China goes on the offensive
The situation in Ukraine has forced China to act. He believes that the United States and Taiwan are deliberately escalating regional tensions, directly linking the Ukrainian conflict with the security of the island, writes FA.
How the conflict in Ukraine changed Beijing's strategy.
When Russia launched a special military operation in Ukraine, Beijing was very much puzzled. For several weeks after the entry of Russian troops into Ukrainian territory, China limited itself to confusing and high-sounding statements, and its diplomats, propagandists and representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to understand what the attitude of Chinese leader Xi Jinping was to the conflict that had begun. Xi's "borderless" partnership with Russian President Vladimir Putin threatened serious reputational risks.
Almost six months have passed since the beginning of the conflict, and there is no end in sight. Under these conditions, Beijing has mostly decided on its position. At first, he was alarmed that the conflict would lead to a significant increase in military spending in Europe, but these fears did not come true. China would prefer it to end with an undoubted victory for Russia, but it also has another wish: that the United States and Europe deplete their stocks of military equipment and weapons by supplying them to Ukraine.Meanwhile, rising energy prices and inflation threaten to weaken the resolve of European countries to maintain sanctions, and Beijing is beginning to feel how transatlantic unity is gradually being destroyed. And although public opinion about China has clearly deteriorated in advanced democratic countries, Beijing is still widely recognized in the global South, as it provides development assistance and provides the necessary diplomatic signals.
At the same time, Beijing has come to the conclusion that regardless of the outcome of the conflict, its own external environment has become much more dangerous. Chinese analysts see a growing rift between Western democracies and various undemocratic countries, including China and Russia. Beijing is concerned that the United States may take advantage of these expanding lines of confrontation and create economic, technological and military coalitions to contain China. He believes that Washington and Taipei are deliberately escalating regional tensions, directly linking the Ukrainian conflict with the security of Taiwan. And Beijing is also alarmed that due to increased international support for Taiwan, its plans for "reunification" will be thwarted.
Because of such perceptions of Western intervention, Beijing has gone on the offensive again. In the future, his foreign policy will increasingly be based on aggressively defending Chinese interests and searching for new ways to gain global power and influence that bypass the bottlenecks controlled by the West.
Who is the narrator
Beijing's reorientation with the start of the Russian operation is noticeable in several areas. A new strategic concept called the Global Security Initiative (IGB) was announced at the highest leadership level this year. This initiative is still only at the initial stage, but it is already clear that it combines several directions of the emerging conceptual model of the world order. But something else is much more important. This initiative signals Xi's attempt to undermine the international community's trust in the United States as a guarantor of regional and global stability, as well as to create a platform around which China will build and strengthen its own partnerships. IGB also opposes false, as Beijing believes, ideas about China's aggressiveness and revisionism.
Xi first outlined the Global Security Initiative in his virtual speech in April. Strictly speaking, there was little new in Xi's speech. But by proclaiming the IGB, Xi sought to wrest control over the information picture of global security from the hands of the United States, its European allies and partners from the Indo-Pacific region, as well as discourage foreign countries from joining military blocs and groups controlled by the United States. By putting forward such an initiative, Xi put on the negotiating table a certain argument that can be opposed to the United States during the discussion about the external appearance and internal content of the international order after the Ukrainian crisis. The Chinese narrative is based on the idea that China is a force of stability and predictability, opposing an increasingly unstable and capricious America.
Another thing is equally important. Beijing continues to position itself as an innovator and leader in the system of global governance of the XXI century. When the IGB was proclaimed, it was constantly included as an agenda item in reports on China's bilateral and multilateral meetings with the countries of Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America. This indicates that Beijing insists on the diplomatic promotion of its new initiative and its inclusion in the terminology dictionary of global governance. IGB has not yet found much response in Tokyo, Canberra and Brussels, but it will certainly be talked about in Jakarta, Islamabad and Montevideo, where there is dissatisfaction with the international order under the leadership of the United States.
Xi in his April speech confirmed that the strategic partnership between China and Russia will continue, despite Putin's special operation in Ukraine. In particular, Xi mentioned "indivisible security", recalling a phrase from the early 1970s that was used in negotiations between the Soviet Union and the West called the Helsinki Process. But under Putin, this term formed the basis of Russian arguments that NATO expansion directly threatens Russia's security. Chinese officials have made it very clear that Beijing sees a direct link between the expanding NATO presence in Europe and the growing coalition of US military partners in the Indo-Pacific region. As senior Chinese diplomat Le Yucheng stressed in his May speech, "The United States has been flexing its muscles on China's doorstep for quite some time, creating exclusive groups against China and inflating the Taiwan problem to test Beijing's limit of patience." He went on to say: "If this is not the Asia-Pacific version of NATO expansion, then what?" Such a link between the security of Russia and China has also become a central component of the joint statement of Xi and Putin, which was made on February 4.
More friends and stronger friendship
As part of the reorientation of its policy after the start of the Russian operation, China is also rapidly strengthening partnerships with countries outside the Western camp, that is, with most of the states of the global South. China has long sought to strengthen friendship with foreign countries, but now it recognizes that some states, for example, European democracies, will never side with it if they are forced to make a choice. Speaking about Ukraine, Le Yucheng complained in March: "Some leading countries make unfounded promises to small states, turn such small countries into their pawns and even use them to wage indirect wars." Beijing does not want to face the same development of events in the event of a conflict with Taiwan or with some other neighbors. Chinese scientist Yuan Zheng explained the PRC's point of view as follows: "Beijing believes that some American militant hawks and aggressive groups are counting on the start of an indirect war in the Chinese geographical environment." Although the Chinese leadership is confident in the political system of its country and in strengthening its economic and military power, it recognizes the dependence of the PRC on imports of goods and resources that ensure its development and contribute to strengthening its military potential. Accordingly, Beijing is rapidly deepening and expanding its partnerships in order to protect itself from painful sanctions and not to be left alone in difficult times. To do this, he is strengthening bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. In August, a sniper competition will be held in Venezuela as part of military exercises led by Russia. China, Russia, Iran and ten other countries can take part in them. It will be a show of force in the Western Hemisphere, clearly directed against the United States.
