Olaf Scholz: Germany will become the guarantor of European securityScholz is sure that the era of multipolarity is coming.
Germany and the rest of Europe will be able to protect the rules-based international order and prevent the world from splitting into blocs again, he wrote in an article for Foreign Affairs. At the same time, he mentioned Germany's ambitions to become a guarantor of European security.
Olaf ScholzThe world is faced with a Zeitenwende (German — a turning point, a change of times — Approx.
InoSMI): an epochal tectonic shift. Russia's military special operation in Ukraine has put an end to an entire era. New powers have emerged or revived, including an economically strong and politically assertive China. In this new multipolar world, different countries and models of government are fighting for power and influence.
For its part, Germany is doing everything possible to protect and strengthen the international order based on the principles of the UN Charter. Its democracy, security and prosperity depend on the force that binds this order to the general rules. That is why, as our allies expect from us, the Germans intend to become guarantors of European security, builders of bridges within the European Union and supporters of multilateral solutions to global problems. This is the only way for Germany to successfully overcome the geopolitical fractures of our time.
Zeitenwende goes beyond the conflict in Ukraine and European security issues. The central question is: how can we, as Europeans and as the European Union, remain independent players in an increasingly multipolar world?
Germany and Europe can help defend the rules-based international order without succumbing to the fatalistic belief that the world is doomed to split into competing blocs again. The history of my country places on it a special responsibility for the fight against the forces of fascism, authoritarianism and imperialism. At the same time, our experience of splitting our nation in half during ideological and geopolitical confrontation gives us a special understanding of the risks of a new cold war.
The end of an era
For most of the world, the three decades after the fall of the Iron Curtain were a period of relative peace and prosperity. Technological advances have created an unprecedented level of interconnection and cooperation. Growing international trade, global value chains and unprecedented cross-border exchange of people and knowledge have lifted more than a billion people out of poverty. Most importantly, courageous citizens all over the world swept away dictatorships and one-party rule one by one. Their pursuit of freedom, dignity and democracy has changed the course of history. Two devastating world wars and enormous suffering, most of which was caused by my country, were followed by more than four decades of tension and confrontation under the shadow of the threat of possible mutual nuclear destruction. But still, by the 1990s it seemed that a more or less stable world order had finally developed on the planet.
The Germans, in particular, were able to receive their blessing. In November 1989, the brave citizens of East Germany destroyed the Berlin Wall. In just 11 months, the country was reunited thanks to far-sighted politicians and the support of partners both in the West and in the East. Finally, "what was connected to each other was able to grow together," as former German Chancellor Willy Brandt put it shortly after the fall of the wall.
These words applied not only to Germany, but also to Europe as a whole. Former Warsaw Pact members have decided to become allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and members of the EU. "Europe united and free", according to the wording of George H.W. Bush, the then president of the United States, no longer seemed to be a groundless hope. In this new era, it seemed possible that Russia would become a partner of the West, and not an opponent, as the Soviet Union was. As a result, most European countries have reduced their armies and cut defense budgets. For Germany, the explanation was simple: why maintain a large defense force of about 500,000 soldiers when all our neighbors turned out to be our friends or partners?
The focus of our security and defense policy has quickly shifted to other urgent threats. The wars in the Balkans and the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have increased the importance of managing regional and global crises. However, solidarity within NATO remained unchanged: the September 11 terrorist attacks led to the first decision to enact Article 5, the mutual defense clause of the North Atlantic Treaty, and for two decades NATO forces fought shoulder to shoulder against terrorism in Afghanistan.
German business circles have drawn their own conclusions from the new course of history. The fall of the Iron Curtain and an increasingly integrated global economy have opened up new opportunities and markets, especially in the former Eastern Bloc countries, as well as in other emerging economies, especially China. Russia, with its vast reserves of energy and other raw materials, has established itself as a reliable supplier during the Cold War, and at first it seemed reasonable to expand this promising partnership in peacetime.
