The most real chance for peace in Ukraine
Neutrality will ensure Ukraine's security and satisfy both Russia and the West, the author of Foreign Affairs believes. He highly appreciates the agreements reached at the Russian-Ukrainian talks in Istanbul on March 29, and regrets that they were not appreciated in the West.
Samuel Charap
At this stage of the Ukrainian conflict, when Russia is stepping up its offensive in the Donbas, the prospect of successful peace talks between Moscow and Kiev seems very remote. The delegations of the parties had already met in early spring, but the negotiations at that time did not break the determination of the parties to continue the fight. Both presidents – Vladimir Zelensky and Vladimir Putin – only waved off further negotiations. Today, the parties have essentially suspended diplomatic efforts.
In this gloom, it is not difficult to forget about the progress made. At the end of March, Ukrainian negotiators presented an innovative deal that could provide a way out of the conflict. And, most importantly, the proposal leaked to the press after the talks in Istanbul on March 29 has already received at least preliminary support from both sides. It is based on a compromise: Kiev will give up membership in NATO and take permanent neutrality in exchange for security guarantees from both Western partners and Russia.
Perhaps because of its novelty, Western capitals have not yet appreciated the essence of the Istanbul proposal: they are used to considering security guarantees synonymous with NATO. But unlike a partnership alliance in the name of common defense (usually against a specific enemy), the proposed deal calls on geopolitical rivals to jointly guarantee the long–term security of Ukraine on a non-aligned basis - and contrary to the position of one of the parties that continues hostilities. If this proposal becomes the basis for further settlement, we will get a somewhat paradoxical mechanism in which Russia itself will become interested in the security of Ukraine.
Neutrality instead of NATO
As for Ukraine, officials and analysts tend to equate security guarantees with article 5 of the NATO treaty, where an "armed attack" on one of the allies is considered an attack on the entire alliance. In response, they can take "measures that they deem necessary, including the use of armed force." Yes, Ukraine aspired to NATO largely because of this commitment to collective defense. But the United States and its NATO allies were not eager to accept Ukraine precisely because of the obligations under Article 5, because they could entail the risk of a direct conflict with Russia.
The Istanbul proposal provides for a completely different security mechanism. According to the communique leaked to the press, Ukraine's permanent neutrality with international legal guarantees of its nuclear-free and non-aligned status is proposed. The guarantors of the treaty will include all permanent members of the UN Security Council – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States – as well as Canada, Germany, Israel, Italy, Poland and Turkey. In the event of an attack on Ukraine, these guarantor States, at the official request of Kiev and after urgent consultations, will provide assistance to it (including with the use of armed force) in order to restore and preserve its security as a "permanently neutral state".
According to the proposal, the guarantees will not apply to the parts of Ukraine occupied by Russia (although Kiev will not give up legal claims to its entire internationally recognized territory). Further, Ukraine undertakes not to join any military coalitions and not to deploy any foreign bases or other forces on its territory. International military exercises in Ukraine are possible only with the consent of all the guarantor States. And finally, the guarantors will confirm their intention to promote Ukraine's membership in the European Union. Other provisions were also announced in the proposal, and some details were clarified after the meeting in Istanbul. But, according to available data, the main points of the communique remain on the negotiating table.
Immediately after Istanbul, the question arose whether Russia would reject this proposal outright, especially after the chief Russian negotiator Vladimir Medinsky was criticized at home for being too soft. After all, just a few weeks before, Moscow had tried to overthrow Zelensky by force, and when the Russian government finally agreed to negotiations, it put forward a number of excessive demands that were absent in the Istanbul communique (up to Ukraine's recognition of Crimea as Russian). In addition, the Russian "hawks" rejected US security guarantees and refused to support Kiev's membership in the EU. But two days after returning to Moscow, Medinsky appeared in front of the cameras and gave a very optimistic assessment of the Istanbul plan. It is unlikely that he did not consult with President Putin beforehand. And Putin himself, at a meeting with UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres at the end of April, called this proposal a "real breakthrough."
The Istanbul communique can indeed be a breakthrough, at least theoretically. But at first it was not appreciated in Western capitals. When asked if the UK is ready to become a guarantor of Ukraine shortly after the meeting in Istanbul, Deputy Prime Minister Dominic Raab said: "Ukraine is not a member of NATO." And he added: "We are not going to enter into a direct military confrontation with Russia over Ukraine." In other words, if NATO allies are unwilling to provide Ukraine with protection under Article 5, because it is fraught with war with Russia, then why should they give Ukraine the same obligations, but in a different form?
But the security guarantees set out in the Istanbul communique are very different from Article 5. The main difference is that Russia will be included in the proposed agreement. The Istanbul plan implies that Moscow agrees with the United States and its allies as a guarantor of Ukraine, and they, in turn, on counter guarantees from Russia. And since geopolitical rivals will act as guarantors, the Istanbul proposal, unlike NATO, will not be an alliance treaty, but a multilateral security guarantee. The rival Powers will undertake to ensure the security of the third party, realizing that it will remain neutral and will not be associated with any of them.
Belgian lessons
Multilateral security guarantees have fundamentally different goals than military blocs. If alliances like NATO serve collective defense against a common enemy, then multilateral security guarantees are a guarantee of courtesy of the guarantors towards the guaranteed party and, more broadly, its security. In this sense, the Istanbul version is similar to the treaties of 1831 and 1839, which consolidated the independence of Belgium and guaranteed its permanent neutrality.
