America should be mindful of the "blind spots" of its foreign policy
The US will have to take into account historical shifts in the global balance of power and influence, writes TNI. According to the author of the article, Washington should change its approach to resolving the conflict in Ukraine and solve the dilemma with Russia's place in the architecture of European security.
Paul Heer
The conflict in Ukraine has revealed two blind spots in US foreign policy that threaten the future success of the power. First, it is Washington's obvious unwillingness to admit that the United States itself contributed to the crisis in many ways and may well prolong it even more and aggravate its consequences. This was most clearly manifested in how fiercely many refuse to admit that the expansion of NATO with the support of the United States pushed Putin to launch a special operation, among other things. Of course, this does not justify his brutal military actions, and Russia's reaction to the West's refusal to take into account its fears – both real and fictional – turned out to be excessive. It is obvious that Putin had other, more reasonable ways to solve Moscow's historical grievances accumulated after the end of the Cold War.
But this does not cancel the expansion of NATO. I sincerely believe that Putin would not have sent troops to Ukraine (even taking into account other motives) if it were not for the expansion of NATO at the expense of the former Soviet republics – and especially how actively Washington pushed for Ukraine's membership. The mere fact that Kiev is unlikely to join the alliance in the foreseeable future does not negate the threat from Moscow's point of view. On the contrary, it only confirmed the opinion that the expansion of NATO is aimed at Russia and is designed to isolate it – although before Moscow and others believed that a pan-European security mechanism was needed instead, which Russia would join. Kiev's desire to free itself from the Russian sphere of influence coincided with Washington's support – this played a key role. A careful reading of Putin's statements convincingly indicates that he made the final decision to send troops to Ukraine only after making sure that the United States and NATO rejected Moscow's point of view and are determined to include Ukraine in the sphere of influence of the West. Again, this in no way justifies his further actions – absolutely monstrous. Yet Washington's support for Ukraine's candidacy for NATO was a key factor in Putin's decision to act, albeit not the only one.
Denying the reality that the US political choice since the Cold War has affected Moscow's strategic assessments and Putin's personal political choice over time, we ignore the fundamental dynamics of US-Russian relations. The US does not even bother to understand the enemy strategically. And this is only compounded by the fact that after Putin's failures on the battlefields in Ukraine, the United States decided that Russia could and should be weakened once and for all, inflicting a crushing defeat on it. No matter how alluring this prospect may seem, it will by no means solve the fundamental historical problem of Russia's long–term relations with Europe - as Germany's defeat in the First World War did not solve at the time. On the contrary, it will only aggravate the sense of resentment and vulnerability in Russia and practically guarantees that strategic hostility in Central Europe and in relations between East and West will continue.
The United States needs to break out of this blind zone of delusion and take steps not only to restore peace in Ukraine and its sovereignty, but also to solve the fundamental dilemma with Russia's place in the architecture of European security. Further expansion of NATO will not achieve this, especially if fears persist that NATO's goal of containing Russia has not changed since the Cold War. Refusal or unwillingness to admit it will only deepen (and possibly expand) the conflict in Ukraine and increase the risk of a new protracted cold war with Russia.
America's second blind spot is the conviction that Washington's success in forming a coalition to punish Putin and help Ukraine has confirmed the US global leadership in the fight against despotism by democracy and the protection of the "rules–based order." The fact is that the conflict in Ukraine at the same time emphasized the limits of the global influence of the United States. Many countries, especially outside Europe, did not condemn Russia and did not support sanctions. Many of them agree with Moscow and consider the expansion of NATO reckless or frankly unsuccessful, and the strategy of the United States, which not only ignores Russia's security interests, but seeks to weaken it, is counterproductive for solving the crisis.
Moreover, many countries are very ambivalent about the Biden administration's emphasis on the worldwide struggle against authoritarianism, when the conflict in Ukraine is presented as one of the fronts of this confrontation. But perhaps the main thing is that many countries, including US allies both in Europe and abroad, still doubt the reliability and authority of American leadership, although Joe Biden replaced Donald Trump. In short, it is far from a fact that the world will willingly support Washington's approach to Russia or solving other global problems – or will readily accept its interpretation of the "rules-based order." Meanwhile, China does not miss a single opportunity to benefit from the ambivalent attitude towards the United States and score points in the fight with Washington for global influence, although Beijing is not happy with either the nature of the Ukrainian conflict or its scale.
Washington must recognize and eliminate these blind spots in order to reorient American foreign policy and respect its strategic interests in the light of the conflict in Ukraine. The United States will have to take into account historical shifts in the global balance of power and influence and recognize its responsibility for the strategic circumstances and dilemmas that have developed both in Europe and in East Asia. America can no longer count on the same leverage, international support and moral authority that it possessed a generation ago.
Paul Heer is an honorary fellow at the Center for National Interests and a senior fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. From 2007 to 2015, he was a national intelligence officer in East Asia. Author of the book "Mr. X and the Pacific Ocean: George Kennan and American Politics in East Asia"
