Great difficulties lie ahead for NATO
FA writes that despite the appearance of success of NATO, the alliance is facing great difficulties ahead. Now the union is cemented by the conflict in Ukraine, but centrifugal tendencies are strong in it. Europe is separating from the United States. The author believes that today the role of NATO should be to resolve the conflict in Ukraine and find ways of dialogue with Russia.
Charles Kupchan
The greatest threats to the unity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will arise after the Madrid summit.
Thanks to Russian President Vladimir Putin, the NATO summit in Madrid was held this week against the backdrop of the revival of this Western alliance. Putin's special operation in Ukraine is forcing NATO to return to its mission, which was laid down in it when it was founded — to provide collective protection from Russia. Members of the alliance demonstrate unity and determination by transferring weapons to Ukraine, increasing defense spending, strengthening the eastern flank of the alliance and imposing tough economic sanctions against Russia.
The Russian special operation in Ukraine showed that NATO has returned, but in fact it has never disappeared. The Alliance was in good shape even before Putin launched his special operation, which is one of the reasons that he was able to respond to the events in Ukraine with such readiness and solidarity. Since the end of the cold war, NATO has demonstrated its ability to adapt to the times, conducting operations in remote areas, including Afghanistan and the Balkans, and opening its doors to the new democracies of Europe.
But despite the good health and demonstrative unity, NATO faces a lot of pressing issues, and the discussions in Madrid are only coming to their solution. Events in Ukraine, of course, dominated the summit. At the same time, the conversation on him focused on the easy part: to deliver more weapons to the front line. But NATO also needs to take on a much more difficult part: when and how to combine the flow of weapons with a diplomatic strategy aimed at achieving a ceasefire and subsequent negotiations on territories. The urgency of such a turn stems from the need not only to put an end to the deaths and destruction in Ukraine, but also to limit the terrible economic consequences of the war, which could threaten the Atlantic alliance from within, undermining solidarity and weakening the democratic foundations of the West. The conflict in Ukraine also poses a number of additional important tasks for NATO: how the organization can cope with its current expansion, how it can tame the growing geopolitical ambitions of Europe and how it can participate in the creation of a new transatlantic architecture capable of solving increasingly complex and diverse problems facing the West.
Diplomatic Endgame
Transatlantic efforts to support Ukraine have focused on providing the country with the weapons it needs to defend itself. That's how it should have been. Kiev needs more firepower to counter and even reverse Russia's advance in eastern and southern Ukraine. The goal, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, is "to protect every meter of our land." Washington does not yet want to dissuade Kiev from attempts to completely expel Russian troops from Ukrainian territory. "We are not going to tell Ukrainians how to negotiate, what to negotiate about and when to negotiate," said Colin Kahl, Deputy Defense Minister for Policy Affairs. "They will work out these conditions for themselves."
But today is the time for NATO to focus on the diplomatic endgame of the Ukrainian conflict and try to capitalize on its efforts to strengthen Ukraine's position by facilitating a cease-fire and subsequent negotiations. After some initial military successes of Ukraine, the advantage on the battlefield has shifted in favor of Russia, which is one of the reasons why France, Germany, Italy and other US allies are now insisting on a turn towards diplomacy. Washington is still resisting. As President Joe Biden stated in early June, "I will not put pressure on the Ukrainian government — publicly or privately — to make any territorial concessions."
But Washington can hold out like this for a very short time. It is not only about maintaining transatlantic solidarity by adopting a European choice of strategy, which also includes the search for ways of a diplomatic settlement. Even with additional arms supplies, Ukraine most likely will not have enough combat power to oust Russian troops from its entire territory or even at least restore the territorial status quo that existed in February. The continuation of the war may well mean for Kiev new losses of the lives of its citizens and territories, and not gains on the battlefield. And the longer the military conflict continues, the higher the risk of escalation, intentional or accidental, and the longer and more serious the disruptions in the global economy and food supply will be.
Of particular concern are the economic consequences of the war for NATO members themselves, including the potential impact of rampant inflation on all American politics. The internal foundations of US foreign policy have become much more fragile than ever before. The bipartisan "centrism" that prevailed during the Cold War has long gone, giving way not only to the polarization of American politics, but also to the powerful growth of "neo-isolationist" sentiments. Former President Donald Trump's "America First" foreign policy was more a symptom than a cause of this internal turnaround. Biden's "foreign policy for the middle class" signals that Democrats have also become very sensitive to the desires of the electorate, requiring Washington to spend more time and resources on solving problems at home, and not abroad. Biden's departure from Afghanistan brought him some points on this front. His ambitious program of domestic investment and renewal was also aimed at improving the lives of Americans, at getting the middle class back on its feet and restoring the country's political axis.
