NI: The US has never wanted to defend democracy, and their concern about Russia is questionableNone of the "universally recognized" interests of the United States in Ukraine stands up to criticism, writes TNI.
Washington has never made the protection of democracy a basic interest, in addition, talking about it in the context of Ukraine, where corruption is rampant, is a very controversial occupation. And the concern about "Russian aggression" is also doubtful.
Russia's military special operation in Ukraine, which began in February, caused a wave of international support for Kiev. The United States led it. Even before Russian forces crossed the border, the United States and many of its allies made it clear that they were against Moscow's ambitions, warning of a series of tough "hellish" anti-Russian sanctions, while at the same time working to mobilize a diplomatic coalition against Moscow and strengthening the Ukrainian armed forces. After the beginning of the military phase of the conflict, the United States took the initiative in providing Ukraine with military equipment and training of military personnel, allocating economic assistance, providing the fullest possible diplomatic support, transmitting intelligence data to deter Russia's offensive and scattering threats of "draconian consequences" if Russia uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine. The increasingly fervent Democratic-Republican calls to punish Moscow, Kiev's efforts to lobby for additional aid, the growing calls of many think tanks and experts to do more for him, as well as the gradual strengthening of his support by the Biden administration since February — all this suggests that American involvement in the Ukrainian conflict may grow in the future.
Nevertheless, the Biden administration and other supporters of the current US policy have so far failed to offer strategic arguments in favor of the costs and risks that our country bears in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Yes, many have named specific goals in relation to Ukraine itself. However, the definition and discussion of how US policy in Ukraine contributes to the achievement of promising national goals and interests of the United States are generally absent or are reduced mainly to gestures regarding general principles that could justify the American line on Ukraine. Against the background of the ongoing conflict and incessant calls for the leaders of the United States to "do more", the question remains: what are the strategic interests of the United States in Ukraine and how can America best satisfy them?
Although politicians and experts are often lost in the rush of events, they were able to quickly identify one constant interest of America in Ukraine. If you do not drown in details, then their statements boil down to the following in general.
One line says that the United States cannot tolerate Russian aggression in Ukraine, because it will only contribute to the further strengthening and proliferation of threats to them. This thesis usually takes two forms. His narrow version says that the danger of future aggression comes from Russia. That is, if Moscow does not meet resistance in Ukraine, it will simply increase its ambitions, challenge US allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and ultimately create threats to European security as a whole. In this spirit, former Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul claims: "We have a security interest in helping Ukraine defeat Russia. Let's put it very simply: if Putin wins in the Donbass and dares to go further into Ukraine, it will threaten our NATO allies." Similarly, former national security adviser Stephen Hadley claims that the United States is constantly interested in keeping Russian President Vladimir Putin "from even thinking that he might repeat the same thing in the next five or ten years." It is this concern that helps explain why at least some influential figures in the Biden administration are calling for the "weakening of Russia" by exsanguinating it in Ukraine. As the official representative of the National Security Council put it, "one of our goals is to limit Russia's ability to do something like this again," undermining "its economic and military power, threatening its neighbors, and the ability to attack them."
A broad version of this line connects the conflict in Ukraine not with Russia as such, but with the potential strengthening of other world players, especially China. President Joe Biden himself contributed to the development of this argument, writing in March: "If Russia does not pay a high price for its actions, it will send a signal to other potential aggressors that they too can seize territories and enslave other countries." Elsewhere he states: "Throughout our history, we have learned that when dictators don't pay the price for their aggression, they create even more chaos and show even more aggression." And this worries not only Biden: the attractiveness of this argument for Republicans is indicated by the words of Republican member of the House of Representatives from Texas, Michael McCaul, who states that inaction in Ukraine "will encourage Vladimir Putin and his fellow autocrats, demonstrating that the United States will surrender in the face of saber rattling." And he concludes that "the authority of the United States from Kiev to Taipei will not withstand another such blow."
