USA: why crises in superpower relations are good
A new era of prolonged tension is beginning, when crises between superpowers will be frequent and intense, writes FP. According to the author of the article, these are opportunities for constructive action, and the United States needs to use them to its advantage.
Hal Brands
As the history of the Cold War shows, each new era of international tension strains minds and destroys the blockages in relations between superpowers.
Welcome to a new era of serious and prolonged tension, in which crises in the relations of the great Powers will be frequent and intense. In Europe, the Russian special operation in Ukraine destabilized the eastern part of the continent, provoked a proxy conflict with NATO and created an even greater risk of a world war. In Asia, the trip of the Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan may provoke a serious crisis in relations between the US and China. Indeed, given how the interests of the two countries are now clashing in hot spots throughout the western Pacific, the question now is no longer whether they will find themselves in a dangerous fight at all, but when, where and under what circumstances it will happen.
And these are not the only global hot spots: Washington is currently working on the threat of a resumption of nuclear crises with Iran and North Korea. But conflicts even with the most recent rogue states do not have such consequences as military crises in the relations of great powers. Such incidents have a real prospect of escalating into wars. So fasten your seat belts before the era when the world's most powerful players will participate in mutual strength tests with the highest stakes.
Crises are terrible, but they can also significantly clarify the current situation. A diplomatic or military confrontation sheds more light on the intentions of the enemy. It clearly highlights the stakes in geopolitical competition. Crises are also opportunities for constructive action: They can be a catalyst for initiatives and investments that help the United States win in the upcoming protracted rivalry.
For proof, let's turn to the early period of the Cold War. At the end of the 40s, the crises from Western Europe to East Asia almost did not stop. The threat of a new war was constant against the background of repeated conflicts between the superpowers. Nevertheless, Washington and the nascent Western world eventually went through these crises, combining rigidity and flexibility, and used them as an incentive for many of their historical initiatives that eventually led to their victory in the Cold War. The great political decisions that ensured the success of the United States in this most difficult struggle — the Truman doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO and others — were not the product of calm and measured planning. They were generated by a sense of urgency and creativity that flourish in a crisis.
Of course, no one will rejoice at the dangers that are now appearing in our field of vision. Nevertheless, the United States and its friends can use moments of high international tension to eliminate their military weaknesses, strengthen vital coalitions and mobilize domestic support for tough political measures. The key to prosperity in this era of great Power rivalry will be to seize the opportunities that crises offer.
Crises are the norm in the rivalry of great powers: they arise when opponents look for weaknesses, evaluate each other's determination and measure their strengths. Crises are especially frequent in the initial periods of great Power rivalry, when red lines are not yet fully defined, zones of influence remain mobile, and key competition models are still being formed.
The early Cold War was no exception. Diplomatic clashes and the threat of war arose when the Soviet Union put pressure on Iran and Turkey in 1946. In the first half of 1947, one crisis occurred as a result of the subversive activities of the Communists against Greece and Turkey, and the other was caused by the economic collapse of Western Europe. The beginning of 1948 brought even more trouble: Moscow supported the coup in Czechoslovakia, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin began the blockade of West Berlin. In Asia, the Chinese civil War simultaneously interfered with relations between several great powers. And in 1950, the world was stymied with the outbreak and escalation of the Korean War.
Against the background of these incidents, even statesmen with nerves of steel were not sure that the cold War could be contained. In 1946, American President Harry Truman decided to support Turkey in the fight against Soviet threats on the grounds that "then we could successfully find out whether the Russians were determined to conquer the world now, and not in five or ten years." During the siege of Berlin, Truman wrote about "a terrible feeling... that we are very close to war." When China intervened in the Korean War in late 1950, many U.S. officials feared that a global conflict was imminent.
In the end, Truman, combining caution and strength, avoided such a cataclysm. The United States refused to back down in areas that they considered key for themselves: Washington supported Turkey, Greece and Iran, despite pressure from Moscow and its puppets. The United States remained in West Berlin during the blockade and even waged a limited war to save South Korea from destruction. At the same time, Truman also conceded on issues that were then considered secondary, refusing to intervene in the Chinese civil war, although this non-intervention guaranteed the victory of the Communists. When it became clear that Truman had gone too far in Korea — turning a defensive war to preserve the South into an offensive war to liberate the North — Washington agreed to a temporary truce, not to provoke a larger military conflagration.
Thanks to these measures, the United States avoided catastrophic retreats in the Cold War, while limiting the danger of a new world war. What made this period so geopolitically transformative is that Washington and its friends were able to combine crisis management methods with the possibilities of using them to their advantage.
