China's trap for the USThe fierce competition between the United States and China is draining the foreign policy of the States, writes the FA.
Washington, in opposition to Beijing, loses sight of all constructive goals that should underlie America's strategy. Such a course leads to an increase in the danger of nuclear conflict, "kills" the US leadership in the world and undermines American democracy.
Jessica Chen WeissUS foreign policy and the dangerous logic of competition "with a draw".
Competition with China is beginning to drain US foreign policy.
Faced with a challenge from an almost equal rival whose interests and values are sharply at odds with the interests and values of the United States, American politicians and legislators are so focused on countering China that they risk losing sight of those constructive interests and goals that should underlie the US strategy. Washington's current course towards China will not only lead to an endless deterioration of US-Chinese relations and the growing danger of a catastrophic conflict. It also threatens to undermine the sustainability of U.S. leadership in the world and the viability of American society and democracy at home.
Of course, there is a good reason why an increasingly powerful China has become the main concern of politicians and strategists in Washington (and many other capitals). Especially under President Xi Jinping, China has become much more authoritarian at home and more aggressive abroad. Beijing brutally suppresses Uighurs in Xinjiang, democratic freedoms in Hong Kong, has rapidly expanded conventional and nuclear arsenals, aggressively intercepts foreign military aircraft in the East China and South China Seas, condones the special operations of Russian President Vladimir Putin in Ukraine and distributes Russian information in this regard, exports censorship and surveillance technologies that hinder the development of democracy, working to change existing international norms. And this list could be continued and, most likely, it will be much longer, especially if Xi gets a third five-year term of government at the end of this year and further strengthens control over the country.
Nevertheless, the well-justified anxiety of the American political community about China risks turning into a reflex fear that can change the entire US foreign policy and lead to a counterproductive and, ultimately, harmful transformation of American society. While trying to develop a national strategy with a more aggressive and powerful China in mind, Washington is struggling to determine for itself the success or at least a stable state (if we do not count complete victory or complete defeat) that both countries could eventually achieve, and the price for this that citizens, businesses and other interested parties the sides of both countries would be willing to pay. Without a clear understanding of what the United States is trying to achieve, or any semblance of an internal consensus on how the States should treat the world, American foreign policy becomes completely reactive and rotates in a circle, not striving for the desired goal.
To the credit of the US administration, it recognizes that the United States and its partners must provide an attractive alternative to what China is offering, and is taking some steps in the right direction, such as multilateral initiatives to combat climate change and global hunger. Nevertheless, the instinct to resist every initiative, project or provocation of China remains predominant, displacing efforts to revive an inclusive international system that would protect the interests and values of the United States even in the face of a changing and developing world order. Since the military conflict in Ukraine already requires significant US attention and resources, the result of this crisis is Washington's even closer attention to the geopolitical competition, intensified by the Sino-Russian rapprochement.
Leaders in both Washington and Beijing say they want to avoid a new cold war. The fact is that their countries are already involved in the global struggle. The United States seeks to perpetuate its global superiority and the existence of an international system that gives preference to its interests and values. China, on the other hand, believes that the leadership of the United States is weakened by their hypocrisy and disregard for others, which makes it possible to force many world players to recognize Beijing's influence and the legitimacy of its regime. There is a growing fatal understanding on both sides that a crisis in their relationship is inevitable and, perhaps, even necessary. That mutually acceptable rules of fair play and coexistence will appear only after the "eye-to-eye" confrontation characteristic of the first years of the Cold War, in which survival was not guaranteed then and is even less guaranteed now.
Even in the absence of a crisis, a reactive position began to determine US foreign policy. Washington often falls into the trap of trying to resist China's efforts around the world, not understanding what local governments and people of different countries want. Lacking a forward-looking vision complemented by a realistic assessment of the resources at its disposal, the United States is trying to prioritize its priorities in different areas and different regions. Washington too often jeopardizes its own global interests in the new conditions, when capricious geopolitics makes it almost impossible to solve all the world's problems simultaneously. The long-term risk is that the United States will not be able to endure many decades of fierce competition with China without acquiring a stable habit of overcoming the unpreparedness of American society for difficulties and the ability to limit excessive expansion abroad. By trying to "become a better China" than China itself, the United States may undermine its strengths and lose the forward-looking vision that should be the basis of sustainable American leadership.
