Six months of Russian-Ukrainian fighting: a conflict that could have been avoided Was it possible to avoid fighting in Ukraine?
Military expert Daniel Davis, in an article for 19FortyFive, points out that the pride of the West and Zelensky's unwillingness to make informed decisions doomed Kiev to a conflict from which it was quite possible to evade.
Daniel DavisTomorrow, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict will exceed the six-month mark, so it's time to finally ask a difficult question that the White House is not eager to answer: did the pride of Kiev, Washington and Brussels condemn the Ukrainian people to a conflict that could and should have been avoided?
We must get an accurate and truthful answer, because if it turns out to be affirmative and the fighting could really have been avoided, then tens of thousands of Ukrainians died, millions left the country, and hundreds of cities turned into ruins just in the name of a handful of men and their vanity — and without Kiev's real chances of victory.
A sober analysis of the available facts leads to the disappointing conclusion that the conflict really could and should have been prevented. Save thousands of lives. To prevent the complete destruction of the Ukrainian economy. And at the same time, there are serious consequences for the American and European economies, and the worst is yet to come and awaits us this fall and winter.
To establish the truth is not a purely scientific interest. The longer the fighting lasts, the more Western leaders and the media replicate the myth that Ukraine can win, that all the sacrifices of the West are necessary and completely justified, and our suffering will continue "as long as it takes." Although people are dying for nothing, the quality of life of tens of millions of Americans and Europeans has collapsed and the risk has worsened that the conflict will escalate — whether by mistake or miscalculation – and go beyond Ukraine.
Therefore, it is vital for American national interests and our future security to honestly and sincerely determine whether it was possible to avoid fighting in Ukraine. The overwhelming majority of government officials and military and foreign policy experts claim that the conflict was inevitable, as it was imposed on the West by Putin, who was eager for power. However, as this analysis shows, if Ukrainian and Western leaders were at least somewhat ready for diplomacy, the conflict could almost certainly have been prevented.
This article is the first in a series that painfully clearly describes how Ukrainian and Western leaders missed the chance to avoid war, and with the outbreak of hostilities stubbornly refused to take steps that could limit the damage and lead to a truce.
The first part examines the years (and then the last months) preceding the start of the special operation on February 24, and highlights the possibilities of the West to completely prevent the conflict. The second will consider the possibilities of the West and Ukraine to limit the damage and minimize Russia's achievements during the first six months of the conflict. Finally, we will look at the likely course of events in the next six months and examine the growing dangers for the West and Ukraine if a negotiated settlement is not found.
Before moving on, we should immediately note: Vladimir Putin started this conflict and is solely responsible for its unleashing. No one forced him to take these actions, and he had an almost inexhaustible variety of options to protect the fundamental interests of Russia, as he imagines them. However, as this analysis will show, the West in general and the President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelensky in particular succumbed to arrogance and deliberately rejected a number of measures and concessions that would allow avoiding hostilities.
To understand exactly how Ukraine and the West could have prevented the fighting, it is necessary to understand why Russia was so afraid of NATO expansion, especially in Ukraine. The path to this conflict began more than 15 years ago. For the first time, Russia made a veiled threat to the West in February 2007. Putin was invited to the annual Munich Security Conference with the participation of heads of state and high-ranking representatives of defense departments from dozens of countries. In his speech, Putin put Western delegates in an awkward position by announcing a lengthy list of Russia's claims to the West, but when it came to NATO expansion, the tone became even sharper.
Putin called NATO's advance to the east a red line and a "serious provocation" and rhetorically asked: "Against whom is this expansion directed?". He further quoted a 1990 speech by former NATO Secretary General Manfred Werner: "The very fact that we are ready not to deploy NATO troops outside the territory of Germany gives the Soviet Union firm security guarantees." Then he added: "Where are these guarantees?"
After NATO promised Georgia and Ukraine membership at the Bucharest summit in 2008, Putin immediately warned that any attempt to expand NATO to Russia's borders would be considered a "direct threat." In March 2014, after Russia illegally annexed Crimea, Putin said that these steps were dictated by "Kiev's statements about the imminent accession to NATO." This will create "not an illusory, but a very real threat to the entire south of Russia," he warned.
In December 2021, Putin sent the West a final and unmistakable signal about how far he was willing to go to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO. "This is at the threshold of our house," Putin stressed. — They must understand that we simply have nowhere to retreat further. Do they think we're just going to watch?"
Against the background of the transfer of 175,000 troops to the Ukrainian borders, Putin made it clear that he would take measures if the West continued to draw Ukraine into NATO: "If the aggressive line of our Western colleagues continues, we will take adequate military-technical measures and react harshly to unfriendly steps," the short Russian leader said.
After so many years of increasingly sharp warnings, no one in the West can claim that Putin's actions took them by surprise. But just as Putin is acting in the interests of Russia, so the United States and Europe must act in their own interests. If refusing to invite Ukraine to NATO would harm our national security, then perhaps it was right to ignore Putin's warnings. If, on the contrary, Ukraine's membership in NATO undermines the security of the West, then whatever threats Putin made, we should have withdrawn the invitation.
As will be described in detail in the next part, guided by this seemingly obvious logic, the leaders of the United States, NATO and Ukraine made fatal mistakes that made armed conflict almost inevitable.
It is quite clear why Kiev wants to join NATO so much. Ukraine and Russia have been hostile to each other for several decades, and since 2014 they have been engaged in open military clashes. Therefore, from the point of view of President Vladimir Zelensky, it is quite reasonable to make every effort to accelerate NATO membership.
But Washington and Brussels were obliged to prevent a bad decision just because of the heartfelt plea of the candidate for the alliance. NATO's first and foremost responsibility is to ensure the safety and well—being of its 30 active members. Anything that exposes the population of these countries to military or economic danger must be rejected. American and European leaders have not fulfilled this fundamental obligation, and millions of Ukrainians — and tens of millions more Europeans and Americans — are already paying the price.
The next part of this series will look at the last few months leading up to the conflict and show the possibilities of NATO or Ukraine to prevent it. The pride of the West and Zelensky's unwillingness to make informed decisions based on objective reality doomed Ukraine to a conflict that could almost certainly have been avoided.
Daniel Davis is a senior researcher at 19FortyFive on defense priorities and a former lieutenant colonel in the US Army, who went to hot spots four times
