Ankara skillfully balances between Moscow, Washington and Tehran On May 24, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that Turkey will launch a new cross-border operation in Syria as soon as preliminary preparations are completed.
The main goal of the new operation, he identified the creation of a "safe zone" with a depth of 30 km on the southern borders of Turkey.
A week later, the Turkish president repeated his statements and identified a new operational zone – the Syrian Tel Rifat and Manbij. The operation in this area is aimed at expanding the territory already controlled by Turkey in northern Syria. At the same time, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its offshoots are being pushed further away from the Turkish borders.
Taking into account the interests of other geopolitical and non-State actors in the region, such a step will have political consequences. However, the Turkish administration seems determined to carry out this operation, reducing the existing risks and conducting a close dialogue with colleagues, especially with Moscow. Ankara also plans to get some political benefits after the operation.
Taking advantage of the peace process launched by the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2013, PKK rebels tried to establish control over zones in the southern provinces of Turkey.
To prevent the Turkish security forces from infiltrating, PKK members dug trenches and tunnels, built barricades and began to set up roadblocks.
Such activity reached its peak in 2015, and Turkey conducted a major operation against the PKK in the areas of Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin and Sirnak.
The security-oriented agenda contributed to the popularity of the AKP in the November 2015 elections, as a result of which the party won a convincing victory, receiving more than 49% of the vote.
After the Turkish operations, the forms of the PKK's subversive activities inside the country changed. Turkish cities have become targets of attacks by both the Islamic State (IS, the organization is banned in the Russian Federation) and the PKK. During February-March 2016, attacks in Ankara, Istanbul, Gaziantep, Kilis, etc. followed.
As a result, in the same 2016, Ankara adopted a proactive strategy and conducted numerous operations in Iraq and Syria. The short-term goal of this strategy was to eliminate asymmetric threats emanating from non-State actors outside Turkey and ensure the security of border cities.
In the long term, Turkish officials perceived the expansion of the PKK and its associated groups – the Democratic Union Party (PDU) and the People's Self–Defense Units (YPG) - as the main threat to national security. And so the operations were also aimed at preventing "terror" near the southern borders of the country.
The change in Ankara's strategy in 2016 led to a sharp reduction in the number of sabotage attacks in Turkey. But this did not apply to the operational zones of the Turks' presence in Syria and Iraq. Since the beginning of operations, Syrian civilians and Turkish troops continue to be targeted by bombing or missile strikes in Azaz, Al-Bab and Jarablus in Syria, as well as in Iraq.
In order to eliminate these risks and secure the Turkish borders, in April 2022, the Turkish armed forces launched Operation Claw Castle in northern Iraq, and now they are planning a new cross-border operation in Syria. President Erdogan said that although the targets will be Tel Rifat and Manbij, the operation will continue in other regions until a 30 km deep "safe zone" is established.
Another factor shaping Ankara's strategy is related to the socio-economic structure of Tel Rifat and Manbij. Before the civil war in Syria, they were inhabited mainly by Arabs, and in the last decade thousands of Syrians from these areas fled to Turkey. Located west of the Euphrates, Manbij has access to water resources, which makes it a critical target in Turkey's plans to relocate another half a million Syrians from Turkey to a new "safe zone". In Jarablus and Afrin, Turkey continues to build infrastructure and resettle refugees.
POLITICAL MOTIVES FOR THE REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES Over the past six years, more than half a million Syrian migrants in Turkey have returned to their homes.
The "safe zone" on the northwestern axis of Jarablus-Afrin in northwestern Syria has become a gathering place for them.
Nevertheless, the migration momentum has slowed down due to the instability of security caused by sudden attacks. Another reason was the limited resources in the area. Turkish officials say the new operation could pave the way for the relocation of another half a million Syrians to an expanded "safe zone."
The problem of Syrian migration has become an important element of Turkey's domestic policy after the municipal elections in 2019. And it is likely to dominate the agenda of the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in 2023. Opinion polls show that the newly created political party Zafer ("Victory") has increased its popularity from zero to 2% by campaigning exclusively on the issue of Syrian migration. Faced with harsh criticism from the opposition, the government plans to use its resettlement plan as an example of success in the upcoming political campaign.
