What will happen if the conflict in Ukraine gets out of control?
The authors of the article in Foreign Affairs write that Vladimir Putin and Joe Biden do not want a full-scale conflict, but the situation can still get out of control. This will make the world live in a new way. Now nothing can control the unfolding events.
Liana Fix (LianaFix), Michael Kimmage (MichaelKimmage)
How to prepare for an unintended escalation
The fifth month of the Ukrainian conflict is coming to an end. Despite all the talk about the mutual intersection of "red lines" — the manner of warfare on the part of Russia and military assistance to Kiev from the West — no one has crossed the real red lines yet. At the initial stage of the confrontation, both sides agreed on a set of rules — tacit, but quite effective. The Russian side agreed to the supply of heavy weapons by NATO allies and the provision of intelligence to Kiev. Western countries, gritting their teeth, accepted Russia's conduct of hostilities by conventional means within the Ukrainian borders (while looking forward to Moscow's defeat), until the conflict came to the point of using weapons of mass destruction. And still these invisible rules work, which proves the unwillingness of Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin to get involved in a larger war.
But, of course, such a possibility cannot be ruled out. After all, the conflict is not controlled by any international mechanism. The UN is secondary here, and the EU has joined one of the parties. The United States is not in a position to end hostilities on its own terms — neither is Russia and Ukraine. Negotiations between Moscow and Kiev broke down, and despite all efforts to reduce the escalation, there have been no diplomatic contacts between the United States and Russia since February 24. Add to this the scale and complexity of the conflict, the number of countries involved and the new technologies used — and you get an explosive mixture.
And for this reason, Putin and Biden's desire to avoid a larger-scale clash does not guarantee that such a war will restrain itself. The conflict may spiral out of control even if neither side makes a conscious decision to escalate or use nuclear weapons. And, despite the small probability, a nuclear strike should not be ruled out, given Russia's capabilities and the ambiguity of Moscow's nuclear doctrine. Accidental escalation, in fact, can be even scarier than intentional, since the latter implies the chance of intentional de-escalation. A guided trajectory is still easier to reverse than one that moves according to its own internal logic and whim.
To understand what awaits beyond the horizon, you can look into a good guidebook — the history of the Cold War. Taking into account the duration of the conflict and the propensity for mistakes of political and military leaders on both sides, the confrontation between the USSR and the USA ended peacefully — and this was a remarkable result. However, behind the bright miracle of humanity's survival in the nuclear era, there are dark spots of the proximity of confrontation and periodic escalation characteristic of the second half of the twentieth century. The Ukrainian conflict is likely to follow this pattern — there will be phases where an increase in the level of general confrontation will be avoided due to competent management, and they will be followed by stages of sudden uncontrolled tightening. Strategists and diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic should prepare even more diligently for such a scenario than for a deliberate escalation. The fog of war, which is only thickening due to the promptness and unreliability of social networks, is quite real. It can envelop even the most verified strategies.
Red lines
Biden openly says what he will not do in the Ukrainian conflict. He will not interfere directly. He will not sanction direct intervention by NATO. He will not impose military confrontation goals on Ukraine that are more maximalistic (or minimalist) than those set in Kiev. And even despite the immeasurable volumes of arms supplies, Biden clearly outlined the difference between Ukraine's self—defense — which Washington unconditionally supports - and strikes on the territory of Russia itself. Military assistance to Kiev is inscribed exactly within these borders. Biden wants Ukraine to win on its own terms and on its own territory. He definitely does not want the conflict to escalate into a regional confrontation, and even wrote an article about it in the New York Times to convey his intentions to Moscow.
Putin's position is more ambiguous: he threatened NATO allies with "consequences" for supporting Ukraine. Russian propaganda regularly advocates an offensive on Berlin and nuclear strikes on London. Such rhetoric is actively inflated and forms a "consensus of permissiveness" between the Kremlin and the Russian public. In June, due to disagreements regarding the transit of goods to Kaliningrad, Putin threatened Vilnius with some punitive retaliatory measures. Lithuania is a NATO member, and a Russian attack could provoke a direct military conflict. As for other countries, Putin can arrange or take advantage of the crises in the Balkans to strengthen Russia's position — prepare the ground for a coup, use paramilitary groups. Another risk is powerful cyber attacks on critical infrastructure in Europe and the United States. If they take place, the United States and others will most likely respond, and a new chapter of confrontation will begin.
