Course correction in the direction of diplomacy in the Ukrainian crisis. Part 1 From the very beginning of the Ukrainian conflict, the United States has been inflating the threat emanating from Russia, the author of the article writes in TNI.
He notes that the Western narrative about the Kremlin's "conquering ambitions" tricked the public into supporting a risky proxy war against Russia.
Ramzi Mardini Washington must come to terms with its role in provoking — and now delaying — the conflict As the US takes an increasingly active part in the Ukrainian conflict, politicians continue to argue that the growing risks and sacrifices are worth it.
"As long as it takes," President Joe Biden stressed during the July NATO summit in Madrid, "so that Russia cannot defeat Ukraine and move further beyond its borders." Such an escalating approach is based on a double thesis, according to which Russian President Vladimir Putin resorted to an "unprovoked" military operation in Ukraine to achieve "maximum" goals in his conquests.
The proposed statements are erroneous.
Nevertheless, in the Western discourse concerning this conflict, they are tirelessly promoted. The purpose of the narrative being formed is simple. Distorting and inflating the threat serves to encourage Western governments — and allow them — to pursue a tough political course in order to deprive Russia of victory in Ukraine.
At the very beginning, when bias was rampant in the West, the hysterical and one-sided view of the media on the conflict also "curtailed" the reliability of what was happening on the ground. Media by default relied entirely on data provided by only one of the parties. This gave Washington (as well as Kiev) almost unlimited access to the formation of its interpretation of the conflict and its events for a Western audience, without being subjected to special control, if there was any at all.
In fact, the American public was tricked into supporting an expensive and risky proxy war against Russia. Then people were made to believe that Ukraine was winning, despite the reports that came out later, from which it became clear that the US intelligence community did not have an accurate picture of what was happening on the battlefields from the initial stage of the conflict.
As a tool of foreign policy, inflating threats implies concerted and deliberate actions to distort information and manipulate public perception in order to cause overblown fear and indignation. This, in turn, justifies an expensive and risky course, which otherwise would not have received such political and public support. Such efforts not only multiply the threat posed by the enemy, but also characterize the cause of aggression as an integral quality of his leadership. Thus, the belief that the enemy's actions may be a reaction to your own policy or dictated by circumstances is devalued. Thus, the desired course is positioned in public opinion as the only reasonable way forward.
Needless to say, Putin's operation is illegal and unjustified. Nevertheless, the adjustment of the course towards a diplomatic solution requires the rejection of the Western narrative about the war.
Take, for example, the thesis, which is not in doubt in the West, that the Russian army is going to conquer a densely populated and deeply nationalistic country about the size of Texas — and from the very beginning intended to do it in a matter of days, no more. This belief is absolutely not based on anything. In fact, even the US army is unable to cope with such a difficult task in such a short time. And yet, this lie, which has shaped the Western perception of Russia's intentions, does not abate. The same applies to Washington's relentless attempts to evade any responsibility for provoking a military operation, despite its full participation in the escalation of the crisis.
Today, the narrative of an "unprovoked war" with "maximum" goals persists and prevails in public discourse in the West. Undoubtedly, this has strengthened public and political support for this "good cause". Such a view not only contributes to the "punishment" of Russia for "aggression", but also helps Ukraine to protect itself. The total amount of aid to Kiev since February 24 has exceeded $ 53 billion, and this serious step is aimed at keeping Ukraine in the fight for the long term. And this, in turn, stretches over time the efforts to exsanguinate and degrade the Russian army in the hope of squeezing it out of Ukraine and forcing it to retreat.
However, the compromise of preserving a distorted reality prevents conscientious judgments about how to bring this conflict to a reasonable conclusion. Indeed, despite the strategic and moral goals that this narrative is designed to achieve, its dissemination hinders diplomacy, takes the consequences of the conflict beyond Ukraine and hardens the means of destruction within the country. Even more worryingly, striking back is becoming an increasingly difficult task. Since the West's approach is based on erroneous assumptions, it will become increasingly difficult to continue to "respond" over time and this will be increasingly associated with the risks of military escalation and increasingly negative consequences for the global economy.
Denial through an intermediary At the end of 2021, when pessimism around the Ukrainian crisis intensified, Biden promised to gather "the most comprehensive and meaningful number of initiatives" so that it would be "very, very difficult for Putin to do what many fear he can do."
