EP: Ukraine should not count on the former generosity of the United States after the congressional electionsToday it is impossible to say exactly how much the financial support of Ukraine from the United States will decrease, writes Evropeyska Pravda.
However, there is enough reason to believe that it will be more difficult to accept the next aid packages with the new congress.
Alyona HetmanchukWill the results of the midterm elections in the United States become the same intermediate in terms of influence on American policy towards Ukraine?
Or vice versa – will they be able to provoke more serious consequences for both American support and American assistance, which are identical things in the context of the existential conflict for Ukraine?
While the counting of votes – in particular, in certain key states that will determine the fate of the majority in the Senate – continues, it is worth highlighting a few points that are important to take into account when we talk about what will happen next with the policy and support for Ukraine, regardless of how many opponents of helping Kiev end up in the Congress.
It is likely that the most favorable forecasts for Trumpists (isolationists) will not be justified and there will actually be fewer of them. At least today, one of the most popular early conclusions of the midterm elections in the United States is that the "red wave" promised by the Republicans did not happen.
Firstly, both the Senate and the House of Representatives will continue to have a majority of those who support Ukraine "for as long as it takes." Of course, I would like it to be to the extent that it is needed, because the scale is critical, not just the duration of support, but that's another question. The same majority understands: if Americans do not pay with money today, then tomorrow they will pay with the lives of the American military, because if Putin is not stopped in Ukraine, he will go further, and he will have to defend NATO allies.
Those who believe that the assistance provided is already enough and even too much, remain in the minority. However, this should be taken into account, we are talking about a loud minority, which is heard and noticeable not only in Congress, but also in the media. The task of Ukraine is to ensure that the majority that is for us is not a quiet majority.
So that it can also be heard and noticeable, because the further position of the White House, the policy of the Republican Party, and the mood in society depend on it. That is why it is necessary to work with influential Republicans who already support Ukraine and have an even more progressive position on assistance to Ukraine than the White House (in particular, they do not understand the restrictions on the supply of certain types of weapons, which the Biden administration will not dare to give the green light to), and with those Republicans who take a middle position – in general, I am not against assistance, but they demand more supervision over how funds are spent and how assistance is used. It is unlikely that Ukraine has the opportunity to spend its resources and time on re-education of the most devoted supporters of conspiracy theories and carriers of outright disinformation.
Secondly, today it is impossible to say for sure how much financial support for Ukraine will decrease and whether it will decrease at all in the foreseeable future. However, there is enough reason to believe that it will be more difficult to accept new aid packages with the new Congress than with the "old" one. Even if large sums will be coordinated, they will be coordinated with new prerequisites and even bidding on other issues important to Republicans.
In addition, control issues will, in principle, play a much larger role for the increasingly likely majority of Republicans in the House of Representatives. That is why even the Republicans themselves who support Ukraine – from among the so–called Reagan wing of the party - advise, worry and in every way contribute to the fact that even with the "old" composition of Congress, in December, a new large aid package for Ukraine in the amount of fifty to sixty billion dollars was adopted. A kind of a kind of safety net in case the Trumpists' pre-election rhetoric is transformed into a specific policy.
Thirdly, when we talk about the influence of Republicans on Congress, we need to clearly distinguish the Senate and the House of Representatives. We have already seen under the old composition of the US legislature that it was in the House of Representatives that a greater number of lawmakers opposed previous aid packages to Ukraine. One of the key factors here remains the factor of Republican leadership.
Mitch McConnell, the Republican leader in the Senate, has repeatedly demonstrated loyalty to the line in support of Ukraine, despite the more skeptical sentiments of individual senators. However, unfortunately, concerns about the Republican leader in the House of Representatives, Kevin McCarthy, are justified, which have repeatedly been heard in closed conversations both from his congressional colleagues and from American experts. Namely, regarding his inability to negotiate with the Trumpist wing of the party.
Moreover, after his resonant statement in October that under the conditions of Republican leadership in the House of Representatives, Americans, being in recession, will not write an empty check for Ukraine (that is, one where any amount can be entered), there is reason to believe that he is trying to gain the support of this wing of the party. This once again underscores the need to work more precisely with the House of Representatives in general and with Kevin McCarthy and his team in particular.