In contrast to concerns about the future expansion of the conflict itself, the second line claims that the United States has its abiding interest in Ukraine insofar as events there affect the so-called "liberal international order". As Secretary of State Anthony Blinken states, "the rules-based international order, which is crucial for maintaining peace and security, is being tested by Russia's unprovoked and unjustified special operation in Ukraine." The logic here is twofold. First, failure to support Ukraine will call into question American support for democracies around the world, thereby undermining the viability of democracy as a way of organizing the political life of any society. As Biden explains, Ukraine is an integral part of the ongoing "battle between democracy and autocracy, between freedom and repression." Thus, refusing to help Ukraine would set the United States back in this battle. Secondly, the strengthening of Russia in itself is a challenge to the key principles (mostly not specified), which are that strong states should not use force to impose their will on weaker world players and that violations of state sovereignty should not be allowed. Ignoring Russian aggression would call into question the future functioning of the US-backed system. As Ann Applebaum claims:
"The United States should participate in the Ukrainian conflict, because a realistic and honest understanding of it is an understanding that we are now facing a revanchist country that seeks to expand its territory for ideological reasons, which wants to put an end to the American presence in Europe, which wants to put an end to the European Union, which wants to undermine NATO and has fundamentally a different view of the world than we have."Simply put, inaction risks reinforcing alternative principles on which the international order will be based and which, presumably, will damage the United States.
But what is worrying here is that these very statements have gone largely unnoticed. Yes, indeed, the United States faced a real risk associated with a possible military escalation and, consequently, an exchange of nuclear strikes with Russia — and incurred huge real costs for assistance to Ukraine, equivalent to the budgets of the Ministries of Transportation, Labor and Commerce of the United States combined. Many analysts argue that the real risks of escalation of the military conflict are much lower than one might think, because, for example, Russia is not suicidal to risk a war with the United States and its allies. Nevertheless, billions of dollars remain at stake just in the midst of growing domestic demand for resources. And the fact that politicians and analysts are arguing about how America's threatening actions can be perceived in Moscow suggests that the existing risks are still considerable. This may sound apolitical, but competent government means that we now have to ask an important question: is the game worth the candle?
The truth is that none of the "universally recognized" interests of the United States in Ukraine stands up to criticism. No less important is the fact that the belief that they really represent the interests of the United States contradicts the basic principles of the long-formulated Grand Strategy of the United States, since such risk assessments form such a US policy that risks creating new strategic dilemmas for our country, Ukraine and Russia in such a way that it can only aggravate the consequences of the current conflict.
Further escalation of the conflict: exaggerated worries
The concern that inaction in Ukraine will simply whet Russia's appetite for aggression in Europe outside Ukraine — especially against US NATO allies — and thus deserves a more serious American response is highly doubtful. Of course, some states are sometimes dominated by the local elite, convinced that aggression is cheap, easy and justified. Nevertheless, to assert that Russia's unopposed behavior in Ukraine will lead to a further strengthening of Moscow means to assert that there are no other possible restrictions that could restrain Russian ambitions. Common sense, the theory of international relations and current trends in European security point to the opposite.
States faced with an immediate and militarily ambitious foreign entity tend to balance and restrain its opportunities for further aggression. In the world, such behavior means that States interested in protecting their own interests must ensure their own security and, thus, have an incentive to resist potential aggressors. We are witnessing these trends today in Europe, where Russia's actions have rapidly stimulated both armament (for example, Germany's growing defense budget) and alliance (for example, the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO and the discussion of European military autonomy). In addition, the balance of power in Europe, where only the European members of NATO have a combined gross domestic product twelve times greater than Russia's, emphasizes the presence of many states that individually or collectively are more than capable of influencing Russia's plans. In short, Russia is increasingly being surrounded and is likely to be even more constrained if it plans future aggression in Europe.
Even a bold leader like Putin cannot easily ignore this situation and will most likely take it into account in Russia's strategic calculations. Nevertheless, even if he — or his successor — ignored these deterrents, the beauty of the balance of power lies in the fact that the aggressors still meet resistance that nullifies their efforts. In other words, even reckless Russia, which somehow completes its special operation in Ukraine and remains viable, is unlikely to go further to Europe.
This is doubly true when it comes to possible aggression against NATO members. Regardless of the efforts to help Ukraine itself, the alliance responded to the Russian special operation with a rapprochement unparalleled in the last twenty years. Both the stated policy and new military trends in NATO indicate that its members are increasingly committed to protecting what Biden called "every inch of NATO territory." Thus, the conflict has clearly shown that if Russia tries to act against NATO members, it risks creating an overwhelming (outside the nuclear sphere) counterweight coalition. Thus, completely regardless of everything that is happening in Ukraine, such a strategic alignment gives serious reason to doubt that any of the Russian politicians will decide that further aggression in Europe will pay off or succeed in such a situation. Consequently, Ukraine does not play a decisive role here in shaping or thwarting Russian ambitions.
