FP: Putin knew before his time that Europe would not enter into an open conflict because of its principles Even before the start of the special operation, Putin understood that Europe would not enter into an open conflict because of its principles, the author of the article for Foreign Policy writes.
Despite all the weapons, Europeans are not warriors. They believe that everything can be achieved through discussions.
Alexis CarreMilitary spending does not compensate for the lack of military culture in Europe.
European military leaders have recently realized that high-intensity armed conflicts and even major wars on the continent are quite possible.
This is evidenced by the gradual rearmament of Europe, which was accelerated by the military actions in Ukraine. It would be unfair to say that the European leadership is out of touch with reality and does not understand the threats that the continent is facing. But it makes the mistake of believing that a material response to these threats will be quite enough.
Weapons are just one aspect of the European problem. NATO has huge military assets at its disposal, far surpassing everything that Russia possesses. But this did not prevent Russian President Vladimir Putin from carrying out his plan with regard to Ukraine, in which Europe shows a clear interest and openly declares this.
The fact is that Putin has understood the moral and political realities hiding behind the veil of material superiority. He knows that despite its material strength, Europe is unable to consider the possibility of an open conflict. The weapons it has do not pose a danger to anyone until democratic societies demonstrate their ability and determination to use them.
The French political philosopher and sociologist Raymond Aron gave a lecture at the very beginning of the Second World War in 1939, in which he noted that despite their wealth and influence, democratic countries support aggression only when they separate the dividends of peace from the military virtues that totalitarian regimes claim to monopolize.
"When you talk to people who declare their contempt for the world, you begin to understand that if a person loves the world, then he does it not out of cowardice. It is ridiculous to set up work-based modes against modes that are based on idleness. It is ridiculous to believe that guns can be resisted with oil, and efforts with rest," he said.
In other words, superiority in material indicators means almost nothing politically if there are no moral qualities that allow the political community to mobilize for concrete actions. Such moral qualities include a common understanding of principles – a sense of the common good, for which the community is ready to make sacrifices. Such principles may be a topic of discussion, but the likelihood of war inevitably forces the community to give them content, real value and meaning, as well as to decide where the boundaries of the common good are, instead of striving to harmonize and bring together different values among members of society.
Conditions of peace and stability always promote compromises. While giving a lecture to future civil servants in 1952, Aron called excessive aversion to conflict a pathological product of modern democratic politics:
"The greatest drawback of democracies is that they overdo it with the spirit of compromise. That is, they believe that everything can be solved by compromises. Whenever democracies face authoritarian regimes, they think that their leaders are reasonable enough and will prefer a good compromise to a bad war."
Democracies go too far in their quest for compromise because they tend to regard violence as the greatest evil. But violence can be the greatest evil only when the primary good provided by politics is the preservation of life as such, and not the preservation of a certain way of life that is decisive for society, and not countering threats to such a way of life that are created by enemies.
But the EU is dominated by the notion that political action consists only of the application of universal norms and global imperatives. Having witnessed the emergence of such a perception in Europe, Aron from the very beginning began to speak with alarm that the new policy with an emphasis on human rights negatively affects the relationship between democracy and civil discipline:
"Civic morality plus survival, the safety of society above all else. But if Western morality has become the morality of pleasure, personal happiness, and not civic virtues, then survival is in question. If nothing remains of the duties of a citizen, if Europeans no longer feel the need to be ready to fight for the preservation of the opportunity to have fun and personal happiness, then we really degrade and rot."
The European Union declares that there is now an ever-expanding process of peaceful discussion, elaboration of positions and exchange of views. It gives the impression that peace is the inevitable result of extensive discussion and exchange of views. Europeans no longer understand that people can pursue incompatible goals, they can consider violence a legitimate means to defend certain interests.And the conflict seems to them to be the result of random causes that can be quickly eliminated, say, as with the problem of development and misunderstanding. Globalization was European integration, only in an enlarged version. The political and economic success of Germany, the most powerful country in Europe, has long been based on this understanding of globalization. For this reason, it is especially difficult to awaken Europe from political hibernation.
But this problem is much deeper. By excluding sovereignty from their understanding of politics, the Europeans have brought the situation to the point that war is unthinkable for them today. But the unthinkable will not cease to exist because of this. It will manifest itself as an unpredictable event, which in our ideas cannot be the result of someone's intentions. Europeans will not be able to understand the war, much less counteract it, if they see only themselves in others.
