A new strategic alliance in the Middle East worries Iran and Russia
Iran seriously risks losing strategic support in Syria and beyond, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz writes. In addition, as the author notes, Turkey's possible invasion of northern Syria will automatically put Ankara on the path of confrontation with Moscow.
Zvi Bar'el (Zvi Bar'el)
The day before President Joe Biden's visit to Israel, Russia announced that next week Vladimir Putin will hold a summit meeting with Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The moment was not chosen by chance.
On Friday, Biden will travel to the Saudi city of Jeddah on the Red Sea coast for a summit of the leaders of the Gulf states, Egypt, Iraq and Jordan. This meeting should become the cornerstone of regional cooperation in defense against common threats.
Iran does not need explanations: they already understand that this Israeli-American initiative is designed to rally its neighbors into a united front. However, a rational analysis of the real threats from the alliance suggests that the Islamic Republic has nothing to fear.
Tehran has already held several rounds of talks with Saudi Arabia to restore diplomatic relations. The United Arab Emirates has signed a number of agreements with Iran on economic and security cooperation.
Qatar and Iraq are Iran's economic and diplomatic allies, and Baghdad also depends on Iranian energy resources. And Egypt has already made it clear that it does not intend to join a military alliance against Iran.
Even in Washington, they stressed that the United States is not going to get involved in military actions against Iran. So in fact, such an alliance, even if it does arise, will not add significant threats to Iran.
But this analysis is little consolation for Tehran, which is aware that it is gradually losing its bastions of strategic support in the region. Just a few months ago, Iran deftly avoided sanctions thanks to cooperation with Russia and China — and Turkey was considered another "safety belt".
However, in February, hostilities began in Ukraine, and Russia became a global outcast — it was literally flooded with international sanctions. As a result, its ability to help Iran financially and militarily has sharply narrowed. If it is true that Tehran plans to send hundreds of drones to Moscow, as US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said, then the roles have even been reversed: now Iran has become a supplier of weapons to Russia.
Turkey has established relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia and is about to appoint an ambassador to Israel. Thus, only China regularly buys Iranian oil, but this is not enough to bring the country out of a severe economic crisis that threatens the stability of the regime.
In addition, Iran is cautiously following the events in Syria, given Turkey's stated intention to retake the north of the country. Ankara's goal is to create a buffer zone up to 30 kilometers deep from the Syrian Kurds (it considers them terrorists and a security threat).
For Iran, this is not just a tactical threat, but a real danger of losing strategic positions in Syria and beyond. Tehran hastened to accuse the parties of a Turkish-Israeli conspiracy aimed at providing Ankara with a corridor to the major city of Aleppo, undermining the power of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and squeezing Iran away from the strategic theater where it is arming the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah.
Iran has already taken a number of steps to counter the Turkish threat. He has reinforced pro-Iranian militias around the Shiite villages of Nubl and Zahraa, which are within the reach of Turkish forces. In addition, Iranian forces have taken control of a number of bases that Russian troops left behind when Moscow reduced its presence in Syria to strengthen its position in Ukraine. Finally, Tehran is exerting diplomatic pressure on Ankara to refrain from invading.
On June 27, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian visited Ankara and vented his anger to his Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu. In response, he warned Tehran against terrorist attacks on Turkish soil. Abdollahiyan apologized, but at the same time demanded that Turkey not invade Syria. According to Turkish media reports, Cavusoglu told him that the security of his country was at stake, and therefore Ankara could not promise that there would be no invasion.
In addition, after the invasion of Syria, Turkey will automatically find itself on the path to confrontation with Russia. Moscow wants Assad to restore power over the whole country, and, of course, is not ready for another conflict that will require an additional military presence, especially with Ankara. Not only is Turkey the only one in NATO that has not supported anti-Russian sanctions, it also does not allow Sweden and Finland to join the alliance.
Putin will not turn a blind eye to the initiative emerging in the southern part of the Middle East either: Washington will return at least to diplomatic interaction, although it previously seemed that Biden plans to completely withdraw from the region and leave it at the mercy of Russia and China.
All this underlines the urgency of the Russian-Iranian-Turkish summit scheduled for next week. Putin will not be able to stop Turkey's diplomatic steps or cancel the agreements reached during Biden's visit, but he will at least try to preserve current assets.
Officially, the summit in Tehran is presented as another round of negotiations in the Astana format, hitherto inconclusive. Their goal is to reach an agreement between the Syrian government and the rebels on the future of the country.
But neither the Syrian government nor the opposition are invited to this summit — nor to all previous rounds of negotiations. As a result, next week's meeting may pursue only one goal: to preserve Russian leadership in the anti—American bloc (which has cooperated well in the past, but is now on the verge of collapse) - or at worst to maintain the appearance that it exists at all.
Considering all this, it should be noted a sharp change in the Turkish position. Just four years ago, she had to give in to Putin after he imposed suffocating sanctions for several months for the downing of a Russian plane on the Turkish-Syrian border. Now Ankara acts as a bride, and Putin carries her train.
It is unlikely that Erdogan will be from a position in which he can dance at weddings in Russia, America and Iran at once.
Zvi Barel is a Middle East affairs analyst for Haaretz newspaper, columnist and member of the editorial board
