The Atlantic: disputes over military aid to Ukraine are not abating in GermanyThe Atlantic writes about the ongoing disputes in Germany over military aid to Ukraine.
The history of the last war and the successful coexistence with the USSR in the post-war decades are a serious reason for the Germans not to interfere in the Ukrainian conflict even more.
Ann ApplebaumDisputes about which weapons to give to Ukraine are actually disputes about Germany itself.
In February last year, three days after Russia launched its special operation in Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz addressed the Bundestag and delivered a remarkable speech.
Scholz, a Social Democrat with little experience in military matters, told the Germans that their country, which has been used to thinking since the 1990s that it no longer needs a real army, will add 100 billion euros to its defense budget this year. According to him, Germany needs "flying planes, ships capable of going to sea, and soldiers optimally equipped to perform combat missions." He said that decades of growing dependence on Russian energy will end, and that Germany will start looking for alternative sources. And after several weeks of refusing to send weapons to Ukraine, he said that Germany would now send anti-tank weapons and Stinger missiles to Kiev.
Scholz called it a Zeitenwende, or "historic turning point," and not everyone was ready for it. Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, the chairman of the Bundestag defense committee (and a free Democrat, part of the government coalition), watched the faces of politicians from Scholz's own party. She saw that many were stunned. But still, she thought that the "turning point" would begin immediately. Instead, she said, it was as if Scholz "said these big words, and then had to sit down and rest."
And that's where we are now: since the Chancellor's speech, the Germans have been arguing about what assistance to Ukraine really means, what weapons can and cannot be sent, what can cause an extremely harsh reaction from Russia and what can help win the war. Despite the fact that more and more German weapons are coming to Ukraine, the debate about it remains much more heated in Germany. It's hard to imagine any major American talk show devoting an hour to talking about whether to send tanks to Ukraine or not, but recently one German talk show did it (I know because I was on it). Opposition politicians loudly criticized the government, but Strack-Zimmermann and other politicians from the ruling coalition criticized the pace and composition of aid. Anton Hofreiter, a member of the Bundestag from the Green Party, which is also part of the coalition, told me that the supply of heavy weapons to Ukraine took place only because so many people were "pushing and pushing" on the government. I caught a glimpse of emotion in these arguments during a series of meetings in Berlin last week, where I watched people ask questions to Wolfgang Schmidt, the head of Scholz's office. More than once he was asked about tanks then.
A little background: Germany has tanks that it could offer to Ukraine, but does not do it. The German government has also banned other European countries owning German-made tanks from sending these tanks to Ukraine. Nevertheless, Germany has sent many other heavy weapons, including those similar to tanks (the Flakpanzer Gepard anti-aircraft complex has artillery barrels and heavy metal tracks, which most people associate with tanks, and is already in Ukraine). Thanks to these supplies, as well as other air defense systems that shot down missiles in the sky over Kiev this week, Germany became the third largest supplier of weapons to Ukraine after the United States and Great Britain. Meanwhile, countries such as Poland handed over Soviet-style tanks to Ukraine that they had in their warehouses (and Ukraine took away many more tanks left by the Russian army). Large modern Western "main battle tanks" that can be used to attack Russian troops may give Ukraine some advantage. But they are not going to Ukraine. Many Germans think that this refusal is a form of some kind of indecision or unnecessary scrupulousness, and when they talk about it, they get angry pretty quickly.
So why aren't German tanks being sent to Ukraine? During the panel discussion, in which I also took part, Wolfgang Schmidt gave a number of explanations. Some of them were related to logistics: tanks, as he noted, require long supply chains and repair systems, and it will take a lot of time to prepare them. Some were even related to their appearance: "If tanks were captured with a German Iron cross on them," Schmidt said, "it would be a great reason for Russian propaganda to say: look, it's NATO attacking us."
But logistics can be adjusted. The appearance of tanks, at the moment, is hardly such a strong irritant. Putin knows perfectly well which side the German government is on, and in any case, German tanks sent to Ukraine will be painted in the colors of the Ukrainian flag, and not with German identification marks. In truth, the decisive argument here is political. As Schmidt said, "no one else supplies Ukraine" with modern tanks — neither the French, nor, most importantly, the Americans. And the Germans, or at least Scholz and Schmidt, are waiting for someone else, first of all, the United States, to go first.
The question arises: why? Germany could create a consortium of all countries owning German tanks — among them Poland, the Netherlands, Finland, Spain, Greece — and supply them together, which would help solve both the logistical problem and the issues of training military personnel. A group of Green and Liberal Democrat politicians issued a statement this week calling for this, "coordinated action by our partners and allies. Let's move forward together!" But it is unlikely that the Social Democrats will join them until the Chancellor decides to act. And at the moment Scholz is hesitant. Because this is not really a dispute about tanks. This is a dispute about Germany. And it is still not resolved.
