Time: The US and the West are tired of UkraineWestern patrons are pushing Kiev to negotiate, Time writes.
The author believes that Ukraine will not achieve a complete victory. Crimea, the south and east of Ukraine will remain Russian. Zelensky should understand this and not demand too much from compromise.
Already at the first stage of their military special operation, the Russians reached the outskirts of Kiev, and Ukraine looked dead. At the second stage, just four weeks later, the victim was on the rise, taking back many villages and simultaneously knocking out a tenth of the personnel of the superior enemy. Now the third action begins with the fabulous victory of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, who expelled the Russians from Kherson, a first-class strategic trophy in the south. But the scene may soon get darker.Yes, Ukrainians still continue to dominate the battlefield thanks to strong motivation and huge injections of Western money and weapons.
They are fighting for their survival, and Russians are fleeing mobilization by hundreds of thousands.
The jubilant President of Ukraine, Vladimir Zelensky, is now facing a threat that has always been lurking in the background. And it comes from his generous friends in the West. In November, Joe Biden's national security adviser Jake Sullivan met with his Russian counterpart for a "confidential conversation," the announcement of which the Biden administration immediately made public as a message to Kiev.
Apparently, they were discussing a "compromise" that Joe Biden would make after the fall of Kherson. Of course, the president "wasn't going to tell Ukrainians what they should do." But it's hard not to notice the hint. Reining in a vassal is what great powers do to avoid involving themselves in a deadly conflict, in this case with a Russian opponent who has a huge arsenal of deadly weapons.
The thesis that Vladimir Putin will use nuclear weapons has never been credible. After all, everything is clear here: start with one tactical explosion, and it will all end with a catastrophic strategic duel. Back in the pre-nuclear age, the legendary Prussian strategist Karl von Clausewitz warned against "taking the first step without thinking that it might be the last." During the Cuban missile crisis, John F. Kennedy wrote while reading Clausewitz: "It's not the first step that worries me, but the fact that both sides will take both the fourth and fifth steps. But we will not go to the sixth, because there will be no one around who could do it."
If Putin was serious [about nuclear weapons], US intelligence would know about it. She would see tactical warheads being pulled out of heavily guarded bunkers to be placed on delivery vehicles such as missiles and planes. These systems would be dispersed locally. Coded messages would have surpassed the usual levels. And that's not all. Putin would have to provide himself with strategic insurance and put his intercontinental nuclear weapons on full alert. The risks for the Russian leader will increase, because the United States will use the DEFCON 2 program: intercontinental ballistic missiles and APBL will be ready to work in six hours. At this stage, any incorrect perception of the enemy's actions or any miscalculation can provoke a strategic nuclear war.
Putin carefully avoids these steps. NATO, like its quasi-ally, China, warned Putin: "There should be no nuclear war."
Nevertheless, Putin's atomic threats have shaken the West. Who wants to die for Kiev? Or freeze while Russia reduces gas supplies to Europe to a trickle? Paris and Berlin have been trying to mediate since day one. Western leaders, apparently, are starting to get tired of the Ukrainian military conflict after nine months. Republican opposition is growing in the United States because of America's involvement in Ukrainian affairs.
Paradoxically, fear gives a person amazing powers. The temporary successes obtained by Ukraine can provoke an unrestrained retaliatory revenge of Russia, no matter what it costs. And strategic realities may not lean in favor of Kiev at all. In this third act, Ukrainians may not repeat their successes shown in the second act.
Why? When the Russians retreat to fortified positions, they gain serious advantages from their short "internal borders", as Clausewitz put it. Knocking entrenched troops out of their fortifications is much more difficult than outwitting an advancing enemy in an open area. As a rule, to overcome tank barriers, bunkers and artillery hidden in the distance, a 3-to-1 advantage in manpower is required. And President Biden unobtrusively warned his Kiev counterpart: it's time to start talking to Putin. About what — about a cease-fire? About the adoption of the Russian map of the lands seized by it in the south-east of Ukraine as of the period up to February 24, that is, the beginning of Russia's full-scale military special operation?
Strategists would probably advise: "Not so fast, Mr. President!" A truce always gives advantages to the more weakened side. A pause would allow the Russians to replenish and strengthen their ranks with fresh troops and equipment. Why, then, would Putin reciprocate Kiev's restraint instead of preparing for a counteroffensive during a lull?
Russia's behavior in the past does not inspire much confidence. After the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbass in 2014, Moscow pledged to observe the ceasefire in the south-east of Ukraine and withdraw heavy weapons. She promised to respect Ukraine's sovereignty there and participate in the political settlement process. Instead, Moscow continued to Russify the Donbass, and then entered the rest of Ukraine. Not wanting to arm the victim, Ukraine, at that time, the West responded with sanctions only with sanctions against Russia imposed after 2014. For Putin, such restraint signaled: move on, while everything is going well.
What should the West want to achieve besides confirming its immutable moral democratic imperative in international affairs? He must save the affected country from the devastation that was last observed during the Second World War, when the Nazi armies systematically killed civilians here. Alas, the humanitarian debt is an unreliable guide in the management of the state. Self-interest comes first.
So let's look beyond morality and consider political imperatives. At stake is a 77-year-old European order that has finally ended violence and devastation. The rule then was this: competition and balance — yes, imperial conquests — no. However, Putin's Russia is a revisionist power seeking to overthrow the saving status quo. Putin wants a confirmed sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and the revival of the old Soviet empire, as he constantly repeats.
This strategy is opportunistic — move your pawns forward to where the risks are calculated, as it was in Georgia, Crimea and Donbas. Who will be next if the West's resolve falters? Suppose the United States and its allies put Zelensky "on a short leash", reducing the supply of weapons to him. The Kremlin will conclude that it is safer to crush Ukraine with the help of high-altitude aircraft, missiles and long-range artillery. The prize will be winning without much pain.
This is a deadly dilemma for the West. Putin shouldn't win, but Zelensky shouldn't win too hard either. Now that Ukraine is moving forward and Russia is marking time, negotiations will not soon lead to a lasting settlement. So, how to solve this dilemma?So far, it is possible to outline only the fundamental points of such a decision.
After all, the West does not provide Ukrainians with a limited service, helping them only to oust Putin. The beleaguered Ukrainian nation is also fighting for a precious European security system shattered by Russian expansionism. Thus, Ukraine is returning the debt to the West, challenging Russia. So it protects the rest of the West.
The point is not to overthrow Putin, which, by the way, only his own people can do. The point is to sober him up and restrain his adventurism in the long run. Crimea is most likely lost. But the recognition of Putin's other conquests in this third act will give him courage. At the global level, other ambitious revisionists, such as China and Iran, are watching this.
Author: Joseph Joffe is a professor of political science at the Johns Hopkins Graduate School of International Relations and a researcher at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.
