The conflict in Ukraine and the return to Eurocentrism
Against the background of the Ukrainian conflict, dangerous militaristic ambitions are intensifying in Europe, writes The Hindu magazine. Following the United States, Europe is trying to divide the world into "its own and others" and this exacerbates the already high tension in the world.
The political and military consequences of the Ukrainian conflict may pave the way for the return of the Eurocentric world order.
For centuries, Europe has imagined itself as the center of the world — its order, politics and culture. The collapse of the colonial system, the transformation of the United States into the sole superpower of the Western world and the rise of other countries in other parts of the world dramatically weakened the centuries-old domination of European states and their ability to shape the world in their own image. The modern world order can hardly be called Eurocentric: it is dominated by the United States, and it is challenged by rising great powers. It is moving towards a multipolar system, in which the European scheme of formation of the world order has turned out to be very limited. So it has been at least until now.
War and instability in Europe
However, the political and military consequences of Russia's military special operation in Ukraine could potentially change the current global balance and return us to the Eurocentric world order, although much less powerful than its previous incarnations. So far, the US continues to dominate the transatlantic security landscape, and most likely, the situation will remain like this for some time. Nevertheless, the new awareness of security in Europe reduces Washington's ability to continue to be a fulcrum of transatlantic strategic thinking.
If Donald Trump returns to the White House in 2024, Europeans will probably start taking their own security much more seriously. And this process has clearly already begun. If wars can shape the international order, then it is Europe's turn to lead the world again. The United States, tired of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, does not seem interested in new rounds of foreign military interventions. But the mood in Europe seems to be changing, and there is a shift in the European narrative from pacifism to insecurity-induced militarism. And it is along this line that the understanding of the form of the modern international system can go in Europe.
The Russian special operation in Ukraine has led to an inevitable sense of insecurity in Europe, especially in Germany, where I recently spent a week talking with officials, parliamentarians, journalists and members of the strategic community. As a result, I have the impression that Europe has been "rudely awakened" from its lazy half-sleep and sweet dreams of a long peace on the continent and the power of pacifism. "Existential insecurity" has sparked renewed enthusiasm for the future of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Commission of the European Union in Brussels has supported Kiev's bid to become a candidate for EU membership, and the 30—member NATO military alliance accepts two more members - Finland and Sweden. And all this is due to what the Europeans call "Putin's special operation in Ukraine" (they carefully distinguish between Russia and Vladimir Putin).
This new military unity is not just words, it is backed up by the political determination and financial resources of the richest economies in the world. Berlin, for example, has decided to spend an additional 100 billion euros on defense in addition to its usual 50 billion euros per year. At the beginning of next year, it is planned to announce a new national security strategy, and the hope of "transforming Russia through trade" is no longer popular with most German politicians and thinkers. In modern Europe, there is also a belief that NATO and the EU are waiting for better days in the future. In this regard, many here even consider Putin's special operation in Ukraine a "hidden blessing."
Impact on institutions
Germany, the engine of this new security thinking in Europe, is abandoning its past self-image as a pacifist nation. In his address to the German parliament at the end of February, the new Chancellor Olaf Scholz called February 24 of this year a Zeitenwende (revolution) in the history of post-war Europe. A country that spent no more than 1.3% of its GDP on defense for two decades will now spend more than 2% on strengthening its armed forces.
It is noteworthy that Berlin, apparently, no longer believes in the United Nations or the UN Security Council and decided to put their faith in the revived EU and NATO. It is interesting to note how quickly Europe's trust in democratic global institutions has weakened in the face of a military conflict involving a neighboring country that is not a member of the EU and NATO.
European States are deeply concerned about the vulnerability caused by globalization, and this has led to a rethinking of the internal problems of "total globalization". This means abandoning multilateralism in favor of "Europeanism" and, apparently, will lead to further undermining of planetary institutions.
The cumulative effect of Europe's remilitarization (no matter how modest it may be at the moment), its loss of faith in multilateral institutions and the increased importance of the EU and NATO will be the uncontrolled transformation of Europe into an even stronger global super-structure based on military force and turning into a new regulatory norm. The EU already has alarmingly disproportionate capacity to set standards for the rest of the world. Instruments such as the Digital Services Act and the Digital Assets Act, or European human rights standards have been adopted unilaterally, and will become inevitable for other parts of the world. And although these instruments and norms may themselves be progressive in nature, the problem lies in the process of their adoption, which is one-sided and Eurocentric. Thus, a democratic Europe creates undeniable moral and political problems, using undemocratic processes to take seemingly progressive measures for the rest of the world.
Consequences for others
So what does this really mean for this rest of the world? Recent statements coming from Europe that "democracies" should unite to defeat the undemocratic aggressor contain a taste of future events: the Eurocentric division of the world into "friends and enemies" will determine its interaction with other countries. India is a friend, but its position on the special operation in Ukraine is not "friendly" enough towards Europe!
The decline of multilateralism and the growth of Eurocentrism will invariably mean that normative and system-forming discussions will most likely be carried out by Europeans, among Europeans, for Europeans and "elected non-Europeans", which will lead to less consensus with the rest of the international community. The EU will lead the way in setting standards for all of us, and we will have no choice but to follow it. Of course, Europe will look for partners all over the world, but first of all, to create a Eurocentric, rather than a truly global world order.
This unilateral attempt to "shape the world" in its own image and likeness will also be presented as an attempt to counter China's ambitions to establish global domination. When countries like India face this, they will face a difficult dilemma: to resist politically and normatively the imposition of their global agenda by Europeans, or to be practical and "jump on the European bandwagon."
Wars in Europe and Eurocentrism
The key message of the European narrative about the conflict in Ukraine is that European states would like to see wars and conflicts in Europe as the main threat to international stability and the "rules-based" world order. It is obvious that the global political priorities of the non-West are completely different — from solving the problem of extreme poverty and backwardness to achieving social stability and eliminating local conflicts. The sincere surprise prevailing in European capitals today about the lack of interest and sympathy in other parts of the world in relation to the Ukrainian conflict is very indicative from the point of view of the Eurocentric views on the world that are ingrained among Europeans.
Happymon Jacob is an associate Professor at the Center for World Politics, International Organizations and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