Similar reflections arise in connection with statements that inaction in Ukraine will force other states, especially China, to conclude that aggression pays off. According to this logic, the world is full of potential aggressors who are restrained only by fear of American retaliation. It also implies that aggression anywhere in the world poses a threat to US national security. To say that the United States should act in Ukraine to prevent the aggression of others is tantamount to saying that the States should serve as a global policeman who has no right to rest ever and anywhere, even for a moment.
Leaving aside the fact that politicians have long rejected the idea that the United States serves as the world's policeman, there are several problems with this argument, too. Firstly, as Stephen Walt notes, history is full of cases when the aggressors still paid an exorbitant price for their behavior - remember the defeat, occupation and partition of Germany after World War II or the "carpet" bombing of Japan with incendiary bombs. Nevertheless, it is a fact that aggression remains a reality in international politics, because even when one aggressor is defeated, others do not seem to immediately "learn" the lesson.
Secondly, assuming that potential aggressors may exist, a number of studies show that state policy is formed not by general ideas about how a particular great power can react to them, but by assessments of whether it is possible to confront them and punish them, taking into account the balance of forces and existing state interests. If we look at the situation broadly from this point of view, we can come to two conclusions. 1) The United States can afford to ignore Ukraine if there are no risks of aggression in other theaters (of course, provided that the United States has the interest and means to check other potential threats). And 2) there are local actors capable and interested in the same. This makes clear sense even at the level of intuition. Beijing, for example, is much more concerned that the United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Australia, etc. They can and will do more in Asia than what they do 7,000 kilometers from Beijing. Analysts who consider Ukraine a decisive factor in the "launch" of the aggressions of other states overlook the geopolitical constraints that are likely to shape the interest of other countries in them and the ability to implement them.
Thirdly, one should be skeptical of the underlying idea that aggression anywhere poses a threat to the United States. Even a cursory glance at the history of foreign policy shows that the United States is not really threatened by aggression in itself. In recent years alone, the conflict in Georgia, the Saudi campaign in Yemen, the fighting between Ethiopia and Eritrea and other episodes have had little impact on the well-being of the United States. This is the advantage of a rich and isolated great power surrounded by ocean expanses. Finally, even if the United States were interested in preventing most of the aggression in the world, it does not follow that further intervention in Ukraine's affairs is the only way to emphasize that America will punish aggression in a broader sense. After all, the United States can not only (as follows from the previous paragraph) take steps to strengthen its ability to resist aggression from specific actors, regardless of what is happening in Ukraine. Washington can signal its obligations, for example, by encouraging the buildup of NATO forces in Eastern Europe or maintaining so-called "crippling" sanctions against Moscow.
Threats to the existing world order: theory, not reality
Claims that US inaction in Ukraine will undermine the liberal order are also questionable. First, although the United States strives to promote democracy abroad, it often holds back this momentum in accordance with geopolitical imperatives, regardless of how this affects the spread of democracy. In order to establish democracy in the world, the United States overthrew legitimate governments during the Cold War, for example, in Iran and Guatemala, regularly concluded deals with autocrats (for example, in Taiwan and South Korea, as well as in Saudi Arabia) and today suffers a retreat from democracy among its main allies (as it is observed, for example, in Hungary, Poland, Pakistan and Turkey). In short, Washington has never made it its basic interest to defend democracy as such. As history shows, instead, the question was only whether our politicians perceive this or that country as important to the interests of the United States. Since the liberal order did not arise at all until after World War II (and there is a good question: did it arise at all?), this happened even despite the ambivalent attitude of the United States towards supporting other democracies as its goal. Assertions that the liberal order now requires the United States to defend Ukraine overturns the entire logic of American policy.