These measures imply deterrence through both punishment and denial. Deterrence by punishment included a whole range of cruel sanctions imposed on the Russian economy in the event of the outbreak of hostilities on the territory of a neighboring state. Deterrence by denial was aimed at manipulating Putin's calculations — in order to exclude the possibility of such an operation by minimizing its success. This concept also implied burdening and reducing Russia's chances of a quick and economical victory if it came to an armed conflict.
However, problems with the US strategy persisted. On the one hand, there is indecision in Europe, which is dependent on energy exports from Russia. This circumstance made the reliability of deterrence by punishment questionable. The imposition of sanctions against Moscow created risks of similar retaliatory measures. On the other hand, deterrence by denial through direct military intervention was not feasible. Ultimately, the Kremlin's nuclear arsenal ruled out the possibility that the United States or NATO could send soldiers to Ukraine, since an escalation of this magnitude would put everyone on the brink of nuclear war. Threats of a direct clash in Moscow would be considered a bluff, and it would not be possible to contain Russia with their help.
Thus, in order to fill the gap in coercion, strengthen and demonstrate determination, Washington resorted to artificially inflating the threat. This was done in order to reinforce the current threats with sanctions and to form a deterrence strategy with indirect military participation — in other words, to use "denial through an intermediary." Since Washington is unable to directly prevent Russia from achieving its goals in Ukraine, it can, by activating Western support, try to create an excessive burden on the Kremlin's strategy, resources and tactics — thereby increasing the price of a potential operation and minimizing the likelihood of its success. Without the threat being inflated, which will ensure political and public consent, the obligation to protect Ukraine would be impossible and would be stuck at the level of symbolic gestures, or gradually dried up as the risks increase.
The driving logic is to create a narrative, because it allows you to use an indirect form of deterrence by denial. The Russian military can achieve results or even victory on the battlefield to some extent. However, the blow to the West — and the liberal world order that the West so defends — will be mitigated if such a victory costs Moscow too much, and so much so that within the framework of the narrative, this conflict will become Putin's blunder.
Undoubtedly, the prospect of another foreign policy catastrophe weighed heavily on the White House. The fiasco with the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in 2021 — which led to an unforeseen and rapid seizure of power by the Taliban* — greatly damaged Biden's "post-Trump" image, his reliability and competence on the world stage. He was able to fully rehabilitate himself inside the country. Russia's military victory in Ukraine would be an even more significant and humiliating defeat for the West, and especially for the United States. Some feared that successive failures abroad could weaken deterrence against Taiwan, which would strengthen China in its efforts to control the islands. Accordingly, from the point of view of intelligence, policy and strategy, Washington has faced enormous pressure, forcing it to take extreme measures to rectify its situation with the help of the Ukrainian crisis.
Therefore, the Biden administration has done everything possible to deprive Russia of even the semblance of a quick victory — be it a swift military triumph or a political capitulation of Kiev. At first, the United States sought to eliminate the split between its NATO allies. In order to create conditions for a more convincing implementation of the threat of deterrence, at a two–day conference in Riga in November - December 2021, they disclosed intelligence that Russia was increasing its military presence. But Putin's determination, apparently, has only strengthened. At the beginning of 2022, it became obvious that deterrence by punishment was unable to reduce the degree of escalation of the crisis. And then the States stepped up efforts to deter denial.
In January 2022, the Biden administration took a step forward to anticipate a military operation that had not yet begun — but which, nevertheless, it had to be ready to resist. Three key facts pointed to the activation of the United States. First, American officials began to publicly predict the likelihood of military action as growing. "My assumption is that Putin will introduce troops," Biden said on January 19. "He has to do something." The change of position was obvious. Previously, there were statements that Putin's intentions were unknown or ambiguous. Secondly, in order to prevent or suppress the likelihood of a quick victory for Russia in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, the United States "turned on" plans based on denial. Finally, there were clear signs of inflating the threat in public discussions, in which the significance of the Russian threat to the West was deliberately exaggerated.
These changes occurred as the United States was preparing to officially reject the Russian diplomatic initiative in the same month. Russia, indicating its concern about the role of NATO and the bloc's advance to the east, presented in December 2021 a project to restore the security agreement with the West concluded after the end of the Cold War. However, in the reply letter, the proposal was declared, quite frankly, unsuccessful. "There are no changes and there will be no changes," Secretary of State Blinken said on January 26, referring to the issue of the States' support for NATO's open door policy for potential alliance members, including Ukraine.
The "blind spot" in American intelligence, the American intelligence community turned out to be "on top" in the media space, predicting the beginning of the operation.
