June 3 marked 100 days since the beginning of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, which turned into Russia's biggest war since 1945. The course of hostilities in Ukraine, primarily with regard to the actions and capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces, is being actively studied abroad, and with a variety of assessments and conclusions. An interesting look at the problems is given by the article published by the American online publication "War on the Rocks" [...] David Johnson "Would We Do Better? Hubris and Validation in Ukraine" ("Can we do better? Arrogance and verification by combat in Ukraine").
Crossing of M1A2 SEP v.2 Abrams tanks of the 1st Armored Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division of the US Army across the Elbe near Storkau (Germany) during the American-German-Dutch exercises Heidesturm Shock, 06.06.2015 (c) US Army
Hapless Russians are floundering in Ukraine. Their poorly trained, unprofessional soldiers are not capable of conducting a modern combined-arms war. Russian Russian soldiers, even if they were trained and trained, the incompetent Russian officer corps, full of corrupt sycophants, is not able to use them effectively.
The latest evidence of Russia's incompetence is the destruction of units that tried to force the Seversky Donets River in the Donbass in eastern Ukraine [meaning the defeat of Russian units when trying to force the Seversky Donets at Belogorovka in the Luhansk region on May 8-9, 2022. - bmpd]. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (an unbiased source in these matters) reported that the units of the Russian brigade detected by aerial reconnaissance suffered heavy losses: "As a result of artillery strikes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 70 units of Russian armored vehicles were burned... Out of 550 servicemen of the Russian brigade, 485 were killed."
Or so we are told. But is this really the case?
Western commentators are generally satisfied with this narrative and have pounced on the river crossing fiasco as further evidence that the Russian armed forces are continuing to fight the determined resistance of well-trained and motivated Ukrainian forces. In an article in The Wall Street Journal, military experts analyzed Russia's shortcomings, explaining their failures mainly by inadequate training and poor leadership. They say this failure is one of many that "point to problems more in the chain of command than at the battlefield level, and probably indicate that the top leadership is striving for achievements that the troops are not ready for." Thus, "Russia offers the world lessons on how not to do, say Western combat veterans."
And what if analysts see the lessons of Ukraine incorrectly, through lenses refracted by their own prejudices and arrogance? What if the key variable is not the professionalism of the Russian military, but the nature of this war?
As we will see, American and Russian doctrines are similar in river crossing operations and many other types of tactical and operational maneuvers. If Russia's failure is due to the failures of personnel, then the war does not challenge existing military concepts and capabilities of the United States, if they are used by professionals. If the problem is not in the personnel, then the US approaches may be invalidated. Hence the question: will the US forces act better in such a war as in Ukraine?
Learning to "steer"
This finger-waving by the clumsy Russian military is new. Many, if not most, military analysts believed that the war in Ukraine would end quickly with the fait accompli of Russia's victory. The Red Army is in the city - resistance is useless!
Many of these estimates were based on the prediction of military operations involving the Baltic countries - the vulnerable eastern flank of NATO. It showed that the Russians would be in Tallinn (Estonia) and Riga (Latvia) within 60 hours. It was believed that it was here that the Russians posed the most serious security threat, and during the games, the Western military sought to understand what increase in the number of NATO forces would ensure their deterrence.
Given the geographical location and the modest presence of troops in the Baltic countries, these conclusions were plausible. The distance from the border with Russia to Riga is only about 130 miles, and the three Baltic states are, in fact, a fairly narrow strip directly on the borders of Russia and Belarus. The Russians also have a militarized enclave in Kaliningrad, posing a threat on both sides of the Suwalki Passage, which controls overland access from Poland to the Baltic States. In addition, NATO forces in these countries, at the level used in war games, will be significantly inferior in numbers and armament to any Russian invasion forces.
The invasion of Ukraine is clearly not going as expected by the Western analytical community, and especially the Russians. However, we should not forget that Ukraine is not the Baltic States. Ukraine has strategic depth and significant armed forces that have been reorganized and trained under NATO supervision since the Russian invasion in 2014. It also receives massive and almost unhindered material support from the West.