Some of the theses of Putin's ambiguous rhetoric are just bragging. He cannot afford to participate in a larger conflict. Yes, Russia has the money to continue its policy in Ukraine, but the Russian armed forces have already suffered losses. Any additional conflict, especially against well-armed NATO forces, will only exacerbate these problems. Thus, in theory, Putin and Biden can meet each other halfway. Not wanting to fan the fire even more, both are interested in observing the unspoken rules of the conflict.
Back to the Cold War?
By their desire to adhere to an unspoken set of rules, Putin and Biden "returned" an important trend of the Cold War. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the United States and the USSR never officially agreed on the procedure for conducting indirect conflicts. Neither side, for example, established the basic principles for the Korean War, the first fierce conflict of the era of the arms race. Instead, for about 40 years, both sides improvised on the way to a sustainable manner of solving problems. The following was acceptable: mutual accusations, cultural and ideological confrontation, espionage, active measures like propaganda and disinformation campaigns, struggle for spheres of influence, interference in the internal politics of other countries and, finally, support for each other's opponents, both in war and in peacetime (usually sweetened with varying degrees of so-called "plausible deniability"). The list of prohibited items consisted of only two items: direct military clashes and the use of nuclear weapons.
One can only guess about today's unspoken rules. For Western countries, it seems, the most important thing is to keep their regular armed forces away from the conflict. Abandoning the etiquette of the Cold War, the United States "pushed" plausible deniability, widely used during the support of the Mujahideen in the fight against the USSR in Afghanistan in the 80s. Washington and its allies openly supply the Ukrainian Armed Forces with heavy weapons, train Ukrainian soldiers on their territory and share intelligence about the location of Russian facilities. Moscow, for its part, does not take aim at convoys with weapons going to Ukraine until they leave NATO territory. In addition, Russia did not in any way hinder the constant flow of American and European political leaders to Kiev, each of whom visited the country where military operations are taking place. Such self-restrictions would have been unthinkable during the Second World War, but they were quite typical for the Cold War.
Within the rules
What could jeopardize the unspoken rules that the United States and Russia have agreed on? The first option is pure chance. The second is a cycle of events that will "require" escalation. And you can be sure that both of these options can converge at one point: chance can become a pretext for escalation in a spiral, as it happened during the Cold War.
Take the Caribbean crisis. The confrontation between Washington and Moscow over Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba - which is too often remembered as an example of the coolness of then US President John F. Kennedy — almost ended in disaster. Nikita Khrushchev, the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, went beyond the bounds of what was permissible; Cuban leader Fidel Castro was overzealous; Kennedy was lucky enough to find an effective solution — to remove American missiles in Turkey in exchange for dismantling the Soviet ones in Cuba. The only mechanism that made it possible to achieve de—escalation is the ability of Kennedy and Khrushchev to agree and find common ground. The mechanism, I must say, is uncomplicated. Later, in 1983, in the atmosphere of high tension of the Cold War, the USSR misunderstood the NATO exercises "Able Archer", which simulated an escalation of the conflict. In Moscow, they were perceived as preparation for a real nuclear attack, and were close to striking back, which would lead to a catastrophe. The unspoken rules of the Cold War almost misfired again. Perhaps as many as two such cataclysms that were prevented are not so bad for a period of 40 years. Or maybe even two is too much.
Similarly, the Ukrainian conflict is at risk of accident. Today, the concern is more related to Russia. The unspoken set of rules may be quite obvious to Putin, but it is impossible to say the same with certainty about his commanders, many of whom are annoyed by failures on the battlefield, problems with weapons and the resilience of the Ukrainian army. Their adventurism can result in an airstrike outside Ukraine — for example, on a column of NATO weapons. This, of course, will be a blow to a member of the alliance — and not at all because such a risky decision was made directly in the Kremlin. The risk, of course, here is that Washington will perceive such a blow as a deliberate escalation on the part of Moscow. Putin builds all his military rhetoric on ambiguity, so he may not have reliable tools to change the opinion of the White House, as well as the ability and desire to point out a mistake and admit it. There will be no war between Russia and NATO.