The hint is contained in the historical background of the mentioned statement: "As a country responsible for the most terrible human rights crimes in Europe, especially in Poland and the countries of the former Soviet Union, we have a special responsibility for restoring and ensuring peace" and preventing human rights violations. In other words, this group of Greens and Liberal Democrats claims that the lessons of German history make Germany think about preventing a new genocide in Europe, even during a possible military intervention. They and other political forces in Germany feel this and often talk about it.
But over the past three quarters of a century, and especially in the three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany, many Germans have learned the exact opposite lesson from history. The lesson of 1945, as it was widely understood until now, was that Germany must prevent war at any cost by refusing to enter it, especially in Europe, regardless of the stakes in it. The lesson of 1989 was often understood in the same way. If Americans think that the Cold War was won thanks to nuclear weapons, the long-term presence of American troops in Europe and Ronald Reagan's desire to strengthen his obligations in NATO, then many Germans, especially in Scholz's Social Democratic Party, believe that compromises and trade helped to end the confrontation between the West and the USSR, and most importantly, the construction of mutually beneficial pipelines to Russian gas fields.
Of course, business interests play a significant role here, especially large German companies that have invested in these pipelines. Talk to a German industrialist or economist, and you can often hear real anxiety in their words: when will the Ukrainian military conflict end? When are we going to get back to normal? Along with zero military involvement, the old German history lesson also implied a green light for doing business with Russia, turning a blind eye to the growing evidence of Russian ambitions and assuming that a high level of economic interaction would sooner or later make Russians more active and friendly. The Wandel durch Handel mantra — "change through trade" — gained momentum both because it sounded beautiful and because it was very profitable. Although Strack-Zimmermann and Hofreiter are among the many Germans who have come to terms with the collapse of this paradigm, many others do not think so. The specter of a break with China, which buys billions of euros worth of cars and equipment from Germany every year, is now really becoming more threatening. Every new weapon sent to Ukraine becomes just another indication that the normal situation in Europe will not return in the near future.
Of course, elementary fear also plays a role. Perhaps due to the fact that the memory of German cities burned in World War II is still alive in Germany, the German media have been emphasizing the danger of the Russian nuclear arsenal since the very beginning of the war. Claudia Major, a military analyst at the German Institute of International Relations and Security, told me that her team had compiled a 100-page list of nuclear threats against Germany made by Russian officials and state propagandists who spoke either on Russian television or in the media. This intimidation tactic works. Calls for some kind of deal - for a forced settlement of the conflict — are as loud in Germany, especially among the extreme right and extreme left, as in similar pro—Russian political circles in America.
Of course, this message is very much liked by Russians who want to make the occupation of eastern Ukraine permanent — a fait accompli that will allow them to regroup, rearm, create a massive migration crisis in Europe, and then attack the rest of Ukraine a few years later. A temporary cease-fire would expand the capabilities of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who could declare victory now and continue his own later. Germany would not be safer, but in greater danger, as the borders of an aggressive, emboldened Russia would move further and further to the west. Although some in the political center of Germany logically understand this, many are still scared — that's why every category of weapons intended for Ukraine is becoming the subject of new debates, and perhaps partly why the chancellor does not want to be the first to supply heavy weapons to Ukrainians. Will the transfer of Western aircraft provoke the use of tactical nuclear weapons by the Russians in Ukraine, or maybe even the bombing of German cities? And the supply of long-range artillery? And the main battle tanks?
But the ferocity of the debate itself reflects the profound changes that have already taken place in German society. Of all the Western democracies, Germany has placed the biggest bet on trade with Russia and Russian gas, as well as the biggest bet on Putin's rationality. And it is Germany that is now paying the biggest economic price for this military conflict (take only the issue of gas). Nevertheless, support for the Ukrainian resistance remains very strong here. In a September poll, 70% of Germans surveyed still said they wanted to help Ukraine win, even if it meant higher energy prices.
Scholz himself recently spoke about the Russian "crusade" against liberal democracy, acknowledging that Putin is committed to the destruction of the world in which Germany used to exist and flourish. Schmidt likes to say that the acuteness and depth of the debate about tanks and other weapons in Germany reflects the fact that the Germans are not used to leadership, that they are still "in our teens." Yes, they are no longer blind followers, but they are also not quite ready to lead.
He is clearly right, although I would say differently: in fact, some Germans are ready to lead, some Germans have re-learned the lessons of history, and some Germans are beginning to convince their compatriots that the world has changed and that they should change with it. But we are far from winning this dispute. When they finally do, Europe will be ready to defend itself, and Russia will no longer be able to count on supporters of its appeasement. That's when the historic turning point of the Zeitenwende will finally become a reality.
