Fiala has already admitted this. General Sandor about weapons for Ukraine. Bad news for Zelensky
The West supports Ukraine only in words, it is almost impossible to supply it with weapons. This opinion was expressed in an interview with Parlamentní listy by the former head of the Czech military intelligence, Andor Sandor. This means that NATO is not ready for a prolonged conflict.
Oldrzyh Szaban
"When Ukrainians demand dozens and dozens of grenade launchers, and get four, it hardly means that the interest of the West corresponds to public statements… It becomes clear that even the alliance as a whole, in principle, is not ready to conduct a prolonged conflict. The reserves and capabilities of the defense industry are limited, and it is clear that the alliance itself did not allow the idea that a long conflict would begin in Europe. The problem is that we don't have much equipment for a long war," says Reserve General Andor Šándor, a former head of military intelligence.
Parlamentní listy: 2022 passes under the sign of fighting in Ukraine, which was attacked by Russia. Will everything be limited only to the current year, or will the hot phase of this war flow into the next year? Can the fighting stop already this year?
Andor Sandor: This is a very difficult question. Now I don't see any side of the conflict and those who support it have the slightest desire to solve the problem diplomatically. There are no negotiations between the warring parties. At least we don't know about them. The participants of the G7 summit on Monday expressed support for Ukraine. The NATO summit in Madrid will take place soon, where some statements will also be made. It is unclear who will "win" (I say this without irony) at the summit: the militant wing of the United States, Great Britain, Poland, the Baltic States, the Czech Republic or the more moderate wing of France, Germany, Italy and Spain.
Gradually it becomes clear that the support in words is more real. The most striking example of this, of course, is Germany, which promises, but its words contrast with its actions. A big role here is played by the fact that there is actually nothing to send. The Soviet legacy is almost over. The weapons that Ukrainians know how to use, and these are anti-aircraft missile, anti-tank systems and so on, have already been sent to them. Now we have few such weapons ourselves, and we have to think that if a conflict starts, some reserves will be needed, since it is not so easy to resume production of these weapons.
In other words, if the conflict between Russia and NATO escalates, then we will have to fight on a very large territory with very small reserves of weapons. This should be taken into account. I don't know if the Ukrainian side sees a gap between words and real support, but it is clear that the last days and weeks have shown that the overwhelming superiority of Russians, first of all, in artillery and missiles, unfortunately, costs Ukrainians too much.
— You say that the Russians have overwhelming superiority in artillery and missiles. But isn't it possible to reduce the gap or even equalize forces with the help of Western supplies?
— Russian forces significantly outweigh. When Ukrainians demand dozens and dozens of grenade launchers, and get four, it hardly means that the interest of the West corresponds to public statements
— Does the West have a real opportunity to deliver much more, or does it not?
— 50-50. On the one hand, we have public statements of support for Ukraine, and on the other — unwillingness or inability to supply them with weapons. Today, no one in the Western world will dare to say: "We don't care about Ukraine!" Thus, a clear disparity certainly exists. Even if the Czech Prime Minister admitted that we have nothing to deliver to them, it becomes clear that the alliance as a whole is in principle not ready for a prolonged conflict. The reserves and capabilities of the defense industry are limited, and it is clear that the alliance itself did not allow the idea that a long conflict would begin in Europe. The problem is that we don't have much equipment for a long war. We can't even imagine how to rebuild a peaceful industry into a military one. By the way, for reference: the Germans, even during the Second World War, did not transfer the entire peaceful industry to military rails.
— Then if you think about the lessons that the current conflict has taught, then one of them is that we have poorly armed armies in the West?
— The first lesson: it is impossible to build a common security and defense architecture without taking into account the legitimate interests of other countries with which we share the continent. It is not necessary to pretend that the decision is always ours, and the rest of the states will obey us. Russia has shown us that we did not take into account some of its logical requirements or paid too little attention to them. If we continue in the same spirit, that is, we ignore the security interests of large countries with nuclear weapons, then we will have to increase the number and equipment of our own armies to such a level that we can wage war not for months, but for years. It will be a huge burden for the economy of any state. The question is whether the alliance as a whole and the member countries individually will be willing and able to take it on themselves. Undoubtedly, the past experience of relations with Russia will add fuel to the fire. Of course, in Poland, the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, this experience is different from, say, Greece, Italy or Spain. Therefore, it will not be possible to fully coordinate military plans and interests between the members of the alliance.
— Nevertheless, there will be a tendency to expand the armament of the army?