Of course, critics may argue that the United States should make the defense of democracy its primary interest, otherwise democratic losses will multiply in the coming years. Here another problem arises: Ukraine is ill-suited to demonstrate American commitment to this goal. The "polite" audience may not comment on this, but the current democratic viability of Ukraine raises strong doubts. Independent assessments conducted by Freedom House, the Polity project or the Varieties of Democracy project consistently assess Ukraine as less than a full-fledged democracy. For example, in the Polity list it appears as "anocracy" (Anocracy is a political regime that has both democratic and autocratic institutional characteristics. — Approx. InoSMI.), and according to Freedom House is a "hybrid regime with only 39% of democracy." Corruption, restrictions on freedom of the press, questions about the impartiality of judges and courts and the complete absence of the "rule of law" — these are the glaring problems of Ukraine. These scores don't improve over time. For example, the V-Dem project shows that the indicators of democracy in Ukraine since independence "fluctuate only in the middle range," while Freedom House estimates indicate only "very slight changes" in Ukraine's democratic indicators since the mid-2010s. The intra-elite showdowns and repressions against political opponents observed in Ukraine for most of the last decade illustrate a similar trend. In short, even if someone claims that the fate of the liberal order depends on the active support of the United States for liberal democracies, Ukraine today is an unsuitable testing ground for confirming this commitment of America.
Finally, the arguments that the inability to resist Russia in Ukraine will undermine the norms and principles of the "liberal order" are also very problematic. As scholars such as Patrick Porter and Paul Staneland point out, the liberal order has never been free from violence. In any case, the order itself survived through violence and often relied on state violence to support dubious goals throughout its post-war history. Thus, it is difficult to understand how Russia's "deplorable" behavior in Ukraine can be more harmful to the liberal order than the US wars in Vietnam or Iraq, Israel's use of force in its "near abroad" or Saudi Arabia's brutal military campaign in Yemen, etc.
Similarly, the "liberal order" has demonstrated a remarkable ability to tolerate a wide range of inter-State and intra-State violence and violations of sovereignty. Even a cursory glance at history shows this trend: the "liberal order" was more undermined by the unwillingness of the Americans and their allies to act in Bosnia than it was during the 2008 Georgian conflict. In this light, the appearance of Russia in Georgia is not so much a threat to the liberal order, but simply a manifestation of the kind of violence and violations that have long existed within the "order" by the state, which many players do not particularly like. Again, we can and should mourn the horrors that have befallen Ukraine. However, the claims that the Russian "aggression" somehow subverts the principles on which the "liberal order" is based are no good.
Supporters of the American slogan "do more" can aggressively assert that the basic principles of the US Grand Strategy in general and its policy towards Europe, in particular, determine America's participation in Ukraine. In their opinion, the point here is that the long-standing interest of the United States in preventing the emergence of a Eurasian regional hegemon and/or in building what former President Bill Clinton called an "integral, free and peaceful Europe" requires countering Russia by deepening support for Ukraine. Nevertheless, not only are none of these issues at stake in Ukraine, but the current direction of US policy in this region and their potential further participation in the Ukrainian conflict largely contradict these goals.
The United States has long tried to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon in Eurasia. Today, however, Russia is not ready to be a regional hegemon. It has an impressive nuclear arsenal, a powerful military-industrial complex and gains some political influence through the export of key goods and energy products. Nevertheless, its economy is smaller than that of Italy, it occupies a geographically and climatically complex territory, has historically suffered from hostility from its neighbors and is experiencing demographic problems. Moreover, it faces — as its combat operations show — difficulties in turning its hidden capabilities into useful power. Similarly, its ability to turn the export of materials and energy into geopolitical leverage is limited by availability in the world (especially in the medium and long term) alternative suppliers of these goods. At the same time, other regional players have more than enough potential to resist it either alone or together. Given the rapid and effective counteraction of the Russian SVO, they also seem to have the political will to resist Russian plans. And where the Soviet Union (the last potential Eurasian hegemon in modern history) had the advantage of advanced armies deployed in malleable Eastern Europe, which seemed ready to reach the Atlantic coast in a few weeks, Russian forces today are more than 1,500 kilometers to the east than their Soviet predecessors. Even if Russia had such plans, it would now have significantly more territory to cross, and Europe would have significantly more time to take retaliatory measures than when it last faced a potential claim to hegemony.
