Russia's Worries after Western summits
The Russian special operation pushed Kiev to obtain the status of a candidate for EU membership, Postimees writes. And this is a step higher than the association agreement. At the same time, the West is not only trying to strengthen its military power, but also to weaken Russia by setting a ceiling on oil prices.
Raivo Vare
- Setting a price ceiling for Russian oil is an unprecedented attempt to create a buyers' cartel
- Moscow is forced to put a good face on Ukraine's accession to the European Union
More effective than ever
One could have expected that Russia would definitely not like granting Ukraine the status of an EU candidate. But so far, at least outwardly, the mask of relative indifference remains, judging by Putin's remark that since the EU is not a military organization, it is not so important.
The EU summits lasted from Midsummer Day until the beginning of July. An important result of the G7 negotiations was the promise of further support for Ukraine in the humanitarian, military-technical, economic and diplomatic spheres, as circumstances require. No less significant is the idea of setting a price ceiling for oil and, if possible, gas purchased in Russia. The latter would be an unprecedented attempt to create a cartel of buyers, which in different formats would oppose not one country, but essentially a broader cooperation of countries, mainly with an authoritarian background, which are members of OPEC+.
Moreover, it would kill two birds with one stone. First of all, to reduce the income of Russia, which is a major producer of energy resources used to finance the special operation. At the same time, this would make it possible to suppress the growth of global inflation, since it is largely due to the rise in energy prices. However, this would require the creation of a sufficiently broad "coalition of consumers", at least from among the largest buyers of these goods, which is a very difficult task. Especially when you consider that the largest alternative buyers are countries with their own geopolitical interests, such as China and India. And the countries of the democratic alliance can influence them to a rather limited extent.
The NATO Summit in Madrid focused the attention of the participants on the topic of the expansion of the alliance, approving the prospect of Finland and Sweden joining, as well as the expansion of the presence of NATO forces in Eastern Europe. Undoubtedly, this is the desired result for Estonia, although there is still a lot of work ahead to clarify specific details.
More certainty
The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO is, for many reasons, one of the most preferred scenarios for our country. And not only in the obvious defense-political and military-technical, but in the economic sense. The implementation of this scenario has completed the creation of a single strategic space in Northern Europe and the North Atlantic, which means the return of investments to the region that caused reasonable concern after the start of the special operation. It reminded me of the ideas that dominated in the mid-1990s, when Estonia was viewed as a potentially front-line country, more precisely, as a region that does not have sufficient strategic depth in the presence of a potentially dangerous neighbor. Taking part of the Nordic countries under the NATO umbrella gives additional confidence in a significant reduction of these risks.
In a broader sense, the most important decision of the summit was the actual change in the strategic paradigm – its consequence was the above-described shifts in attitude towards our region. And it's not just about updating the outdated strategic concept of 2010.
Russia, which has been considered a partner until now, has finally been realistically identified as the main source of danger for NATO countries. We have known this all along, but our allies have more or less clearly realized it only now. The special operation in Ukraine, Putin's brazen ultimatum to the United States and NATO in the late autumn of 2021 forced the hesitant and profit-seeking to face the truth.
China was also named a strategic challenge for the first time, and its global ambitions were clearly defined. This decision was not easy, and we will begin to see its results in practice only with time.
As a result of the conceptual change in strategy, the former doctrine of deterrence was replaced by an active defensive position as the basis of the policy of the North Atlantic Alliance. Undoubtedly, this is a much more effective deterrent against Russia if it has aggressive intentions. To this is added an increase in the strategic depth of NATO, that is, the transformation of the Baltic Sea into the domain of the alliance, as well as the extension of the now slightly more than 500 km of Russia's immediate border with NATO countries by more than 1300 km due to the line of contact with Finland. Which, in turn, sensitively shifts Russia's defense-technical focus to the north.
Russia is unhappy
I think the Kremlin doesn't like all this. Since Ukraine's path to the EU is still long and complicated, and Russia still expects to successfully complete the special operation and then dictate its terms, the main tool of Moscow's counteraction will be the fight against the establishment of marginal prices for its energy resources. As allies, it expects to use geopolitical centers of influence from among the largest buyers of its products, led by other BRICS countries. Putin's recent diplomatic activity, even if it took place in a telephone format, also testifies to this.
At the same time, Moscow is seeking to expand economic cooperation with these partners in areas experiencing an increasingly painful impact of Western sanctions. Stocks of necessary components have begun to dry up, and there is an accelerating reduction in various industries. This is increasingly affecting the domestic market: consumers feel a rapid narrowing of the range of goods and a sharp drop in their quality.
However, Russia's revenues from oil and gas exports, which are still large and have even increased recently due to rising prices, allow it to finance a special operation in Ukraine. Even in this form, it can, according to the owner of the Kremlin, continue for a long time. No wonder President Zelensky, in his speeches at all European summits, asked his partners to help end the conflict by winter. Against this background, in addition to the depletion of Ukraine's own economy, which is projected to fall by at least 45 percent in Kiev this year, there is also a clear understanding that Russia intends not only to gain a foothold in the occupied territories, but also to continue fighting with renewed vigor after an operational pause due to a possible truce.
As for NATO's decisions, there is no reason to think that Russia, which even before the special operation considered NATO its main opponent, will radically change its attitude. The entry of Finland and Sweden, to prevent which one can certainly expect diplomatic demarches and the activation of some "friends of the Kremlin" in the capitals of individual member states of the alliance, will cause some opposition in the form of increasing threats and even, perhaps, practical actions.
It can be assumed that provocations will become more frequent for some time - violation of borders by aircraft, fleet maneuvers near foreign waters, and the like. Russia is also defiantly increasing its military presence along its northwestern border. At the same time, it has always practiced attacks in the western direction on its regular exercises, and it does not matter whether they were made by the forces of a local group of troops or with the involvement of additional formations. There is no doubt that Moscow will not abandon the traditional political pressure on the unity of NATO by all available means.