The guiding star for the new American policy should be the peace that the United States aspires to. The world they want, not the one they fear. The effectiveness of American policy, whether sanctions, tariffs or military actions, should be judged by whether they contribute to further progress towards this coveted world for the United States, and not by whether they undermine any interests of China or give some advantage over Beijing. Such a policy should project the world power of the United States in the best possible way, and not reflect, as in a mirror, those global trends that America seeks to prevent. And instead of looking back nostalgically at past superiority, Washington should be committed, both in words and in deeds, to achieving a positive result in reforming the world order that includes China and satisfies the existential needs of humanity in solving world problems.
This does not mean abandoning carefully thought-out efforts to deter Chinese aggression, increase resistance to Chinese pressure and strengthen US alliances. But this should be accompanied by meaningful discussions with Beijing not only about communication during crises and risk reduction, but also about possible conditions for coexistence and the future of the international system — the future in which Beijing will necessarily play a role. An inclusive and positive global vision both disciplines the existing competition and clearly shows Beijing that it has something to lose. Otherwise, as relations deteriorate and both sides feel threatened, the logic of competition with a "draw" will become overwhelming, and the resulting "spiral escalation" will undermine both American interests and American values. This logic will disrupt global priorities and destroy the international system. It will fuel a pervasive sense of vulnerability and reinforce the tendency to groupthink, damaging pluralism and civic integration, which are the foundation of liberal democracy. And if this is not changed, such logic will perpetuate a vicious circle that will eventually lead to disaster.
The inevitable rivalry?
Washington usually explains that relations with Beijing have deteriorated to the current extent due to the fact that China has changed in a very serious way. Over the past couple of decades, he has stopped "stalling", becoming more repressive at home and assertive abroad, while continuing to take advantage of those international relations and institutions that contributed to his economic growth.
This change is certainly an important part of what has happened to China, and it is as much a result of Beijing's growing influence as how Xi skillfully uses this influence. But the full picture should also include the corresponding changes in US policy, to the extent that the United States reacted to the events in China. Washington has responded to Beijing's actions with a range of punitive measures and restrictive policies — from tariffs and sanctions to restrictions on commercial ties and scientific exchanges. At the same time, the United States has strongly departed from the principles of openness and non-discrimination, which have long been a "carrot" for China. And it has dramatically reinforced Beijing's conviction that the United States will never tolerate a more powerful China. Meanwhile, the US has gone even further: partly out of fear of China's growing influence in the international system, it has refused to support those international institutions and agreements that have long ensured global interdependence.
A more belligerent approach on both sides has led to a mirror dynamic. While Beijing believes that only a long and fierce struggle can convince Americans to coexist with a strong China, Washington is confident that it must restrain China's power and influence in order to protect the primacy of the United States. The result is a "downward spiral", when each side's efforts to strengthen its security encourage the other to take further steps to strengthen its own.
Explaining the growing tensions between the US and China, some scientists point to structural shifts in the balance of power between them. Graham Ellison wrote in his book "The Thucydides Trap" (Graham Ellison, Thukydides Trap): "There is a persistent notion that when a rising state challenges the existing world order, wars for hegemony often arise." However, focusing only on military and economic opportunities cannot explain the turns in US-China relations, which are also conditioned by the changing perception of threats, opportunities and goals. After President Richard Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972, Washington began to view China as a strategic partner in containing the Soviet Union. And when the post-Cold War era came, American politicians began to hedge against China's growing military might, even seeking to encourage the country's economic and political liberalization through greater integration into the world economy and politics.