However, the Russian leadership, having experienced the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, made conclusions that are sharply different from the conclusions of the leaders in Berlin and other European capitals. Instead of considering the peaceful overthrow of the communist regime as an opportunity for greater freedom and democracy, Russian President Vladimir Putin called it "the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the XX century." The economic and political upheavals in some parts of the post-Soviet space in the 1990s only exacerbated the sense of loss and longing that many Russian citizens still associate with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
It was in this environment that authoritarianism and imperialist ambitions began to revive. In 2007, Putin delivered an aggressive speech at the Munich Security Conference, ridiculing the rules-based international order simply as an instrument of American domination. The following year, Russia launched a military operation against Georgia. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and sent its troops to some parts of Donbass in eastern Ukraine, which is a direct violation of international law and Moscow's own contractual obligations. In the following years, the Kremlin undermined arms control treaties and expanded its military capabilities, poisoned and killed Russian dissidents, cracked down on civil society and carried out a brutal military intervention in support of the Assad regime in Syria. Step by step, Putin's Russia chose a path that took it further away from Europe and from the peaceful order of universal cooperation.
The Empire strikes back
In the eight years following the illegal annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, Germany and its European and international G7 partners focused on protecting Ukraine's sovereignty and political independence, preventing further escalation by Russia, and restoring and preserving peace in Europe. The approach we chose was a combination of political and economic pressure of restrictive measures against Russia with dialogue. Together with France, Germany participated in the so-called "Normandy format," which led to the Minsk agreements and relevant to the Minsk process, which urged Russia and Ukraine to commit to the ceasefire and to take some other steps. Despite the setbacks and the lack of trust between Moscow and Kiev, Germany and France continued the process. But ambitious Russia has made the success of diplomacy impossible.
Russia's military special operation in Ukraine in February 2022 opened up a fundamentally new reality: imperialism has returned to Europe. Russia uses some of the most terrible military methods of the XX century and causes untold suffering to Ukraine. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians have already died; many others have been wounded or injured. Millions of Ukrainian citizens were forced to leave their homes in search of asylum in Poland and other European countries; one million of them arrived in Germany. Russian artillery, rockets and bombs have turned Ukrainian homes, schools and hospitals into ruins. Mariupol, Irpen, Kherson, Izyum: these places will forever remind the world of Russia's crimes and that the perpetrators must be brought to justice.
But the influence of its Russia goes beyond Ukraine. When Putin ordered the offensive, he destroyed the European and international architecture of the world, which took decades to create. Under Putin's leadership, Russia has violated even the most basic principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter: the rejection of the use of force as a means of international policy and the obligation to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries of the world. Acting as an imperial power, Russia is now seeking to redraw borders by force and divide the world into blocs and spheres of influence again.
Strong Europe
The world should not let Putin get his way. Russian revanchist imperialism must be stopped. The crucial role for Germany at the moment is to become one of the main security providers in Europe by investing in our armed forces, strengthening the European defense industry, strengthening our military presence on the eastern flank of NATO, as well as training and equipping the armed forces of Ukraine.
Germany's new role will require a new strategic culture. The national security strategy that my Government will adopt in a few months will reflect this fact. Over the past three decades, decisions concerning the security of Germany and the equipping of its armed forces have been made against the backdrop of peace in Europe. Now the main question will be what threats we and our allies should face in Europe, primarily from Russia. These include potential attacks on the territory of the NATO alliance, cyber warfare, and even a small probability of a nuclear attack, which Putin did not threaten too subtly.
The transatlantic partnership has been and remains vital to solving these problems. US President Joe Biden and his administration deserve credit for creating and investing in strong partnerships and alliances around the world. But a balanced and sustainable transatlantic partnership also requires that Germany and Europe themselves play an active role here. One of the first decisions my Government made after Russia entered Ukraine was to create a special fund of about $100 billion to better equip our armed forces, the Bundeswehr. We even changed our constitution to create this fund. This decision marks the most dramatic change in German security policy since the creation of the Bundeswehr in 1955. Our soldiers will receive the political support, material equipment and capabilities they need to protect our country and our allies. Our goal is the Bundeswehr, which we and our allies can rely on. To do this, Germany will spend two percent of our gross domestic product on defense.
