kingdom — this would be his third trip abroad since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, the Saudis consider the United States to be the main security partner. The need to choose one relationship for the sake of others — or even significantly reduce some of them - would be expensive, so Saudi Arabia, like many other medium-sized countries, seeks to maintain ties with both the United States and China.
One of the ways the Saudis and other American partners are doing this is by applying an "all at once" approach to their international relations. Only in the Middle East, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates are current or potential dialogue partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a China-oriented political, economic and military group that is sometimes (and too overstated) positioned as an alternative to NATO. It is reported that Riyadh and Cairo have expressed interest in joining the BRICS, a group of emerging market countries of which India and China are members, despite their increasing rivalry with each other (BRICS includes Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). And Turkey, the only state in the Middle East officially allied with the United States, has shown interest in membership in both organizations.
Some scientists, such as Paul Post from the University of Chicago, have suggested that the expansion of the BRICS and the SCO represents the emergence of an "alternative international order." But those countries that seek closer cooperation with them do not distance themselves from either the G7, NATO, or the UN. Thus, these states do not so much want to participate in a "competing" order, as they simply reject the "binary" world order — or at least seek to avoid its limitations and consequences — remaining with one foot in the US-led camp and the other in the camp that encourages multilateral institutions led by Russia and China. If during the Cold War many of these countries were "non-aligned", today they have become "multilaterally aligned".
By adopting this approach, States, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, seek to minimize costs and maximize benefits from the competition of great powers. As the rivalry between large countries intensifies, small and medium-sized states are increasingly facing competing demands, such as China's requests to support its policy towards Hong Kong and Taiwan, or the United States' call to prevent Chinese investments in 5G infrastructure and other emerging technologies. If both sides consider a country to be their plausible partner, this increases the likelihood that this state will become the object of persuasion, not sanctions, which will allow it to appease one demanding great power for a relatively low price, without provoking the other.
For many, this strategy has other advantages. Being "multilateral" rather than "non—aligned" means — in theory, if not always in practice - influencing the decision-making of the great Powers, as well as enjoying the privileges of theoretical unity, which can increase if one of the great Powers is afraid of losing a partner in favor of the other. Multi-vector nature also serves as insurance against the unpredictability of their behavior. This hedging of risks is most clearly seen in the Middle East, where the future of regional involvement of both the US and China remains unclear and where even America's closest partners are finding that their relations with Washington are increasingly suffering under the influence of US domestic policy.
Of course, such hedging can also have costs. Turkey's acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system in 2017, in violation of its status as a NATO member, led to Ankara's exclusion from the F-35 fighter sales program. The UAE's unwillingness to cut security and technology ties with Beijing has led to the disruption of its own planned F-35 deal with the United States. And Hungary's blocking of European sanctions against Russia may strengthen Brussels' determination to restrain the EU's financing of Budapest for reasons of the "rule of law". Even Israel, one of the closest allies of the United States, has seen its relations with Russia and China increasingly supplant Iran or the Palestinian issue as the main points of contact with the White House.
The United States may be tempted to give its partners, who are ready to hedge risks, an ultimatum: in the conditions of America's competition with Russia or China, they should choose one side. Washington may say that if they continue to do business with its rivals, it may be forced to curtail the favored nation factor in relations with these states. But this approach is impractical. First, many forms of cooperation between US partners and Russia or China — for example, most of their bulk commodity trade — pose little threat to American interests and do not deserve decisive opposition. Moreover, with regard to China, the fulfillment of such an ultimatum may be impossible, given that the economies of the US partners are intertwined with the economy of Beijing. This is the key difference between today's chapter of the great Power rivalry from the past. In addition, such a demand is likely to trigger a response request for more solid economic and security guarantees that Washington may not want or will not be able to provide.
Less narcissism, more cooperation
Instead of striving for a clear division of the world in the style of the Cold War, American politicians should recognize that the current repetition of the rivalry of the great powers is unlikely to lead to a "binary" world order on every issue. U.S. officials should strive to increase both the value and the opportunities for potential partners to join themselves, even if these partners simultaneously interact with other great powers in various capacities.