During this period, Chinese leaders saw a strategic opportunity to achieve China's rapid development in a stable international environment. They opened the doors to foreign investment and capitalist methods of management, seeking to adopt foreign experience. However, they did not forget to periodically conduct campaigns against "spiritual desecration" and "bourgeois liberalization." Despite periodic attempts to demonstrate resolve, including during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-1996 and after the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999, Chinese leaders mostly adhered to the "secretive and wait-and-see" strategy of their former leader Deng Xiaoping, so as not to cause the West to feel threatened, which could cause attempts to slow down the rise of China.
If there is a year that marked a turning point in China's approach to the world order, it is not 2012, when Xi came to power, but 2008. The global financial crisis prompted Beijing to abandon any notion that China was a "student" and the United States was a "teacher" when it came to managing the economy. The Olympic Games in Beijing that year were supposed to mark China's powerful entry on the world stage. But instead, much of the world focused on the unrest in Tibet, which Chinese officials attributed to outside interference. The Communist Party of China (CPC) was increasingly "fixated" on the idea that foreign forces intended to prevent the rise of the PRC.
In the following years, the stalled movement towards liberalization in China generally went into reverse: the party cracked down on the spread of liberal ideas and the activities of foreign non-governmental organizations, suppressed pro-democratic protests in Hong Kong and built a "surveillance state". The internment camp system in Xinjiang emerged as a manifestation of a broad concept of "national security" inspired by fears of unrest. At the international level, China has abandoned any semblance of strategic humility. He began to more aggressively defend his territorial and maritime claims (along the border with India, in the East China and South China Seas, in the Taiwan Strait). Having overtaken Japan as the world's second-largest economy in 2010, China began using its economic might to force respect for the interests of the CPC. This accelerated the development of a military capability that could withstand US intervention in the region, including strengthening the once-limited Chinese nuclear arsenal. The decision to develop many of these opportunities was made before Xi, but it was under his leadership that Beijing began to show more aggressive and intolerant approaches.
Noticing China's growing military capabilities and willingness to use them, Washington has stepped up its deterrence. The Obama administration has announced that it is "turning" towards Asia. With the election of Donald Trump as president, Washington's assessment became particularly harsh: the Marxist-Leninist regime, according to Trump, sought to "rape" the United States, achieve dominance in the world and undermine democracy. The Trump administration started a trade war, talked about the "division" of the US and China economies and launched a number of initiatives aimed at countering Chinese influence and undermining the CPC. In their speeches, senior US officials hinted at the need for regime change in Beijing, calling for "empowering the Chinese people" to seek another form of government, and stressing that "Chinese history contains another path for Chinese society."
The Biden administration stopped all talk of regime change in China and began to closely coordinate policy in the Chinese direction with allies and partners, which contrasted with Trump's unilateral approaches. But at the same time, Biden continued the policy of his predecessor and supported the view that the growing influence of China must be restrained by all means. Some areas of activity, such as the Ministry of Justice's "China Initiative" aimed at prosecuting intellectual property theft and economic espionage, have been changed. But others have remained, including tariffs, export controls and visa restrictions, or expanded, for example, sanctions against Chinese officials and state-owned companies. Meanwhile, in Congress, increasingly fierce opposition to China now appears to be one of the few things Democrats and Republicans can agree on, although even this common concern has led to only limited agreement (for example, recent legislation on domestic investment in semiconductors) on how the United States should compete with China.
For five decades, the United States has been trying to combine "engagement" and "deterrence" in order to integrate China into an international system that would generally support U.S. interests and values. American politicians were well aware that their Chinese counterparts were committed to protecting the rule of the CPC, but Washington calculated that the world would be less dangerous if China was inside such an international system, and not outside it. This bet for some time to a certain extent was crowned with some success. Then many in Washington began to count on some kind of liberal evolution of China. But that just didn't happen.