Nevertheless, Western military analysts have now moved from being overwhelmed by Russian military power to underestimating it due to actions in Ukraine. Perhaps it's time to take a deep breath and just "exhale".
Why is Russia at an impasse?
Most of the analysis is now focused on identifying the causes of Russia's unexpected failures, trying to find explanations for why the Russians cannot effectively use their sophisticated tools. The answer, apparently, lies in a fundamental difference: Russians are not like us.
A recent assessment conducted by the Institute of Modern Warfare at West Point symbolizes the currently widespread consensus that logistical failures and the inability to conduct effective combined-arms operations are the Achilles heel of the Russian armed forces. This is partly due to the lack of training and combat experience. Moreover, this is due to the fact that their soldiers are poorly led and do not have a non-commissioned officer corps and sufficient authority for junior commanders, which are characteristic of the armed forces of the United States and other Western countries. Thus, Ukraine's advantage lies in the fact that it is "trying to model its armed forces according to NATO and US standards, including creating its own sergeant corps through participation in programs such as the NATO Defense Education Enhancement Program."
Consequently, according to one analysis, "the Russian army, which many consider the second strongest in the world, has serious limitations. It turned out to be a facade of shiny new tanks and planes, hiding all the quality and command problems noted above until they had to fight."
In short, Russia has a "Potemkin army".
What should I do if the diagnosis is wrong?
It's hard to argue with the symptoms of Russian performance art, but what to do if an incorrect diagnosis is made? What if Western military suffer from a similar disease, but do not notice it because of superficial assessments of the Russians?
In this regard, the episode with the crossing of the river [Seversky Donets] is especially indicative. All the commentators in The Wall Street Journal article emphasized the complexity of such operations. The comments of retired US Army Brigadier General Peter DeLuca are revealing: "All combat operations should be a carefully choreographed ballet of kinetic violence, people, vehicles and aircraft... and crossing the river is one of the most difficult maneuvers." Consequently, he continues, "all this has to be coordinated to be effective, and we have not seen the Russians doing this in Ukraine at all." British commando engineer Tony Spammer also expressed his opinion based on his experience in Afghanistan. "We would never have immediately left and would not have made an attempt." Instead, he explained that "his units will conduct up to seven slow rehearsals at their base, and then train for speed, each time reducing dangerous operations by a few minutes before deploying into combat."
The military professionals mentioned in the article talk in detail about how they could conduct this operation in a different way: thorough reconnaissance, first ensuring security on the opposite bank of the river, deception using several false crossing points, the use of smoke screens to conceal the operation, and other generally obvious doctrinal principles of crossing the river. Russian Russian troops seem to have ignored their own military doctrine and combat regulations, making a hasty attempt at a maneuver that requires careful planning, extensive resources and strict control," the article notes, ironically, that this is also a Russian doctrine: "Russian troops seem to have ignored their own military doctrine and combat regulations, making a hasty attempt at a maneuver that requires careful planning, extensive resources and strict control." The probable cause of the Russian disaster on the Seversky Donets: "the top leadership demands successes for which the troops are not ready."
However, the Russians carried out several successful crossings of the Seversky Donets River in order to transfer forces for offensive operations further than Izyum. These crossings allowed the Russians to position forces for offensive operations in the area south of the river.
These forces, like other successful Russian operations, are almost not covered in the media. Ukrainian failures also do not occupy a prominent place in the reports from the war. Most likely, this is the result of a sophisticated Ukrainian information campaign, backed up by positive stories of journalists whose access is carefully controlled by the Ukrainian government. This control over information is backed up by the excellent operational security of their armed forces. Indeed, it was the Ukrainian government that distributed the video of the unsuccessful crossing of the Seversky Donets River.
The unsuccessful crossing of the river is presented as another evidence that Russia's unsatisfactory actions in Ukraine today are the result of a failure of leadership, aggravated by insufficiently trained inexperienced soldiers with steadily declining morale.
This is to be expected from Ukrainians, who, after all, are involved in a possibly existential conflict for them, in which the narratives of the international media play a key role in ensuring their support. However, those who are passionate about stories about Russia's failures should think carefully about why this is happening, perhaps because they need to confirm their personal competence and the competence of their country's armed forces.