China also seeks to strengthen the blocs of states that support it, or at least do not support the United States. First of all, Beijing seeks to strengthen and expand the BRICS as part of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, seeing in this association an alternative bloc of the developing world, which should create competition for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), G7 and G20. In May, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a meeting of BRICS foreign ministers, inviting nine more guests, including from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. A month later, Xi himself hosted the BRICS summit, at which he advocated expanding the membership of this association and proposed new initiatives for cooperation in the field of digital economy, trade, investment and supply chains. Xi also invited an unprecedented number of world leaders (13 heads of state) to participate in a high-level dialogue with the BRICS countries on global development. Among them are Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. Shortly after that, Argentina and Iran submitted official applications to join the BRICS. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey also showed interest in joining. In July, Moscow even proposed to the members of this association to create "a new world reserve currency that will better serve their economic interests."
Along with the expansion of the BRICS, Beijing is seeking to transform the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, of which Russia is a member, turning it into a powerful bloc that can use its deep political, economic and military ties as an instrument of pressure. China has long insisted on expanding economic cooperation within the SCO and offers to conclude a free trade agreement, as well as open a SCO bank. Last year, his proposals did not give the desired result, but in May of this year, the SCO discussed the issue of increasing cooperation between member countries, especially in the field of international security and economic cooperation. The number of SCO members will increase this year, as Iran will join it, and Belarus' membership is not excluded in the future. Therefore, this organization will certainly act more aggressively on the world stage. In June of this year, Tehran proposed the SCO to create a single currency and expressed the hope that this organization would become a "concert of non-Western great powers."
Now it is extremely important to observe how China, Russia and Iran will strengthen relations with each other inside and outside the blocs, and how they will help coordinate the positions of countries that are dissatisfied with the leadership of the United States. Another variable affecting China's support from developing countries will be Beijing's ability to use its close relations with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to enlist the assistance of Muslim states, as well as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Backing up words with force
The last component of the restructuring of Chinese foreign policy concerns the armed forces. Beijing believes that the West is unable to understand and sympathize with Russia's legitimate security concerns, in its opinion. China has no reason to believe that the United States and its allies will treat its own concerns differently. And since diplomacy is ineffective, China may face a situation where it will have to use force to demonstrate its determination.
First of all, this concerns Taiwan, and Beijing is more concerned than ever about American plans for this island and, as he believes, the increasing provocations of the United States.In the circles of Chinese foreign policy analysts, a discussion has begun about whether another crisis in the Taiwan Strait is looming, and if so, how China should prepare for it. Diplomat Yang Jiechi, now a member of the CPC Politburo, said his country would take "decisive action" to protect its interests, including the use of military force. At the same time, the People's Liberation Army of China is increasingly conducting exercises near Taiwan in an attempt to deter third parties from interfering. This development helps explain why Beijing issued unusually harsh warnings about the visit of the Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to the island. He said that such a visit "will have the most serious negative impact on the political foundations of Sino-American relations."
It would be a mistake to dismiss Chinese warnings and threats of military action just because the previous warnings were not implemented in practice. An invasion of Taiwan is still unlikely, but Beijing has many ways to escalate tensions without starting an armed conflict. Among other things, it can send its combat aircraft to fly over Taiwanese territory. And if Beijing takes more radical actions because of dissatisfaction with the behavior of the United States recently, it can easily result in a full-scale crisis.
It all depends on Si
Will China's latest attempts to change the balance of power and seize the initiative yield results? It is still unclear whether the IGB will change the foundations of the international order and whether it will become a key component of the Chinese approach to global governance. Previously, China tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to guide the discussion on global security. To this end, he developed a New security concept aimed at expanding economic and diplomatic cooperation. It was first presented in 1996. Of course, at that time China had fewer levers of economic and diplomatic influence. Regardless of the final outcome, the IGB provides a good opportunity to assess how Beijing will guide the discussion on regional and global security after the upcoming XX-th Party Congress, which is to be held in the fall.
Beijing's efforts to expand and activate organizations such as the BRICS and the SCO are encountering certain obstacles. India, for example, is a member of both associations and can counteract blatant anti-American efforts. But even a slight expansion of the capabilities and strengthening of the unity of these organizations will help Beijing to disrupt any forceful and punitive actions that the United States and its allies may take against China in the coming years.
But perhaps the most important factor shaping China's strategic environment for the future is Beijing itself. On paper, it is already possible to distinguish the first outlines of the adjusted Chinese action plan. This is deepening ties with the global South. This is a re-targeting of existing institutions led by China, for example, the SCO. These are new security concepts that coincide with Chinese ideas about the international order. If implemented correctly, this strategy will undoubtedly complicate US foreign policy. But these efforts will take a lot of time, and they may fail if China's increasingly aggressive and assertive actions against its neighbors generate an international reaction of rejection or unwillingness to cooperate with China. Xi's fascination with "his own goals" and his excesses have become the most serious obstacle to the implementation of the grand strategy of the PRC. His thirst for power may well doom Chinese foreign policy to failure.
Authors: Bonnie Lin and Jude Blanchette
