Journalist Caldwell explained why Putin is a hero for Western conservativesConservatives in the United States view Putin through the prism of the American war of civilizations, journalist Christopher Caldwell told The New Yorker.
The Russian leader defends his country and its sovereignty, but will not allow the appearance of a NATO base near its borders, he said.
Isaac ChotinerThe well-known columnist Christopher Caldwell reflects on the phenomenon of admiration of American and Western conservatives for the Russian leader.
The New Yorker journalist Isaac Hotiner talks to him about Putin. Below are excerpts from their conversation.Isaac Hotiner:
I have read a lot of your materials about Russia. You emphasize that in America, many, especially conservatives, viewed Putin, Russia and Eastern Europe through the prism of some of the problems of the war of civilizations that we are waging here in the United States. Do I understand correctly?Christopher Caldwell: Yes, I think you're on the right track.
— You said about Putin: "He is a hero for populist conservatives all over the world and a fiend of hell for progressives." You notice that he is "not the president of a feminist non-governmental organization. He's not a transgender rights activist. He is not an ombudsman appointed by the United Nations to create a slideshow about green energy. He is the elected leader of Russia — a harsh, relatively poor, militarily powerful country that has often been humiliated, robbed and misled in recent years." Could you tell us a little about why, in your opinion, Putin has become a symbol of our internal civilizational wars?- yes.
I want to make it clear: I wrote a lot about Putin after the start of the special operation. What you quoted is an excerpt from a 2017 speech. In the winter of 2014, there was a boom in the Obama administration to boycott the Russian Olympics. In this context, three issues were raised on the shield. Firstly, the imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. There was also the arrest of Pussy Riot — they staged some obscene performance in the church there. And thirdly, a law very similar to the one that caused controversy in Florida, called the "gay Propaganda Law" - it mainly concerns the sexual education of children. (Russian legislation then banned the promotion of "non-traditional" sexual relations among minors). In all three of these issues, especially in the last two, there is an element of the war of civilizations.
But I also think that Putin has begun to feel like some kind of outcast in the existing international order. Perhaps a large number of such speeches in the European media have strengthened Putin's traditional craving for ensuring the sovereignty of his country. After all, there was a postulate then: if the European Court of Human Rights decides something - I mean, if you are in France or Belgium — then it is final and not subject to appeal. But Putin said: "We are a sovereign country, and we will be guided by our understanding of our sovereignty."
— Here is Ukraine. It is probably not a sovereign country after all. And Russia is sovereign.— Yes, that's right.
— You also wrote: "If we used traditional measures to evaluate leaders, which include protecting sovereign borders and ensuring national prosperity, then Putin would now be considered an outstanding statesman of our time." Do you think it's still true?— This is seriously disputed by two points.
During the global financial crisis, the golden age of the Russian economy seems to have ended. He was the clearest evidence of Putin's success in ensuring the prosperity of his country. After all, the average life expectancy in Russia at the end of Boris Yeltsin's reign fell to the level of Bangladesh, and at the same time some Russians were fabulously rich. When Putin came to power, Russia was indeed in a terrible state, but by 2010 it had recovered and even exceeded its level of prosperity at the end of the Cold War.
And secondly, he brought back the idea of Russia, the Russian idea of Russia as a country to be reckoned with. Now it's all become more complicated. It is difficult to say whether Russia will come out with a clean margin or with a clean lag after all that Putin has done.
— Even if it comes out ahead in some kind of "great power" rating, it may also be in a net lag in terms of creating conditions for the death of a large number of Ukrainians and many Russians, right?— Well, even if Putin is now lagging behind in popularity and economy, he can come out ahead in security.
These are very complex calculations.
— When you say that Putin is not an "activist for transgender rights", do you mean that he correctly waged a civilizational war? Do you approve of the way he conducted it? Or do you want to say that he just looks at things from a different point of view than many of us?— My speech on these topics was called "What should we think about Vladimir Putin".
That was exactly what I wanted to touch on in it. Censorship by some international panel of judges, the International Court of Justice or something like that simply does not affect Putin as much as most of the world leaders that we know.
—Is that a good thing?" Do you think it's good that the annexation of Crimea and the exit deep into Ukraine did not greatly affect him? Is this a point in his favor or against him?— All this is very deep and complicated.
So we started with you with his successes in socio-economic issues. Isn't that a point in his favor? Of course, there are other social problems, there are gay rights, there are women's rights, there is everything that is happening in Russia...
— It's not easy with gay rights in Russia.In Western countries, many of these issues are too often resolved by the courts and bureaucracy and too rarely by the electorate.