A comforting diagnosis of the wrong disease
What's comforting about blaming Russia's failures on its practices rather than its doctrine is that it frees the Western military from having to scrutinize its own doctrine. This is important because, as noted in various articles, the doctrine of crossing rivers is the same for all armed forces.
The doctrine of forcing rivers is largely based on the hard-learned lessons of the Second World War in Europe, when all armies faced the problem of forcing rivers and other obstacles to maneuver. Indeed, crossing the river to meet the enemy has always been one of the most difficult operations to perform. Perhaps the most infamous example is the attempt to cross the Rapido River in January 1944 during the Italian campaign. This operation failed due to the determined German resistance and led to heavy losses of Americans. There were also successful examples, first of all, the night crossing of the Rhine by boat on March 22, 1945 in Nierstein by the 5th Infantry Division from the 3rd Army of General George Patton - "the first crossing of the Rhine River by boat by the invading army since the time of Napoleon Bonaparte." A more famous example was the earlier capture of the Ludendorff Bridge over the Rhine at Remagen on March 7, 1945.
World War II was the last time the U.S. Army or the Russian army actually crossed a river against a competent, well-armed enemy. Operations in Afghanistan, as a rule, were of a private nature, and river crossings, although difficult, did not meet much resistance there. They were also not a critical component of the success of the operation, whereas in World War II they were such, and in Ukraine they are such now. Hence the Russian desire for quick action.
What is the disease?
The story of the river crossing highlights a real disease that has struck both Russians and their Western observers: chronic inexperience in offensive battles against a competent opponent, capable, according to today's description, of challenging all spheres in a protracted war that leads to a large number of victims. Neither Russia nor the West has had operational or combat experience similar to the war in Ukraine for more than a generation, if not since the Second World War.
By combat experience, I mean the practice of deploying, maneuvering and providing large multi-layered formations in joint actions against a competent, well-armed enemy, determined to fight and capable of it. Both armies have veteran leaders with many years of combat experience. Russia has been giving combat experience to its military since the 1990s in Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea, Ukraine and Syria, as well as in other countries with its Wagner Group military contractors. The United States and many of its NATO allies participated in combat operations in Afghanistan, and the American and British armed forces gained extensive experience in Iraq. However, Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm (1990-1991) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) were the last large-scale US combat campaigns, both of which were conducted against opponents over whom there was a significant superiority, and took place in an environment in which the United States had air supremacy and full control of the sea.
The Ukrainian challenge is different from what the Russians have previously faced. Ukrainians are defending themselves, and they have extensive experience of such operations in the Donbas since the invasion in 2014. Whether they will be able to go on the offensive of any scale in the future is still unknown.
The Russian-Ukrainian war as of May 24 is only three months old, which is not enough by the standards of any major war. It may be recalled that from July 7 to September 26, 1941, the German attack on the Soviet Union as part of Operation Barbarossa reached the capture of Kiev. The current war seems to be turning into a protracted war of attrition. Thus, the Russian strategy of limited maneuver and strong reliance on firing positions may still be reasonable. They seem to be learning, as Russia analyst Michael Kofman noted in a recent podcast, "War on the Rocks." Such a delay in major combat operations is also beyond the experience of Western officers currently in service.
At the beginning of the war, the active personnel and the main weapons systems allocated by Russia for the invasion significantly outnumbered the Ukrainian ones - almost twice. It is difficult to obtain accurate data on the losses of personnel and equipment, especially in Ukraine, where this data is considered a state secret for obvious reasons. Nevertheless, if the figures reported by each of the opposing sides are taken as an approximation, then these current estimates show that both sides are suffering from significant exhaustion, especially in terms of personnel.
If this is true, then Ukraine may have serious problems if the war continues much longer. Karl von Clausewitz's observation is as true now as it was in the 19th century: "Of course, it is in the nature of things that when comparing the relative strength of two armies, the smaller force will be exhausted sooner than the larger one; it will not be able to move for so long, and therefore the radius of its theater of operations will inevitably be limited." It remains to be seen whether Russia, with its unused but largely unprepared manpower, will be able to maintain combat-ready forces in the field for longer than Ukraine, which is also mobilizing its reserves and volunteers.