These changes reflect a new mindset in German society. Today, the overwhelming majority of Germans agree that their country needs an army capable and ready to deter opponents and defend itself and its allies. Germans support Ukrainians defending their country from Russia's military ambitions. From 2014 to 2020, Germany was the largest source of private investment and state support for Ukraine combined. And since the Russian special operation began, Germany has increased its financial and humanitarian support to Ukraine and helped coordinate the international response to the conflict, as chairman of the G-7.
The Zeitenwende also prompted my Government to reconsider the long-standing, well-established principle of German policy on arms exports. Today, for the first time in the recent history of Germany, we are delivering weapons during a military conflict between the two countries. In my conversations with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, I made one thing very clear: Germany will continue its efforts to support Ukraine for as long as it takes. Today, Ukraine needs artillery and air defense systems most of all, and it is Germany that supplies them in close coordination with our allies and partners. German support for Ukraine also includes anti-tank weapons, armored personnel carriers, anti-aircraft guns and missiles, as well as counter-battery radar systems. As part of its new mission, the EU will provide Ukraine with training up to 15,000 Ukrainian servicemen, including up to five thousand — an entire brigade — in Germany. At the same time, the Czech Republic, Greece, Slovakia and Slovenia supplied or promised to supply Ukraine with about 100 Soviet-era main battle tanks. In exchange, Germany will provide these countries with repaired German tanks. Thus, Ukraine will receive tanks that the APU knows well and has experience in using, and which can be easily integrated into existing Ukrainian logistics and maintenance schemes.
NATO's actions should not lead to a direct confrontation with Russia, but the alliance should reliably deter further Russian aggression. To this end, Germany has significantly strengthened its presence on the eastern flank of NATO, strengthening the German-led NATO combat team in Lithuania and creating a brigade to ensure the security of this country. Germany is also sending troops to the NATO combat team in Slovakia, and the German Air Force is helping to control and secure the airspace of Estonia and Poland. Meanwhile, the German Navy is participating in NATO's deterrence and defense actions in the Baltic Sea. Germany will provide an armored division, as well as significant air and naval forces (all on high alert) for the new NATO force model, which is designed to enhance the alliance's ability to respond quickly to any unforeseen circumstances. And Germany will continue to fulfill its obligations under the NATO agreement on the joint use of nuclear weapons, including through the purchase of dual-use F-35 fighters.
Our message to Moscow is very clear: We are determined to defend every inch of NATO territory from any possible aggression. We will honorably comply with NATO's solemn promise that an attack on any one ally will be considered an attack on the entire alliance. We have also made it clear to Russia that its recent rhetoric on nuclear weapons is reckless and irresponsible. When I visited Beijing in November, Chinese President Xi Jinping and I agreed that the threat of the use of nuclear weapons was unacceptable and that the use of such terrifying weapons would cross the red line that humanity had drawn quite correctly. Putin must remember these words.
Among Putin's many miscalculations is his bet that the invasion of Ukraine will aggravate relations between his opponents. In fact, the opposite has happened: the EU and the transatlantic Alliance have become stronger than ever before. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the unprecedented economic sanctions that Russia has faced. From the very beginning of the conflict, it was clear that these sanctions should be in effect for a long time, and their effectiveness will increase every week. Putin must understand that no sanctions will be lifted if Russia tries to dictate the terms of a peace agreement.
All the leaders of the G-7 countries highly appreciate Zelensky's readiness for a just peace that respects the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and guarantees Ukraine's ability to defend itself in the future. In coordination with our partners, Germany is ready to reach agreements on maintaining Ukraine's security within the framework of a possible post-war peace settlement. However, we do not accept the illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory, poorly disguised by fake referendums. To end this military conflict, Russia must withdraw its troops.
