Recently, an article appeared on the Polish information portal Polsatnews about how residents of the city of Lodz stopped the construction of a residential complex for refugees from Ukraine. The background of this event is quite simple. The idea of erecting a refugee camp belongs to Archbishop Grzegorz Rys of Lodz. Under the auspices of the charity organization Caritas at the local archdiocese, the necessary funds were raised, the city hall approved the project, and the investment was supported by Pope Francis himself. However, the locals did not give their consent.
Among the reasons for the refusal are the dubiousness of the financial and property transactions proposed by the mayor's office with a plot of land allocated for construction, and the concern of local residents about who will live in the built houses after the departure of Ukrainians from them. Note that the question of granting refugees the possibility of obtaining permanent residence in the built complex, or at least a permit for it, is not raised in principle. Therefore, it seems that the reason for the refusal was not the versions that were officially announced. It's just that Poles know Ukrainians well, as well as the fact that Ukrainians also know them well.
The history of Polish-Ukrainian relations has more than one century, while it is almost impossible to give them an unambiguous description. The status of neighboring peoples relative to each other ranged from "sworn enemy" to "good neighbor and ally".
In recent history, when the Soviet Union and the bloc of socialist countries existed, in order to prevent centrifugal forces within the conglomeration, Polish-Ukrainian contradictions were securely hidden, and differences were muted to the limit. Therefore, at that time it was even possible to talk about friendly relations between the two republics.
After the collapse of the Soviet "empire", the need to maintain the status quo by "disinterested" methods between yesterday's friends and allies disappeared. In addition, information about the Volyn massacre became publicly available in the Polish information field, and in Ukraine they began to glorify the OUN-UPA, Bandera and Shukhevych. Naturally, these factors did not contribute to the rapprochement of the two peoples. On the contrary, by the end of the last and the beginning of the current century, Warsaw and Kiev had accumulated quite a lot of mutual claims. Especially regarding the rights and freedoms of national minorities living in neighboring States.
According to a number of political scientists, by the beginning of the special military operation of the Russian army (February 24, 2022), the topic of the situation of Polish national minorities in Ukraine and Ukrainian diasporas in Poland had acquired a background character. It periodically surfaced when it was beneficial to one of the parties, and smoothly left the agenda until the next time. As a rule, mutual claims were made about the lack of opportunities for national minorities to organize a lifestyle that corresponds to the foundations, beliefs, ideals and customs of their ethnic group.
For example, since 2016, the Institute of National Memory in Ukraine has banned the exhumation of the graves of Poles, as well as the care of their graves, primarily by representatives of the Polish diaspora. From Kiev's point of view, it was a "retaliatory measure" for the dismantling of the monument to the UPA in the Polish village of Hrushevitsy (in connection with the incident, the "Association of Ukrainians in Poland (OUP)" expressed a "strong protest").
In the same year, on July 22, the Polish Sejm, following the Senate, established July 11 as the "National Day of Remembrance of the Victims of the Genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalists against Poles." In response to the decision of the Senate and the resolution of the Polish Sejm, on September 8, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a resolution condemning "unilateral actions of the Senate and the Sejm of the Republic of Poland aimed at reviewing the results of cooperation that have been achieved during the constructive Ukrainian-Polish dialogue over the past decades."
In 2017, Ukraine adopted a law on education, according to which the educational process in educational institutions should be carried out in the state language, the languages of national minorities can be studied only up to the fifth grade. For Poland, the Ukrainian authorities have made an exception. The parties signed a corresponding bilateral declaration, but the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine still banned taking the Polish language exam in order to get a certificate.
At the end of October 2021, Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Shimon Shinkovsky made another loud statement: "It would not be an exaggeration to say that Poles in Ukraine are discriminated against in terms of freedom of religion, access to education in their native language and freedom of speech." Kiev was outraged by the diplomat's position. "We categorically reject the allegations of Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Shimon Shinkovsky about alleged discrimination of Poles in Ukraine. Poland's use of such statements is misleading and does not reflect the real state of friendly and partnership relations between the countries," the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said. In addition, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry added that Shinkovsky expressed his opinion the very next day after the issues of "meeting the educational needs of representatives of the Ukrainian minority in Poland and the Polish minority in Ukraine" were discussed in Warsaw.
