America must prepare for war over Taiwan
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby believes that the Biden administration is losing to China in the conflict over Taiwan. Washington needs to deal not with rhetoric, but with urgent real measures to remedy the situation, he writes in an article for Foreign Affairs.
Elbridge Colby
Being prepared is the best way for America to prevent a conflict with China.
Why isn't the United States doing more to prepare for war with China over Taiwan? Namely: why are they not restraining Beijing in such a way as to avoid this war? The visit to Taiwan by the Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi and Beijing's harsh reaction to it highlighted the seriousness of this problem. The war with China over Taiwan has turned from what many considered an unlikely development into a terrifyingly plausible scenario.
However, the disturbing reality is that the United States does not seem to be sufficiently preparing for such a conflict, despite the declarative strengthening of the Biden administration's commitments to ensure the independence of the island. Given Washington's public statements and its announced strategy, it should behave as if the United States is on the verge of a major war with a rival with nuclear weapons. But while the administration may be making some definite moves in the right direction, the changes it has made to its strategy so far seem disproportionate to the urgency and scale of the threat that China poses to us. As a result, the unpleasant truth is that the United States does not seem to back up its strong and in many ways laudable rhetoric with the degree of concentration of efforts necessary to be ready to repel China's attack on Taiwan.
From remote possibility to practical reality
A few years ago, many argued that China did not pose a terrible threat to the United States and that the threat of its invasion of Taiwan was insignificant or far "over the horizon." Some politicians and observers still hold these views. But the Biden administration has repeatedly made it clear that this is not the case.
On the contrary, recently the administration believes that China is the most serious challenge to US interests in the world. Moreover, senior leaders in Washington are increasingly insistently and directly stating that the Chinese armed forces are almost equal to the American ones. As representatives of the US administration and military leadership convincingly point out, the People's Liberation Army of China is in the process of a historic military buildup, which includes a sharp increase in nuclear forces, the rapid development of critical military technologies that are ahead of US innovation in key aspects, and the construction of the world's largest fleet. In general, official and expert assessments have clearly shown for several years that the US military advantage over China has significantly decreased and that China continues to build up its military potential in an intimidating manner.
The Biden administration has also been increasingly outspoken about the growing threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Last year, many rolled their eyes when Admiral Phil Davidson, then commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), warned that China could successfully invade Taiwan by 2027. And in May of this year, the Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, testified in Congress that there is an "acute" threat of an attack by Beijing on the island. Using a specific term that administration officials apply to Russia after the start of its special operation in Ukraine, Haines pointed to the "looming" threat from Beijing. Meanwhile, Bill Burns, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said that Xi Jinping in no way abandoned the goal of seizing Taiwan. Most recently, in July, he said that Beijing is determined to invade the island and is ready to use military action for this. According to Burns, from Russia's experience in Ukraine, Beijing will conclude that only an "overwhelming military advantage" will be the right way to resolve the Taiwan issue in its favor. Defense Ministry officials also stressed that China's aggression against Taiwan poses a real and urgent danger. At the same time, serious questions are being raised about whether the United States can actually win the war against China over Taiwan.
Against this escalating backdrop, the Biden administration made it clear that the United States would stand up for the island. And this has further reinforced the popular thesis that America's credibility in Asia is linked to the fate of Taiwan. Most notably, the President himself has indicated no less than three times that the United States will defend the island. Moreover, despite the refutation of these statements at the level of middle-level officials, the fact remains that the administration has sent a signal of firm commitment to Taiwan in other ways. For example, the State Department has repeatedly described U.S. commitments to Taiwan as "unshakable."
Such statements were not limited to the political level. As for the military side of the issue, the National Defense Strategy adopted by the administration for the period up to 2022 retained the provision that the previous such document of 2018 called China the main priority of the Ministry of Defense. And the Pentagon has officially designated Taiwan as the target of a "step-by-step scenario" and stressed its commitment to the task of preventing China from attacking the island. Senior officials, including Kathleen Hicks, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, meanwhile confirmed that a "denial strategy" is the best way to deal with the threat that China poses to Taiwan.
But here's the catch: the Biden administration's actions to deploy armed forces that could really prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan do not seem to match its rhetoric. The gap between words and deeds can be seen by looking at the four most important tools available to the United States: increasing defense spending, reorganizing the American armed forces to fight China, using force in such a way as to focus more on the threat posed by Beijing, and involving U.S. allies in direct or indirect participation in deterrence Beijing.