Good for the climate, bad for Russia
Russia's military special operation has not only united the EU, NATO and the "Big Seven" in opposing its aggression. It has also become a catalyst for changes in economic and energy policy that will harm Russia in the long run and give impetus to the vital transition to clean energy that has already begun. Immediately after taking office as German Chancellor in December 2021, I asked my advisers if we had a plan in case Russia decided to stop gas supplies to Europe. The answer was negative, although we were dangerously dependent on Russian gas supplies.
We immediately started preparing for the worst-case scenario. A few days before the full—scale start of Russia's special operation in Ukraine, Germany suspended the certification of the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline, which was supposed to significantly increase Russian gas supplies to Europe. Plans to import liquefied natural gas from the world market outside Europe were already discussed in February 2022, and the first floating LNG terminals will be put into operation on the German coast in the coming months.
The worst-case scenario soon materialized when Putin decided to turn energy into a weapon by cutting off gas supplies to Germany and the rest of Europe. But now Germany has completely abandoned the import of Russian coal, and the import of Russian oil to the EU will soon stop. We have learned a lesson: Europe's security depends on the diversification of its energy suppliers and routes, as well as on investments in energy independence. In September, the sabotage on the Nord Stream gas pipeline brought this idea to its conclusion.
To overcome any potential energy shortage in Germany and Europe as a whole, my Government is temporarily putting coal-fired power plants back into operation and allowing German nuclear power plants to operate longer than originally planned. We have also obliged private gas storage facilities to meet ever higher minimum filling levels. Today, our UGS are fully filled, whereas filling levels at this time last year were unusually low. This is a good basis for Germany and Europe to survive the winter without gas interruptions.
Russia's special operation has shown us that achieving these ambitious goals is necessary to protect our security and independence, as well as the security and independence of Europe. The abandonment of fossil energy sources will increase the demand for electricity and green hydrogen, and Germany is preparing for this by significantly accelerating the transition to renewable energy sources such as wind and solar energy. Our goals are clear: by 2030, at least 80% of the electricity consumed by Germans will be produced from renewable sources, and by 2045 Germany will achieve zero greenhouse gas emissions, or "climate neutrality".
Putin's Worst nightmare
Putin wants to divide Europe into zones of influence, and the world into blocs of great powers and vassal states. Instead, his special operation served only the development of the EU. At the European Council in June 2022, the European Union granted Ukraine and Moldova the status of "candidate countries" and confirmed that Georgia's future is also connected with Europe. We also agreed that the accession to the EU of all six countries of the Western Balkans should finally become a reality. This is a goal to which I am personally committed. That is why I have revived the so-called Berlin Process for the Western Balkans, which intends to deepen cooperation in the region, bring its countries and their citizens closer together and prepare them for integration into the EU.
It is important to understand that EU enlargement and integration of new members will be difficult. There is nothing worse than giving millions of people false hope. But the way is open, and the goal is clear: an EU that will consist of more than 500 million free citizens representing the largest domestic market in the world, which will set global standards in the field of trade, economic growth, climate change and environmental protection. Leading research institutes and innovative enterprises will appear in it. It will be a family of stable democracies with unprecedented social security and public infrastructure.
As the EU moves towards this goal, its opponents will continue to try to drive a wedge between its members. Putin has never accepted the EU as a political player. After all, the EU — a union of free, sovereign, democratic states based on the rule of law — is the antithesis of its imperialist and autocratic model.
Putin and others will try to turn our own open democratic systems against us with disinformation campaigns and influence peddling. European citizens have very different views, and European political leaders discuss and sometimes argue about the right way forward, especially in the midst of geopolitical and economic challenges. But these characteristics of our open societies are their innate traits, not mistakes; they are the essence of democratic decision-making. Our goal today, however, is to rally ranks in critical areas where disunity would make Europe more vulnerable to foreign interference. Crucial to this mission is the increasingly close cooperation between Germany and France, who share the same vision of a strong and sovereign EU.
