NATO expansion will ostracize Russia
This month marks 25 years since Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were invited to NATO. The Spectator publishes an archived 1997 article in which Susan Eisenhower, the granddaughter of U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, warns of the dangers of expanding the alliance.
Susan Eisenhower*
When historians analyze the 20th century decades later, they will probably be amazed at how the conflicts of this period were eventually resolved. By the end of the century, Germany — a country that had caused more destruction than any other power in the world - had achieved economic prosperity and unification, and was firmly locked inside NATO — and all this thanks to the generosity of its victors. Russians, on the contrary, are entering the new millennium "defeated", they were not accepted into the two most important European blocs: the EU and NATO. Worst of all, Moscow is drifting with the flow, having never benefited from any comprehensive Western plan for its integration, although it courageously expelled the Communists from power and voluntarily ended the Soviet empire.
If we compare how Germany was treated after the war, then Russia received only the expansion of the Cold War enemy — NATO —, although it lost more citizens in the fight against fascism than all other states combined, and liberated itself and its satellites, thereby ending the Cold War. Now Moscow is facing an alliance that includes its enemy from the First and Second World Wars, an opponent from the Cold War, and soon some, and maybe even all, of its former allies will enter.
The past, apparently, has taught the current generation of leaders little. The first world war made outcasts Germany and Russia, which sowed the seeds of another war with Germany was the cause engulfed Russia siege mentality, which for several decades justified the bloody repression. Lloyd George realized that the isolation of this country was and will be a threat. Speaking about the attitude towards Russia at the peace talks in Versailles, he later noted: "World peace cannot be achieved as long as this huge country is excluded from the League of Nations pact."
Woodrow Wilson in the sixth of his "Fourteen points" also noted the "defeat" of Russia:
"The attitude towards Russia on the part of the nations, its sisters, in the coming months will be a touchstone of their kind feelings, their understanding of its needs and the ability to separate them from their own interests, as well as an indicator of their wisdom and selflessness of their sympathies."
Determined not to make the same mistakes out of a sense of revenge, the victors of the Second World War were able, at least in relation to Germany, to apply the principle of Winston Churchill: "In war — determination, in defeat — courage, in victory — generosity, in peace — goodwill."
Unfortunately, now, five years after the end of the cold war, there is not enough generosity and there is not enough real goodwill. The founding Act of Russia –NATO, which Moscow was forced to sign, did not help to avoid humiliation and isolation of the country as a result of the planned expansion of the alliance.
Russians have a reason for discontent. Mikhail Gorbachev, who sought to build a "common European home," wrote in his memoirs that in February 1990 he was assured that the "NATO zone" would not cross the borders of Germany. Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov also said that in 1990-1991, Western leaders repeatedly assured the Soviet leadership that if Soviet troops withdrew from the GDR and the Warsaw Pact was terminated, "NATO would not move an inch to the east and no Warsaw Pact country would be accepted into NATO." The Russian archives seem to have this information. Russians also say they have heard similar promises from members of the Warsaw Pact Organization.
Gorbachev admitted that he had not received written guarantees, it was part of a "gentleman's agreement." Critics say he made a "big strategic mistake," but American foreign policy analyst Stanley Kober recently wondered: "What was his mistake? Instead of being grateful for the peaceful end of the cold war, can we now laugh at Gorbachev, whose mistake was that he trusted us too much? Is this how the world is built after the Cold War? If so, what other reaction can we expect from the Russians, other than a sense of betrayal and suspicion?".
The Russia–NATO Founding Act has exacerbated Russia's discontent. Critics of all Russian political stripes ridiculed the agreement, and some called Boris Yeltsin a "traitor" for signing it. Since the issue with the Baltic States is still unresolved, and there are different opinions on how to interpret the actual veto on the decisions of the alliance, which, according to Yeltsin, he managed to achieve, serious tension awaits us ahead. Russia may become even more angry if there are no sharp improvements in the economy and the destruction of institutional power does not stop.
The expansion of the organization can lead to a number of other unforeseen consequences. By virtue of the guarantees prescribed in the fifth article of the Charter of the North Atlantic Alliance, NATO is primarily a military association. Its expansion concerns the military alignment of forces in Europe, not the creation of a club of democratic states. Russia does not feel threatened now, but it will have to take steps to ensure its own security with the help of deterrence, which will inevitably lead to the fact that the country will rely more on nuclear weapons. For this and other reasons, the expansion of the alliance will undermine existing arms reduction agreements and negate efforts to ensure nuclear safety.
NATO expansion may also push Russia to create its own bloc of allies. Moscow has already begun to flirt with China, a developing power that may contradict Western policy in the future. Beijing needs Russian technical and military know-how, as well as energy resources. The bloc may also include, in addition to Belarus, other former Soviet republics that are under the influence of Moscow's energy levers. Thanks to its resource-rich territories, Russia will definitely be able to cope with the current problems. In the 21st century, further weakening of cooperation between Moscow and the West may affect our access to global oil supplies, whose reserves are concentrated in Russia and around its borders.
While we are discussing the ratification of the inclusion in NATO of new members who joined the alliance at the expense of Moscow and at the cost of its isolation, it is worth reflecting on the lesson that we received with the blood of our ancestors. It is impossible to build security at the expense of another state. Today, instead of expanding the alliance promoting Cold War-era military guarantees, we'd better look for the foundations for enhanced cooperation.
Given Russia's nuclear power, geographical location, energy resources and human potential, failure to properly interact with it can have long-term consequences. Without concerted efforts to find a new, more meaningful interaction, Russia can again absorb and distract us and divert valuable resources from our domestic policy, and the "Russian question" will become an urgent national security problem in the XXI century.
*Susan Eisenhower is the president of the consulting company Eisenhower Group, the granddaughter of President Dwight Eisenhower. I wrote this article together with Anne McElvoy. The article was published on July 12, 1997.