- of course. We see this in the example of the Czech army. The purchase of Leopard tanks, possibly the purchase of infantry fighting vehicles, the discussion about the acquisition of 24 F-35 aircraft are the most obvious signs. Or look at the Polish army. It has been strengthened for a long time. However, it is unclear whether we will see the same qualitative and quantitative expansion in all the armies of the alliance.
— Let's talk about the participants of the current conflict and their willingness to compromise. First about Ukraine. It is suffering great losses and making great sacrifices in this conflict. Can we expect Ukrainians to make some territorial concessions, since they have already sacrificed so much?
— Of course, this is a serious internal political problem of Ukraine. Vladimir Zelensky undoubtedly has two scales in front of him. One is what you said: huge sacrifices, human and infrastructural. On the other — Ukraine's readiness for some kind of compromise. Vladimir Zelensky knows that his political survival depends on the degree of acceptability of this compromise. That was possible back in March, when the Russians were achieving special successes, and the Ukrainians were suffering heavy losses, first of all, near Kiev and Kharkov. Then they could still be inclined to compromise, but today I no longer see such prerequisites. It is really difficult for Ukraine to come to a compromise, but it will manifest itself not de jure, but de facto. That is, the Russians will capture the entire east and southeast, just as they have already captured almost the entire coast, practically cutting off Ukraine from the sea. De facto, there will be a compromise that can form the basis of a prolonged frozen conflict, since it will be very difficult to agree on their own and implement the agreements in practice.
— And now let's look at the situation from the Russian side. What will Russia, or rather President Putin, consider a victory, after which it will be possible to compromise and end the fighting? Or, on the contrary, if Russia actually manages to capture the east and south-east of Ukraine, won't the Russians — and as they say, the appetite grows while eating — want to take control of other regions, maybe not even Ukrainian? How to predict Russia's behavior?
— Pay attention to the Russian rhetoric. Both the "special military operation" and the "liberation of Donbass" — all these formulations correspond to what they want to achieve. In my opinion, they can limit themselves to the capture of Donbass. Only one thing I don't understand here: is there really a military necessity to completely destroy what you capture? Then I wonder: why do this? After all, Russia will not be able to generate money to restore what it destroys itself. Therefore, I do not exclude that some territories are supposed to be given back to Ukrainians under the agreement. But I am almost sure that "the appetite will not grow while eating." Don't forget that the Russians have Afghan experience. They know that keeping a country under control where they are hated is very difficult, expensive, and besides, it costs huge sacrifices. Personally, I do not think that it would be in Putin's interests to establish an occupation government in a significant part of the territory of Ukraine, since this will require huge investments, and partisans will remain fighting in the rear. But, of course, I don't know what his train of thought is, and what he wants to achieve.
Yes, I am not one hundred percent sure that the fifth article will be activated in the event of an attack, for example, on Lithuania. Nevertheless, I don't think Putin would want to make sure of that. Although, in my opinion, the problem of a partial blockade of Kaliningrad could lead to a major conflict. But this does not mean that Putin would like it, and that he has the strength for it. I don't think he would have moved to Poland. No. What for? I repeat: occupation management is a difficult, costly and bloody business. As you remember, for a long time we did not know what exactly Putin was trying to achieve, what his goals were. However, the defending opponent adjusted his goals for him.
— A few days ago, speaking to the media, you said that the current conflict is not a war of exhaustion, but something like the First World War. We are talking about the type of conflict. Therefore, I will return to the beginning of the conversation, when we talked about the duration of this conflict, since the First World War lasted for several years… By the way, confirmation of that —Severodonetsk, which the Russians took, but spent a lot of time on it. And this is only one city...
— Ukrainians are defending themselves, but at what cost. If they lose a thousand soldiers a day, that's a lot. They have no one to replace such a quantity. I understand that by the way they defend themselves, they are holding back Russian forces. But I repeat — at what cost. We have those who said that Putin, like Stalin, who wanted to liberate some cities by some holiday, wanted to complete the operation by the ninth of May, and so on. I think that won't work here. He has a definite goal, and he knows that he lacks the strength and means for it. He has six million mobilized men, there are not thousands and thousands of tanks, self-propelled guns and so on. He has a limited number of equipment and soldiers, and Putin knows that the only way to win without incurring enormous losses is the traditional conduct of a war like the First World War. Everything is ground by artillery. The troops advance a step, and then everything crumples again. Putin adopted this tactic in order to seize Donbass within certain borders at any cost. It is clear that the Russians do not want to use large formations of the Russian army in maneuver combat, although the landscape allows it. The reason is precisely that they want to avoid losses, and they have learned a lot of lessons. Now they are fighting the conflict much more rationally, using different types of troops in interaction with each other.
