Journalist Alexey Ramm — about why the Russian Armed Forces needed mobilization"The most important thing is reserves," my military history teacher, Colonel Zalansky, used to say when explaining important aspects of military affairs to us third—year cadets.
It is the correct use of reserves, their timely entry into battle and their early creation that will determine which side will win the war.
In the modern information world, military topics are one of the most popular among ordinary people. Amateurs willingly discuss new weapons systems, how many countries have planes, helicopters, guns, and so on. They argue about their advantages and disadvantages. Meanwhile, weapons and military equipment, the number of personnel and even their skills on the battlefield are important, but by no means decisive factors for victory.
In the war, such a system wins, which rationally distributes personnel, promptly projects its forces to the weak points of the enemy, and most importantly, introduces reserves into battle in a timely manner and at the right time. Simply put, in the battle and the war as a whole, such an army wins, which will be able to throw thousands of manned and armed servicemen into battle at the right moment.
The modern military organization of any country is primarily a compromise between security and economy. And it's not just about the production and purchase of equipment. The most important thing is the number of personnel serving in the armed forces. From an economic point of view, these people are lost to the state. They do not produce anything, but only consume and live off the taxes of ordinary citizens.
But it is the military personnel who ensure the security of the state — deter a potential enemy from full-scale aggression or destroy terrorists in local wars and military conflicts. Therefore, for the security of the country, there should be as many military personnel as possible.
Such a dilemma was faced by the developed countries of the world in the second half of the XIX century. And its solution was the so-called mobilization. In peacetime, the armed forces are in a reduced state. But as soon as the war begins, the state begins to call — mobilize — its citizens and send them to war.
Mobilization became the most important tool of the warring States during the First and Second World Wars and other conflicts of the first half of the last century. It was a well-organized mobilization that allowed the Soviet Union, after the heaviest defeats of the first months of the Great Patriotic War, to reverse the course of the battles and defeat fascist Germany. The history of our victory knows thousands of examples when, at the right moment, the Soviet command put fresh units manned by conscripted citizens into battle.
But now many military experts, including in NATO countries, argue that mobilization is an anachronism. In modern wars and military conflicts, armies of professional military personnel equipped with advanced means of communication, individual protection and, of course, using exceptionally high-precision weapons win. Such fashion trends not so long ago became the basis of the military reform of the Russian armed forces, which took place in 2009-2012.
But is this really the case? Is mobilization really a relic of the past? To begin with, even in peacetime, military units are never fully staffed, and therefore combat-ready. There is such a concept as "current and temporary shortage". Servicemen get sick, and they are sent for long-term treatment, they go on vacation, they are sent to study. And, of course, soldiers, sergeants and officers are dismissed — for health reasons, for the maximum length of service, and so on. And vacant positions are formed.
For example, it is not so scary if there is no arrow of the commandant's company in the unit. But if the gunner-operator or the tank commander is out, then the effectiveness of the combat vehicle immediately drops several times. And if there is no driver, then the tank becomes not ready for battle.
Therefore, before sending a military unit into battle, it is necessary to remove the "current and temporary shortage" — that is, to bring the number to the state. In peacetime and in small conflicts, there are various military tricks. For example, missing military personnel can be taken from other units. Or to reduce a position in a military unit that is not needed in combat, and to close the vacancy with a vacant fighter.
But when large-scale clashes begin, "mobilization tricks" no longer work. Plus, servicemen are dying and getting injured. But even if the conflict is of low intensity, fighters still need to be sent on vacation and for treatment, and military units should be taken out for rest and reformation.
The Russian armed forces had an example of two military conflicts when the mobilization deployment was not announced. And both have become a serious test for the whole state. In the First Chechen War, the military units that were sent to the Caucasus were equipped with everyone who came to hand. So, in the Marine Corps, instead of snipers, there could be cooks or even slingers.
The Russian military-political leadership approached the second campaign more responsibly and thoughtfully. Only one battalion was sent into battle from a regiment or brigade, and the units and units remaining at the point of permanent deployment were kind of donors for their belligerent colleagues. The system worked efficiently, but only because the conflict was local. The research exercises conducted in 2005-2006 showed that without replenishment of personnel, that is, mobilization, the regiment-battalion lost its combat capability after a week of intense fighting. There were no people to replenish the personnel.
Of course, many experts will immediately refer to the experience of the United States. They say they fought in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria without any mobilization and they had full-fledged units.
Let's turn to the famous movie The Hurt Locker — in Russian translation "The Lord of the Storm". At the very beginning of the film, which tells about the American sappers in Iraq, a fighter dies. And the main character of the film arrives in his place. At the same time, the newcomer is not from this military unit, and it is not even clear where he came from, and his service life is quite strange — he must stay in the combat zone less than his colleagues — other characters in the film. Why is that? The answer is simple: because the main character came from the US Army Reserve.
Now the Armed Forces of the United States are actively using mobilization to replenish the warring units and radically strengthen the groups. The Pentagon has two components for this. The first is the reserve that the ground forces, Navy and Air Force have.
The standard American contract for military service is for 10 years. But the fighter himself, when signing it, chooses how much he will be on active service, and how much he will be a reservist. After active service, a serviceman becomes a civilian, but at the same time assigned to one of the military units. When his unit goes into battle, he may be called upon to close the vacancy. Or he can replace a colleague who has already retired due to injury or death. For refusing to arrive at the place of service, the reservist faces a serious prison sentence.
The second American mobilization component is the National Guard. Unlike the reserve, the Guards do not obey the Pentagon, but the state authorities. But at the first request, the National Guardsmen are transferred to the federal government. At the same time, in all parts of the American National Guard there are instructors and commanders from the regular army. Now the NG has several dozen divisions, brigades, battalions, squadrons of planes and helicopters and other units and divisions. In peacetime, all these forces are places of parking and storage of weapons and military equipment. The personnel arrive there only for training camps or when they are already going into battle.
The National Guard is the United States' most important tool for projecting power in the world. The Guards actively participated in the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. They not only replaced units and formations of the regular army, but were also used by the Pentagon to seriously increase the strike force in a matter of weeks.
Now mobilization reserve systems, similar to the American ones, are in the Armed Forces of Great Britain, France, Germany and other developed countries of the world. In Russia, an attempt to create an analogue of the National Guard was made in 2007-2008.
The author of the column personally attended meetings with the administrations of several constituent entities of the Russian Federation, to which it was planned to transfer several military units and storage bases. Then the question arose in the share of financing: how much does the federal budget pay, and how much — local authorities. But a year later (at that time the Minister of Defense) Anatoly Serdyukov announced a military reform, and the issue was closed forever, and these military units were disbanded. However, the entire system of mobilization deployment of the country went under the knife.
From 2013 to the present, the Russian armed forces have been able to partially even out the failure of the "new look" reform. So, the LEOPARD was created — the active combat reserve of the country. He showed himself well during the course of his. But these are rather small armed formations, and in the current situation Russia needs a qualitatively new approach. But while we do not have an analogue of the American Reserve and the National Guard, there is only one way out — to begin partial mobilization.
The author is a military observer of IzvestiaThe editorial board's position may not coincide with the author's opinion