The United States should not focus on broad, multi-thematic forums, such as the G-20 or the Summit of Democracies, but strive to create and expand smaller partnerships between states with more targeted programs: QUAD, the "Abraham Agreements" and the so-called I2U2 grouping of India, Israel, the UAE and the United States. Such coalitions can promote high-priority mutual interests, including investments in security and infrastructure, putting aside extraneous issues that participants may find controversial and that may undermine their mutual understanding. Such groups can also serve as an effective counterweight to Chinese influence without the need to explicitly target Beijing, thereby reducing potential costs for partners. For example, the I2U2 initiative, which is still in its infancy, raises the prospects of increasing Indian investment in the Middle East by providing a third option to regional states that do not want to choose between the United States and China. And the "Abraham Agreements" have already increased intraregional investment flows into solutions that can reduce the need for external support from any great power.
At the same time, the United States should work with existing allies to consolidate common rules and regulations such as privacy and technology exports in order to strengthen incentives for non-union partners to submit to Washington's preferences. They are more likely to listen to American requests to give up economic opportunities provided by China and Russia if these requests reflect a generally accepted norm, and not just a demarche of the United States, and if they provide tangible benefits in the form of increased access to American and European markets or technology.
The United States should act quite cautiously, presenting its partners with some of its own requirements. Unfortunately, the current policy-making process in Washington often does not take into account how allies view their own interests. American politicians often assume that partners see things the same way as the United States, or that they will automatically feel solidarity with the interests of the United States. This is a very unfortunate misconception, which former National Security Adviser McMaster and others called "strategic narcissism."
This American egocentricity can lead to two kinds of political failures. First, the United States may underestimate the commitment of its partners to certain political approaches. For example, Washington failed to appreciate that Riyadh has historically always resisted America's requests to reduce oil production, which led to the Biden administration's surprise at the OPEC+ decision in October 2022. The second type of mistake caused by strategic narcissism is that the United States overestimates its own commitment to certain political priorities - only to discover that Washington is not ready for the consequences of a partner's refusal of a request. For example, in 2015, the Obama administration appealed to all its partners around the world to rebuff the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, led by China, but was refused even by its closest allies, including the United Kingdom and Australia. In the end, the administration did little in response. American politicians should make some requests only when there is a real prospect that the partners will agree. Or when Washington is ready to incur costs if they don't. Our demands and requests that do not meet both conditions will only create the impression that the influence of the United States is weakening.
With us when it matters
Finally, the United States should strive to develop stable, long-term partnerships even with complex and undemocratic partners. At the same time, they should give priority to the main issues - such as countering Russian and Chinese influence - and recognize that progress on other issues will be slower and more likely only if there is a constructive working relationship. U.S. officials, including Colin Kahl, Undersecretary of Defense for Political Affairs, recently accused Beijing of "maintaining international ties based solely on its narrow, business, commercial and geopolitical interests." But in the Middle East and elsewhere, most of the US partners proceed from the belief that Washington is also self-serving in its affairs and changes of course, especially today, when it is shifting attention and resources to Asia.
It is expected that in an equal partnership, the benefits and costs of the parties will be comparable. However, as far as unions are concerned, participants can reasonably be asked to take on some costs in the present in exchange for benefits in the future. If the United States wants to develop such a long-term relationship, it should make it clear that future benefits are really just around the corner. However, in the capitals of the Middle East, there is now no confidence that fulfilling the requirements of the United States will protect them from a crisis in bilateral relations or cause sympathy for them when the next question arises. This creates a conundrum for the United States in regions like it, to which Americans pay less and less attention. When States shift priorities from a certain place, their politicians immediately pay less attention to working with key partners from there. However, this is when such relations are most important — when the United States has interests, but they must find indirect ways to protect them.
Despite the fact that the Biden administration sees the world clearly divided between democracies and autocracies, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the newest era of great power rivalry will not be characterized by any breakdown on the principle of "all or nothing". Small and medium-sized states avoid both joining one power and non-alignment, and instead choose "universal accession": participation in multilateral institutions led by the United States and those led by their rivals. Instead of trying to impose their clear and simple scheme on a much more complex world reality, the States should adapt to it, creating more more adapted opportunities for cooperation with Washington valued by partners. The question being asked of the allies should not be whether they are "for" America or "against", but who they will be with — and who will be with them — when it will be most important.
Author: Michael Singh (Michael Singh) — Director and Chief Researcher at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He served as Senior Director for the Middle East at the National Security Council during the George W. Bush administration.