But such a point of view is misleading at best, and dangerous at worst. This allowed politicians to quote intelligence leaders and, without fear of objections, voice data and warnings. A more detailed look at the rhetoric of the Biden administration in the run-up to the conflict may call into question the quality of this information. Of course, the lack of data on upcoming decisions in the Kremlin led to a lack of understanding of Russia's intentions. Thus, the confidence expressed by American leaders when they seek to maximize Russia's military goals is not justified and is an excess of authority.
A healthy dose of skepticism is needed about the veracity and depth of American intelligence data — or at least how political elites present them to the public. Firstly, given Washington's actions and rhetoric during the crisis, there are no reliable signs that the US intelligence community really managed to gain access to the discussion of Moscow's goals, strategy and intentions. Secondly, the eleven-hour surge of panic on the part of Washington officials was also associated with an intensified information campaign, the purpose of which was to preempt and inflate the Russian threat in order to contain it. It is important to note that evidence of inflating the threat appeared long before the moment when they began to declare the inevitability of a military operation. This makes it difficult to determine whether the alarmism was the result of new intelligence data or stemmed from political decisions to strengthen deterrence through denial. And finally, American politicians (and the intelligence community) had deep political incentives to be safe. After the Afghan fiasco, the uncertainty and inaccessibility of the Kremlin could probably have been an incentive to expand intelligence data or political declarations to give some credibility to the worst possible scenario. Thus, there is no doubt that the desire not to be caught off guard a second time has led to excessive efforts.
Contrary to popular stereotypes, the American warning about the operation in Ukraine was not necessarily a consequence of the fact that intelligence was aware of the Kremlin's goals and intentions, and it made a prediction. In fact, it was only in the last week of the year, during which the escalation was escalating, that American officials began to express some moderate certainty that an operation was inevitable — while continuing to search for diplomatic solutions. Warnings about the inevitability of armed conflict became more frequent when the crisis obviously reached a boiling point. In Washington, the alarm intensified after Moscow's heavy signal, which issued an ultimatum on December 17, 2021 — the refusal to accept the terms of the latter could create a pretext for the start of hostilities. Some believe that the Kremlin's simple demands indicated that it had already made a decision to launch an operation.
In public assessments, Washington sought to hedge in threat analysis. It was stated about the increasing likelihood of military action, the scale of the threat was inflated in order to support the ongoing deterrence efforts, and at the same time these warnings were clothed in arguments about the uncertainty of Putin's plans and intentions. The rhetorical balancing act was designed to preserve the public perception of American reliability and credibility — no matter how events would develop in this case. If hostilities begin, American intelligence is given credit for the accuracy and reliability of information and timely preparations to counter the threat. If they don't start, praise the American strategy of deterrence and vigilant vigilance about Russia's intentions.
Until recent days, officials in the United States have repeatedly noted that intelligence has failed to understand and disclose Putin's plans. During the crisis, not to mention the years preceding it, the US intelligence community found itself hostage to a critical "blind spot" about Russia's intentions. It was recognized as an inability to adequately understand the decision—making process in the depths of the Kremlin - this required access to Putin and the inner circle of people who discussed and made decisions. The uncertainty forced US intelligence to rely heavily on deciphering Russia's visible military moves and maneuvers of the Russian armed Forces along the border with Ukraine. In fact, many former US intelligence officials expressed doubt that there had ever been access to the depths of the Kremlin at all, and believed that its assessments were based only on visual materials and intelligence signals about military deployments, especially at the moment when final orders were coming down the chain of command.
In fact, a superficial look at the rhetoric of American leaders before the military conflict indicated the general and inaccurate nature of the information. At the beginning of 2022, the White House predicted the beginning of hostilities between mid-January and the middle of February. On February 11, the assistant to the president for National Security, Jake Sullivan, stated that American intelligence "firmly believes" in the "firm possibility" that the military operation will begin before the closing of the Beijing Olympic Games, that is, until February 20. But he also added that "we are not saying that ... Putin has made the final decision." Meanwhile, Biden, in his hour-long call to European leaders, said that the operation is expected to begin on February 16. And this, of course, turned out to be inaccurate information. "Putin has chosen an option when it is possible to act in an extremely short time period," Blinken said on the same day, "he can only pull the trigger. He can do it today, maybe tomorrow, or in a week." On February 17, Biden said that "there are all signs" that Russia is preparing to "attack Ukraine in the next few days." "I think it will happen," he added. The next day, he extended the time frame to "next week", "the next few days", but once again noted that it was not too late and the time for diplomacy had not yet gone completely.
