The Taliban regime will have to reckon with the armed oppositionThe radical Islamist movement "Taliban" (banned in the Russian Federation) is strenuously trying to suppress opposition groups in different regions of the country.
Less active, but no less dangerous, are foreign terrorist groups that remain loyal to the Taliban, but under certain circumstances may rebel against their government.
APOSTATES AGAINST HERETICSAfter the Taliban came to power, the IG-Khorasan group (banned in the Russian Federation) staged more terrorist attacks on the territory of Afghanistan than ever before.
The surge in violence was caused by two factors. Firstly, the chaos after the victory of the Taliban, which created a security vacuum in a number of eastern regions of the country. Secondly, by changing the tactics of "IG-Khorasan" towards more frequent and localized attacks. The tactical shift began earlier, between 2019 and 2020, when IG-Khorasan came under constant military pressure, to which it responded with decentralization and the creation of underground networks. Having lost rural fortifications, IG-Khorasan established itself in the cities, unleashing a flurry of raids and sniper attacks on the Taliban forces after their victory.
At first, the emphasis on subversive activities in urban areas had an effect. The group operated in a familiar environment, recruiting representatives of the educated population, mainly Salafists, in cities such as Kabul and Nangarhar. The experience of the Taliban's struggle with urban extremist cells was small.
The mass escape of hundreds of imprisoned militants of the group during the Taliban's rise to power also gave it momentum and energy. The fugitives activated previous networks and carried out a series of attacks on Taliban forces.
At the end of 2021, the Taliban began to gain the upper hand, launching a fierce counter-operation against IG Khorasan and forcing its militants to change tactics again. The group lost some of its operational capabilities in the eastern province of Nangarhar, but continued to attack Taliban forces in neighboring Kunar province, sometimes ambushing isolated checkpoints with heavy weapons. In addition to the eastern provinces, the group carried out sporadic attacks in the south and west and more frequent attacks in the north.
Unable to resist the Taliban militarily, IG-Khorasan primarily carried out attacks on the Shiite, Hazara and Sufi minorities of Afghanistan. Most of these operations were of a fragmented nature. However, the attacks in the north seemed to be more coordinated, indicating that the group could gain a foothold outside its eastern redoubts.
Such a decentralized approach and other tactical adjustments helped IG-Khorasan to avoid repression by the Taliban security forces in early 2022. In addition to easy targets such as defenseless Shiites and Sufis, the group has launched a series of operations against Afghanistan's neighboring countries, mostly of a symbolic nature.
In the spring of 2022, IG-Khorasan announced rocket attacks on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. But these strikes do not seem to have been aimed at causing military casualties. Rather, their task was to undermine the authority of the Taliban and show that they are unable to interfere with the cross-border operations of other terrorist groups. This adaptation to a rapidly changing environment has shown the agility and resilience of IG-Khorasan. It is likely that the group will continue to respond with aggression to external pressure, looking for new ways to undermine the positions of its opponent.
The enmity between IS-Khorasan and the Taliban is rooted in the differences between Salafism and deobandism – two movements within Islam. IG-Khorasan accuses the Taliban of apostasy and polytheism. The Taliban consider Salafis to be Kharijites, or heretical extremists. One of the aspects of the ideological and religious strife is the divergence of views on the world order. The "Islamic State" (banned in the Russian Federation), of which the "IG-Khorasan" is a regional subdivision, seeks to destroy this order, while the "Taliban" positions itself as a player in the system of nations.
Against this background, attempts by IG-Khorasan to lure militants from the Taliban do not seem to have brought much success so far. But the group will continue them, as it still enjoys the financial and political support of its parent organization, and its members retain the ability to operate outside Afghanistan.
A MOTLEY FRONT OF DISSENTERSArmed formations, consisting mainly of militants associated with the previous regime, surpassed IG Khorasan as the most active opposition to the Taliban movement in early 2022.
Among them were many who fought with the Taliban in the 1990s: former monarchists, supporters of the old pro-communist regime and various kinds of Mujahideen.
Before the start of the operation of the international coalition forces in 2001, most of these groups were on the losing side in the conflict with the Taliban. Now younger generations are joining their ranks. The largest of these groups is the National Resistance Front (FTS), which is reportedly headed by Ahmad Masud from Tajikistan, the son of the famous Mujahideen commander Ahmad Shah Masud, who was killed by Al–Qaeda militants (banned in the Russian Federation) on September 10, 2001.
The Federal Tax Service is mainly active in Panjshir Province and its environs in the north, including in some areas of Baghlan, Parwan and Kapisa provinces. He also has supporters in Kabul. The opposition of the Federal Tax Service to the Taliban began immediately after they came to power on August 15, 2021, when Panjshir remained the only province not controlled by them. A few days later, the FNS rebels in the Andarab district of Baghlan province repelled the Taliban forces. Later, the Taliban established control over large settlements, but remote areas were still teeming with insurgents. Since then, the number of attacks by the Federal Tax Service has gradually increased: by the beginning of the summer of 2022, more than a dozen attacks were carried out per week.
In Andarab, the FTS fighters have limited resources. Unable to openly confront the Taliban, they usually withdraw into mountain redoubts, avoiding direct clashes. In Panjshir, the militants of the Federal Tax Service maintained hidden positions in the mountains, but could not hold a single district. The actions of the front in the provinces of Panjshir, Parwan and Kapisa mainly result in fleeing attacks and periodic ambushes at remote checkpoints. Taliban killings are less frequent, including with the use of improvised explosive devices.