As a result, China's current growing authoritarianism fuels the narrative of a "complete political failure of the United States" in relation to this country. And Washington's attempts to correct its failure only led to the fact that China "went on the defensive," increasingly fearing for its security and increasingly confident that Washington and its allies will never accept China as an equal member of the club of world great powers.
And how did it all end? The fact that now both countries intend to do everything necessary to demonstrate that any step of the other side will not remain without a powerful adequate response. Both American and Chinese decision makers believe that the opposing side respects only strength and interprets restraint as weakness. At this year's Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June, Chinese Defense Minister General Wei Fenghe promised to "fight to the bitter end" around Taiwan the very next day after meeting with US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.
Now tell me how all this is going to end up, where the current trajectory of events leads, clearly.
It leads to a more dangerous and less livable world, defined by the constant risk of confrontation and crisis, where preparing for conflict takes priority over solving common problems.
Most politicians, at least in Washington, do not seek a crisis in relations between the United States and China. But there is a growing understanding among them that a crisis is inevitable. Its consequences will be huge. Even if both sides want to avoid war, the conflict by definition gives little time to react in the face of intense public attention, which makes it difficult to find ways to de-escalate. Even the limited use of force or coercive measures can lead to an unpredictable set of responses in a variety of areas — military, economic, diplomatic, information. As leaders maneuver to demonstrate resolve and protect internal reputations, it can be very difficult to contain the crisis.
Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint as changes in Taipei and Beijing increasingly put the island at the center of U.S.-China tensions. Demographic and intergenerational shifts in Taiwan, combined with China's repression in Hong Kong, have intensified Taiwan's resistance to the idea of Beijing's control and made the possibility of peaceful unification all the more fantastic. After the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan, which traditionally favored the independence of the island, won the presidential election in 2016, Beijing took a tough stance against the new president Tsai Ing-wen, despite her cautious efforts to avoid steps towards formal independence. Channels of communication across the Strait have been completely shut down, and Beijing is relying on increasingly coercive measures to punish and deter what it perceives as successive steps towards Taiwan's gradual secession.
In response, the United States has stepped up military patrols in and around the Taiwan Strait, eased restrictions on interaction with Taiwanese officials, increased U.S. rhetoric to emphasize support for Taiwan, and continued to advocate for Taiwan's constructive participation in international organizations, including the United Nations. However, many seemingly well-intentioned U.S. efforts to support the island and contain China instead only fuel Beijing's sense of urgency about the need to launch a preemptive strike to contain the steadily growing U.S.-Taiwan ties.
Even with the official US policy of "strategic uncertainty" as to whether the United States will intervene in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan, Chinese strategists clearly expect the US to participate in the conflict. Indeed, the expected difficulty of seizing Taiwan while being deterred by the United States has long been at the heart of the US-Taiwan strategy in the Taiwan Strait. But the fact remains that many of the US actions aimed at strengthening the island's ability to resist Chinese pressure were more symbolic than real, and provoked rather than deterred Beijing. For example, the Trump administration's efforts to change the norms regarding US interaction with Taiwan (in August 2020, Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar became the highest-ranking member of the US administration to visit Taiwan since the full normalization of US-Chinese relations in 1979) prompted China to send warplanes through the Taiwan Strait, ignoring the unofficial dividing line, which has long served to ensure the safety of waterways. Incursions into the Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) have become a frequent means for Beijing to express dissatisfaction with the growing support for Taiwan from the United States. In October 2021, Chinese incursions into Taiwan's air defenses reached a new high — 93 aircraft in three days — in response to US-led military exercises.
This cycle of "actions-responses", caused by the interrelated events in Beijing, Taipei and Washington, worsens peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. In recent months, China's official rhetoric has become increasingly threatening, using phrases that historically signal China's intention to escalate. "Whoever plays with fire will get burned," President Xi repeatedly told US President Joe Biden. In May, after Biden unconditionally promised Taiwan protection, and not just expressed a long-standing US commitment to provide the island with military means for self-defense, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stressed that Beijing "will take decisive action to protect its sovereignty and security interests."