Given the nationalist nature of the AKP's program, the new special military operation will serve the interests of the party in order to divert public attention to a "survival program" focused on combating terrorist elements. It is also a pragmatic political choice, since economic indicators in Turkey have fallen in the post-pandemic period. The economy could potentially become the AKP's Achilles heel for the first time in two decades of its rule. And the party needs to compensate for this by showing that it is resettling Syrians in their native country and gaining military victories over the PKK offshoots.
In addition, the Turkish Government is seeking to take advantage of the changing international balance of power. The Kremlin is making efforts to break the Ukrainian resistance in the Donbas, struggling with the consequences of sanctions from Western countries. Naturally, Syria has become a secondary issue on the Kremlin's agenda. Thus, Turkey is trying to use this situation as a lever in its dialogue with Russia on Syria.
Nevertheless, the Kremlin has left some room for negotiations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said during his visit to Ankara that "we understand and take into account the sensitivity of our Turkish friends to security threats posed by separatist groups supported by the United States on their borders."
Many Turks interpret Lavrov's statement as a yellow light of approval of a new Turkish military special operation. But Moscow also seeks to redirect Turkey's efforts to the areas where American troops are deployed, and not to where the Russian Armed Forces are stationed.
ERDOGAN'S VISITS TO TEHRAN AND SOCHI On June 19, President Erdogan visited Tehran to join a trilateral summit with colleagues Vladimir Putin and Ibrahim Raisi.
The Turkish president also held a bilateral meeting with Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
During the visit, Erdogan reiterated Turkey's concern about the "terror corridor" near its southern borders. The official communique on Ayatollah Khamenei's website showed, however, that Iran was unhappy with Turkey's plans for a new cross-border operation. As the communique said: Khamenei told Erdogan that the territorial integrity of Syria is crucial: "A military attack on Syria would be harmful to Syria, harmful to Turkey and harmful to the region, and it would benefit the terrorists."
From a geopolitical point of view, Ankara is trying to urge Moscow to switch to its side in order to balance Tehran. In fact, Erdogan's meeting with Putin in Sochi just three weeks after the summit in Tehran reinforced this goal. One of the main topics on the Turkish President's agenda was the problem of Syria. Following the meeting, the parties adopted a joint statement and "reaffirmed their determination to act in concert and in solidarity in the fight against all terrorist organizations."
Turkish political analyst Serhat Erkmen argues that Turkey can overcome Iran's resistance by including "the forces of the Syrian government in the equation in coordination with Russia and launching an operation in Tel Rifat. In other words, a deal with Moscow could allow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's forces to advance north while Turkey expands its control in Tel Rifat and then in Manbij."
Meanwhile, tensions between the West and Turkey have somewhat decreased in parallel with the Russian special military operation in Ukraine.
The special operation helped the West to recall Turkey's decisive role on Russia's southern flank. With the beginning of the special operation in Ukraine, Ankara pragmatically played its cards: located at a safe distance from Moscow, at the same time provided military assistance to Kiev.
In addition, Ankara used the applications of Sweden and Finland for membership in NATO as a lever to force these countries to reconsider their approaches to the PKK as a terrorist organization. Thus, the West may be more supportive of the Turkish operation in Tel Rifat or Manbij against the background of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine.
In the past, international reaction has influenced the timing, but has not prevented Turkey's cross-border operations in Syria. Currently, Turkey is trying to coordinate its steps with regional players, as well as with the United States and Russia.
It is difficult to determine whether Turkey has a clear green light from any of these actors. However, the operational plans of the Turkish Armed Forces are already ready. And this time, the position of the Turkish government is shaped not only by Turkey's security considerations, but also by the balance of power in the international arena, as well as geopolitical dynamics.
Vasily Ivanov Vasily Ivanovich Ivanov is a journalist.
