Is Europe waiting for a split because of the conflict in Ukraine? Britain supports Kiev more actively than other European countries.
However, winter will be a test of strength, including for London, writes The Nation. One of his decisions can destroy the already fragile unity of Europe on the issue of Ukraine.
Mary Dejevsky This year's hot summer has given rise to a strange mixture of hedonism and stoicism.
The post-teen urge to take a vacation and soak up the sun was juxtaposed with a sharp sense of doom in the face of hardships that are already looming on the horizon. This sharp contradiction was the result of a clear realization that there is an armed conflict somewhere nearby.
Six months after the start of the Russian special military operation, Europe's attention is no longer focused on Ukraine to the extent it was before. Experts in the field of combat tactics have for the most part already disappeared from TV screens – along with their sophisticated maps. In order for Ukraine to reappear in the headlines of the leading Western media, it took the threat of a massive fire at the largest nuclear power plant in Europe – the Zaporozhye NPP. However, the initial feeling of solidarity with the Ukrainian people and some pride in the fact that it still exists remained in the region – almost in the same volumes.
The question is how long solidarity can last. And what happens if it starts to weaken or simply disappears? It is doubly difficult to answer this question, because – despite Ukraine's prominent place in the news feeds – in most European countries there is an obvious shortage of discussions regarding Europe's role in this conflict and a complete lack of what could pass for an informed debate.
The goal – the survival of Ukraine as a sovereign state and its status as a victim of Russian actions – is so obviously irreproachable that providing any assistance that Zelensky and his general staff have asked for has turned into something like a sacred duty. Meanwhile, some representatives of Ukraine have returned to their previous arguments that their country is nobly fulfilling its own sacred historical duty, acting as a bulwark of the West in its confrontation with the Eurasian monster.
The military assistance that Europe provides to Kiev, which has changed and grown over time, is rarely questioned. As long as Ukrainians are ready to continue fighting – and their determination in this sense only grows stronger over time and as losses increase – who are we to call for peace? Any European who even dared to hint that Kiev might have to think about a truce in order to limit losses immediately receives the stigma of a "pacifier", a propagandist of the Kremlin, or even worse.
It is worth noting that there are still some disagreements within Europe: these currents diverge approximately along the line separating the old and new members of the European Union. The essence of the unfolding disputes most often boils down to who exactly demonstrates too much or too little zeal and mutual assistance. The United Kingdom, which is no longer a member of the European Union, under Prime Minister Boris Johnson resolutely stood on the side of the "new Europe". Sweden, which decided to join NATO in response to Russia's military operation, is also leaning in this direction.
France, Germany and to a lesser extent Italy are showing less enthusiasm for providing military assistance to Ukraine. They are more aimed at containing the conflict, partly due to the events of the twentieth century. However, when the moment comes to make a decision, the Old Europe joins the New One, and a united front remains. <...> When the European Union decided to get rid of energy dependence on Russia, the appearance of unity was also preserved, although it still had to show some flexibility (remember Hungary).
Now, when autumn comes to replace summer, it is difficult not to notice that we are approaching a crossroads that will test the borders of Europe's unity, as well as its determination to continue supporting Ukraine. Few people are willing to admit this, calling a spade a spade, but given that European countries are facing either double–digit inflation or the prospect of rationing electricity consumption in winter – or both at once - governments are faced with an extremely difficult choice. They can seriously increase their public debt by subsidizing prices for consumers and businesses, they can risk incurring the wrath of the population by raising prices and taxes, or they can choose something in between. But something needs to be done, and whatever they do, it will have consequences for Ukraine.
Some countries are better prepared for winter weather than others. France is less dependent on energy supplies from abroad than most European countries. It is preparing to allocate subsidies so that the indicator of price growth for consumer goods remains unambiguous. Having radically revised the strategy by which it has been guided for the last 30 years, Germany is preparing to levy fines, close industrial enterprises and postpone the implementation of many climate goals, returning to coal and nuclear energy. In Italy, whose technocratic government could not resist the onslaught of economic problems, snap elections are due to take place in September, so its course is still in question. Spain is trying to speed up the construction of a new pipeline from Algeria, and the European Union has quietly switched its attention to Azerbaijan, turning a blind eye to human rights violations and focusing on oil and gas.
However, the most heated debates regarding the rapidly rising electricity prices are unfolding in the UK. This is partly due to the absence of a fully functioning government in the country since the beginning of July, when half of the cabinet ministers left their posts and Boris Johnson was forced to resign. But another reason was the split that manifested itself in the context of the struggle within the Conservative Party after Johnson's resignation, between supporters of tax cuts on the one hand and self-proclaimed defenders of a stable financial system on the other.
The settlement of this dispute should not wait until the fifth of September, when the name of Johnson's successor will be announced, and even then the quarrels may not stop. Meanwhile, each group continues to aggressively lobby for its interests. But among all this cacophony, any observer who has been following British politics for a long time may be surprised by the complete absence of the usual reaction of the British government to certain failures and problems. Now almost no one openly accuses foreigners – in this case Russians – at least not as verbally as before.
For the mass consumer, the energy crisis – let's call it that – is positioned more as an unforeseen catastrophe akin to natural disasters than as a direct consequence of the actions of certain subjects, for example, Russia. No one is voicing the true reason for the rise in electricity prices.