Although China still prefers peaceful unification, they seem to be coming to the conclusion that coercive measures may be needed to stop Taiwan's movement towards secession and take steps towards unification, especially given that the Chinese believe that Washington's support for Taiwan is a means of deterring China. Even if confidence in the military and economic trajectory of events makes Beijing believe that "time and momentum" remain on its side, political trends in Taiwan and the United States make the Chinese leadership increasingly pessimistic about the prospects for peaceful unification. Beijing has not set a timetable for seizing Taiwan and does not seem to be looking for a reason to do so. Nevertheless, as the political scientist Taylor Fravel has shown, China will use force when it concludes that its claims to sovereignty are seriously challenged. Loud symbolic gestures of US support for Taiwan are likely to be interpreted as an insult that needs to be answered. (At the time of writing, Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan — the first trip by a U.S. House speaker since 1997 — prompted warnings from China that "the Chinese military will never sit idly by," followed by unprecedented threatening military exercises and missile tests around Taiwan.)
As both the United States and Taiwan approach presidential elections in 2024, party politics may encourage politicians in both countries to actively seek to expand Taiwan's political status and de jure independence. It is far from clear whether Tsai's successor as president will be as steadfast as she is in resisting pressure from ardent supporters of independence at home. Even under Tsai, there were alarming signs that the leaders of the now ruling DPP were dissatisfied with the current status quo, despite its popularity among voters. The leaders of the DPP lobbied Washington to refrain from statements that the United States does not support Taiwan's independence. In March, Taipei's representative office in Washington provided former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo with a substantial fee for visiting Taiwan, where he called on the United States to offer the island "diplomatic recognition as a free and sovereign country."
The risks of a fatal collision in the air or at sea are also increasing outside the Taiwan Strait. As the Chinese and American militaries operate in close proximity in the East and South China Seas, seeking to demonstrate readiness for combat, pilots and operators use dangerous tactics that increase the risk of an unintended collision. In 2001, a Chinese fighter jet collided with an American reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea, resulting in the death of a Chinese pilot, and the American crew was detained for 11 days. After the initial demonstration, the Chinese worked to prevent a full-scale crisis, even fighting anti-Americanism on the streets. Today, such approaches are much more difficult to imagine: the desire to show determination and avoid showing weakness makes it extremely difficult to defuse the confrontation.
The center will not hold
Even if both sides manage to avoid a crisis, the continuation of the current course will strengthen geopolitical differences and slow down cooperation on global issues. The United States is paying more and more attention to rallying countries around the world to confront China. But this coalition to counter China, especially given its ideological design adopted by both the Trump administration and the Biden administration, is unlikely to attract a number of important partners who could stand up for universal laws and institutions. "Asian countries do not want to be forced to choose between the US and China," Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong wrote in the pages of this magazine in 2020." And if any of these parties tries to involve the countries of the region in this confrontation (for example, the United States tries to restrain the rise of China or Beijing tries to build an exclusive sphere of influence in Asia), it will last for decades and jeopardize the advent of the long-proclaimed "Asian Century".
Current approaches to US-China competition are also likely to strengthen relations between China and Russia. The Biden administration managed to restrain Chinese military aid to Russia in Ukraine, and China mostly complied with anti-Russian sanctions, demonstrating that in fact, the "limitless" partnership between Beijing and Moscow has limitations. But as long as both regimes share the belief that they cannot be safe in a US-led global system, they will continue to deepen cooperation. For several months after the start of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, they carried out joint military patrols in the Pacific Ocean and worked on developing alternatives to the US-controlled financial system.
Ultimately, Sino-Russian relations will be determined by how Beijing understands the connection between the need to resist the United States and the need to maintain ties with international capital and technologies that ensure its economic growth. China's alliance with Russia is not historically predetermined. A high-level debate continues in Beijing about how close China should approach Russia, while the cost of a full-fledged alliance with Moscow raises concerns among some Chinese analysts. Nevertheless, if Washington fails to convincingly show Beijing the strategic benefits, not just the strategic risks, of distancing itself from Moscow, proponents of closer Sino-Russian cooperation will continue to win disputes.