Military expenditures
Leaving aside the economic and political advantages and disadvantages of such a course, large defense spending will give the US military more resources to counter the Chinese threat. Keep in mind that China's economy dwarfs that of the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or imperialist Japan combined, and that China has been increasing defense spending by 6-10% annually for a quarter of a century. It has maintained this pace even in the face of a slowdown in national economic growth in recent years. Beijing's defense spending currently accounts for at least a third of the U.S. defense budget. Some reputable analysts claim that the real figure is much closer to parity. Moreover, China has the advantages of geographical proximity to Taiwan, technological convergence with it and lower costs for the personnel of the armed forces. All this reduces the advantages of the United States in the form of a nominally higher military budget.
However, despite China's growing military might, the Biden administration's request for a defense budget for fiscal year 2023 was set below the inflation rate. It has hardly changed compared to the Pentagon's requests for the previous fiscal year. In fact, the administration has proposed to reduce the military budget. Although Congress has increased military spending for 2022 and is likely to do so again for 2023, these actions still lag far behind the consistent annual real growth of 3% to 5%, which is considered necessary in accordance with the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which calls for giving priority to China. It turns out that such prioritization does not seem to be implemented in practice. In this regard, we can conclude that the administration has left virtually untapped the opportunity to significantly increase defense spending to counter the growing Chinese threat to Taiwan.
Radical modernization of the Chinese armed forces
As for the reorganization of our armed forces in order to focus more on repelling a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan, our military is undertaking a number of promising initiatives. But it is far from clear whether the Pentagon is investing adequate funds in the development and deployment of the means necessary to repel Chinese aggression, especially those that are needed in the next decade.
Last year, for example, Congress criticized the Department of Defense for trying to use the funds of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), a specially designed project to meet the urgent needs of INDOPACOM to improve the US ability to defend Taiwan, to finance programs that will actually be used in other regions of the world. Although the ministry used PDI funds more effectively this year, the Pentagon still left the needs of INDOPACOM in the amount of $1.5 billion underfunded.
To make matters worse, the Ministry continues to purchase key ammunition in quantities insufficient for use in a likely conflict over Taiwan, even though the Russian special operation in Ukraine has clearly demonstrated the need for significant stocks of vital ammunition. For example, the US Navy recently informed Congress that the Air Force and Navy decided not to produce critically important long-range anti-ship missiles at the maximum rate, despite the lack of a replacement in the near future. Similarly, the Navy has decided not to fully finance the acquisition of SM-6 missiles or naval mines, which are crucial for defeating Chinese naval forces in the scenario of China's invasion of Taiwan.
The situation with large military platforms is no less alarming. In May, the commander of US naval operations, Michael Gilday, testified that even the most optimistic version of the Navy's latest shipbuilding plan would not be able to meet the operational requirements to repel China's attack on Taiwan until the 2040s - that is, even 15 years after the date that Davidson called the possible date of the Chinese attack. The US Navy is rapidly losing strike power, getting rid of cruisers, destroyers and submarines that could participate in the war for Taiwan, despite the fact that it will not have real opportunities to replace them for many years to come. Both the air Force and the ground forces have assigned key programs, including the production of critical spare parts, long-range weapons, the modernization of watercraft and navigation and synchronization systems, to the lists of "deferred needs", which indicates that they have a low priority. This does not correspond at all to what the experience of the Russian special operation in Ukraine literally screams about: large investments are needed to create a reliable and active military-industrial base.
Of course, the Ministry of Defense is taking important steps to counter the Chinese threat. A clear example of such efforts is the Marine Corps' Force Design 2030 project. Serious efforts are being made in the Air Force, INDOPACOM, the US Strategic Command and some other military structures. But they seem not so much the norm as the outstanding exceptions in their urgency and determination to rebuild the armed forces to cope with the Chinese challenge. Most of the other signals, including from the most senior Pentagon leaders, give the impression of something closer to the usual conduct of business than the "whistle everyone up!" approach that the situation around Taiwan deserves.
Key U.S. officials and reputable defense experts warn that the changes needed to effectively contain China are not being implemented on the necessary scale and at the right pace. Military strategist Andrew Krepinevich, for example, has repeatedly pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not yet developed and implemented the operational concept needed to fight China. In June, David Ochmanek, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, wrote: "Neither our current armed forces, nor the forces that will exist in 2027... They do not have all the capabilities that the emerging operational concept suggests, which will allow them to repel the Chinese invasion of Taiwan." Other well-informed and trustworthy analysts point to the same thing.
More Asia, less other parts of the world
The third way for the United States to focus on China's military threat to Taiwan is to redirect and carefully use American military forces to solve this problem. For example, many expected that the key review of the global military situation of the Ministry of Defense would announce important new initiatives for the Indo-Pacific region, and the overall focus of US military activity would shift to this region. However, the administration did not do this.