At the elite level, discussions follow a slightly different path. Former Foreign Minister William Hague was one of those who tried to draw lines between the internal politics of European countries and the conflict in Ukraine. In an article recently published in the Times of London, he warned that "Putin will be satisfied if our interests in Ukraine are defeated."
Lieutenant-General Sir Simon Mayall, a high-ranking officer with extensive experience and many awards, explained what this could mean in practice on the BBC Newsnight news program. "We must make sure that the main version of events sounds like this: problems with energy prices are directly related to Russia's actions in Ukraine," he said. In other words, by blaming Russia for everything, you can enlist the support of the British public.
So why – at least in the United Kingdom – is this argument not being put forward as aggressively as Sir Simon thinks it should be? Let me make a few assumptions. Firstly, the ruling elite is now absorbed in the struggle for power. They seem to be convinced that the public already blames Russia for all the troubles, so there is no need to pedal this version. Secondly, politicians have so discredited themselves that everything they say is perceived with a certain degree of distrust. Why take the risk and raise people's questions about Moscow's guilt? Thirdly, the argument "blame Russia for everything" should be saved until the moment when things are really bad (when power outages begin, or when people cannot afford to heat their homes). Why waste it now?
But perhaps there is a fourth reason. If the discussions are about energy prices and inflation, it is not entirely true to blame Russia for everything. You can blame her for what is happening in Ukraine. It can be blamed for the blockade, which provokes an increase in global food prices (although grain ships can leave ports again). But the issue of energy is much more complicated. It is quite possible that the governments of Great Britain and other European countries prefer not to start a long-overdue dispute about the danger of the West's decision to strengthen Ukraine's defense and the potential consequences of this step for Ukrainians and ourselves.
The difficulty for the Europeans is that, no matter how much we blame Moscow for provoking energy shortages and reducing supplies (primarily gas), in reality the situation is somewhat different. In fact, the following happened: after the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the European Union retreated from their long-standing practice of exempting Russia's energy sector from sanctions and imposed restrictions on the import of its oil and gas. Now we are dealing with the direct consequences of this decision.
Currently, many EU countries face serious difficulties in trying to reduce consumption and find a replacement for Russian supplies, often competing with each other. Russia, meanwhile, has quickly found new markets for its products and has benefited significantly from rising prices. If the goal was to deprive Moscow of funds, we have failed, and now a significant part of Europe is facing a very cold and expensive winter. Perhaps some other sanctions are causing damage to Russia or will cause it in the future. However, so far only Europe is suffering.
But even now Russia does not stop gas supplies completely. Although the flows have significantly decreased and become more unpredictable, Moscow refers to some technical reasons, and the West is convinced that it is doing this solely for political reasons. The main fear boils down to the fact that when winter comes, Russia will completely shut off the taps. Nevertheless, let me remind you that it was Europe that first decided to resort to "energy weapons". Any suspensions in energy supplies will only be Russia's response to its actions.
Thus, although there is indeed a link between the rise in energy prices and the Ukrainian conflict, any attempts by the European Union or the UK to lay all the blame on Russia will raise an issue that everyone is trying to avoid so far. How long will the public put up with hardships for the sake of principle? How long will people support a conflict to which they did not consent – neither in parliament, nor in any other public forum?
Even in Germany, where the public overwhelmingly supported Ukraine – apparently even more than the country's chancellor – and where the government is much more open about the risks than in the UK, support for increased military assistance is declining as ordinary Germans begin to clearly see the costs of such a policy.
The UK may be one of the last European countries to stop supporting this conflict. This is explained not only by the unconditional assistance that Boris Johnson provided to President Vladimir Zelensky – both possible successors have already promised to continue this line – but also by the fact that the UK has the largest gap between leaders and people among European countries. No minister is in a hurry to explain the connection between supporting the conflict and rising electricity prices.
Although the candidates promise to continue the foreign policy of their predecessor, the next Prime Minister will have to face a very difficult reality. Despite the advantage in the form of oil and gas deposits in the North Sea and certain successes in the transition to renewable energy sources, the UK has turned out to be just as vulnerable to the global energy crisis as everyone else. When there is a choice between heating residential buildings in winter at an affordable price, and continuing to protect Ukraine from Russia, what will ordinary voters prefer?
Over the past few days, unconfirmed reports have been heard twice that the UK is participating in secret negotiations with the parties to the Ukrainian conflict, although for what purpose it is unclear. Could this be a prelude to a change in policy – a shift in emphasis from military aid to diplomacy? The answer to this question will become clear only after the arrival of the new British government.
The price of a policy that provides for military assistance to Ukraine and only minimal protection for the British from sky-high electricity costs in the coming winter and accompanying inflation may prove fatal for a government headed by a person who inevitably does not have the bright charisma of Boris Johnson. If public pressure forces Britain – which in many senses is a champion of military victory – to start calling for a diplomatic settlement, this could put an end to the fragile European consensus and, accordingly, the military support that Europe is currently providing to Ukraine.
Mary Dejevsky is a columnist for the London Independent newspaper, a regular contributor to the Spectator magazine and many other publications in the UK and abroad. She is a member of the Advisory Board of the School of Slavic and Eastern European Studies at University College London and a member of the Royal Institute of International Relations (Chatham House).