The conflict in Ukraine, despite the eternal political confrontation in Congress, has pushed this most important problem of internal unity in the country into the background. The provision of military and economic assistance to Ukraine enjoys extraordinary support from both parties. However, time is not on the side of this apparent "party consensus", which may crumble to dust as the November midterm elections approach. The war in Ukraine, which has arisen along with total disruptions of commodity supplies caused by the pandemic, exacerbates economic difficulties, which plays into the hands of Republicans with their constant slogan "America first". Inflation is at a 40-year high. The prices of gasoline, food and other necessities continue to rise rapidly. The stock market is in a swoon amid talk of an impending recession. The events in Ukraine are hardly the only cause of these economic hardships, but they certainly play an important role in them. It also consumes precious time and drains the Biden administration's political capital.
Against the background of these economic problems, the midterm elections, apparently, will give the House of Representatives and, possibly, the Senate into the hands of Republicans. It is impossible to predict the composition of the Republican political cohort that will command in Congress, but the Republican Party is likely to lean even more in the direction of the ideology of "America first". J.D. Vance, relying on Trump's support, recently won the hysterically contested Democratic primary elections for the Senate in Ohio. His views on the military conflict in Ukraine can be a clear symbol of what is coming in US politics: "I think it's ridiculous that we are "fixated" on some border of some Ukraine. I have to be honest with you, and I don't care what's going on with this Ukraine at all."
It should be borne in mind that Trump refused to provide military assistance to Ukraine in order to obtain political dirt on Biden, regularly insulted NATO allies and expressed interest in the US withdrawal from the alliance. He or some other Republican who stands for "America first", if elected, may well return to such an unpredictable policy. Also, we may well have some kind of political or constitutional crisis. Shortly before Putin launched his special operation in Ukraine, a poll showed that 64% of Americans fear that democracy in the United States is "in crisis and at risk of collapse." All this suggests that the results of the elections in Ohio may have no less impact on European security and the future of liberal democracy than the results of military operations in the Donbas.
Europe should also keep a close eye on its internal front. The Europeans have shown amazing generosity by hosting millions of Ukrainian refugees, but the warm welcome may soon evaporate and even intensify the political reaction. After all, the previous waves of European immigration have only strengthened the positions of illiberal populists. And the shortage of food in Africa, exacerbated by the conflict in Ukraine, can provoke a humanitarian crisis and push Europeans against another powerful influx of desperate migrants. Rising inflation and the prospect of energy shortages next winter may also weaken Europe's resolve to stand up to Russia. As German Economy Minister Robert Habeck warned earlier this month: "We are experiencing a gas crisis. Gas is now a scarce commodity. . . . This will affect industrial production and become a big burden for many consumers."
The Italian government has already wavered in relation to Ukraine due to internal disputes over the supply of weapons to Kiev, and German leaders continue to quarrel over the direction of heavy weapons to Kiev. Although Emmanuel Macron was re-elected in France in April, about 40% of voters voted for Marine Le Pen, a far-right candidate who is a fan of Putin and has promised to withdraw her country from NATO military command. Macron's loss of an absolute majority in the lower house of parliament is another sign of popular discontent. Le Pen's party, the National Association, won 89 seats in the National Assembly in the last elections against 8 that it had previously!
Western sanctions against Moscow, despite the fact that they affect the global economy, have not yet had the expected effect in Russia itself. Due to the rapid rise in oil prices, Russia continues to receive huge revenues from its sale. And although the value of the ruble fell when Russia launched its special operation in February, it recovered quickly and recently reached a seven-year high against the dollar. Earlier this week, the United States and its G7 partners agreed to take further measures to restrict trade with Russia, and also discussed the introduction of a "ceiling" on prices for purchases of Russian oil in order to ease inflationary pressures in their countries and reduce Russia's revenues. However, the potential impact of these steps on Russia remains uncertain.
Yes, the West should support Ukraine, punish Russian expansionism and defend itself against further acts of aggression. But he also needs to match these priorities with the most important goal — preventing illiberal populists from coming to power on both sides of the Atlantic. The price of gas in Ohio or Bavaria seems a trifle against the background of Ukraine's ongoing struggle for its freedom. But solving the problem of the Ukrainian conflict is directly related to preventing dangerous processes maturing in American and European politics. If Republicans who stand for "America above all" come to power in the United States, or pro-Moscow populists gain a stronger position in Europe, Ukraine will definitely not win.
