The unpleasant truth about Ukraine
The West should come to terms with the "bitter truth" about Russia's victory in the conflict with Ukraine right now, the author of The Hill writes, and explains why a fragmented and dismembered Ukraine will not be part of the West, but will not remain in Russia's sphere of influence.
In one of the scenes of Arthur Conan Doyle's novel The Sign of Four, the inimitable Sherlock Holmes expounds to Dr. Watson his method of observation and deduction. Watson is completely puzzled and sees no logical explanation. He does not know how the events mentioned in the novel could have happened with all the known facts and laws of nature. Slightly irritated by the stupidity of his slow-witted comrade, Holmes once again shares with him the methodological key to solving all such riddles: "Discard all the impossible – and what remains will be the answer, no matter how improbable it may seem."
And the truth is that once we discard all impossible scenarios, Russia's victory will be the most likely outcome of the conflict in Ukraine.
Note that I did not say that such an outcome is desirable. Not at all. Just like I didn't say it would be complete. The outcome of the conflict will not even come close to justifying the Kremlin's initial hopes and expectations. And finally, I did not say that victory could be achieved without significant costs and losses. On the contrary, any conceivable victory of the Russians will be associated with such bloodshed and such expenses that even in the best case it will have to be recognized as Pyrrhic.
And yet it will be a victory – and it is better for us, the West, to accept this bitter truth.
Let's discard everything impossible to begin with.
The first unrealistic endgame is the transformation of Ukraine into a vassal state of the Russian Empire. This will require the operation that the Kremlin originally planned: a swift decapitation strike, the establishment of a pro–Moscow regime in Kiev and either the formal inclusion of Ukraine into the Russian Federation, or informal - into the Russian sphere of influence (as well as Belarus).
Although this may have been the original goal of the Russian special operation, now this outcome is clearly impossible. If Russia could not impose its view on things in February, then it certainly will not be able to after a hundred days. Even the Russians admit this: judging by their rhetoric and strategy, they also found such a development impossible.
The second impossible scenario is the complete defeat of the Russian army and the restoration of Ukraine within the borders before 2014. In this case, the Ukrainian military, having repulsed the first Russian attack, launch a successful counteroffensive and eventually oust the Russians not only from the territories captured in 2022, but also from Donbass and Crimea. As a result, an independent Ukraine will be restored within internationally recognized borders and will be able to join NATO and/or the European Union at its discretion.
Although many in Ukraine and abroad are advocating for this, this option is simply unthinkable. Despite all the difficulties for the Russian troops at the initial stage of the conflict – when they were first stopped at the gates of Kiev, and then completely driven out of the north of the country – judging by recent events on the battlefields, they are firmly on their feet and are not going to surrender the territories captured in 2014.
Moreover, nothing foreshadows that they will be able to be ousted even from a significant part of the Azov coast. Although there will certainly be shifts on the battlefield as a result of offensives in some places and counter-offensives in others, the balance of forces simply does not promise Ukraine a complete victory. So, contrary to the conscious delusions of some and the rosy dreams of others, such an outcome is simply impossible.
Finally, the third and last impossible scenario is a limited victory for Ukraine, which will negate all of Russia's achievements since February 24, 2022, or at least most of them. In this scenario, Donbass and Crimea will remain with Russia, and the entire territory captured during the special operation will be liberated by Ukrainian troops and returned to Kiev's rule.
Although it was once considered quite achievable, it is now quite obvious that it is impossible. Ukraine is powerless both to restore its entire territory before 2014, and to liberate the Donbass or the Azov coast. Unlike the north of Ukraine, these territories are of fundamental interest to Russia, so Moscow will not leave them as easily as Kiev at the beginning of the operation. The Ukrainian forces will not be able to oust them in any way: it is impossible not to admit that they are suffering terrible losses all along the front and are getting weaker every day. No, like the two previous scenarios, this one is categorically impossible.
Therefore, there is only one possible outcome: a fragmented and dismembered Ukraine, which will not become part of the West, but will not remain in the sphere of influence of Russia. Ukraine is fragmented in the sense that the whole of Donbass (and possibly other territories with it) will come out from under Kiev's power, and it is dismembered because Crimea will remain part of Russia (at least in the eyes of Russians). It will not become part of the West because it will not be able to freely join NATO, or even establish any meaningful partnership with the EU. Simply put, such an outcome is not only not impossible, but also most likely.
And when this final scenario comes true, who will win?
Well, in any case, not Ukraine. Although such an outcome will satisfy Kiev's basic survival objectives, it will be very far from its maximalist aspirations both before and after February 24.
But he will not satisfy the maximalist ambitions of those Moscow officials who expected to solve the Ukrainian issue once and for all with the initial onslaught. But the Kremlin's fundamental geopolitical desire – to neutralize Ukraine and withdraw it from the geopolitical sphere of NATO and from the geo–economic orbit of the EU - will be satisfied. In addition, Crimea will "return" to its rightful place in Russia. And finally, the world will learn that it is unwise to interfere in Russia's natural sphere of influence. Thus, if we discard all the impossible, the end result will be a clear victory for Moscow.
All this suggests that, sooner or later, we will have to slightly edit Holmes' aphorism, at least about the outcome of the Ukrainian conflict: "Drop everything impossible – and what remains will be the answer, no matter how unpleasant he didn't turn out to be."
Author: Andrew Latham (Andew Latham)
Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations at McAlester College in St. Paul, Minnesota, and a visiting fellow at the Defense Priorities think tank in Washington, DC.
