Military observer of Izvestia Anton Lavrov — about the reasons for the abandonment of the right bank of the Kherson region and the immediate prospects of a special operationIn August of this year, the Ukrainian command threw into battle the strategic reserves accumulated over six months.
They managed to push the Russian troops on the right bank of the Dnieper in the Kherson and Mykolaiv regions. However, then it was possible to stop this powerful offensive and inflict really heavy losses on the enemy. All his subsequent attempts at attacks were successfully repelled. What has changed now and why did I have to make the hardest decision to leave Kherson and the surrounding area?
Thanks to the very skillful and professional actions of the Russian military, it was possible to maintain a fragile military parity here, despite the large numerical advantage of the enemy. But the fundamental problem was the increasing complexity of supplying the Russian group. From the very beginning of the special operation, the troops and the local population on the right bank had only three lines of communication with the rest of Russia through the wide and full-flowing Dnieper River here: the Antonovsky Bridge in Kherson, the railway bridge nearby and the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric dam. Despite all attempts, the first few months the Ukrainian troops failed to somehow damage these facilities.
The first alarm signal for the right bank was the fighting for Snake Island at the end of June. It was there that long-range precision-guided missiles and missiles delivered to Ukraine from the United States were first massively used. Then it became clear that the available air defense means do not guarantee one hundred percent interception of their volleys. And every missed high-precision ammunition means the defeat of an important object or equipment.
The problem has not been completely solved so far. According to Commander-in-Chief Sergei Surovikin, despite the counteraction by air defense means, up to 20% of guided missiles reach their targets. In addition, since September, the Ukrainian artillery has also begun to use GPS-corrected 155-millimeter M982A1 Excalibur shells received from the Pentagon. The range and amount of explosives in them are much less than in HIMARS missiles. But such ammunition is generally impossible to intercept by air defense means.
To disrupt transport links, the VFU spent hundreds of missiles, but achieved their goal. Since August, the automobile and railway bridges leading to Kherson have been disabled. It was also possible to damage an alternative route going through the dam of the Kakhovskaya HPP. The port of Kherson was also under missile strikes.
The supply was not completely interrupted. But now it had to be delivered to the other shore by ferries and pontoons, boats. A particularly difficult situation has developed with the transportation of heavy armored vehicles, both for reinforcements and for repairs. It was extremely difficult to transfer her to the side of Kherson. The defense was based on the steadfastness of the infantry and paratroopers, who created a thin line of defense in the fields and forest plantations of the Kherson region, on effective support by artillery and aviation.
Each battalion requires several trucks with supplies on the day of the battle. Even the bravest soldier can't fight much with one bayonet right now. The artillery division needs even more. Difficulties with supply routes led to a shortage of ammunition. Their stocks were melting, as well as the amount of serviceable military equipment. And there were no opportunities to radically change the situation. The combat capability of the group was falling. One of the constant strikes could pass through the weakened defense, cut the group and cut it off even from the meager supplies that were available.
Surely the military command considered other possibilities besides the withdrawal of troops. It was possible to try to move away from the existing front line to other lines, closer to Kherson. This would reduce the length of the front line, consolidate the battle formations and rely on urban development. The troops would be better protected from artillery and strikes, even with precision weapons. It would be possible to hold the city, even in conditions of a shortage of supplies, for months. But he would have to supply the most necessary things at night, in small boats, under continuous artillery shelling, with inevitable and constant losses. Now not only expensive high-precision complexes, but also ordinary field artillery could work along the river.
Delaying the defense would not change the overall situation. The possibility of a peace treaty is not visible on the horizon. New bridges, invulnerable to missiles and shells, would not have appeared across the Dnieper either. The Ukrainian command could at any moment put a trump card on the table — blow up the culverts at the Kakhovskaya HPP and increase the flow of water from its HPPs. This would provoke a flood of the Dnieper and for several days, or even weeks, would make it almost impossible to supply the garrison even by water, which would make it possible to completely isolate it and try to defeat it.
Defense in the city would lead to catastrophic destruction of Kherson, the death of not only its inhabitants, but also to the most serious injury for the settlement itself. We have all already seen the price of persistent urban battles on the example of Mariupol, Severodonetsk, Popasnaya.
After the withdrawal of troops, the crossings across the Dnieper destroyed by Ukrainians are against them. There is no question of any possibility of overcoming the VFU river. Already, the construction of a line of fortifications can be seen on fresh satellite images throughout its entire length. Having received hard lessons from the Zaporozhye NPP, it is unlikely that the enemy will decide on a new adventure of landing light forces, and heavy formations in modern conditions cannot be transported.
Much smaller forces than are currently involved will be able to hold the defense along the Dnieper. The shelled formations will now be transferred to other sectors of the front. After achieving the tactical objectives of the offensives in the area of Ugledar, Artemovsk, Kremennaya and Svatov, Russian troops are likely to switch to strategic defense for the winter period. There, their experience gained in heavy battles on the right bank will come in handy.
Of course, the forces will be released from the enemy. The grouping assembled for the attack on Kherson may, after the restoration of combat readiness and replenishment, turn out to be in another strategic direction. Therefore, no one plans to relax. It is unlikely that one of the parties will decide on major offensives in the winter.
The upcoming pause should be used for the full training of the mobilized and replenishment of troops. It is necessary to launch mass production of inexpensive, but highly effective means of destruction, which have proven themselves admirably in the defense of Kherson — adjustable projectiles, attack drones, precision weapons and communications equipment. The Russian army should start the next campaign already at a new technical level.
Anton Lavrov — military observer of IzvestiaThe editorial board's position may not coincide with the author's opinion