Growing geopolitical tensions, among other things, are crowding out progress in solving common world problems, despite the Biden administration's desire to divide some issues into parts. Although the US President's climate envoy, John Kerry, has made some progress in cooperation with China, including a joint declaration at last year's Glasgow summit, this progress has been outweighed by a clear regression in areas where previous joint efforts have borne fruit, including the fight against drugs, the problem of non-proliferation and North Korea. Too many politicians on both sides fear that willingness to cooperate will be interpreted as a lack of determination.
Such tensions further undermine the already weak foundations of global governance. It is unclear how long the center of the "rules-based" international order will be able to hold out without large-scale efforts to update it. But as Beijing becomes increasingly concerned that the United States is seeking to contain or reduce China's influence in the world, it is increasingly investing in alternative American institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. And gradually, China's participation in the multilateral system is increasingly aimed at discrediting the leadership of the United States in it. Despite the fact that Beijing has not demonstrated loyalty to many of the principles that China claims to support, the growing gap between the haves and have-nots has allowed it to portray America as a defender of the privileges of a minority of the world's powerful states. At the United Nations, Beijing and Washington are increasingly seeking to undermine each other's initiatives by unleashing verbal battles that require third countries to choose their place between them.
Last but not least, the obsession with competition in the United States comes with great costs and dangers. Aggressive U.S. efforts to protect the safety of research, combined with increased attacks on Asian—American scientists, have a deterrent effect on scientific research and international cooperation and jeopardize the attractiveness of the United States as a magnet for international talent. A survey conducted by the American Physical Society in 2021 showed that 43% of foreign graduate physicists and aspiring scientists in the United States consider the country unattractive. About half of young international scientists in the United States believe that the US government's approach to the safety of scientific work reduces the likelihood that they will stay there in the long term. These phenomena are especially pronounced among scientists of Chinese origin. A recent study by the Forum of Asian-American Scientists showed that 67% of teachers of Chinese origin (including naturalized citizens and persons permanently residing in America) are thinking about leaving the United States.
As the United States seeks to shield itself from Chinese espionage, theft of ideas, and unfair trade practices, it often insists on reciprocity as a precondition for commercial, educational, and diplomatic exchanges with Beijing. But strict reciprocity with an increasingly closed system, such as China's, is costly to the comparative advantages of the United States: traditional openness, transparency and equal opportunities in their society, which stimulate innovation, scientific productivity and scientific progress.
The atmosphere of insecurity and fear also has a detrimental effect on democracy and the quality of public debate about China in the United States. The desire not to appear "soft" on China permeates private and public political discussions. The result is an "echo chamber" that forces analysts, bureaucrats and officials to be politically, not logically correct. When people feel the need to outsmart each other in order to protect themselves and advance professionally, the result is groupthink. A political environment that encourages self-censorship and reactive thinking hinders pluralistic debate and a dynamic marketplace of ideas, critical components of the national competitiveness of the United States.
U.S. history is replete with examples of innocent Americans caught in the crossfire of exaggerated fears of an "internal enemy." From the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II to the McCarthyism of the 1950s and hate crimes against Muslim and Sikh Americans after September 11, 2001. In each case, the excessive xenophobic reaction has undermined the democracy and social unity of the United States no less, if not more, than the enemy. Despite the fact that the Biden administration condemned anti-Asian hatred and stressed that political practice should be aimed at assessing a person's behavior, not his ethnicity, some US government agencies and politicians still continue to believe that a person's race and his ties with his family abroad are grounds for increased attention.
Before the catastrophe, if the United States and the Soviet Union were still able to come to a detente at some stage, then there is no reason why Washington and Beijing cannot do the same.
At the beginning of the Cold War, President John F. Kennedy, welcoming the need to "make the world safe and diverse," stressed that "our position is as important as their thinking." He warned Americans not to "view conflicts as inevitable, compromises as impossible, and international communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats."