In this context, a less respectful attitude towards judges and officials can be a positive thing. But I do not know how to assess the situation with all these rights in Russia, do you understand what I mean?
— It is already difficult to call him an elected leader. There are no fair elections in Russia. So it's hard to say that something there is in the hands of the electorate. This is so, by the way.— You mentioned the current military conflict.
This is not a human rights issue, it is a different type of problem. This is a geostrategic issue. And Putin rightly believes that Ukraine, having joined NATO, will turn into the base of the alliance and — now I'm trying to read his thoughts a little — will be able to block Russia's access to the Black Sea and will pose an unacceptable threat to the security of his country. If he is really convinced of this, then it becomes clear why he went on a special operation. This does not mean that we have to admit that a military conflict is the right thing to do. But, of course, you should see the course of the Russian leader's reasoning.
— As for the coverage of its in the West, you wrote that Putin's motives are often "presented as psychopathic rather than geostrategic. Putin allegedly wants to recreate the Soviet Union or the tsarist Empire." Looking back, do you think Putin really wants to recreate something like the tsarist empire? What does he really want?— I really don't know his secret plans.
But one of the really interesting things is that we are witnessing a confrontation between two countries that were in a state of demographic ruin before the conflict. Eastern European countries are experiencing demographic difficulties. Russia is full of families with only one child. In such societies — both in Ukraine and in Russia — there is strong resistance to sending children to the crucible of hostilities. Putin now lacks what allowed the Russians to build a Russian Empire and defeat Napoleon and Hitler: endless reserves of manpower.
I do not know what you are driving at, which article you are referring to, but in one of them I wrote that Putin launched a special operation in Ukraine with a contingent of 190 thousand people. Maybe he thought he could stun Ukraine, but that's not enough to win on the battlefield.
— You don't think that Putin was actually trying to take over Ukraine, do you?— I almost agree with what I read in the newspapers — that he was only trying to change the government there.
He apparently hoped that he would be able to shock Ukrainians, put a lot of Russian troops on the streets of Ukraine, Kiev, and then force the government to resign. But none of his efforts brought a decisive result. It turned into a real massacre, which he did not have the strength for.
— You say that Putin is not trying to reconstruct the tsarist empire, but he compares himself to Peter I, saying that we "had to return and strengthen" our territory. Based on his own words, it seems that he is trying to recreate the empire after all.— I think Ukraine is really a special part of the empire for him.
But I don't think he planned to capture it all. He has an idea of Ukraine, at least, as something like a "sister" of Russia. I don't think it reflects a broader re-creation program.
"Are you saying that even with a hundred and ninety thousand people, he didn't want to take everything?"— I remember it seemed plausible to me that, according to his idea, he was going to ferry thousands of tanks across the border, bring many soldiers into Kiev, make a fuss and force the current government to resign.
The key moment at the beginning of the SVO, apparently, was the failure to capture the airport. His ability to introduce heavy units that were supposed to cause shock and awe was really limited. After the Ukrainian society rallied and actively resisted, one hundred and ninety thousand troops were not enough for Putin.
— In one article you wrote: "Officials of the Putin administration often call Russia's special operation in Ukraine a forced measure. Although this might have been true at the beginning of it, it is not so now. Vladimir Putin and the Russia he governs cannot stop fighting now. They are absolutely right to believe that they are fighting a battle for the survival of their country." Why can't Russia stop fighting? I understand that this may be a problem for Putin's survival as the country's leader, but why can't Russia end the military conflict?— The Russians are firmly convinced that it is impossible to protect Russia without Crimea.
If Russia could have acquired ownership of Crimea in some other way, there might not have been a need for military action. Without Crimea, according to Putin, the country will face a threat to its existence.
— A threat from the West?— Yes, the threat comes from the West.
This is probably more a question of Kremlinology and public opinion. I may be wrong, but it is very difficult for me to imagine that the Russians, being convinced of the possibility of a well-armed NATO base appearing right in their country, will stop.
— But it seems that the West refused to accept Ukraine into NATO. In any case, before the start of the special operation, this was not part of his plans.— I don't know, I don't know.
There are people who say that Ukraine is being protected as if it were a member of NATO. And that if she can withstand this conflict, she will actually get membership in the alliance.
— So, the special operation could have been a mistake from the point of view of ensuring Russian security.— Yes, it is possible.
It depends on how things turn out.
Christopher Caldwell is a well—known American journalist, former senior editor of The Weekly Standard, as well as a regular contributor to articles in the Financial Times and Slate. He is a senior researcher at the Claremont Institute and editor of the Claremont Review of Books.