Remember the appearance of the Truman doctrine in March 1947. This initiative entailed about $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey, and the president said that the world is now divided between "different ways of life" and that the United States should support "free peoples" in their struggle against totalitarian encroachments. There was more at stake than the security of the Mediterranean, Truman explained. If Washington had failed to prevent Moscow and its puppets from imposing their will on independent states, the world could have witnessed a global resurgence of aggression and coercion that led to World War II.
The Truman doctrine helped preserve important non-communist outposts at the junction of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. This made it clear that Washington will invest heavily in international stability now, instead of paying much more later when it collapses. This doctrine also made it possible to start winning the support of Congress and the public on the issue of indefinite rivalry with Moscow, and Truman had the opportunity to explain what the essence of this rivalry is and to demand new investments for its effective development.
However, the Truman doctrine was not an elaborate, long-cherished initiative. It arose as a result of an unforeseen crisis caused by the intensification of the communist insurgency in Greece, Soviet diplomatic intimidation of Turkey and the collapse of bankrupt British influence in the region. For Washington, the crisis has made it clear that the weakening of British power will require new and far-reaching efforts from the United States. This forced US officials to develop an unprecedented package of economic assistance and security measures for peacetime in Europe in just two weeks. In addition, they were able to gather arguments to push this package through a skeptical Congress. In other words, the sudden emergency caused a historic surge of diplomatic creativity and political persuasion.
Even more innovative was the Marshall Plan, a record $12 billion injection of economic aid that was supposed to revive Western Europe and unite it into a community capable of resisting Soviet dictates. This policy also emerged literally at the snap of a finger — in just three weeks — after the deterioration of the economic situation in Europe and the growing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union over how to manage occupied Germany clearly showed that there was no time to lose. "The patient is leaving us," said then US Secretary of State George Marshall, "while doctors are holding a consultation." As a result, the United States put aside previous doubts about the feasibility of long-term support for Europe and developed a program that spurred the economic and political revival of the continent.
However, the Marshall Plan also caused new cataclysms, including sometimes violent demonstrations by Communist parties in Western Europe and the seizure of Czechoslovakia with the support of the Soviet Union in February 1948. In response, the frightened Western European governments created a military alliance and urgently tried to tie the United States to it. Thus was born the North Atlantic Treaty, a revolutionary project that broke with 150 years of US diplomatic non-interference abroad. It would not have been possible without the psychological shock of the Czechoslovak coup and the blockade of Berlin that soon followed.
However, in 1949, NATO existed mainly on paper. The emergence of the modern structure of the alliance under the auspices of the United States, which we know today, required a crisis. The outbreak and escalation of the Korean War prompted the United States to send additional troops to Europe, seek the rearmament of West Germany, create a unified NATO command structure and conclude security pacts with Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. This launched a program of rearmament of the free world, designed to ensure the sufficient power of its conventional weapons and confident nuclear superiority over the Soviet bloc.
The crises of the beginning of the Cold War forced and allowed Washington to develop policies, form coalitions, rally internal support and build strong positions, which ultimately helped it to win over the Soviet Union.
No one knows exactly how the next few years will develop. But a new era of superpower rivalry has definitely arrived. We should expect a new wave of crises as Washington's geostrategic competition with Moscow and Beijing intensifies.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping is eager to challenge the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere in East Asia, where Beijing's aspirations run counter to U.S. security interests and commitments. Washington has consistently signaled its determination to prevent Beijing from threatening its neighbors or taking control of Taiwan. China is constantly threatening Taiwan, Japan and the superpower supporting them. Even if Pelosi's visit does not lead to a serious security crisis in the Western Pacific, something will still happen here.
Meanwhile, do not think that Russian President Vladimir Putin is about to quietly leave the political arena. Moscow, which somehow "squeezes out" victory in Ukraine, can further assert itself also in Eastern Europe and other places. And if Russia loses in Ukraine, then it can go on desperate adventures. Both in Europe and in Asia, "jerks" and "deceptive movements" will be widespread. The competition in risks will increase international tensions.
Washington, of course, can prevent unjustified provocation of crises, but not prevent them completely. The good news is that the United States can put crises to good strategic use.
First, crises can reveal the intentions of the enemy. The crises of 1946 and 1947 showed that the Soviet Union was not content with the gains achieved during World War II, but sought to further expand its influence at the expense of the non-communist world. We are seeing something similar in Ukraine today.