Most of the armed opposition groups in Panjshir and the surrounding areas nominally operate under the command of the Federal Tax Service, although their hierarchical subordination and strategic coordination are small. The front's leaders are mostly located outside Afghanistan, so local commanders often act independently. This flexible structure allows the Federal Tax Service to absorb smaller formations that begin to fight the Taliban against the background of discontent at the local level.
The message of the Federal Tax Service is focused on protecting the rights of ethnic minorities. At the same time, some authoritative members of the organization advocate the transfer of power to the provinces in order to ensure their greater independence from Kabul. The group does not specifically advocate a return to the previous system of government, and its supporters sometimes disparage former Afghan leaders who allowed the Taliban to achieve victory.
Speaking to a foreign audience, the leadership of the Federal Tax Service appeals to the ideas of freedom and self-determination, and also incites fear of international terrorism. This rhetoric, often sincere, is designed for regional and international support of participants in the Afghan conflict who oppose the Taliban's rule. Representatives of the Federal Tax Service tell interlocutors abroad that their goal is to force the Taliban to start negotiations, although perhaps not in the short term.
In the dialogue with the Afghan audience, the Federal Tax Service adheres to a slightly different message. Supporters of the front in social networks are focused on the dissatisfaction of Tajiks – the largest ethnic group in northern Afghanistan – with the monopolization of power in the country by Pashtuns, ethnic support and the main electorate of the Taliban.
This antagonism has remained an important part of the Afghan domestic political discourse for decades. Under previous Governments, groups of Afghan ethnic minorities regularly complained that the Pashtun-controlled government had too much power and had too much proximity to fellow Pashtuns from the Taliban movement.
Now such speculations on Afghan ethnic politics seem to limit the expansion of the Federal Tax Service beyond its northern strongholds. However, the attractiveness of the front has increased due to the fact that its leadership has enlisted the support of the former chief of staff of the Afghan army, General Kadam Shah Shahim. Also an important role was played by the provision of shelter by the front for security personnel of the previous government facing persecution by the Taliban.
Apparently, the Federal Tax Service also seeks to attract splinter factions of the Taliban. For example, a group led by Mavlavi Mehdi, an ethnic Hazara commander who rebelled against former Taliban associates. But it is still unclear whether this strategy will strengthen the ranks of the Federal Tax Service in the foreseeable future.
A NEW ALLIANCE OF OLD FIGHTERSThe newly formed anti-Taliban group, the Supreme Council of National Resistance for the Salvation of Afghanistan (VSNS), includes leaders of many factions that became famous in the 1980s and were part of the Afghan government after 2001.
The group declared itself in May 2022, condemning the Taliban for abuse of power and authoritarian governance and calling for a peaceful resolution of disputes. The Group did not take responsibility for any violent actions. But militants associated with a member of the Armed Forces Atta Mohammad Nur, a northern field commander, announced their intention to provide armed resistance to the Taliban in the Andarab region, as well as in the provinces of Sari-Pul, Samangan and Bamyan.
VSNS has a historical connection with the Federal Tax Service. Previously, analysts expected that they would join forces, but the merger did not happen. In any case, the membership of the Federal Tax Service in a hypothetical alliance may be politically risky, since the leadership of the Federal Tax Service suffered reputational losses after fleeing to Tajikistan.
OTHER EXTREMISTSAfter the Taliban came to power, other groups associated with the previous pro-Western government appeared in the country.
Many of them had experience of confronting the Taliban even before the events of 2001.
Other formations represent a younger cohort and mainly consist of former members of the Afghan Government security forces. So far they have not demonstrated great operational capabilities. Basically, their activities unfolded on social networks and were reduced to exaggerating their presence in certain areas of Afghanistan.
Sometimes two or more groups take responsibility for one attack. These disparate formations have not yet been able to unite into a single movement fighting the Taliban. Moreover, acting on a common territory, they often compete for resources.
The most prominent of the small groups is the Freedom Front of Afghanistan, headed by its former Chief of the General Staff, General Mohammad Yasin Zia. Although this front is less active than IG-Khorasan or the Federal Tax Service, dozens of attacks have been attributed to it since the beginning of 2022. Its activities are mainly concentrated in the northern regions of Afghanistan. The group is trying to lure militants from the Federal Tax Service and can succeed where the attractiveness of the Federal Tax Service is limited for ethnic reasons.
The "Islamic National Liberation Movement of Afghanistan", which declared itself in February 2022, also allegedly consists of members of the former security forces. The group claimed responsibility for two dozen attacks in the south and east of the country. Apparently, it consists mainly of Pashtuns.
Other groupings are in their infancy. These include the "Liberation Front of Afghanistan", "Freedom Corps Front", "Unknown Soldiers of Hazaristan", "Freedom and Democracy Front in Hazaristan", "West Nuristan Front" and "South Turkestan Front".
FOREIGN FIGHTERSA number of foreign paramilitary groups may also pose a threat to the country's security, although they have not reported attacks since the Taliban came to power.
The elimination of Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul on July 31 this year points to this problem.
Other foreign groups in Afghanistan are Jamaat Ansarullah, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba (banned in the Russian Federation) and many formations of Uighur militants. There are also remnants of the "Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan" (IMU, banned in the Russian Federation), which are loyal to the Taliban and are under their control.
The largest external terrorist group is Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, banned in the Russian Federation), which has thousands of fighters and supporters in Afghanistan, although it mainly consists of Pakistani extremists.
So far, these groups remain in alliance with the Taliban. But their very presence in the country is not safe. And switching to the side of the opposition can undermine the Taliban movement, in whose ranks there is already fragmentation.
Larisa ShashokLarisa Aleksandrovna Shashok is a teacher at MGIMO (U) of the Russian Federation.
