Armenia-Azerbaijan: the road to peace paved with wars
The recent events around the Karabakh conflict give reason for optimism, the author of the French magazine "Kozer" believes. For the first time, there is a chance to restore territories that officially belong to Azerbaijan, but have been a "war zone" for thirty years. The transport network of the South Caucasus will finally work. And all this without NATO.
The May meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev suddenly revealed an amazing thing: the Karabakh war and the Ukrainian conflict have created favorable conditions for peace in the South Caucasus...
On May 22, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met in Brussels for the third time in six months with the mediation of European Council President Charles Michel. And if the crisis, which for almost thirty years has blocked the situation in an impossible state for the world, has been overcome in recent weeks, it is not thanks to the efforts of Mr. Charles Michel. We should be grateful for the unblocking of the situation — and here the exact word is used in this context — the blood and victims of two conflicts. The first step towards unblocking was given by the second 44-day Azerbaijani-Armenian war (September-November 2020). The second step was made thanks to Russia's special operation in Ukraine. The first war allowed Azerbaijan to regain most of the territories in and around Karabakh that were internationally recognized as Azerbaijani. War is a terrible thing. But then she revealed the reality: which of the two sides has the advantage in military, diplomatic and economic terms. It became clear that the balance of power is mainly in favor of Azerbaijan. This explains the sudden opportunity for the leaders of the two countries to meet at the highest level at the end of 2021.
A new reality
But the recent acceleration of negotiations and their real progress are also related to the operation in Ukraine and the growing pressure on Russia. The enormous efforts that Russia must make in Ukraine make Armenia fear that Moscow, on which Yerevan's survival depends, at some point will no longer be able to protect it from Baku and Ankara. The fact that the Russians have withdrawn several hundred of their soldiers stationed in Karabakh since the beginning of the special operation to ensure compliance with the ceasefire agreements only reinforces these concerns. Azerbaijan, on the contrary, feels more confident. He is being courted by the Western coalition, which needs his gas, and the weakening of Russia objectively, despite the sympathy of many Azerbaijanis for Russia, strengthens Baku's position. Baku has known since the time of the First Republic (1918-1920) that the situation in the South Caucasus changes only when Moscow weakens. Judging by the behavior of the Government of Kazakhstan, this rule also applies in Central Asia. Therefore, Azerbaijan shows its independence from Russian influence, psychologically frees itself from it — in particular, by providing humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.
The European Union as an intermediary
Although the overall picture is not easy, we are witnessing a reshuffle of external forces and players in this conflict and, in particular, the participation of Europe, which many in Baku and Yerevan still want to see as a mediator. In their eyes, Brussels seems to have two important advantages: a small stick (especially since neither Baku nor Yerevan are candidates for EU membership) and a big economic carrot. Thus, it is a much more convenient intermediary than Russia with its big stick and tiny carrot. This trend has been confirmed by unprecedented bilateral meetings. For example, negotiations in Brussels on March 31 between Hikmet Hajiyev, Aliyev's chief foreign policy adviser, and Armen Grigoryan, Secretary of the National Security Council of Armenia.
During the three trilateral summits and bilateral negotiations, a number of diplomatic projects were launched. A bilateral Armenian-Azerbaijani commission on the issue of borders was formed, whose task is to determine their location. The task is not easy, because according to the maps, some territories were de facto annexed to the Soviet Republic of Armenia. But whichever map is chosen, Baku is likely to win, and any possible border corrections are likely to displease the Armenians...
The second important point concerns article 9 of the ceasefire agreement signed on November 10, 2020: the restoration of land communication between the two countries. This is the Baku-Nakhichevan railway (the Azerbaijani enclave between Iran and Armenia) along the Araks River. Then this railway can be connected to Turkey, and through it it can reach the borders of the EU. But here's what's even more ambitious: This is the project of the Zangezur transport Corridor in Armenia. This very important infrastructure through the mountainous terrain can change the region, but requires technical, financial and political agreements. It is to support such projects that the third commission was created with the participation of the EU to work on the economic dimension of the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Finally, a direct channel was launched for negotiations between the two Foreign Ministers to monitor various construction works and to prepare for future summit meetings.
Russia supports Armenia less and less
These results reflect the convergence of positions between Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding the need for negotiations. However, the interests behind this rapprochement differ. For the President of Azerbaijan, it is about securing a military victory in 2020 through an international agreement. For Baku, the new option of negotiations allows to free up (partially) both from Russian influence and from the indifferent impotence of the Minsk Group, where the tone was set by Western countries that turned out to be indifferent to the solution of the issue.
