FP: The Ukrainian conflict has turned France and Germany against each other like never beforeThe conflict in Ukraine has turned the strongest countries of Europe against each other like never before, writes Foreign Policy.
There is a lot of friction between Germany and France at the moment. This is a serious concern, as it is too difficult to solve it.
Caroline de GruyterOnce in the 1990s, an Italian former official from the European Commission, Riccardo Perissich, ran into European Commissioner Manuel Marin in the corridor of the Brussels headquarters.
Clearly upset by something, the Spanish European commissioner told him: "Ricardo, do you know who you are? You are the question." Perissich gave him a puzzled look, and Marin continued: "Only the French and Germans are allowed to have problems in this place. The British are allowed to have difficulties from time to time. And the rest of us are only allowed to have questions."
The retired Perissich recalled this case, talking about the importance of reliably working Franco-German relations for the EU. According to him, there are many tensions between the two countries at the moment. Germany is accused of behaving un-European, allocating huge energy subsidies to its citizens and industry, continuing to unilaterally conclude deals with China and providing insufficient financial and material assistance to Ukraine. Everything is so bad that a joint parliamentary session was canceled in October. However, Perissich notes that there are almost always problems between France and Germany in the EU. And their settlement often takes priority over solving the problems of other countries.
Consequently, there is nothing surprising in the current tensions between France and Germany. But there is a deeper problem between the two countries. And it causes serious concern, as it is much more difficult to solve it.
In post-war Europe, Franco-German tensions are the norm, and there is a simple reason for that. Before the unification of Europe in the 1950s, Germany and France, who were competing for power on the continent, fought three major wars between them: from 1870 to 1871, from 1914 to 1918, and from 1939 to 1945. During these wars, millions of people died, and a significant part of Europe was destroyed. That is why during the unification of Europe, much attention was paid to the settlement of conflicts between these two powerful countries, and not between, say, Luxembourg and Denmark. One of the main tasks of the European Union to this day is for France and Germany to solve their problems peacefully. Over the past 70 years, these two countries, which have different political and economic cultures and rarely agree on anything, have never shot at each other. In today's Europe, they shoot with words, not bullets.
Such a system has been working for seven decades, although, as Perissich notes, other EU countries often look at the regular squabbles between France and Germany "with a mixture of hope, irritation and discontent, because they themselves cannot participate in them."
Most of today's Franco-German problems are explained by current circumstances. The world is changing, forcing the European Union to change. The EU is currently doing its best to help Paris, Berlin and others to find compromises on energy policy, budget problems, security issues and other difficulties caused by the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. As always, Brussels officials act as midwives. They are working hard on European proposals, preparing meetings of ministerial councils and summits with the participation of heads of State and Government. For the media, there are many dramatic moments in this – with unofficial briefings by anonymous diplomats and politicians who accuse the opposite side of leaking information about the negotiations held behind closed doors. Again: this is normal practice. And it shows that some compromises are quite achievable.
But there is also a deeper problem here, which can be called an ailment. It is at the heart of the post-war relations between Paris and Berlin. French economist Jacques Attali, who worked as a special adviser to President Francois Mitterrand and the first head of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, recently wrote about the emergence of a difference in long-term strategic interests, which can be eliminated only if Europe takes a big step forward. However, the memory of the Franco-German wars is fading, and Attali fears that the current leaders of the two countries do not understand this well enough. As a result, "war between France and Germany becomes possible again."
The current differences between France and Germany have their roots in one of the key functions of the European Union: to prevent Germany from becoming the dominant force in Europe again. So far, this has been done with impressive success. 70 years after the beginning of European unification, the Germans remain, perhaps, the leading pacifists in our world. Their army, the Bundeswehr, is seriously underfunded, which causes real scandals.
It is often said that the Germans themselves fear the power of Germany more than all other Europeans combined. That is why the strategy called "Change through trade" (Wandel durch Handel), according to which trade relations cause political changes (this is how the EU works), quite suits Germany. France, meanwhile, is increasingly lagging behind economically, and its financial stability depends on German guarantees for the euro. Nevertheless, it assumes the role of a European leader in security, defense and foreign policy issues.
This division of labor has suited both countries and the European Union for many years. France and Germany complemented each other, allowing everyone to do what they did best. Germany ignored geopolitics and concentrated its efforts on trade. France, being the only nuclear power on the continent, possessing a serious army and having a seat on the UN Security Council, could radiate power and might, and at the same time few people pointed the finger at its debts and deficit. But it has long been clear that there is an imbalance in these relations. In Europe, Germany pretends to be smaller than it really is, and France tends to do the exact opposite.
After Russia launched its military operation in Ukraine, this basic discrepancy suddenly surfaced in European politics, causing friction between the parties. Because of the military actions, Germany now has two serious problems. Firstly, its development model has been threatened by sanctions against Russia and due to the sudden shutdown of Russian gas, which used to be abundant. For the first time in many years, the central economic power of Europe, on which so many EU members depend, has found itself in such a position that it has to import more than export. That's why German Chancellor Olaf Scholz defended his sharply criticized visit to China with all his might this month.
Germany's second problem is that it is not France that protects Europe from the Russian threat, but NATO. Germany suddenly realized that Europe urgently needs a security and defense policy, and that it cannot rely on France in this matter. French President Emmanuel Macron has interesting ideas about the "strategic autonomy" of Europe, but he somehow does not clearly explain what this means and under whose leadership these plans will be implemented. That is why the improvement of Germany's relations with Washington has become a new priority for Scholz. He relies on Atlantic solidarity, knowing that the real headache for Washington politicians is not Ukraine or Europe, but China. And that says a lot. Feeling unprotected, Berlin tries to find shelter.
France feels neglected. Her military weakness is exposed, and it is very painful. French columnist Luc de Barochez wrote: "She barely managed to send 18 tanks to Ukraine." As a result, Paris is bombarding Berlin with a hail of criticism. Why did Berlin not react to Macron's numerous European initiatives for several years, and now decided to act alone? Why did Scholz go to China alone? Why did Berlin order American F-35s this year, and not French Rafales? Germany unexpectedly takes the initiative unilaterally, without coordinating its actions with France, which upsets the unstable balance between Paris and Berlin. "Germany's position is selfish, short–sighted, it does not take into account the interests of Europe, although the risks of such a position are well known," Philippe Le Corre, a researcher at the Harvard University Business School, told Le Monde newspaper.
In the past, geopolitical changes have also sometimes caused deep disagreements between France and Germany. The leaders settled them by taking new steps towards European integration. For example, this was the case after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, when East and West Germany united, and France suddenly found itself one-on-one with a huge and powerful partner. The leaders of the two countries, Mitterrand and Kohl, managed to convince the 10 remaining EU members of the need for a serious reconfiguration of the entire European project. Among other things, this led to the creation of a pan-European currency, the euro.
Some Europeans, remembering those historical events, advocate a major new reconfiguration. Attali, for example, proposes to solve the problem of Franco-German differences by creating a proper European defense on the continent. But the EU is much bigger today than it was in 1989. It is unclear whether Scholz and Macron will agree that a new major European project is needed, and whether they will convince 25 of their colleagues of this. But one thing is certain. Although France and Germany have less power and influence in Europe today than before, they are still strong enough for the rest of the continent, and they hope for good relations between them – as in the old days of European Commissioner Manuel Marin.