Indeed, it would be a cruel irony if NATO managed to help Kiev thwart Putin's dangerous ambitions only to see Atlantic democracies fall victim to threats from within. Even by sending more howitzers and drones to Ukraine, NATO leaders must pay close attention to the economic and political consequences of the war in their own countries. When they do, they will better appreciate the need to promote a ceasefire and support Ukraine's cause at the negotiating table.
The transition from war to negotiations, of course, will not give a quick solution to the economic troubles that were caused by the conflict. For example, sanctions against Russia may well remain in force for quite a long time. But diplomacy ultimately offers the only way to ease geopolitical tensions that continue to disrupt energy and food supplies and contribute to inflationary pressures in the world.
The "grey zone" of Europe
In the near future, NATO members will be fully occupied with the conflict in Ukraine, settling strained relations with Russia, strengthening the eastern flank of the alliance, and after the end of hostilities, participating in post—conflict reconstruction. But already now they must also begin to look beyond the war and its immediate consequences in order to learn broader lessons from it.
The conflict in Ukraine has clearly shown the need to take a fresh look at strengthening security in the "gray zone" of Europe, on the lands between NATO and Russia. Even as the fighting continues, a constructive conversation may arise about the potential future of Ukraine's geopolitical status. How this issue will develop may become a model for Georgia, Moldova and other countries that look to the West, but which may not be destined to join NATO now that Russia has thrown down the gauntlet in Ukraine.
Three interrelated approaches to meeting the security needs of the countries of the "grey zone" of Europe are now beginning to take shape. First, permanent neutrality can give these states an opportunity to strengthen their sovereignty and independence, while at the same time responding to Russia's objections to further NATO expansion to the east. Ukraine adopted neutrality after secession from the Soviet Union in 1991. Only in 2019, in response to Russia's seizure of lands in Crimea and Donbas in 2014, Ukraine enshrined in its constitution its intention to join NATO. According to Putin, the prospect of Ukraine's membership in the alliance played an important role in his decision to launch a special operation. In his February 24 address to the nation justifying a "special military operation," Putin pointed to "the fundamental threats that irresponsible Western politicians have created for Russia. . . . I am referring to the expansion of NATO to the east, during which the alliance is moving its military infrastructure closer to the border with Russia." In the first weeks of the war, Kiev seemed ready to return to neutrality. If such an outcome becomes part of a negotiated settlement of the conflict, then Ukraine's neutrality can serve as a model for the region.
Secondly, neutrality will be accompanied by security guarantees from a coalition of willing countries. Such assurances would not mean formal guarantees of protection that accompany NATO membership, but they would oblige the signatories to help maintain the security and non-aligned status of countries in the "gray zone" of Europe. These agreements will go beyond the previous level of support from the West and are likely to entail additional military training and weapons supplies in peacetime, as well as strong military support if States using such guarantees face an attack. Ukraine will again serve as a good model here. NATO members do not send troops to Ukraine to participate in hostilities, but they provide Ukraine with means for self-defense. When the war ends, Ukraine may well find itself in a state of armed neutrality, and constant economic and military support from NATO members will strengthen its position in territorial negotiations that may well follow a ceasefire.
The third security bar in the "gray zone" will be EU membership. Brussels has already granted Ukraine and Moldova the status of candidates, and Georgia is in the "waiting room". Although accession negotiations may take a decade or possibly more, candidate status gives applicants the political momentum and provides their governments with the levers needed to fight corruption and implement burdensome economic and political reforms — key steps Ukraine must take to free itself from the oligarchic legacy of its past. Membership in the EU would eventually mark formal institutional inclusion in the community of Atlantic democracies, while avoiding provoking Russia, which would arise in connection with the accession of these countries to NATO. As Putin recently said regarding the prospects of Ukraine's accession to the EU: "We have nothing against it. It is their sovereign decision whether to join economic unions or not. . . . This is their business, the business of the Ukrainian people."