Western armed forces are also subject to what Jeffrey Record calls a "loss phobia." He connects this phenomenon with the Vietnam War, but notes that its modern consequences were manifested in the Allied Force operation in Kosovo. His thesis is that American politicians and high-ranking officers believe that "when using force in situations of limited intervention, we should be ready to sacrifice even operational efficiency in order to prevent losses" and that in the war against Serbia, "the protection of our forces was given priority over the fulfillment of tasks." To support this conclusion, the Record quotes the then chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton, who supports this conclusion: "The main lesson learned from Operation Allied Force is that the safety of our people must remain our top priority."
Consequently, the Western armed forces have largely focused on "protecting their forces" ("force protection"). This was made possible because of the limited nature of most operations - the type of campaigns that most military personnel have almost exclusively encountered during their careers. In addition, behind most operational decisions there is always a fear that perceived public rejection of victims may upset politics. This does not mean that the "irregular" wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were not brutal and deadly. They were certainly real at the level of soldiers, squads, platoons and companies. However, operations there rarely involved the use of a battalion or larger formations in combined arms operations.
For more than 20 years of the war in Afghanistan, not a single platoon position was lost in combat. The casualty rate was extremely low even by the standards of the Vietnam War, and medical care was prompt and comprehensive. Finally, the combat was deadly only on the ground; the planes mostly operated with impunity beyond the reach of the enemy's limited air defenses. Aviation losses were in low-altitude operations and almost exclusively in helicopters.
The war in Ukraine has clearly demonstrated the high human casualties of large-scale and high-intensity hostilities. Russian losses on the Seversky Donets River and in other battles show that these are wars in which companies, battalions and even larger formations can be destroyed in the blink of an eye, which leads to a large number of soldiers killed in battle and wounded, as well as significant material losses.
Consequently, in Ukraine we are witnessing the return of the imperative of preserving forces, not protecting them. Currently, this is beyond the consciousness of the Western military and the current possibilities of providing assistance to the wounded.
Changing the mindset from "protecting forces" to "preserving forces" borders on heresy in the current Western military culture. In Ukraine, Russia learns the need to preserve its strength the hard way - in the inexorable crucible of battle. The reasonable question is whether Western governments, and especially their citizens, are prepared for a conflict that could lead to thousands of deaths and many more victims in just a few weeks. How will the meat grinder affect the mood of the people who are part of the trinity in Karl von Clausewitz's work "On the War" [the three elements of Clausewitz's war - the government, the people and the army], even in countries where there are volunteer armed forces? Will such a level of sacrifice be able to challenge politics, if not destroy it?
The fact that the Russians are restoring units from fresh troops and remnants of units destroyed in battle is the reality of protracted, high-intensity battles. Our own history of the Second World War shows the potential cost of a war with an equal opponent. The 1st Infantry Division of the US Army lost 20,659 people in 443 days of fighting in North Africa, Sicily and Europe. This figure exceeds the full-time strength of the US infantry division during the Second World War at 15,000 people.
It is important to note that such levels of losses in the war in Ukraine also call into question the ability of Western armies to maintain adequate combat power in any situation, except for short wars with modest losses. It can be seen that the Russians rely on hastily mobilized reserves to compensate for losses. Ironically, as has been demonstrated since the Napoleonic Wars, levée en masse [mass mobilization] is a requirement for a protracted state war at this level. Both Russians and Ukrainians have conscription systems for their citizens; this practice has been abandoned along with the infrastructure supporting it in most Western countries. Perhaps this is actually [on the Russian side] a case of prudent preparation, and not an act of desperation?
This war is the same, but different
Although many aspects of the Ukrainian War echo past major wars, such as World War II and, to a lesser extent, the Korean War, there are several new aspects. One of them probably explains the fiasco at the crossing of the Seversky Donets: widespread surveillance of the battlefield. Ukrainians reported that they had discovered the Russian crossing with the help of aerial reconnaissance. Potential sources of such information are now much more diverse and numerous than even in the most recent conflicts. They include a wide range of unmanned aerial vehicles, commercially available commercial satellite images, intelligence data from Western sources and other means.