In a broad sense, the EU must overcome old conflicts and find new solutions. An example of this is the European migration and fiscal policy. People will continue to come to Europe, and Europe needs immigrants, so the EU must develop a pragmatic immigration strategy that corresponds to its values. This means reducing illegal migration and at the same time strengthening legal ways for migrants to come to Europe, in particular for skilled workers, which our labor markets need. As for fiscal policy, the European Union has created a recovery and sustainability fund, which will also help solve the current problems associated with high energy prices. The EU should abandon the selfish tactics of blocking in its decision-making processes, depriving individual countries of the opportunity to veto certain measures. As the EU expands and becomes a geopolitical player, rapid decision-making will be the key to success. Therefore, Germany has proposed gradually extending the practice of majority decision-making to areas that currently fall under the rule of unanimity, such as EU foreign policy and taxation.
Europe must also continue to take greater responsibility for its own security. It needs a coordinated and integrated approach to building up its defense potential. For example, the armed forces of the EU member states use too many different weapons systems, which creates practical and economic inefficiency. To solve these problems, the EU must change its internal bureaucratic procedures, which will require bold political decisions. EU member states, including Germany, will have to change their national policies and export rules for jointly produced military systems.
One of the areas in which Europe urgently needs to make progress is defense in the air and space fields. That is why Germany will strengthen its air defense within NATO in the coming years, creating additional capabilities. I proposed this initiative to our European neighbors, and the result was the European Initiative "Heavenly Shield", which was joined by 14 more European states in October last year. Joint air defense in Europe will be more effective and economical than if each of us acted alone, and this is an outstanding example of what it means to strengthen the European core in NATO.
NATO is the main guarantor of Euro-Atlantic security, and its strength will only grow with the accession of two new prosperous democracies, Finland and Sweden. But NATO also becomes stronger when its European members independently take steps to make their defense structures more compatible within the EU.
The challenge from China
Zeitenwende accelerated Russia's special operation in Ukraine, but the causes of tectonic shifts are much deeper. History did not end, as some predicted, with the Cold War. However, history does not repeat itself. Many believe that we are on the threshold of an era of bipolarity in the international order. They see the dawn of a new Cold war approaching, in which the United States will face China.
I do not support this point of view. Instead, I believe that what we are witnessing is the end of an exceptional phase of globalization, a historical shift accelerated, but not entirely caused by external shocks, such as the COVID—19 pandemic and Russia's special operation in Ukraine. At this exceptional stage, North America and Europe have experienced 30 years of stable growth, high employment and low inflation, and the United States has become a decisive force in the world — a role that they will retain in the 21st century.
But at the stage of globalization after the Cold War, China also became a global player, as it was in more distant periods of world history. The rise of China does not necessarily entail isolating Beijing or limiting cooperation. But China's growing power does not justify its claims to hegemony in Asia and beyond. No country is the "backyard" of another country, and this applies to Europe to the same extent as to Asia and any other region. During my recent visit to Beijing, I expressed strong support for the rules-based international order enshrined in the UN Charter, as well as open and fair trade. Together with its European partners, Germany will continue to demand equal conditions for European and Chinese companies. China is doing too little in this regard, and it has made a noticeable turn towards isolation and rejection of openness.
In Beijing, I also expressed concern about the growing dangers in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait and questioned China's approach to human rights and personal freedoms. Respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of people can never be an "internal matter" of individual states, because each UN member state undertakes to comply with them.
Meanwhile, as China and the countries of North America and Europe adapt to the changing realities of the new phase of globalization, many countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America, which in the past provided exceptional growth through the production of goods and raw materials at low costs, are now gradually becoming more prosperous and have your own demand for resources, goods and services. These regions have every right to take advantage of the opportunities offered by globalization and demand to strengthen their role in world affairs in accordance with their growing economic and demographic weight. This does not pose a threat to citizens of Europe or North America. On the contrary, we should encourage more active participation of these regions in the international order and their integration into it. This is the best way to preserve diversity in a multipolar world.