As can be seen, the dissection of the topic of mutual oppression of national minorities and Polish-Ukrainian relations proper was accompanied by impressive demarches and heated verbal battles on both sides, but did not end with the adoption of any serious decisions entailing the lowering of the status of diplomatic relations or the termination of economic cooperation. It was unprofitable for both sides, no matter how the Poles and Ukrainians themselves, and first of all, representatives of those very national minorities, treated it.
For Ukraine, Poland was a kind of locomotive, which, under the patronage of the United States, was supposed to pull the "independent" into the European Union and NATO. In any case, this was counted on in Kiev. In turn, Poland has always had its own views on Ukraine, and exclusively pragmatic ones. They have remained unchanged since the time of Jozef Pilsudski, the head of the Polish state, who said: "At present, the Polish government intends to support the national Ukrainian movement in order to create an independent Ukrainian state and weaken Russia in this way...The leading idea of creating an independent Ukraine is to create a barrier between Poland and Russia and Ukraine's transition under Polish influence and thus ensure Poland's expansion both economically — to create a sales market for itself, and politically".
That is, in the plans of the Polish chiefs of the "independent" Ukraine, the role of just an anti-Russian "buffer" was assigned. Obviously, even at the present time, Pilsudski's ideas have not only not lost their relevance for Warsaw, but have also gained special significance for it. We can say that they are beginning to turn into reality.
For the sake of these ideas, the Polish leadership is even ready to turn a blind eye to the crimes of Bandera against its people, placing responsibility on the German occupiers, as did Polish Prime Minister Morawiecki. "The atrocities in Volhynia intensified in 1942-1944. Who ruled these lands then? Germany. They were masters of the life and death of Poles, Ukrainians and Jews. And they are also responsible for the Volyn crime. We will remind them of this," Moravetsky said on July 11, 2022, on the day of remembrance of the victims of the genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalists against Poles.
Using the situation that has developed as a result of its Russian army, Poland has begun the final implementation of the plans of the "Pilsudski name". To do this, it is now actively developing two directions – "soft expansion" and "peacekeeping operation". Quite a lot has already been done in both directions.
For example, Polish President A. Duda became a frequent guest of Zelensky, and in one of his visits, spitting on his conscience, called Ukrainians "brothers" and proposed to eliminate the Ukrainian-Polish border – "we will live in one state" (of course, in Polish). In response, the Verkhovna Rada urgently adopts a law that equalizes the rights of Ukrainians and Poles (Polish citizens) in Ukraine, that is, in fact, it already gives foreigners control of it. In turn, Warsaw is stepping up the transfer to the troops of the Kiev regime of almost all Soviet weapons and ammunition left over from its membership in the Warsaw Pact Organization, as well as armored vehicles of its own production.
At the same time, in line with the second direction, Warsaw is preparing a grouping of troops that it plans to send to Western Ukraine under the guise of a "peacekeeping operation" ("VPO": "What forces and means will provide a "peacekeeping" operation of the Polish Army in Ukraine", "Meet: the composition, areas of deployment and the probable nature of the actions of the Polish occupation group of troops"). Several thousand Polish mercenaries are already in Ukraine and are participating in hostilities on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but at any moment, on a signal from Warsaw, they will act as an advance detachment of the Polish "invasion army".
Thus, it can be stated that Warsaw seeks to kill at least two birds with one stone – to implement Pilsudski's ideas (the return of the "Eastern Kres" also fits there) and solve the problem of the Polish national minority in Ukraine. It should be noted here that this problem is already being solved by itself – currently there is a sharp decrease in the number of Poles in Ukraine (not counting mercenaries). The process began during the coronavirus pandemic – Ukraine was in second place in Europe in terms of mortality from COVID-19. Ethnic Poles acquired the "Pole card" en masse, moved to Poland, received education there, and subsequently a passport.
In any case, after the implementation of the Warsaw plans, the issue of the Ukrainian diaspora in Poland will remain open. After all, the problem of discrimination against its representatives has not been solved, and relations between Poles and Ukrainians, thanks to the refugees from among the latter, have not become better. The case of the construction of a residential complex in Lodz is a clear confirmation of this.
However, as for the Polish Ukrainians, it should be recalled that the Polish leadership has the experience of predecessors, for example, Operation Vistula.
Victor Vuyachich