This new reality essentially means that relatively large compounds have nowhere to hide. Surprise, especially with a limited number of potential river crossing sites, may not be possible. Thus, all types of stealth and disguise actions can also be meaningless. Finally, given the complexity of many sensors, smoke screens may be less useful than in the past.
This new reality makes those who criticize Russians not only wrong, but also dangerous. They cling to a doctrine that may be completely outdated in the current operational environment. That they insist that Russian incompetence is mainly due to untrained and poorly motivated soldiers led by corrupt and incompetent leaders gives them a convenient answer that does not devalue their experience or their current methods.
Why is it dangerous?
It is clear that military experts look at the war through the prism of their own experience: their wars. Since the war in Ukraine goes beyond their direct experience, many American observers rely on analogies with what they know, for example, with Operation Desert Storm or the initial stage of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Their views are rightly addressed, given the paucity of knowledge about military operations among most civilian politicians and the general population. Thus, their opinion prevails that Russian failures are related to execution, and not to doctrine.
These experts also draw comforting conclusions: good guys like us, with our help, defeat the bad guys. This is a righteous war. We would have done a great job. These are also dangerous conclusions from two points of view.
First, they confirm the current approaches of the United States, without going beyond the primary explanations of Russia's inadequacy in order to learn from them. In terms of how the US military understands what is happening - doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, people, facilities and politics - the Russian armed forces in most of these areas are similar to the US armed forces, with two glaring exceptions - their obvious shortcomings: in leadership and personnel. This shows the validity of our doctrine, organization, training and technology - both available and being developed for rivalry and potential conflict with China and Russia. There is no need to look behind these doors if the real problem is people and leaders.
Right?
Perhaps the Russians do not have professional military personnel consisting exclusively of volunteers, a strong non-commissioned officer corps or command-oriented leaders who take the initiative. Is this last point really true in the US armed forces - given the evidence of risk aversion in Afghanistan and Iraq - but inside the system itself they firmly believe that this is the case. However, there are also doubters. According to the then chief of Staff of the US Army, General Mark Milley: "I think we are overly centralized, overly bureaucratic and overly risk averse, and this is the opposite of what we will need in any type of war."
The US Army in the 1970s and 1980s turned to the Wehrmacht during World War II for lessons on how to fight the numerically superior Soviet Union and win. After all, the Germans really fought with the Red Army. Former Nazi officers such as General Hermann Balck and General Friedrich von Mellenthin explained their system and its importance at conferences and meetings with American officers and officials. Americanized versions of the German practice of professional military education, officer professionalism and encouraging the initiative of subordinates through Auftragstactik were adopted, which became "mission command" [there is no Russian equivalent of the term, in relation to the German prototype, the translation "tactics of assignments" - bmpd is sometimes used] in the US Army as best practice. But we must remember well that the same type of Red Army destroyed the vaunted Nazi Wehrmacht during World War II in a long, exhausting war of attrition, allegedly suffering from the same diseases of centralized leadership and hastily trained soldiers as today.
In addition, the Germans spread a revisionist story, not unlike the narrative of the "Lost Cause" about the defeat of the Confederacy in the American Civil War. Robert Cittino wrote that they "described the Soviet Army as a faceless and brainless horde, where officers terrorize their people, forcing them to obey, and dictator Joseph Stalin terrorizes officers. There was no grace in her. Her idea of the art of war was to crush everything in its path with numbers, brute force and huge size."
Thus, as in the Union Army in the American Civil War, "quantity triumphed over quality." In other words, the best army lost, and "elite forces disappeared under the superiority of the crowd."