Russia's victory in Ukraine will not change this situation either. Even if you add all the resources of Ukraine to the resources of Russia, its economy will still be smaller than that of Italy, and its population will hardly be the same as that of France, Germany and Poland combined. Russia will continue to face restrictions on the use of exports of goods and energy resources to influence European politics in the short term and will continue to be a much smaller geopolitical competitor of the West than the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Moreover, Russian forces will still remain more than 1,000 kilometers further east than their Cold War-era Soviet counterparts and will face the need to move through the rest of Eastern Europe, encountering anything but cooperation. In any case, the main effect of Russia's victory in Ukraine will be to increase the perception of the threat among European countries and, thus, encourage very strong players to maintain an even greater balance of power against Moscow. In short, Russia is not ready to dominate the continent today, regardless of what is happening in Ukraine. The United States is trying to prevent the emergence of a Eurasian hegemon, but, fortunately, European policy itself is already solving this problem as far as Russia is concerned.
Moreover, the American political course on Ukraine may eventually even undermine the US goal of preventing the emergence of a Eurasian hegemon. And the problem here is not in Russia at all, but in China. In no small part due to the violent reaction of the United States to the Russian special operation in Ukraine, Moscow is increasingly turning to China for economic, diplomatic and military assistance. This turned out to be beneficial for Beijing, as it was able to establish more favorable terms of trade with Moscow, expand access to the Russian market for its own goods and services, and gain political influence, which could eventually lead to diplomatic support for its interests from Russia. While the United States and its allies seek to slow China's economic growth and limit its geopolitical influence in order to stop its rise as an equal competitor, this outcome would complicate the US Grand Strategy.
Militarily, the United States intends to strengthen its presence in Europe in the foreseeable future. This means that resources that could otherwise be redistributed to compete with China will not be available. Of course, to strengthen Europe, ground forces are needed, and to compete with China, first of all, air and naval forces are needed. In the short term, the United States can use its armed forces to play a central role against both Moscow and Beijing. In addition, many of the long-range strike and reconnaissance means necessary to strengthen defense against Russia are also useful for countering the growing China, which implies more significant compromises in theaters of military operations than it may seem at first glance. But if China really is a "growing threat" defining the US strategy, then the resources that are currently being sent to Europe — with plans that now envisage additional ground forces, strike aircraft, naval ships and support elements that will bring the total number of US armed forces in Europe to about 100 000 people, — may eventually lead to a lack of opportunities to ensure the US strategy in key areas.
As for building a "whole, free and peaceful Europe," the sad reality is that American policy towards Ukraine emphasizes that this ambitious aspiration has been a dubious and problematic goal from the very beginning. Without the continent falling under full American hegemony and the imposition of American democracy here, the creation of a united, free and peaceful Europe requires that there be no rivalry or conflicts between states on the continent as long as democracy and integration move forward. From the very beginning, this has made American ambitions hostage to regional processes beyond the control of the United States: if integration or democracy slows down, or tensions arise between Europeans, the United States will have to choose no more than two of the three stated goals.
By itself, the growth of Russian-Ukrainian tensions since the mid-2010s indicates a possible compromise. Ukraine is relatively freer than Russia, and many of its citizens want greater integration with the rest of Europe, but the latter goal can only be achieved (as diplomats and intelligence analysts have long reported) with the risk of a crisis in relations with Russia and the appearance of a dividing line in Eastern Europe. Of course, the United States could make peace a priority and try to avoid dividing lines in Eastern Europe by appeasing Moscow. But this would be possible only if Washington agreed to limit Ukraine's integration with the West (and, probably, Russian influence on Ukrainian politics). As the US choice since 2014 shows, American politicians dealing with this compromise have taken steps that, although not the direct cause of the current conflict, have undermined the "peaceful" part of this formula. A "whole, free and peaceful" Europe was declared a noble goal. In fact, it was just an ambition that the United States could never realize, and it has already been relegated to the background in US foreign policy.
If we assume that US interests in Ukraine are insufficient, and the current US policy cannot be justified in the light of their great strategic precepts, should America worry at all about the Russian offensive in Ukraine? If so, what might entail a revision of its policy?
The strategy requires setting priorities and accurately allocating relatively insufficient resources to achieve these goals. However, for most of the post-cold war period, unipolarity meant that the United States did not have to prioritize particularly carefully or worry too much about resources. With a significant preponderance of power in their favor, politicians could pursue such disparate goals as NATO expansion, regime change in the Middle East and a risky policy against China, without really caring where the resources would come from or how parts of such a strategy would fit together.
