Samuel Charap: with the supply of weapons to Ukraine, the United States is successfully "cooking a frog"
The United States, although involved in the conflict in Ukraine, is cautious in supplying weapons to Kiev, writes Strana. In an interview with the publication, one of the authors of the report of the Rand Corporation analytical center said that the probability of a direct collision between Russia and NATO is small.
Alexandra Kharchenko
The well-known American analytical center Rand Corporation recently released a report on the likelihood of a direct war between NATO and Russia against the background of the conflict in Ukraine. Strana has already analyzed the main theses and recommendations of analysts from the organization, one of the main customers of which is the Pentagon, and now I have talked on this topic in more detail with one of the authors of the report, senior expert at Rand Corporation Samuel Charap.
"Country": Some attribute the appearance of the report to the desire of the West not to increase arms supplies to Ukraine in order to avoid a global conflict. Why did the study come out now?
Samuel Charap:There was no strategic decision about when to release the report. It was written not in July, but much earlier. And they were issued when the bureaucratic procedures – reviewing and publishing process - ended. No one as an organization tells us when to release our reports, not even the sponsors of the study. We value our independence very much.
– What is the probability that the West will increase arms supplies to Ukraine, and what will be Russia's reaction?
– So far there is no reason to think that the pace and systems that are being transferred are so critical for Russia that it is ready to raise the stakes and escalate with NATO. And just the United States and its allies are quite carefully and ultimately successfully dosing supplies so as not to provoke Russia.
Many believe that the United States is successfully "cooking a frog". This is such a metaphor – if you slowly raise the degree of boiling, a frog thrown into the water does not notice it. Probably, six months ago they would not have believed that if America handed over the "Haimars" to Ukraine, there would be no Russian response. But since everything is going gradually, we can say that this is to some extent a success.
When we talk about increasing supplies now, we need to be very specific. Because after the "Haimars" and in general long–range MLRS (multiple launch rocket systems), the question arises - what's next.
– Speaking of "Hymars". Russia recently stated that the United States is directly involved in the conflict in Ukraine. The reason was an interview with a Ukrainian intelligence general to a British publication, in which he mentioned that information on targets for strikes from American MLRS "Haimars" comes from Americans. How alarming is such a statement from Moscow? Could this be a reason for a clash with NATO?
– In my opinion, the fact that the West transmits intelligence to Ukrainian partners is not news. The media has been writing about this almost since the beginning of the conflict. But here an interesting topic arises – how can attempts of coercion without specific intentions to implement it be separated from real threats at all? That is, when it is necessary to take seriously what is being said by Moscow, and when not.
As for supplies, it is necessary to separate the systems from ammunition. So far, I see no signs that new systems of a completely different nature will be transferred. Ammunition and new copies of already delivered systems are quite possible. But at the expense of the pace, I do not undertake to judge. For Europeans, this is already a problem.
– What can provoke a war between Russia and NATO?
– In the report, we did not assess the likelihood of a war between Russia and NATO, but simply described possible ways of events, how such a war could happen. To avoid this, you need to understand how the situation may develop. We described four different ways to a possible escalation of a special type. It should be emphasized that this is the so–called horizontal escalation, when one of the parties to the conflict goes to expand the geography and involvement in the conflict (vertical escalation is an increase in the level of violence or intensity, but without expanding participation). Moreover, we only considered deliberate horizontal escalation, that is, Russia's deliberate decision to go into confrontation with NATO.
This is not a prophetic report, and we did not undertake to assess the possibilities of such a development. There are four ways.
The first is a tit–for-tat between Russia and NATO for what has already happened, which leads to a spiral of escalation. This is, for example, a response for sanctions in the form of a cyberattack. NATO responds in kind, and Russia raises the stakes and goes to military action.
The second way is if Russia perceives the movement of troops or the strengthening of NATO's presence in eastern Europe as preparation for direct involvement in the conflict in Ukraine. And that Russia, most likely, can preemptively escalate to prevent this intervention, if there is such a perception.