These ideas shaped the US views on the Russian armed forces during the Cold War and, despite the fact that they were refuted in the 1990s, they are reflected in assessments today. As retired army colonel and diplomat Joel Rayburn said in an interview with The New Yorker, "A bad army was ordered to do something stupid." Although officers are now promoted on the basis of patronage, this is not so different from the requirement of political trustworthiness in the Russian armed forces during World War II. What had to be taken into account then and now is why the German troops were defeated by such a weak enemy? Perhaps a sufficient number of people, equipment and an indomitable will to fight, despite hardships and failures, is exactly what is really needed to survive and win the war of equals. Ironically, these qualities were demonstrated by the American military itself in World War II, when they contributed to the victory over the Axis powers. These are also the Russian traits that Tolstoy wrote about, and which surpassed one of the most famous armies in history: the Great Army of Napoleon. They can explain the constant support of the Russian people for the war, contrary to Western propaganda, which Putin presented as a war of the West against Mother Russia and calling Ukrainians "Nazis" in order to further provoke parallels with the Great Patriotic War.
This leads to the second danger: arrogance. The unspoken conclusion from Western analysis is that we would have achieved more success than the Russians because we are better than them.
Us?
The words of General James McConville, when he assumed the post of Chief of Staff of the US Army in August 2019, are not just public phrases, they are deeply believed in by the US Army and other branches of the US armed forces as self-characterization: "Our army is regular, the National Guard and Reserve are the most trained, equipped and guided ground forces that have ever entered the battlefield." McConville also gave the main reason why this is so: "People are always my number one priority: the people of our army are our greatest strength and our most important weapons system." Given these deeply ingrained beliefs, it is not surprising that it is believed that the military, which does not share the approaches of the United States, will fail on the battlefield.
These views are dangerous in Western assessments of the Ukrainian military. Currently, the prevailing opinion is that the Ukrainian advantage lies in the fact that they have turned into modern Western armed forces, trained in Western methods for more than a decade. They are professionals. Therefore, they will prevail. Just like us. Again, there is nothing to learn here.
However, the actual evidence is unclear; assessments of Ukraine's military might may be wishful thinking and arrogance. The title of an article in The Wall Street Journal embodies this point of view, saying that it all came down to "years of training in NATO."
It should be recalled that Western initiatives to reform the Ukrainian armed forces did not even begin until the Russian invasion in 2014. Although they advanced, many of the senior officers were brought up in the Soviet system. When I visited the National Defense University in Kiev in 1996 for an exchange as the Director of Academic Affairs of our National Defense University, all the top leaders were former Soviet officers. Some of them were also Russian citizens who chose to stay in Ukraine because they had nowhere to return home in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Consequently, deeply rooted Soviet-style bureaucracy and training model permeated the Ukrainian armed forces. Thus, their rehabilitation, in fact, is a complex restructuring of institutions and a change in culture, which will take time. In particular, initiatives to create a competent officer and non-commissioned officer corps based on merit are long-term efforts that are only taking root at the grassroots and middle levels of the Ukrainian army. Consequently, many of the tactics at the level above the rifle squad look more Russian than American, as do most of the equipment.
A sign that little has gone beyond the exercises with NATO is the small evidence that Ukrainians are conducting joint and combined-arms offensive operations. This opportunity will be important in the transition from defense to attempts of offensive operations to return the territories seized by Russia. In addition, it seems that Ukraine is also losing ground in the Donbas to Russia's slow, persistent offensive.
Therefore, the analysis of the war in Ukraine should answer another unanswered question: what if the idea that quality people and leaders are the most important component of modern warfare is wrong? What if Stalin was right that quantity itself has quality? If that's the case, Ukrainians may need a lot more help if they want to survive in a grueling Russian-style war of attrition.
In addition, as the United States plans how it will compete and potentially fight with China and Russia in the future, the approach should be characterized by humility and a strong desire to challenge existing assumptions, concepts and capabilities, rather than confirm existing approaches.
What happened to Russia can happen to us, and we need to fully understand what happened.
David E. Johnson - Doctor of Philosophy, retired Colonel of the US Army. He is a senior research fellow at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct scientist at the Institute of Modern Warfare at West Point. From 2012 to 2014, he was the founder and head of the Strategic Studies Group under the Chief of Staff of the US Army, General Raymond T. Oderno.