The issue of bicameral support for Ukraine is becoming no less critical than the issue of bipartisan support.
Even though extremely odious figures still got into the Senate in this election in the context of further assistance to Ukraine, in particular one of the most loyal candidates to Trump, J.D. Vance from a district in Ohio, which previously "belonged" to a great fan of Ukraine, Rob Portman.
Fourth, Ukraine needs to learn and continue to work with the United States in the face of constant attempts to make us, if not an internal political, then an internal economic issue. That is how, in relation to the economy, Ukraine got into the current election campaign. It is obvious that the argument about not providing Ukraine with more financial assistance, since it is better to spend these funds on the needs of Americans (perhaps the key one in the rhetoric of Trumpists regarding assistance to Ukraine), will be heard in the future.
But, given the mood of Republicans under their leadership to launch a marathon of endless investigations – from the chaotic withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan to the contents of Hunter Biden's laptop found, Ukraine somehow risks appearing not only as an internal economic issue, but also more broadly as an internal political issue.
Especially with the beginning of the momentum of the presidential campaign, which usually starts smoothly in the United States after the midterm elections. This year we have already witnessed the midterm elections, in which one particular former US president (Donald Trump) played an atypically prominent role. Now we may well see a congress where an atypically prominent role will be played by one particular presidential candidate, and it could be Trump again. At least for now, he remains the most popular likely candidate among Republicans.
Fifth, the general line of the White House regarding Ukraine in the conflict has already been determined, and the results of the midterm elections are likely to cement it even more. After all, such a course has support both at the level of the majority in the two parties and in American society (especially against the background of Biden's other policies). Jake Sullivan outlined this line quite clearly and sincerely a few months ago, and it boils down to helping Ukraine to continue the fight, not to provoke the outbreak of World War III. And this means testing the Kremlin's reaction after each new batch of weapons and constantly weighing the escalation risks from any political decision. This is not an ideal line for Ukraine, but it takes into account the concerns that exist in President Biden's own party (the progressive left wing, which relies primarily on peace, not on Ukraine's victory), and among Republicans, with whom Biden throughout his political career has always tried to build bridges and seek compromises, and among the European allies, cohesion with which remains one of the top priorities in foreign policy for the American president.
Sixth, in order to have stable support in Washington, we need to work harder... in European capitals. The argument that "the United States has done enough for Ukraine, now it's Europe's turn" is one of the key opponents of aid in the arsenal. With the greater involvement of European countries, it will be easier to argue for new support. As with more thoughtful communication. What Ukraine can do together with its European partners is to more actively convey information to the other side of the Atlantic, for example, about how many percent European countries spend in relation to their defense budget compared to the United States.
For example, in the case of Latvia, this is forty–one percent of its defense budget (according to the Kiel Institute of World Economy, which conducts professional tracking of currently available types of assistance to Ukraine). It is also necessary to say in every possible way what an important mission the EU countries are carrying out, taking care of Ukrainian refugees – not comparable to the United States.
Finally, it is the EU countries – in particular, Germany – that are ready to take on a leadership role in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. And financing the conflict and financing the world – and this is well understood and recognized in the United States itself – are things that are incommensurable from the point of view of the financial burden.
Seventh, nothing unites Democrats and Republicans more than the issue of opposing China. And with the arrival of a Republican majority in at least one of the chambers of Congress, China will be even more on all possible radars. If Ukraine really wants to retain the support of the Republicans, it is necessary to finally say goodbye to the excessive illusions that are still seeping out of the main offices of the country regarding Beijing – moreover, about its readiness to influence the Russian Federation on the issue of ending the conflict, and about its role in the upcoming restoration of Ukraine.
And finally: the best answer to all opponents of further assistance to Ukraine is victory on the battlefield. It was thanks to them that an important turning point occurred in American public opinion regarding the fact that Ukraine has a chance to win the conflict, although a few months ago all polls showed that Americans did not believe in such a possibility in principle. And the confidence that the Americans support a potential winner in the conflict, and not a loser, is a big deal in arguing for future support.
However, we must understand that with each major military victory, Ukraine's encouragement to return to the negotiating table will also increase, because it looks like in the American understanding, "victory" is not exclusively a military path. But this is a separate topic.