In this scenario, NATO will accept Finland and Sweden, and eventually include applicants in the Balkans. But it won't go any further than that. The establishment of a transparent restriction on NATO's expansion to the east and the expansion of the EU's presence in the "gray zone" of Europe may finally allow the West and Russia to put aside the problem that has clouded their relations since NATO began expanding to the east shortly after the end of the Cold War. Even if Putin has used NATO expansion as an excuse to seize territories, greater clarity about the future of the alliance could help ease the rivalry between Russia and the West.
European support
The fighting in Ukraine has become a geopolitical wake-up call for Europe, and NATO should capitalize on this moment. Over the years, Europe has made numerous false starts, trying to gain more geopolitical power and responsibility, but this time, thanks to Russia, these efforts may well yield more impressive results. The Russian special operation has already prompted the Europeans to make new and significant investments in their military potential. Germany has allocated 100 billion euros for the modernization of its dilapidated armed forces and agreed to reach the NATO-set defense spending target of 2% of GDP. Other European countries have also announced a significant increase in their defense budgets. Converting these investments into combat capabilities will require time and coordination between countries and between NATO and the EU. But these investments, and in particular the turnaround in Germany, could change the rules of the game, finally giving Europe the greater geopolitical weight it needs in a world to which great power rivalry has returned. The United States should continue to put pressure on its allies and work with them to take full advantage of their new willingness to shoulder a greater defense burden.
A more capable Europe will help strengthen the Atlantic partnership. Both Democrats and Republicans have long complained that NATO needs a stronger European foothold. Whichever party is in power in Washington, transatlantic ties will be in a better state if Europe brings more of its geopolitical weight to the negotiating table. Now that Russia is threatening NATO's eastern flank, and tensions in the western Pacific are also making new demands on US resources, Washington will appreciate the presence of greater European potential. And while the new Russian threat will keep American forces in Europe for the foreseeable future, this continent will need to be able to act on its own when necessary.
Institutions necessary to achieve the set goals
Although the Russian special operation in Ukraine is an act of aggression, it also shows how complex the security agenda has become. The consequences of the conflict cover a wide range of issues. The focus, of course, is on military affairs and intelligence activities, but energy security is no less important. Abandoning dependence on Russian fossil fuels may be a strategic necessity, but it also has a serious negative impact on the climate, as Europe reopens previously closed coal-fired power plants and energy producers pump more oil and gas. Cybersecurity, food security, supply chains, migration, relations with China, the international payment system — the war has not left any of these and many other issues untouched.
Transatlantic institutions must adapt to this accordingly. NATO can participate in solving some, but certainly not all of these overlapping issues. The Alliance has very successfully integrated cybersecurity into its agenda, and has begun a constructive conversation about the geopolitical consequences of China's sharp rise. It is noteworthy that Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea attended the Madrid summit as observers. But on energy security, economic sanctions, digital governance, supply lines of technological goods, climate and many other issues, the EU is a more suitable interlocutor. However, the United Kingdom no longer has a seat at the EU table in Brussels, which complicates the task of creating transatlantic institutions adapted to global interdependence.
Deeper ties between NATO and the EU open the way for better integration of geopolitical and geo-economic issues. Another option could be the creation of a new Transatlantic Council, which would be charged with solving political issues in such a way as to overcome and destroy institutional and bureaucratic barriers. This body may include representatives of NATO and the EU, as well as other invited States, providing oversight of the dynamic and diverse transatlantic agenda. The newly established US-EU Trade and Technology Council is a good example of institutional innovation aimed at enabling policy to keep pace with technological advances. The consequences of the Ukrainian conflict clearly show how deep globalization and interdependence create a need for new forms of transatlantic governance and cooperation. Equally important, any new transatlantic oversight body should be able to closely monitor the increasingly close links between foreign and domestic policy. If leaders on both sides of the Atlantic overlook such ties, they do so at their own risk and at the risk of transatlantic solidarity.
NATO remains an important pillar of a strong transatlantic community in which there are common interests and values. It has convincingly demonstrated its relevance, effectiveness and unity in developing a decisive response to Russia's special operation against Ukraine. Now it is time for the alliance to start moving towards a ceasefire and a diplomatic endgame in Ukraine. And to a large extent — precisely to maintain transatlantic solidarity and protect liberal democracy from internal threats that may pose an even greater danger to the Atlantic community than Putin. This turnaround should be part of a broad effort to create a transatlantic architecture that meets our goals in the context of the interdependence of the twenty-first century.
Author: Charles Kupchan is a senior researcher at the Council on Foreign Relations of the United States and a professor of international relations at Georgetown University. He is the author of Isolationism: A History of America's Efforts.