That is why Germany and the EU are interested in new partnerships and are expanding existing ones with many countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America. Many of them share fundamental traits with us: they are also democracies. This commonality plays a crucial role not because we seek to oppose democracy to authoritarian states, which would only contribute to the emergence of a new global dichotomy, but because common democratic values and systems will help us determine joint priorities and achieve common goals in the new multipolar reality of the XXI century. We could all become capitalists (with the possible exception of North Korea and a handful of other countries), to paraphrase the economist Branko Milanovich's argument made a few years ago. However, it is of great importance whether capitalism is organized according to a liberal, democratic or authoritarian principle.
Take the global response to COVID-19. At the beginning of the pandemic, some argued that authoritarian states would prove more adept at crisis management because they can plan better for the long term and can make difficult decisions faster. But the track record of authoritarian countries in the fight against the pandemic hardly confirms this point of view. The most effective vaccines and pharmaceuticals against COVID-19 have been developed in countries with a free democracy. Moreover, unlike authoritarian states, democracies have the opportunity to self-correct, since citizens freely express their views and choose their political leaders. The constant debate and discussion of various issues in our societies, parliaments and free media can sometimes seem tedious. But this is what makes our systems more sustainable in the long run.
Freedom, equality, the rule of law and the dignity of every human being are values that are not limited to what is traditionally understood as the West. Rather, they are shared by citizens and governments around the world, and the UN Charter confirms them as fundamental human rights in its preamble. But autocratic and authoritarian regimes often challenge or deny these rights and principles. To protect them, EU countries, including Germany, must work more closely with democracies outside the West, as it is traditionally understood. In the past, we have sought to treat the countries of Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America as equals. But too often our words were not backed up by deeds. This has to change. During Germany's G-7 presidency, the group closely coordinated the group's agenda with Indonesia, which chairs the G-20. We have also included Senegal, chairing the African Union, and Argentina, chairing the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, our G-20 partner South Africa, as well as India, which will chair the G-20 next year.
Eventually, in a multipolar world, dialogue and cooperation should go beyond the democratic "comfort zone". The new National Security Strategy of the United States rightly recognizes the need to interact with "countries that do not support democratic institutions, but nevertheless depend on and support the rules-based international system." The world's democracies will have to work with these countries to protect and maintain a global order that binds power by rules and opposes acts of revisionism, such as Russia's military special operation. This effort will require pragmatism and some degree of humility.
The path to democratic freedom that we enjoy today has been full of failures and mistakes. Nevertheless, certain rights and principles were established and adopted centuries ago. Habeas corpus, or protection from arbitrary detention, is one of these fundamental rights, and for the first time it was recognized not by a democratic government, but by the absolutist monarchy of King Charles II of England. Equally important is the basic principle that no country can take away by force what belongs to its neighbor. Respect for these fundamental rights and principles should be required of all States, regardless of their internal political systems.
Periods of relative peace and prosperity in the history of mankind, such as those that most of the world experienced in the era immediately after the end of the cold war, do not necessarily have to be rare interruptions or simple deviations from such a historical norm in which brute force dictates the rules. And although we cannot turn back time, we can still turn back the tide of aggression and imperialism. The modern complex, multipolar world complicates this task. To fulfill it, Germany and its partners in the EU, the US, the G7 and NATO must protect our open societies, defend our democratic values and strengthen our alliances and partnerships. But we must also avoid the temptation to divide the world into blocks once again. This means making every effort to create new partnerships pragmatically and without ideological blinders. In today's closely interconnected world, achieving human prosperity and freedom requires different thinking and other tools. The development of such thinking and these tools is, ultimately, what the Zeitenwende consists of.