An instructive example of this interpretation and reaction is the events of 2014. Then, in July, pro-Russian separatists shot down a Malaysia Airlines civilian plane in eastern Ukraine, which was following flight MH17. As a result of the strike from the Buk air defense system, 298 people were killed — mostly citizens of the Netherlands. Instead of admitting a mistake through its puppet forces or remaining silent, Moscow resorted to absurd accusations and disinformation, putting forward dozens of contradictory explanations. This incident did not go beyond a verbal confrontation, and the Ukrainian conflict remained local and limited in scope. The indignant Netherlands did not consider the possibility of military steps. However, today a similar set of circumstances can lead to completely different results. Unlike in 2014, today NATO will inevitably come under pressure, and some actions will be demanded from the alliance. In addition, many already alarmed countries will perceive such an attack as an expansion of the scale of the war on the part of Russia.
As this example shows, Moscow's propaganda only adds confusion to the conflict. The Russian media persistently present it as a war between Russia and the West, in terms of stepping up to the threats of a larger confrontation. When, for example, Lithuania threatened to block transit to Kaliningrad, the Kremlin's official rhetoric was harsh, and almost Putin himself put forward ultimatums. Most likely, the militant pose was intended for an internal Russian audience. And although both sides eventually lowered the heat, Russia's attempt to keep the conflict in a state of "slow boiling" through propaganda is a trap into which the Kremlin risks falling itself.
Another accident may happen already from Ukraine. Striking at Russian military targets, the APU may not calculate and hit a large civilian object on the territory of Russia. Moscow can use such an attack as an excuse to retaliate against military stocks in maximum proximity to the borders of NATO or even on the territory of an alliance country. Putin will probably decide that Western countries were behind the attack on a peaceful object — just as he considered the Maidan uprising in 2014, which led to the resignation of the pro-Russian president of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych, the work of the CIA. The mere suppression of incidents — without communication between Moscow and Washington at the highest level — may not be enough to overcome the crisis.
Finally, a cycle of unintended escalation reminiscent of the Caribbean crisis could escalate into a regional or world war. Despite the peaceful resolution, the situation of 1962 is very instructive. Khrushchev failed to anticipate Kennedy's sharp reaction in part because he did not know that Washington would detect the missiles before they were fully installed. He mistakenly thought that he could beat the American president through stealth, luck and bluff. Putin is probably smarter and less eccentric, but he has already shown his inability to "read" Ukrainian politics, military potential and fortitude. Whether it's arrogance or rage, but for some reason he may decide that there is no way back, and will go to a significant escalation of the conflict in order to intimidate Western countries once and for all and force them to go home. He may miscalculate the reaction that will follow from the United States and its allies. If this happens, Putin, as Khrushchev once did, will face a painful choice: raise the stakes even higher or retreat.
There are no simple answers
Despite all the risks, patience and composure developed with experience can prevent the Ukrainian conflict from getting out of control. Success justifies determination and speed, but its complexity also justifies slowness. If an accident happens — Russia's military move outside Ukraine, but, say, not on Putin's orders — it will be extremely important for Washington to carefully assess the situation. The evidence may be hard to come by, but the U.S. response should be based on cold-blooded logic, not the principle of "an eye for an eye." Otherwise, both sides may lose the opportunity to reverse the cycle of unnecessary escalation.
Western countries cannot spare Putin from the temptation to expand the scope of the conflict. Only he himself is capable of this, and therefore the United States is acting cautiously. Washington has created conflict resolution channels that have served both sides well in Syria. It remains to be hoped that they will continue to work in Ukraine. The United States must remind itself and its allies again and again about the dangers of unwanted escalation and the need to see Russia's verbal provocations for what they actually are. The best way to respond to trolling, which Putin loves very much, is to ignore it. The same applies to its nuclear threats. Harsh rhetoric does not always require an answer. It can also be prudently ignored.
Nevertheless, there is no panacea for avoiding a large-scale war. Negotiations, discussions and diplomacy will not help here. Putin can be limited only by the use of force, and it is always fraught with risks. The first step towards a proper long—term policy is to recognize the novelty of the situation: a large conflict, which is likely to drag on for years, is flaring up right in the heart of the international system, bringing it closer to anarchy. Trained to observe the rules of the liberal international order, politicians and diplomats must now learn to navigate the situation of its absence.
The less apocalyptic the views of Washington and its allies, the better. The United States and Russia are not on the verge of World War III, and so far every step does not carry an existential threat. The Ukrainian conflict will create more and more disturbing and frightening circumstances. And the world will have to learn to live with it. The Cuban missile crisis lasted 13 days. The crisis caused by the Ukrainian conflict will last for a very long time.