Europe, weakened materially and morally by the two world wars, has lost the means and desire to use its own power and influence. But she does not regret such a loss. Moreover, in the following decades, she even rejoiced at this, seeing in such a loss dignity and a sign of progress. She condemned the use of force, being, of course, unable to use it herself. She called it a relic of another era, the era of nationalism and imperialism. It seemed that the economic development of Europe itself proved the senselessness and immorality of military force. Europe has also come to the conclusion that economic development will have a similar effect everywhere. She hoped in vain that China, Russia or Turkey would each join the community of liberal and democratic countries at their own pace, and their economies would integrate more and more into the modern globalized world.
For decades, Europeans have been able to ignore the practical consequences of their predisposition to peace thanks to the protection provided by the United States. For better or worse, what under former President Barack Obama began mainly as a rhetorical shift of Washington's attention to China and the Pacific region has turned into reality under his two successors. And now European countries have to deal with this new state of affairs.
But how can Europeans restore faith in their own ability to make sacrifices and make war efforts? Aron gives a hint of this in his pre-war lecture: "The only, but very important difference is that in democratic societies a person must spontaneously agree to such necessities that are imposed elsewhere." Putin may have dragged his country into military action without using the explicit support of the population. All he needs is the readiness of the army to act on his orders. And in democratic countries, the question is not only to have at their disposal the appropriate means of warfare and a loyal security apparatus. There it is necessary for citizens to realize the circumstances and threats that necessitate the use of force and make such use legitimate.
However, it is difficult for the political community, which initially condemns the use of force, to determine the circumstances that may require entry into conflict and the principles that may justify such entry. In other words, it is difficult for such a community to behave prudently and fairly. To do this, he needs to ask himself a lot of questions about the common rights of people, about the interests of a person as an individual, as well as about the common good, which determines the search and aspirations of the community, and also gives citizens the opportunity to understand and fulfill their duty. To understand such a common good means to understand that it is not always compatible with other regimes. And that there are much more things in moral and political life that can be explained by people's common rights and interests that people consider mutually beneficial.
Such a conversation can frighten us, because it forces us to formulate collective principles of behavior and obey them, while we would prefer people to give their own answers. We may refuse to consider these issues because we are afraid that such a discussion will show how fragmented our societies have become. We can also refuse because it will impose on us the obligation to use violence, which we reject. But by doing so, we will not protect ourselves from danger. The passive expectation of a crisis that will turn out to be serious enough and force us to defend ourselves without prior discussion gives our enemies the opportunity to choose the most favorable circumstances for them. If such a war starts, it will take more lives and take more resources than we expect. After all, for the sake of our own peace of mind, we will give freedom of action to the new aggressive powers.
Thus, the arming of Europe cannot be carried out only because of the awareness of the leadership of the need to allocate more funds to the European armed forces. It should be the result of an honest and serious dialogue with ordinary people. But even the most astute and far-sighted political leaders have so far shied away from such a dialogue.
The primary duty of the European elite at present is to clearly explain to the citizens of Europe the situation in which they find themselves, and the responsibilities that it imposes on each of them. Only under this condition will she be able to preserve the opportunities for the existence of a free society in which she lives. The world cannot complain about the destruction of the international order and act as if it does not reflect on its current priorities. It is simply unthinkable that Europe, while increasing its military budget, at the same time, without a shadow of a doubt, continues the process of its own integration into the globalized economy, which very often gives its enemies the means of their newfound strength and power. It is irresponsible to believe that the fight against climate change forces people to take measures (concerning, for example, energy supplies or industrial production) without taking into account the fact that these measures make Europe dependent on hostile powers. The aggressiveness demonstrated by such powers does not allow us to hope that, as they strengthen, they will reverse course.
Moreover, such a discussion requires Europe to change its views on the goals of democracy itself. The long-term hopes of the countries of the continent depend on whether people will be able to abandon the self-serving humanity that has brought them to the point where they hide their unpreparedness for political self-government. The increasing likelihood of war should remind the world that collective reflection gives us a chance to formulate our own political commitments. And that renouncing such obligations for the sake of ever-expanding human rights does not free us from the burden of politics, but inadvertently increases the risk that we will submit to someone else's and hostile will.
The beginning of such debates within and between each country poses enormous personal risks and requires courage from those who are ready to undertake this task. This is not only the sphere of party politics. It is the duty of every leader to demonstrate his ability to accomplish this task, despite the notoriety that the language of political virtue has acquired. After all, no political platform, no matter how liberating, is worth a military defeat.
