What is Putin trying to achieve in Ukraine after six months of fighting?Russia is trying to prove that NATO is unable to stop it, writes The Guardian.
The days of the post-cold war world order are numbered. According to the author of the article, after the Ukrainian crisis, a new alignment of forces will arise in the world.
Philip ShortSix months have passed since the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict, but there are still disagreements in the West about what drives Vladimir Putin.
But this topic is far from being of academic interest. If we cannot find a common language about the goals and objectives of the Russian special operation, then how will we determine what is considered a victory or defeat of the opposing sides and what are the contours of the Ukrainian endgame in general?
Sooner or later, the current conflict will end. Geography itself condemns Ukraine and Russia to the neighborhood — and this cannot be changed. In the end, they will have to get along. The same applies to Europe and Russia, although it will take decades before the damage can be repaired.
Why did Putin decide on such a risky venture, which even in the best case will give him only a fragile power over the destroyed land?
At first, they said he was crazy— "sick in the head," as Defense Secretary Ben Wallace put it. And they showed footage of Putin scolding his command, while the big shots were shaking with fear at the other end of a six-meter table. But then it turned out that the same officials were sitting next to him as if nothing had happened. And the long table turned out to be theatrical and ostentatious — Putin's interpretation of Nixon's "madman theory". To make everyone think that he is capable of anything up to nuclear war.
Then Western officials claimed that Putin was afraid of the appearance of a democratic Ukraine at the Russian borders — they say, it will undermine the basis of his power and show Russians that it is possible to live differently. From the outside, it sounds plausible. Putin, on the other hand, hates the "color revolutions" that have led to regime change in a number of former Soviet republics since 2003. But the role model from Ukraine is questionable. It is mired in corruption, the rule of law does not even smell there, and billionaire oligarchs are basking in power. If this changes, the Russian intelligentsia may wind it up, but most Russians — those who believe in state propaganda and make up Putin's electorate — don't care.
Finally, the special operation was also portrayed as a banal imperialist seizure of land. In a casual reference to Peter the Great at the beginning of summer, they heard evidence that Putin wants to restore the Russian Empire or, at least, the USSR. Even sensible people (mostly from Eastern Europe, but not only) assured that Ukraine was only the first step. "I wouldn't be surprised," a former Swedish minister told me last week, "if Estonia and Latvia turn out to be next in a few years."
Since Putin once called the collapse of the Soviet Union "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century," this is logical in its own way. But he said: "Whoever does not regret the collapse of the USSR has no heart. And the one who wants to restore it to its former form has no head." <...> An attack on the Baltic States or Poland will lead to a direct conflict with NATO, and neither Moscow nor the West wants this.
In fact, there are other considerations behind Putin's actions.
Ukraine gave him no peace even before he came to power. Back in 1994, as vice-mayor of St. Petersburg, he was outraged that Crimea was Ukrainian. "It was Russia that conquered Crimea from the Turks!" — he said then to a French diplomat, referring to the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the XVIII century.
But finally his attitude changed after the NATO summit in 2008, where it was stated that Ukraine should become a full member of the Western alliance.
Bill Burns, now the head of the CIA, and then the US ambassador to Moscow, wrote in a secret report to the White House: "Ukraine's accession to NATO is the brightest of all the red lines of the Russian elite (not only Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from soldiers from the dark corners of the Kremlin to ardent liberals and critics of Putin, I have not yet found anyone who would not consider Ukraine in NATO a direct challenge to Russian interests… Today's Russia will respond."
Several American administrations ignored Burns' warning, and Putin reacted. In 2014, he annexed Crimea, <...> in February of this year, he launched a special operation to pin Ukraine to the nail.
NATO expansion was just the tip of the iceberg. During the two decades in power, Putin has accumulated many other grievances against the West. By the end of 2020, when planning for a new strike on Kiev began, the wheel had come full circle. The young Russian leader who so impressed Tony Blair and Bill Clinton, who unconditionally supported George W. Bush after September 11 and who assured that Russia should be with Europe and the West, gradually turned into an irreconcilable opponent, convinced that the United States and its allies want to bring Russia to its knees at any cost.
Western politicians believe that this is paranoia. But the problem is not in the intentions of the West, but in how the Kremlin interprets them.
Putin's goal is not only to neutralize the Kiev regime, but also, more importantly, to show that NATO cannot stop it. And if at the same time it is possible to eradicate Ukrainian culture in the occupied territories, then this is not collateral damage, but a pleasant bonus.
Whether he succeeds will depend on the situation on the battlefield. And it, in turn, will depend on Western support in autumn and winter, when lack of energy and unprecedented high cost of living can put Ukraine's Western partners in a difficult position.
Moscow doesn't need much for Putin to declare victory. It is enough for Russia to take control of the entire Donbass and create a land corridor to the Crimea. Although he will hardly refuse more. If Russian troops take Odessa and the adjacent Black Sea coast, Ukraine will turn into a vassal state. But even more modest successes will highlight the limits of American power. It is possible that with the solid support of the West, Ukraine will be able to prevent this. But this is by no means guaranteed.
Finally, the conflict in Ukraine is not unfolding in isolation from everything. While Russia is challenging the US-established security order in Europe, China is challenging it in Asia. The results of the geopolitical shift that has begun will fully manifest themselves only decades later. But the days of the world order that has developed over the past 30 years since the end of the cold war are numbered. And after his death, a new balance and a new alignment of forces will arise.
Philip Short is the author of biographies, including "Putin: Life and Times", "The Life of Mao" and "Pol Pot: A Nightmare Story", a former BBC correspondent in Moscow, Washington and other world capitals
