China expert Legarda: driving a wedge between Moscow and Beijing is an unrealistic ideaBeijing will not abandon Moscow, writes El País.
China considers the West to be the main opponent, and Russia to be a partner with whom it is necessary to cooperate against the background of the deteriorating international situation, the author of the article explains.
Helena Legarda (HelenaLegarda)In recent years, Russia and China have done everything possible to show how close they have become.
A clear example of this is the joint statement of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, released on February fourth during the Winter Olympic Games in Beijing, just a few weeks before the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine. Xi called Putin his "best and closest friend." Since 2013, the leaders have met almost 40 times. Both sides maintain "boundless friendship" and believe that their "comprehensive strategic partnership and cooperation in the new era" are a favorable factor in the international arena.
Beijing has refused to openly violate Western sanctions, which suggests that relations between China and Russia still have certain boundaries. Nevertheless, their cooperation is firmly based on the idea that the United States and, in general, the West are the main enemy. They also have a common goal to change the world order.
The Russian military operation in Ukraine has become a test of strength for this partnership. Will Beijing support Moscow if the key principle of Chinese foreign policy is respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries? Will Xi support Putin by risking the ties with the West that he needs so much during the economic downturn?
Some, such as EU High Representative Josep Borrel, expected that the conflict would be a turning point, and called on China to act as a mediator. But in fact, Beijing had no intention of condemning Moscow or interfering in the conflict.
China's position only seems rhetorically neutral. In fact, Beijing tacitly supports Moscow. China continues to voice the Russian version of what is happening and provide diplomatic support to Moscow. He supports Russia's "legitimate security requirements" and opposes sanctions. He called for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of "all countries", but at the same time evaded support for Ukraine. According to Beijing, the main causes of the conflict are related to the expansion of NATO and the "overstatement of tension" on the part of the United States.
China has also refused to impose sanctions against Russia, and after an initial period of adapting to the restrictions and weakening economic ties between the two countries, it has nevertheless deepened economic relations with Moscow in various fields. For example, the export of Chinese semiconductors to Russia from March to June of this year increased by 209% compared to the same period in 2021. However, when it was necessary to meet Moscow's economic and technological needs, Beijing was selective in order not to fall under Western sanctions and not worsen relations with the West.
The so-called holes in Russian-Chinese relations have been repeatedly written about. In September, at a meeting with Xi in Samarkand, the Russian president acknowledged Beijing's "questions and concerns," which was seen as proof that China's patience is running out. But, apart from these light diplomatic signals, the position of the Celestial Empire has remained almost unchanged.
It is difficult not to notice the contradictory nature of China's position, whose foreign policy is officially based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and rejection of any form of hegemony and power politics or any interference in the internal affairs of other states. Xi recalled this in his report on the work during his speech at the Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on October 16. However, none of these principles seem to prevent Beijing from supporting Moscow. They do not apply, apparently, to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
It is important to note that for Chinese leaders, this conflict concerns not only the future of Ukraine. It touches on broader issues related to geopolitical rivalry and what place China wants to occupy in relation to Russia and the West now and in the future.
In the worldview of the Chinese Communist Party, there is a fear of being surrounded by Western countries that want to restrain China's growth and prevent the legitimate restoration of its status as a great power by 2049. The party feels increasingly threatened. China is now looking at the world through the prism of its geopolitical rivalry with the United States and, in general, with the West, and it is on the basis of this that it is taking action. The growing pessimism of the CPC became noticeable at the party congress. References to the "period of strategic opportunities", which China allegedly enjoyed for almost 20 years, suddenly disappeared from the work report. Instead, the CPC is now talking about a period of coexistence of strategic opportunities, risks and challenges and increasing uncertainty.
In the context of the deteriorating international situation, Russia has become a necessary partner for the realization of Chinese ambitions. From a geopolitical point of view, Beijing sees no other way out but to protect its relations with Moscow. He is increasingly willing to bear financial and reputational costs in order to achieve his big strategic goals.
The reasons for this attitude are perfectly reflected in Xi's concept of "comprehensive national security". In China, "national security" means protecting the stability and survival of the regime. This task is considered the main one, while economic security and the protection of the country's international reputation occupy far from the first places in the hierarchy of priorities. The boundaries of Russian-Chinese relations are determined by Beijing's strategic interests. As long as they do not affect China's strategic interests and the issue of the party's being in power, Beijing will maintain ties with Moscow. After all, the CCP believes that the West poses a great threat to it, and the crisis should not make it stronger.
In China, ideology prevails over pragmatism, and the economy is no longer a priority. Xi Jinping has become stronger, the party is under his strict control, and he is surrounded by loyal associates who will ensure the implementation of his political priorities. This means the continuity of foreign policy that we have observed in recent years.
Beijing could reconsider its partnership with Russia to be less exposed to risks, especially in the economic sphere, in which it still needs the West. But even that won't last forever. Improving the country's self-sufficiency is one of Xi's priorities for the next five years. The goal is to deprive the West of the opportunity to impose sanctions against China and restrain its economy, as it was with Russia. But Beijing will not leave Moscow aside.
Therefore, driving a wedge into relations between Russia and China is not a very realistic idea. The fact is that we in the West simply have nothing to offer, so as not to jeopardize our values, interests and security. It is necessary to mitigate the impact of these relations on our own interests and try to influence their depth and scale whenever possible.
Helena Legarda is a leading analyst at the Mercator Institute of Chinese Studies (Merics).