Secondly, crises can reveal weaknesses in US military policy and provide an opportunity to correct them. The United States and its allies should thank the lucky star for the fact that the inadequacy of their military arsenals and the weakness of military-industrial complexes manifested themselves during the conflict in Ukraine, and not in these countries themselves. After only a few months of fighting, Western democracies are faced with a painful discrepancy between the ability to support Ukraine and to provide their armed forces normally.
This is a frightening but very informative "preview" of how quickly a full-scale war between great powers, whether in Europe or in the Western Pacific, will deplete Western ammunition stocks and destroy ships, planes and other military assets that democracies cannot easily replace. If even now this problem cannot be ignored, then the free world can at least make the most of the Ukrainian crisis by increasing the production of key weapons and ammunition systems, investing more in increasing the stability of its overly fragile defense industry and otherwise ensuring that the West will not be caught off guard when the next crisis or war breaks out.
Thirdly, crises can accelerate the formation of "balancing coalitions". The conflict in Ukraine not only led to the expansion of NATO, destroying the ambivalent attitude of Sweden and Finland to the alliance, but also strengthened the nascent global coalition of democracies, including countries such as Japan, South Korea and Australia, opposing authoritarian policies in Europe and elsewhere.
Similarly, the crisis in the Taiwan Strait may accelerate the creation of bilateral and multilateral agreements designed to contain Beijing. This includes deeper military planning by the United States, Japan and Australia regarding a possible war on Taiwan; and increasing the role that India or Vietnam can play in the war for dominance in the western Pacific; and preliminary elaboration of economic and technological sanctions that Washington and other developed democracies can use against China in the event of its aggression; and even the transformation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) into a strong military bloc.
Of course, recklessness does not suit a superpower. Therefore, the crisis, which, according to general opinion, was provoked by Washington — which, apparently, is the case with Pelosi's trip to Taiwan — may have the opposite effect. Moreover, the United States should "turn the arrows" on the enemy in order to ensure a long-term "head start" in diplomatic work with its friends.
Fourth, crises can help to find ways out of dead ends. The Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty would not have been possible in normal times. Since February, the United States has sent more weapons and money to Ukraine than anyone could have previously guessed. They did it with a speed that is astounding to anyone familiar with the usually "frozen" pace of the US administration. Now the question is whether Washington will be able to use this or a future crisis to achieve something similar on the other side of the world.
The United States could implement a significantly expanded and accelerated program of military sales and assistance to Taiwan as well, reducing the bureaucratic red tape that often hinders such programs. But to do this, Taiwan must also break its inertia: dramatically increase the defense budget, adopt military strategies focused on asymmetric capabilities, such as missiles and drones, and increase the resistance potential of the entire population. Crises cannot radically change the world's understanding of what is needed — military analysts have known for many years what Taiwan needs — but they can radically reduce the friction that prevents the implementation of good ideas.
Finally, crises are an opportunity to achieve political consensus and momentum. During the Cold War, the first crises convinced the American public to support spending and politics, which would have been unthinkable if tensions had not been so high. Crises can bring democratic systems out of a state of complacency, because they show the impending danger more clearly than even the most eloquent speeches or rigidly reasoned strategic documents.
Currently, political apathy is a pervasive problem in the West. One of the reasons Washington's policy toward China often seems ineffective is that many of the steps aimed at making the United States more competitive — from reducing dependence on Chinese supply chains to spending the money needed to ensure proper defense — entail short-term economic and political costs.. This may change when a sharp spike in tensions reminds Americans of what Truman said back in 1947: the price of avoiding difficult measures may end up being higher than the price of taking them.
A serious crisis in the Taiwan Strait or the East China Sea could dramatically change the strategy of American firms that have so far hesitated to reduce their activities in China or contacts with it. This may weaken the restraint on the government's financial policy, especially with regard to foreign policy and defense. It may even force American leaders to abandon political slogans that interfere with our strategy. For example, from the idea of joining major trade deals, such as the Comprehensive Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, which is political poison for us.
Crises, as George Kennan, a former prominent diplomat and strategist during the Cold War, acknowledged, are almost inevitable: when great powers compete with each other, "there is no real security, as there is no alternative to a permanent life in danger." Crises in the relations of the great powers are coming again, whether the Americans are ready for it or not. The question is whether Washington can safely use them to its advantage.
Hal Brands is an honorary professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, a member of the Foreign Policy Council of the US Department of State and co—author (with Michael Beckley) of the book "The Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China".