The third way is an attempt to stop the flow of Western weapons.
The fourth is if there is instability in Russia of a very serious nature, which has not been seen since 2012 and which really shakes the political system. In this case, this is purely hypothetical reasoning.
– What is the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons?
– In the report, we did not consider vertical escalation, and the use of nuclear weapons by Russia is vertical, not horizontal. Of course, the use of nuclear weapons is possible in a war between Russia and NATO, but we were interested in the path to a principled (possible) decision to go into conflict with the Alliance, not the nature of this conflict. Because we took a specific problem and tried to evaluate it comprehensively.
However, I do not rule it out. It seems to me that it would be irresponsible to exclude anything after February 24. The nuclear issue was not considered in the report.
– What are the scenarios for the development of the situation in Ukraine?
– There is a stalemate scenario, there is a truce scenario without a political settlement, there is a political settlement, and there is a scenario with a prolonged conflict.
It is still difficult to imagine a political settlement – the positions of the parties are so different. And it seems difficult to return even to the points that were at the talks in Istanbul at the end of March.
A short-term or long-term truce is possible, as in the case of Korea. I am inclined to believe (although there are no deadlines yet) that there will most likely be some kind of truce option. It is very difficult to guess when it will be, even for an operational pause as one of the options.
If we recall the Korean example, when the armistice agreement between South and North Korea was signed, it was a purely military document, it was signed by the military and it concerned the tactical aspects of the armistice, the demilitarized zone, and so on. No one would have thought that it would be forever. And it turned out that it has been almost 80 years.
– Is Russia ready to challenge NATO militarily?
– Firstly, from the very beginning of the conflict, it is obvious that Russia does not use all military capabilities, especially those that are applicable in the conflict with NATO.
Aviation takes a limited part in the conflict in Ukraine, the Russian aerospace forces (VKS) remain largely inactive. If we add to this about two thousand warheads of non-strategic nuclear weapons, the capabilities of the Navy outside the Black Sea, then this is not a joke for NATO, but a serious threat. As for the ground forces, the airborne forces are not the types of armed forces that are supposed to pose the greatest threat to NATO.
– Is there a possibility that Russia may go further after Ukraine, for example, to the Baltic States and Poland?
– The concept of risks in a war with US allies is completely different for the Russian leadership than in the case of a conflict with Ukraine. That is, it is unlikely that Russia will risk a war with the United States by attacking their ally, after the army is weakened by the conflict in Ukraine.
Of course, this cannot be ruled out. This is a difficult question, because until the fall of last year, I would say that what happened to Ukraine could not have been imagined. By the autumn – end of last year, I already realized that it could be, and they could go for it.
In this regard, one should always ask oneself whether the Russian leadership is ready to take risky actions. That we, including myself, underestimated.
– Can NATO attack Russia first?
– If there is a conflict only on the territory of Ukraine, I do not think that NATO will be directly involved. Although some believe that this is inevitable. I personally don't think so. Because from the very beginning, the US president and his European allies stressed that they would not directly fight with Russia on the territory of Ukraine.
– How will the situation around Taiwan affect Western support for Ukraine?
– Let's see what it comes to. If there are only Chinese exercises off the coast of Taiwan, then this will only distract the West in the short term during the crisis. At the same time, in strategic terms, Ukraine, although a very important issue for the United States, is not the only one. And the priority in the Indo-Pacific region remains, and over time this will, of course, be a factor that will complicate the concentration of the attention of the United States and allies only on the Russian special operation in Ukraine.
– What are the chances of Ukraine joining NATO against the background of the conflict?
– There was no consensus within the Alliance on Ukraine's entry even before the conflict. But the leadership of Ukraine itself changed its rhetoric after the conflict began, and it can be understood. Because the intention of [Ukraine] becoming a member of NATO did not stop Russia in any way. The big question is what security guarantees can be in the post–war period. It is difficult to talk specifically about this. We do not know what the situation will be, how the conflict will end.