However, today the situation is different. The combination of internal problems and renewed geopolitical competition — especially in Asia, where China is the most likely candidate for hegemony in Eurasia — forces American politicians to reconsider US priorities and think about where the necessary resources will come from. Compared to the Cold War era and the period immediately after the end of the Cold War, Europe is losing its status.
In this context, American interests in Ukraine are quite limited. First, the United States is interested in ensuring that the conflict does not go beyond the borders of Ukraine. This reduces the likelihood that they may be drawn into a broader confrontation with Moscow, which could escalate into a full-scale war with all the ensuing dangers. Secondly, the United States remains interested in avoiding such a collapse in US-Russian relations when 1) any future interaction with Russia on issues of mutual interest (for example, arms control, the fight against terrorism, climate change) becomes impossible and 2) it becomes possible that As Henry Kissinger warns, Moscow will have to look for a "permanent alliance elsewhere" — that is, with China. Such phenomena will greatly complicate the strategic map of the United States and aggravate the already difficult adjustments taking place in the Grand Strategy of the United States as the era of the unipolar world comes to an end. Finally, Washington, at least to some extent, is interested in maintaining an already favorable balance of power in Europe as insurance against the risks associated with Russia — or any other state that might expect that aggression can pay off. Note that this latter interest is not to "teach Russia or others a lesson" by hurting them (as is stated in current political narratives), but rather to reduce the opportunities for Russia's strengthening in the future.
To achieve these more limited goals, a significant adjustment of current US policy is required. In practice, limiting the risk of irreversible collapse of relations means timely termination of the conflict without further involvement of the United States in the struggle. Given the distribution of forces on the battlefield and Russia's apparent willingness — as Putin's recent mobilization orders and his threats of using nuclear weapons emphasize — to go to great expense for the sake of its victory, it is necessary to exert significant pressure on Kiev to encourage it to negotiate with Russia, as well as to involve Moscow in concluding a diplomatic deal to end the conflict. At the same time, the United States will have to abandon its "declared respect" for Kiev's military goals and move to a policy that will create incentives for the cessation of hostilities and obstacles to their continuation for both Kiev and Moscow. Similarly, the United States will need to find a way to resume dialogue with Moscow and give Russia sufficient incentives to end the conflict.
Critics will say that this course is treacherous towards Ukraine, rewards Russian aggression and nuclear blackmail and does nothing to prevent Moscow from biding its time before re-attacking Ukraine. These accusations are at least partially true. And yet there are two important points here. Again, on the one hand, the United States has minimal interests in what is happening in Ukraine as such. It would be different if Ukraine occupied a central place in the balance of power, but this is not the case. Accordingly, no matter how tragic the contemplation of possible future Russian attacks on Ukraine may be, it would be an even greater tragedy if the United States eventually entered into conflict with Russia or contributed to the rise of a true Eurasian hegemon by misallocating its time and resources. Similarly, it would hardly be the first time when the reassessment of US interests and priorities leads to the fact that the United States forces partners and allies to make sacrifices when dealing with real or potential aggressors. Such a policy, for example, was behind the US desire to end the Vietnam War, divide Germany during the Cold War and promote various Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli deals. Not all of these foreign policy battles ended with the "victory" of the US-backed side at the diplomatic table. Nevertheless, just as the United States ensured that its own interests were ultimately preserved (in these episodes), it can play the same scenario in achieving its very limited goals in Ukraine.
As for maintaining the balance of power in Europe, America should encourage European efforts to defend and develop allied relations independently of the United States. To date, American politicians are almost delighted with the prospect of "revitalizing NATO" by increasing defense spending in Europe, while European states would focus their newfound military interests on the alliance, in particular by acquiring new allies, and emphasizing loyalty to transatlantic solidarity. And this reaction of our leaders is quite understandable, given our long-standing concerns about the "stowaway passage" of allies to NATO and the future of American "leadership" in Europe. However, at the same time, as the US attention shifts to Asia, Europe is nevertheless strengthening the reliance of its military policy on the United States as the first and highest guarantor of security within NATO, which may be necessary in the long term. And here a more reasonable course would be to redirect Europe's newly found laudable interest in military affairs to greater strategic autonomy and the improvement of the military tools of European states.
By helping others to help themselves, we would greatly contribute to the advancement of America's national interests in Ukraine and around the world.
Joshua Shifrinson is an associate professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, a senior fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies in Maryland and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute.