While making it clear that Beijing will pay a high price if it resorts to force or other forms of coercion, Washington must at the same time give China a real choice. Deterrence requires threats to be accompanied by guarantees. In this regard, American politicians should not be afraid to interact directly with their Chinese counterparts to discuss the conditions on which the United States and China can coexist, including mutual restrictions on competition. It was relatively easy for Americans to imagine coexistence with China when it was believed to be on the path of one-way liberalization. The United States and its partners now face a more difficult task: to imagine coexistence with an authoritarian superpower, finding a new basis for bilateral cooperation that focuses on shaping China's external behavior, rather than changing its internal system.
The main thing here is related to Taiwan, where the United States should strengthen deterrence, but at the same time clarify that its "one China" policy has not changed. This means that Beijing must know how costly the crisis around Taiwan will cost it, jeopardizing its development and modernization goals. But at the same time, it must be brought to him that if he refrains from aggressive actions, neither Washington nor Taipei will take advantage of the opportunity to further escalate tensions. However, while Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and other senior American officials have confirmed that the United States does not support Taiwan's independence, other actions of the administration (especially Biden's repeated statements suggesting an end to "strategic ambiguity") sow unnecessary doubts in this regard.
By helping to strengthen Taiwan's resilience to Chinese pressure, Washington should avoid identifying Taiwan as a vital asset to U.S. interests whenever possible. Such statements fuel Beijing's confidence that the United States is seeking to "use Taiwan to contain China," as China's ambassador to Washington put it in May. Instead, the United States should make clear its continued interest in a peaceful process to resolve differences on both sides of the strait, rather than a concrete outcome. And along with emphasizing the costs that Beijing can expect in the event of an escalation of pressure against Taiwan, American politicians should firmly show Taipei that its unilateral efforts to change Taiwan's political status, including calls for de jure independence, diplomatic recognition by the United States or other symbolic steps indicating the eventual separation of Taiwan from China, are counterproductive.
These steps will be necessary, but not sufficient to overcome the growing fatalism regarding a possible Taiwan crisis, given Beijing's firm belief that the United States is trying to contain China with all its might and will use Taiwan for this. In order to prevent the final destruction of US-China relations, more active efforts will be required to establish the boundaries of fair competition and a willingness to discuss the conditions of reasonable coexistence. Despite recent meetings and calls, senior U.S. officials do not yet have regular contacts with their Chinese counterparts that would facilitate such discussions. These contacts should be coordinated with US allies and partners to prevent Beijing's attempts to drive a wedge between the United States and other countries in Europe and Asia. But Washington must also come to a common understanding with its allies and partners regarding possible forms of coexistence with China.
Skeptics may say that the Beijing leadership has no reason to play along with the United States, given the Chinese tendency to triumphalism and deep distrust of America. Indeed, this is a serious obstacle. But, it seems, it is still worth checking the assumption that Washington can take steps to stabilize tensions without bringing the matter from the very beginning to a military crisis with a competitor possessing nuclear weapons. There is reason to believe that Beijing is sufficiently concerned about the issue of at least some stabilization of relations with the United States to reciprocate. Despite the statement that "the East is rising and the West is falling," China remains the weaker side, especially given the uncertainty of the dynamics of its economic development. And internal problems, as a rule, have always limited China's behavior, rather than encouraging it to risky external adventures. Political scientist Andrew Chubb has shown that when Chinese leaders faced problems with their legitimacy, they acted less aggressively in areas such as defending the sovereignty of islands in the South China Sea.
