China's Challenge for America
Over the past decades, China has made impressive progress and has become a challenge for the United States in great-power competition, writes Project Syndicate. What will happen in the next three decades, and who will be the winner? The answer will depend, in particular, on China's actions and America's reaction to them.
Joseph Nye
ASPEN – In July of this year, at the Aspen Security Forum (I am the co-chair of the forum), the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, Qin Gang, called for a better understanding of his country. But there was a serious debate among the assembled experts on the issue of China's goals. President Xi Jinping has announced China's intention to overtake America in the field of critical technologies, such as artificial intelligence and synthetic biology, by 2030, and many analysts predict that China's GDP (in terms of market exchange rates) will surpass US GDP at the beginning of the next decade. Is China really striving to take the place of the United States as the leading world power by the centenary of communist rule, which will be celebrated in 2049?
Some alarmists metaphorically say that the Chinese are now "ten feet tall" (that is, they are full of optimism), but one experienced Aspen participant joked that China is more likely 5 feet 10 inches tall compared to America's 6 feet and 2 inches. Anyway, China has made impressive progress in recent decades, and US strategists call it a "defining challenge" in great-power competition.
What will happen in the next three decades? The answer will depend on many unknowns. Some analysts believe that China is on the decline because it has not been able to avoid the "middle income trap". Others believe that China is "reaching a plateau" because of demographic constraints, low factor productivity and Xi's policy of indulging state-owned enterprises rather than private companies. In addition, China has faced serious problems of growing inequality and environmental degradation. Xi Jinping's "Chinese dream" and any other linear plans may go downhill due to unforeseen events, such as the Taiwan War or the financial crisis.
And here again, some of the experts in Aspen expressed more pessimism than the rest. There is never a single future, there are only many possible scenarios, and the answer to the question of which of them will be the most likely will depend, in particular, on China's actions and America's chosen reaction to these actions.
And just as there are many options for a possible future, America has the risk of making many possible failed mistakes in responding to the Chinese challenge. That is why a reasonable strategy should not provide only one of the options. The most dramatic failure would be a big war. Even if America prevails in this war, a military conflict between the two economically largest countries in the world will lead to such global economic consequences that the consequences of Russia's attack on Ukraine will begin to look relatively moderate.
Security experts gathered in Aspen focused on Taiwan, which China considers its dissident province, as a potential pretext for a Sino-American war. America has long been trying to convince Taiwan not to declare independence de jure and at the same time deters China from using force against this island. However, the Chinese military potential is increasing, and although US President Joe Biden denies changes in American policy, high-level visits to Taiwan (most recently the Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi visited the island), according to Chinese officials, deprive this policy of content. One can imagine how both sides will suddenly find themselves in a state of war, like the major powers of Europe in 1914.
The second type of catastrophe would be a protracted cold war, intensified by the increasing demonization of China in the domestic political life of the United States. Such an outcome will hinder Sino-American cooperation in the management of the global economy or environmental interdependence, primarily in the fight against pandemics and climate change. And the US-Chinese rivalry, which hinders cooperation in order to slow down the spread of nuclear and biological weapons, will cost everyone very dearly.
The United States will also suffer if it cannot cope with internal political polarization and solve its socio-economic problems, which may lead to a defocusing of attention and a serious weakening of the technological dynamism that allows the country to successfully compete with China, which is on the rise. The rise of populist nativism that restricts immigration or weakens America's support for international organizations and alliances can also lead to a competitive loss.
Finally, America can shy away from its vision and values. Yes, of course, realism and prudence are necessary conditions for a successful strategy against China. The United States has no way to make China a democratic country, only the Chinese themselves are capable of it. But the presence of the concept of democratic values and human rights is important for creating a soft power that benefits America by attracting rather than forcing allies. That is why a successful US response to the Chinese challenge begins at home, and it must rely on the protection of America's own democratic institutions.
The United States should also invest in research and development, including through the Chip and Science Act, recently approved by Congress and involving spending of $280 billion, in order to maintain its technological advantage in critical industries. And America should remain open to the world, including Chinese students, and not retreat behind a curtain of fear and decadence.
In foreign and security policy, the United States needs to restructure its existing military forces to adapt to technological changes, as well as strengthen allied structures, including NATO and partnerships with Japan, Australia and South Korea. It should be emphasized that the share of the world economy, which accounts for America and its allies, is twice as large as the share of China and Russia combined. The United States needs to expand relations with India, including within the diplomatic framework of the Quad, an informal group on security issues of four countries, which also includes Japan and Australia.
In addition, America needs to strengthen and complement its participation in existing international organizations created to set standards and manage interdependence. Finally, it is important to cooperate with China, whenever possible, on issues of transnational interdependence.
Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, in an important new book, "Preventable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the United States and Xi Jinping's China," suggests making "managed strategic rivalry" the goal. In the short term, the rise of nationalism in China and the assertive policies of the Xi government mean that in this equation, the US will probably have to spend more time competing. But if America manages to avoid ideological demonization, avoids misleading analogies with the Cold War and maintains its alliances, then it will be able to successfully cope with the Chinese challenge.
Joseph S. Nye Jr. is a professor at Harvard University and the author of the book "Does Morality Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from Roosevelt to Trump" (Oxford University Press, 2020).