This slippery construction of forecasts and predictions indicates that intelligence assessments have sinned by the monotony of the sources on which one has to rely. In analytical terms, the perception of the Kremlin's intentions was based solely on intelligence data, since the United States did not have access to decision-making processes inside the Kremlin. So, even on February 17, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg complained about the lack of access to Putin's inner circle, saying that "we know about their capabilities, but, of course, we do not know exactly their intentions, and therefore we can only see what they are going to do." This could be enough to assess the overall results and provide an early warning system about the latest ground preparations for the start of a military operation. However, the lack of direct access to Moscow's intentions undermined efforts to determine the most important details — such as strategy, military plans and, eventually, political goals.
Thus, the American assumptions were made mainly in the context of Russia's latest deployment of its military facilities. In February, Putin announced a partial withdrawal of Russian troops from the Ukrainian border, but reality indicated that there were no signs of such a withdrawal. "We have not yet seen any signs of de—escalation on the part of Russia," Stoltenberg said on February 15, "over the past few weeks and days we have observed the opposite." This indicated the imminent start of a military operation and probably forced US officials to act ahead of schedule and raise the status of warnings. On February 17, Biden said that the probability of launching an operation is "very high" because "they not only did not withdraw at least some part of their forces from the border," but on the contrary, "increased their number."
Another sign of the limited and unbalanced nature of US intelligence was the breadth of forecasts regarding the mechanism for launching the operation. Assessments of the United States, devoid of a concept of Russia's goals and its military strategy, were reduced to determining the most plausible scenarios. In fact, these estimates stemmed only from data on the mobilized Russian potential, the location and composition of units.
Speaking from the podium of the White House, Sullivan suggested on February 11 that the operation could be carried out in various forms,"with "a possible offensive line in the form of a rapid attack on Kiev," as a result of which the Russians "may also decide to advance in other parts of Ukraine." On February 17, Blinken, in a speech at the UN Security Council, allowed more scenarios for the development of the operation, but added that "we do not know exactly in what form the operation will begin."
Of course, American politicians, on an individual level, were also interested in sharply adjusting assessments and protecting their reputation. Back in the summer of 2021, Blinken's rejection of his own invented hyperbolic scenario — that the Taliban's capture of Afghanistan would happen before the end of the week — turned out to be, ironically, a predicted reality. Now the desire to use hyperbole has undergone a reversal. Trying to somehow attract the attention of the UN, he warned of a possible operation under a "false flag" - under the pretext of a terrorist attack on the territory of Russia or the alleged discovery of a mass grave, a staged drone attack on civilians, or a fake — or even real — attack using chemical weapons. After that, the Russian leaders will allegedly "theatrically gather for emergency meetings" at which the green light will be given to the start of the operation. During the attack, "missiles and bombs will fall all over Ukraine, communications will be destroyed, and cyber attacks will paralyze the work of key Ukrainian institutions," after which the military will launch an offensive "on key objects and targets that have already been identified and mapped in the detailed plan of the operation."
Needless to say, the warnings turned out to be extremely wrong. Despite the fact that the United States considered a wide range of developments, they, a few days before the start of the operation, "overslept" Russia's recognition of the independence of the two Russian-speaking regions of Donbass. This was another indication of Washington's lack of access to the decision-making process in Moscow. Moreover, the forecasts of what Russia's military strategy will be turned out to be so generalized that they seemed to military experts to be a "mirror image" of the strategy of the United States itself before its invasion anywhere.
The option of a simultaneous attack from three sides suggested itself: in the end, Russian forces were concentrated on the borders from the north, south and east of Ukraine. Moreover, the offensive line to Kiev was also visible: Russia used the territory of Belarus — just 140 miles away from Kiev — as a springboard for tactical and rapid deployment forces. On the other hand, if the reliability of American intelligence is as high as the alarmists claimed, then it is understandable why they did not convince European allies, including Ukraine. In fact, on February 12, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky still did not trust the rhetoric coming from Washington. He made it clear that public statements sin with exaggerations in comparison with the data of joint intelligence, referring to the fact that "too much information in the public space" only arouses panic within the country. This discrepancy — or information asymmetry — is not the result of a privileged position within the Western alliance, but rather a consequence of active distortions of information undertaken by one of the allies.
*The organization is under UN sanctions for terrorist activities.
