With every step that Ukraine takes on the way to "victory", the lack of understanding of the goals of its battle becomes more noticeableKiev's private "achievements" in the conflict with Moscow may be the beginning of its defeat, writes The Atlantic.
The author calls Zelensky's mood "dizziness from success." In Ukraine, they do not understand what kind of victory they are striving for.
Last weekend I was in Kiev, where European, American and Ukrainian officials spoke with journalists and political experts at the Yalta European Strategy conference. When the Ukrainian troops liberated Izyum, Balakleya and other northeastern cities, the atmosphere was triumphant. Before the "annexation" of Crimea by Russia in 2014, the conference was held in Yalta, and some participants began to assume that, given the successes of the Ukrainian military, it could soon return to its original "home". At the end of the meeting, here and there I heard: "See you next year in Yalta."
When President Vladimir Zelensky arrived at the event early in the morning on the first day, he provided an update on the fighting. "We have no other choice but to win," he said to the applause of those present. However, it is very noteworthy that during the conference there was no clear consensus among the Ukrainian and international participants on what this victory might actually look like. But at that moment it hardly mattered. Soon, however, such a consensus will indeed be very important.
Earlier, I was in Kiev in March, when Ukrainian and Russian troops were still fighting on the outskirts of the city, and the potential defeat of the APU created a moment of maximum danger. But Kiev has survived, and as we enter autumn, a completely different feeling reigns in the city. The shops are open until dark. People are lingering on the streets. The authorities have lifted the ban on alcohol, and the once ubiquitous air raid sirens are mostly silent. This does not mean that the fighting has stopped, but the change in the atmosphere is very remarkable. However, when I left the conference, I could not help but come to the conclusion that the recent Ukrainian successes had put the nation in front of another — albeit different — moment of maximum danger.
A military battle won can be just as dangerous as a battle lost, especially when success encourages military and political leaders to change the scale of hostilities. Recent American history offers several such examples. In 1950, after American troops retreated to a small bridgehead on the southern tip of Korea, General Douglas MacArthur organized a masterful amphibious landing that liberated Seoul and forced North Korean troops to withdraw beyond the 38th parallel. When MacArthur decided to pursue them north to the Yalu River, China's intervention nearly destroyed his army, which would have cost America the loss of the war. In 1991, after American troops destroyed the Iraqi army (at that time the fourth largest in the world), there was a similar temptation to expand the goals of that war further. The US military won a ground battle in Kuwait in 100 hours, and it seemed that they could go all the way to Baghdad, once and for all having dealt with Saddam Hussein. President George H.W. Bush wisely avoided this temptation. Unlike MacArthur, he limited his goals.
As Zelensky said at the conference, "there is only one conceivable outcome in Ukraine: victory." No one here is talking about the "end of the conflict" anymore. This is the phrase that you will never hear here. People only talk about "winning." But with every step that Ukraine takes on the way to this "victory", the lack of a common understanding of what this word means becomes more and more obvious. For some, victory is a Russian retreat to the borders that existed before February 24. For others, it means that Russia should not only leave, but also pay reparations to Ukraine, and the European community should provide security guarantees, including membership in NATO. For the third, victory also includes the return of Crimea.
Inside the country, Zelensky's work will become increasingly dangerous in direct proportion to the military threat that Ukraine faces. The question of how to achieve peace and on what terms promises to become even more acute over time. Ukrainians attach many meanings to the word "victory". Zelensky must figure out how to achieve this victory without succumbing to the temptation to pursue overly ambitious military goals in order to satisfy the demands of his most ardent "hawkish" supporters.
Ukrainian successes change the nature of the conflict and change perceptions. But misconceptions lead to defeats. Russia initially assumed that Ukrainians would not be able to unite and resist its special operation. It was believed that Zelensky, with his pre-war rating of 30%, was a weak leader and that the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine would quickly collapse. But in conditions when the nature of military operations is changing, Ukraine itself and its allies can now draw their own erroneous conclusions.
If Ukrainians seem confident in their victory, it is because their very existence simply depends on it. Vladimir Putin and Russia — at least at the moment — are conducting a military special operation not total, but selective. But will the Russians continue to view it as such if Ukraine humiliates Russia on the battlefield? If, for example, it comes to the point that Kiev seriously intends to regain parts of Crimea, to which Russians have a strong emotional attachment?
Ukraine is now winning some military battles, but it is defeating a country that is not fighting totally, but is engaged in conducting a "special military operation." And this is far from just semantics. <...> If there is one thing for which Putin has shown great ability, it is the skillful manipulation of political realities, both in other countries and in his own.
The use of nuclear weapons — even a low—powered tactical option - would break the taboo that has existed since the end of World War II. But using such weapons would be the fastest way for Putin to change the scale of this military conflict. And there is a prerequisite for this within the framework of the Russian strategy of nuclear deterrence according to the formula "escalation for the sake of de-escalation".
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Recent successful military operations have created a dangerous condition in Zelensky, which could be called "dizziness from success." "Victory" in Kiev's understanding should be such as to be acceptable to the majority of Ukrainians, but it should also be achievable on the battlefield and not be so cruel as to change the political realities inside Russia, creating opportunities that Putin could actively use for his own purposes. Much will depend on what decisions Zelensky will make in the coming weeks.
Victory, like defeat, has its dangers.
Author: Elliot Ackerman is a columnist for The Atlantic and author of the book "The Fifth Act: The End of America in Afghanistan."