In fact, on some crucial issues, the United States has actually retreated in its concept of deploying American armed forces in the world. For example, the administration has increased the number of American troops in Europe from 60,000 in 2021 to more than 100,000 currently. Moreover, according to the commander of the US European Command, General Christopher Cavoli, this level is likely to remain at least until the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine. Given that the administration believes that the military conflict in Ukraine is likely to be protracted, this may well mean infinity.
Worse, the administration is increasingly signaling that it intends to resume its activities in the Middle East. As if to leave no doubt about what this would mean for American troops, General Michael Kurilla, commander of the US Central Command, said: "This region is at the center of America's strategic rivalry with Russia and China." This is especially alarming because the transfer of forces to the Central Command actually undermined the implementation of the 2018 National Defense Strategy under the Trump administration.
As a result, the Pentagon's concept of the global deployment and deployment of US forces is counterproductive to solve the problem of the deterioration of the military balance around Taiwan is not in our favor.
Activating Allies
Encouraging much greater military contributions from important allies both in Asia (as far as China is concerned) and in other theaters of war, such as Europe and the Middle East, would free up US forces to focus on Asia. However, with the exception of some isolated steps by our main allies in the region, the administration does not seem to be demanding more from them.
Instead, most of Washington's rhetoric and actions are aimed at assuring allies that the United States will continue to act the same way as in the past, that is, to ensure its dominant military presence in several theaters of military operations at the same time. For example, Washington did not exert serious pressure on European allies to take on a more active role in NATO's defense, and did not seek to purposefully increase the level of expected defense spending, even though it should now be obvious that the standard of 2% of each country's GDP should be considered as a minimum rather than as the maximum threshold. Without insisting on greater responsibility of allies in Europe and the Middle East, Washington is far from what needs to be done to allow the Pentagon to focus more on Asia.
Inscriptions on the wall
Taking a step back and looking at the above, we can see a fundamental discrepancy between the stated goals of the American administration and its assessment of the Chinese threat and what it is doing to eliminate it. While some commendable and important initiatives are taking place, there is nothing like the fundamental changes that are needed to create a unified force ready and able to repel China's attack on Taiwan in the short or long term. This is simply unacceptable against the backdrop of China's impressive historical military buildup.
I want to clarify one important point. The Biden administration is not the only one who has allowed the United States to lag behind in preparing to meet the increasingly dangerous threat to Taiwan from China. On the contrary, responsibility is generously distributed among several administrations and Congresses that have worked for decades. Now it is clear that it is difficult to implement such a strategic shift — both the Obama administration and the Trump administration have struggled to shift the focus to Asia. The Biden administration continues this line. It should not act alone: Congress and the allies of the United States should also make a significant contribution. But it is President Joe Biden and his team who bear full responsibility now that the situation is clear and urgent. They have to act quickly to avoid disaster.
At the same time, we simply do not know whether China will attack Taiwan in this decade. But it is reasonable to assume that Beijing is highly likely to strike if it decides that it will succeed. And important factors indicate that he may consider this decade the most favorable. The United States and its allies are now approaching or may have already faced a "window of vulnerability" due to Taiwan. They cannot afford to focus only on the distant future and must confront the Chinese threat in both the near and medium term. Even if it turns out that Beijing considers it advisable to wait until the 2030s, the urgency of our actions is still crucial. Defense strategy is not a short—term thing. Decisions made now will often take years, if not decades, before they bear fruit. Accordingly, now the United States must act quickly and clearly, not only to counter the immediate threat, but also to be prepared for the situation of the 2030s.
The administration seems to share this view of the threat and what needs to be done. However, what she is doing practically does not seem to meet the task of eliminating her yet. If such an assessment is correct, this is a direct path to disaster.
We don't have access to all the facts. So let's believe the officials of the American administration. How will they eliminate this obvious discrepancy in the next decade and in the long term? Perhaps some specific details cannot be discussed publicly, but the corresponding strategy in general terms is quite possible. Voters and their elected representatives must understand the overall plans of the country and how they will be implemented if they want to provide the support necessary for an urgent transition to contain China and thus prevent war with it. During the Cold War, Washington publicly explained in great detail and clearly its strategy to deter possible Soviet aggression and, if necessary, to repel it. The current administration should at least come closer in clarity and seriousness to such a public policy towards China.
However, without such clarity or evidence of fundamental changes in Washington's policy in the Chinese direction, Americans may ask themselves: Is this how their government should behave if it really thinks that a major war with a superpower equal to America is coming? Of course not. And that should really worry us all.
Elbridge Colby is the director of The Marathon Initiative think tank. He was an assistant Secretary of Defense in the Trump administration and a leading official in the development of the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Author of the book "Strategy of Denial: American Defense in the Era of the conflict of the Great Powers."