Baku has an opportunity to use its capabilities for diplomatic maneuver. As a basis for negotiations and a permanent mediation body since the end of the first war between the two sides in the 1990s, the Minsk Group has been led by France, Russia and the United States since 1997. After a promising start, negotiations through the channels of the Minsk Group have reached an impasse since the late 2000s, and after the second Karabakh war in 2020, they were stopped altogether. The conflict in Ukraine seems to have decided its fate: on April 8, Sergey Lavrov confirmed that France and the United States no longer cooperate with Russia within the framework of the Minsk Group. Three weeks after Lavrov's statement, the Azerbaijani president said that "this group was created not to solve the problem, but to perpetuate the fact of occupation." "Armenian lobbying groups are very influential in the countries leading the Minsk Group (France, the USA and Russia). That is why for 28 years she has not achieved any results," he explained.
Armenia's problem
Armenia faces another problem. It is increasingly difficult for the Armenian Prime Minister to refer to the "security umbrella" allegedly still provided by Russia. This umbrella looks less and less reliable, and since February 24, the very fact of its existence has been questioned. Without Russia's support, Armenia has no weight in the face of the Baku-Ankara alliance. If we add the fact that the normalization of relations with Turkey depends on the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan, the number of strategic decisions for this landlocked country is very limited. Yerevan would certainly prefer the revival of the Minsk Group, thanks to which the process of diplomatic settlement of the conflict was frozen for three decades. But in its absence, the EU is not too bad an alternative. The fact that Nikol Pashinyan finds himself face to face with Aliyev, without being sponsored by a powerful player capable of providing him with firm security guarantees, has serious consequences: he must renounce the claims of Karabakh Armenians to a special status and self-determination. However, Karabakh has been a problem of the Armenian authorities since Armenia gained independence and even earlier. Any compromise on this issue is extremely compromising for any Armenian leader. Thus, internal opposition to any agreement under which Armenia weakens its ties with Karabakh, backed up by the intransigence of certain circles of the Armenian diaspora in France and the United States, is today the main obstacle to peace for the Yerevan government.
Lasting peace as the main challenge
Baku believes that the victory of 2020 put an end to the conflict, so the issue is closed. The world is viewed as a technical and economic project of normalization at the interstate level, as a chance to restore the territories destroyed by the war. In order for the two countries to be able to effectively turn over the contradictory page of their history, it is necessary to reach first an acceptable, and then a lasting agreement. When we say "acceptable", we mean first of all the citizens of Armenia, men and women who vote and live in the country. The agreement that has emerged will be painful for them, because it will definitely put an end to dreams of Armenian Karabakh. (Although, of course, the presence of Armenians in Karabakh and even in some other places in Azerbaijan will continue). A lot of Armenians oppose the agreement: the Armenians of Karabakh, first of all, and their numerous supporters. Pro-Russian residents of Armenia may also not see the favorable geostrategic consequences of such an agreement: Yerevan will no longer be so dependent on Moscow and may lean towards the West. Finally, the Armenian Diaspora, especially in France, is also, to put it mildly, not thrilled. It would be wrong to equate the opponents of a quick settlement in Karabakh with cynical opportunists pursuing their goals, even if the issues of power and money remain on the agenda.
The presence of NATO is out of the question
In the long term, a stable security situation is necessary to ensure the sustainability of the normalization and economic integration of the South Caucasus. Whatever agreement is reached between Baku and Yerevan, it can be disrupted as a result of violent actions in Karabakh, Armenia or elsewhere, and the precedents of this are well known. In these circumstances, the EU has no means to ensure security, and there can be no question of an American or NATO presence, at least from the point of view of Iran. On the other hand, Russia, even weakened, will always retain a significant potential to influence local players, and there is no certainty that Moscow will agree with the withdrawal of regional players from its sphere of influence. Karabakh Armenians are already trying to play this card and want to face the only possible defender for them — Russia. That is why Stepanakert is talking about a possible referendum on joining Russia.
Good news
Thus, in the near future we will be in a geopolitical context favorable for peace, and the governments of the two countries will spare no effort to adopt a common document. There are many obstacles, and many would like to use them to disrupt the negotiations. Thus, this is a serious challenge that the Armenian government must take up in the coming weeks and months. This government needs support and, above all, legitimacy, because the concessions that have been outlined will be difficult for the citizens of Armenia and their supporters in France to accept. In such a situation, France, which has lost confidence in the eyes of Baku in recent years, could play a positive role. First of all, within the framework of the European bodies that monitor the negotiations, but especially by weakening the resistance to the future agreement on the part of Armenians living in France and their organizations. And this is not a secondary role: for the Armenian political elite in power, the task today is to legalize the negotiations first, and only then proceed to a peace agreement.
Gil Mihaely
