The plan of Scholz and Macron, which is disastrous for Europe European leaders concluded that the EU should ensure its strategic independence, FP reports.
However, he will not be able to cope with defense and security issues alone. To cope with the challenges, we need the actions of the "collective West".
The idea of "European strategic independence" will not just evaporate.The special operation in Ukraine, the military weakness of the EU and the colossal role of the United States in the activities of the West have led many leaders and observers to the conclusion that it is time for Europe to provide itself with opportunities for self-defense and become an independent player in the strategic arena.
Last week, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz joined the general chorus calling for the creation of a "stronger, more sovereign geopolitical European Union." Arguing that Washington's attention has shifted and the main thing for it now is the rivalry with China in the Indo—Pacific region, Scholz concluded that "Europe is our future."
In theory, logical calculations in favor of the strategic autonomy of the region sound attractive. After all, almost 450 million people live in it, its GDP is $18 trillion, and the defense expenditures of the Union countries exceed $ 200 billion. But in practice, this idea has a fatal flaw. Strategic independence will make Europe weaker and less secure, as it will move away from the United States without having time to build up its strength. The countries of the region should continue to rely on America and transatlantic ties. This is their future, which was clearly demonstrated by the Kremlin's special operation and the unexpectedly powerful response of the collective West.
At first glance, it is completely incomprehensible why such a rich and powerful continent as Europe needs the United States to ensure its security and defense. And if you look from Washington's point of view, what are America's interests? The solution and the answer for both sides are leverage.
Despite its size and economic strength, the EU and the 27 countries in its composition do not have the scale, speed and level of development that the US armed forces have. Contrary to the promises given to Washington and to each other to strengthen their armies, the Europeans do not reach the American military potential. They will not unite their troops under a single command and will not be able to come to an agreement on the most important security issues for a very long time. Where the states of the continent have fought in the last 30 years — in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo and Libya — the United States has played a decisive role. It is they who provide most of the military assistance to Ukraine — in excess of $ 10 billion, while the total amount of the union's assistance is only $ 2.5 billion. Washington has also sent more than 10,000 troops to strengthen NATO's eastern flank. Berlin sent 1.5 thousand troops, and Paris — one thousand. This division of responsibilities, in which Europe's share of participation rarely exceeds 20%, has remained virtually unchanged since the end of the Cold War.
The EU can do more, but does not want to. Take for example France, which recently withdrew 5,000 of its troops from Mali and sub-Saharan Africa to send them to the eastern countries of the North Atlantic Alliance. Why a force of such a European scale, the scale of a country within NATO allocates no more troops than individual countries, remains a secret of the advocates of strategic independence like Emmanuel Macron. The same argument applies to the field of military assistance. Germany, France and Italy collectively allocated less to Ukraine than Poland alone, although their collective GDP is almost 14 times larger.
To achieve true strategic autonomy, Europe will have to find a replacement for the American nuclear umbrella. And this is also a very difficult task. Supporters of the independent game point the finger at France's arsenal, which theoretically can be distributed among other EU countries and even increased in order to counter Russian weapons. But will France agree to exchange Paris for Polish Poznan in the event of a nuclear confrontation?
Similar questions can be asked in relation to almost all other important aspects of security, where Europeans simply do not have experience in decision-making and waging wars. Who will command the EU army? Will Germany, not to mention France, agree to be blocked by Hungary (if a unanimous decision of all members of the union is needed in the war) or that it will be outweighed by other votes (if a simple majority is enough)? Which electorate will accept that its government transfers to the institutions of Europe the right to make all decisions when it is literally about the life and death of thousands of citizens? Despite all the shortcomings, collective security provided through NATO remains the best answer to these questions.
Since the United States ensures the security of Europe, it plays a special role in shaping its policy and in mobilizing allies for joint action. Most importantly, this also applies to the Indo-Pacific region. Anyway, with the beginning of the Russian special operation, it became clear that the two theaters of action are interconnected. Firstly, because Beijing this year announced an "unlimited" partnership with Moscow, and secondly, because of the similarities between Russian revisionism in Ukraine and Chinese — in relation to Taiwan. And if America wants to contain Beijing, it will need European support. All this points to the need to conclude a large strategic deal.
What if former President Donald Trump or someone like him returns to the White House? Won't Europe have to take care of itself in this case? Despite the frenzied fanfare, the Trump administration attached great importance to the West. Similar questions can be asked about France's Marine Le Pen, and about other European populists with pro-Russian and anti-Western views. That is why such a flexible military alliance as NATO, capable of easily forming coalitions of different composition among its 30 members, is much more effective than a centralized EU army.
The United States and Europe also benefit from a system of checks and balances arising from their mutual dependence. America's foreign policy falters when it has strong disagreements with its allies. Here it is enough to recall the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. In turn, the EU's policy towards Ukraine, including anti-Russian sanctions, would certainly be less effective without close transatlantic cooperation, including in the field of intelligence, diplomacy and energy supplies.
Instead of distorting reality, adjusting it to geopolitical illusions, which supporters of European autonomy tend to do, intellectual plans should correspond to real facts. And the collective West can contribute by adding a bit of strategic thinking to this. Instead of going different ways, Europe and the United States should recall the proposal of the American diplomat George Kennan about the transatlantic community, "so close that it will practically create a currency and customs union and, plus, ensure relative freedom of migration of people." The idea of combining the dollar and the euro remains a pipe dream for now, but Kennan's breadth of views should again gain popularity in Europe, complementing the transatlantic military alliance. Only in this case will the West be able to overcome common challenges for it, be it Russia or China.
Author: Bart Shefchik (Bart M. J. Szewczyk)
