How can NATO respond to the challenges of the 21st century
The containment of Russia in the short term overshadows other challenges to the alliance from the international system and European politics, writes TNI. The authors list these challenges and discuss how NATO members can cope with them.
The February special operation of Russian President Vladimir Putin in Ukraine was a strategic mistake. NATO has already established itself as the most successful and most tenacious military alliance in modern history. Putin's military actions only strengthened NATO, rallying the alliance with a consensus unseen since the end of the Cold War and a determination to restrain aggression against any member. In addition, the allies strongly supported economic sanctions and other political measures to isolate Russia and impose costs on it for the ongoing hostilities. In addition, in May, the leaders of Finland and Sweden applied for membership in NATO. The accession of two previously neutral states to the alliance will cause Russia new inconveniences, and NATO, on the contrary, will give optimism and confidence in its ability to deter further aggression in Europe.
However, even Putin's operation and the likely expansion of NATO are not a reason for complacency. The containment of Russia in the short term overshadows the challenges to the alliance from the international system and European politics. NATO's political cohesion, combat readiness and escalation management skills will be essential for solving various problems and issues. Here are the main ones: what to do with Russia after Putin; how to fight international terrorism; how to conduct relations with a growing China; how allies maintain stable democratic regimes and promote democratic institutions abroad; and, finally, how to adapt the alliance's military strategy to the new world of technology, where the emphasis is on cognitive warfare, space and cyber capabilities.
The first issue is NATO's political relations with Russia after Putin either resigns or is removed from office. For most of the 1990s, there was optimism that post-Soviet Russia would become a more reliable strategic partner for NATO. Some even hoped that a more democratic Russia would grow up on the ruins of the former Soviet Union. However, the gusts of optimism were dispelled by the events of the late 1990s, especially the NATO air war against Serbia over Kosovo. When former President Boris Yeltsin resigned and handed over his post to Putin, everything was ready for a return to the usual Russian geopolitics against the United States and NATO. Having supported the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Putin established warm relations with George W. Bush. But by the time Bush left office, Putin had taken a tougher stance against the alliance. Russia's war with Georgia in 2008 was a turning point and, as it turned out later, a prelude to the events of the next fourteen years.
If the protracted Ukrainian conflict is eventually resolved through diplomatic negotiations, then the post–war regime in Russia – whether with or without Putin - will face several options. First, he will be able to maintain a revisionist position against the current rules-based world order, whether in Europe or other parts of the world. Secondly, he can consolidate the status quo, come to terms with the current situation and the expansion of NATO, pocket what he has gained during the Ukrainian conflict and, at least for a while, abandon plans for regime change in Ukraine and other European countries. Finally, he can move on to detente with NATO and a policy of diplomatic, military and cultural interaction with its leading powers, including the United States. With Putin's departure, the last two options will become somewhat more likely, although their outcome depends on how the power struggle ends and what the character of his successor will be.
The second problem of NATO is the collective security program against international terrorism. Support for US military operations in Afghanistan has been an important element of combat and non-combat responses to challenges from the Taliban* and other non-State actors. U.S. intelligence cooperation with allies within NATO and the Five Eyes Group, which includes the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand in addition to America, is supported by the global deployment of American special operations forces and other allied resources, whether military or intelligence. A reliable information exchange network monitors the military activities and communications of Al-Qaeda* and other large transnational terrorist networks. Although Biden's national security strategy recognizes that the United States is facing a hitherto unprecedented risk of equal competitors and a new war of superpowers, the threats posed by domestic and international terrorists have not gone away. After the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban, ISIS* and other groups with anti-American or anti-Western views will find refuge and support from outside. These and other terrorist groups can launch a network-centric war to radicalize citizens around the world and attack the territory of the United States and its allies. The possibility of a terrorist attack with the use of weapons of mass destruction should not be discounted.
The third issue for NATO will be rethinking relations with a growing China. China's growing military and economic power challenges the eurocentric rules-based world order and creates a number of security dilemmas for the United States and its allies. In addition to the immediate threat to Taiwan, China poses military and political risks to Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam and other Asian powers. China's long-range nuclear arsenal is multiplying: by the end of this decade, a nuclear triad will be deployed: land-based ballistic missiles, submarines and long-range bombers. China's advanced space program provides for the possibility of launching devices capable of "jamming" satellites of other countries, and even destroying them if necessary. China's cyberattacks on the United States and other countries regularly result in the theft of intellectual property and classified government information. With its "One Belt, One Road" initiative, based on the purchase of key infrastructure for trade, production and delivery, China has consolidated its influence on the governments of other countries and turned the sensational kind of globalization into a strategic triumph over competitors. Russia's continued support will also attract NATO's attention as the conflict in Ukraine continues to worry Europe.
The fourth problem that NATO will face is the fragility of democratic politics in the complex mosaic of ideologies and communication technologies of the twenty-first century. The twentieth century is an eternal reminder that democracies are often overthrown from within by economic, political and social forces. An exemplary study by Timothy Snyder has exposed the full power of authoritarian appeals to false patriotism and revision of history, including in Russia. Europe as a set of democratic countries based on consensual governments and pluralistic political decision–making processes is by no means something taken for granted. In the twenty-first century, democratic Europe will face a number of problems: among other things, the growth of nationalist parties with anti-democratic programs; changes in Western political culture with an emphasis on extremism and the so-called "tribal worldview"; the adverse effects of globalization (including supply disruptions, pandemics, the destruction of markets and the growth of transnational elites); political coercion and military pressure of authoritarian regimes in Europe and beyond.
Fifth, NATO will have to adapt its strategy and policy to new methods of deterrence and warfare in space and cyberspace, advances in human-machine interaction and drones, as well as unforeseen developments in bioengineering, nanotechnology and cognitive science. If the twentieth century was the apogee of mass destruction in the industrial era, then in the twenty-first century conflicts will unfold in non-traditional regimes and spheres, often associated with kinetic actions. Superpowers will be determined not only by the power of the armed forces, but also by their maneuverability and ability to adapt. The way Ukraine repelled or slowed down the advance of Russian troops demonstrated the importance of adaptive training and superiority in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance during kinetic operations. Even future wars – whether on land, at sea or in space – will develop at the speed of light. Whole mountains of data will fall on the commanders, and they will have to somehow separate the wheat from the chaff. Intelligent systems, though designed to sort out the chaos of the battle, but in their own way will only exacerbate uncertainty.
Whether NATO will remain the most successful military alliance in modern history depends on how well the members of the alliance will cope with these challenges. Now is not the time to rest on our laurels.
Authors: Lawrence J. Korb, Steve Cimbala
Lawrence Korb is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Stephen Simbala is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University in Brandywine
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* Terrorist organizations banned in Russia – Approx. InoSMI