Since Beijing and Washington are unwilling to make unilateral concessions, fearing that they will be interpreted as a manifestation of weakness at home and by the other side, detente will require reciprocity. Both sides will have to take coordinated but unilateral steps to prevent a military crisis. For example, tacit understanding can lead to a reduction in China and the United States' operations in and around the Taiwan Strait, lowering the temperature of confrontation, but not signaling weakness. Military operations are necessary for the United States to demonstrate that the United States will continue to fly and sail wherever permitted by international law, including the Taiwan Strait. But ultimately, the ability of the United States to contain China and Taiwan's ability to defend itself against Beijing's attempt at armed unification have little to do with whether American warships cross the Taiwan Strait 4, 8, 12 or 24 times a year.
In the current atmosphere of distrust, words must be backed up by actions. At a virtual meeting with Biden in November 2021, Xi said, "We have patience and we will pursue the prospect of peaceful reunification with the utmost sincerity and effort." But Beijing's actions have since undermined its credibility in Taipei and in Washington. Biden also told Xi that the United States does not seek a new cold war and does not want to change power in Beijing. However, subsequent US actions (including efforts to diversify supply chains outside China and new visa restrictions for CPC officials), for their part, also undermined Washington's credibility not only among Chinese leaders, but also in other countries of the region. It does not help that some representatives of the American administration continue to draw parallels with the Cold War in statements on US-Chinese relations.
So the Biden administration itself must do much more to prevent accusations of hypocrisy and double standards. Look at the US policy on combating "digital authoritarianism": Washington has targeted Chinese companies engaged in surveillance technologies more harshly than similar enterprises operating in the US, Israel and other Western democracies.
What should the world be like
So far, the Biden administration's efforts to create a "new order" in the region have focused on agreements excluding China, such as the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Agreement. Although officials cautiously insist that these initiatives are not directed against any one country, there are few signs of any corresponding efforts to involve Beijing in new international or regional structures. However, some signals have appeared on the sidelines of international forums that inclusive groupings in the Asia-Pacific region can still work. (For example, the World Trade Organization has concluded agreements on subsidies for fisheries and vaccines against COVID-19 for the countries of the region). But if investments in narrower coalitions continue to take precedence over broader, inclusive agreements and institutions, including those in which China and the United States have an important role to play, geopolitical tensions will break rather than revive the international system.
The renewal of US leadership requires Washington to take additional measures to remove the criticism that the US-led order means "rules for others, but not for America." A clear and explicit recognition of cases of violation by the United States of the UN Charter, such as the invasion of Iraq, would be an important step towards overcoming this international discontent. And Washington should bring significant benefits to the citizens of developing countries, whether on COVID-19, climate, hunger control or the spread of advanced technologies, and not just urge them not to work with China. At home, Washington should work to restore bipartisan support for U.S. participation in the international system.
At a time when the United States needs to rethink its domestic and international goals, it should do so for itself and the American people, and not for the sake of surpassing China. The concretization of the inclusive, positive vision of the world that the United States seeks should be the first step towards clarifying the conditions under which the United States will welcome or accept Chinese initiatives, rather than reflexively oppose them. The divergent interests and values of these two countries will continue to lead the United States to oppose many of Beijing's actions. But this resistance will be accompanied by a clear willingness to negotiate the terms of China's growing influence. The United States cannot cede so much influence to Beijing that international rules and institutions no longer reflect U.S. interests and values. However, today the greater risk is that excessive efforts to counter China's influence will undermine the world system itself by combining its paralysis and reducing the possibilities of alternative systems put forward by other major powers.
Finally, the United States must do much more to invest in the strength of its example and ensure that the steps taken to counter China will not undermine this example of theirs, dragging America into the trap of trying to outwit China. Defensive or punitive actions, whether military, economic or diplomatic, should be evaluated not only in terms of whether they counteract China, but also in terms of how they affect the entire world system and whether they reflect loyalty to the principles of the United States.
Competition cannot be an end in itself. As long as the achievement of superiority over China in the competitive struggle will determine the success of the United States policy, Washington will continue to measure it not by its own criteria. Ratings are a symbolic construct, not an objective reality. If the pursuit of progress, peace and prosperity of mankind is America's ultimate goal, as Blinken claims, then the United States does not need to defeat China to actually win.