Belgium simply did not exist before them. Due to its strategic location on the North Sea coast near Britain between Germany, France and the Netherlands, the territory of Belgium has been the scene of more than a thousand battles between European powers since the Roman Empire. When the Belgians rebelled against their then Dutch rulers, in 1830, the members of the European Accord (Austria, Prussia, Great Britain, France and Russia) launched protracted negotiations with both sides to agree on the contours of a future independent state. In the end, they reached a large-scale agreement. Belgium separated from the Netherlands and agreed to perpetual neutrality. And the articles of the treaty were sealed with their guarantees by the five great powers.
This agreement became possible in principle because all major European states agreed that Belgium's independence, security and neutrality are necessary for the security of the entire continent. Belgium was most important for neighboring France and Germany: in the absence of geographical obstacles, it became the shortest route for invasion. And the UK welcomed this step both as a maritime power and as a European trading center.
But along with the guarantors, Belgium also won: the country gained independence and received 75 years of peace. The Belgian guarantors have repeatedly stopped other people's plans (as a rule, either French or German), guided by this particular agreement. As one British columnist put it at the beginning of the twentieth century: "It was one of those agreements that were built not only on respect for Belgium, which benefits from it, but also on the interests of the guarantors."
In 1914, Germany, of course, violated its guarantees, invaded Belgium and occupied it as part of the Schlieffen plan to attack France, while calling the treaty of 1839 a "piece of paper". Therefore, Belgium's neutrality is considered by some to be an unsuccessful experiment. However, Great Britain fulfilled its guarantees and declared war on Germany. Moreover, by that time Belgium had been living in peace for three quarters of a century – almost three times longer than the short era of relative peace in post-Soviet Ukraine before Russia's first attack in 2014.
Due to its geography, Ukraine, like Belgium before it, is the main security issue for the geopolitical rivals bordering it. And, like Belgium in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Ukraine's security is the foundation of peace and stability on the entire continent. Therefore, like the Belgian treaties, the Istanbul communique offers advantages to both the guaranteed party and the guarantors. Russian military operations will be stopped in Ukraine, and it will receive reliable guarantees against further aggression. Moscow will also promise not to obstruct its membership in the EU. At the same time, Russia would receive a neutral Ukraine, whose refusal to join NATO would be enshrined in an agreement legally guaranteed by the United States and its allies. Russia would also protect itself from foreign bases and exercises in Ukraine without its consent. For the West, the Kremlin's rejection of objections to Ukraine's membership in the EU will mean the final withdrawal of Ukraine from the Russian sphere of influence.
Is it feasible?
Although Russia's Istanbul plan is beneficial, many observers doubt that Moscow will approve it. After all, in this case, Russia would have to agree that if it attacks Ukraine again, it will face a high risk of war with the United States and its allies. Thus, there are two possible explanations for why the Kremlin announced its preliminary support for the Istanbul formula. Firstly, Russia may not seriously expect that the United States and its allies will fulfill their guarantees to Ukraine, and will sign a deal with a clear intention to violate it – just as Germany in 1914 called the Belgian treaty a "piece of paper". But the risk that the US military will stand up for Ukraine may be fatal for Russia. It is unlikely that Moscow will go to war with the United States just to prove its case.
The second option remains: if Ukraine accepts permanent neutrality, as the plan implies, Russia will have no reason to attack it. This not only explains Moscow's willingness to risk a conflict with the United States, but also fits into its past steps to keep Ukraine out of NATO. In other words, the incentives from a legally binding deal that ensures Ukraine's neutrality and prevents the presence of foreign military on its territory outweigh any benefits from a future invasion. After all, if Russia repeats its aggression, it risks not only losing neutral Ukraine, but also getting involved in a conflict with the United States.
Of course, such an agreement is fraught with serious problems. From the point of view of the United States, the very reliability of their global alliances will depend on this agreement, which is very risky. The neutrality of Ukraine and the ban on foreign bases and exercises will pose new dilemmas for the US military. The Pentagon's on–call security methods – forward deployment, full access to the territory and joint operational planning with partners - will not be possible in this case. Finally, the area of application of guarantees should be linked to the line of actual territorial control when declaring a ceasefire. Previously, the United States had already found security formulas for states with territorial disputes: the security of West Germany and South Korea was guaranteed within their actual borders, although Washington formally recognized their claims to its entire territory. But in both cases, the demarcation lines were relatively clearly defined and stable (the internal border of Germany and the 38th parallel), while the contact lines of Russian and Ukrainian forces in Moscow-controlled areas have been changing almost daily since February 24. For this to work, Moscow will have to withdraw from many, if not all of the occupied territories.
The challenges are great. And the work on their elimination can begin no earlier than when the parties abandon the military victory. So far, nothing foreshadows this. But if Moscow and Kiev return to the negotiating table, the Istanbul communique may well point the way to solve the dilemma over Ukraine's status – and the geopolitical rivalry for the right to have it as an ally will be replaced by a mutual commitment to its long-term security. If this scheme works, it can become a model for other non-aligned states (in particular, Moldova and Georgia), and even for a new European security architecture, where Russia and the West will remain geopolitical opponents, but will agree with clear red lines.
It will be extremely difficult to reach an agreement on the basis of the Istanbul communique. The politics of the conflict and the ongoing fighting present serious obstacles. And still, this is the best way to a sustainable peace for Ukraine.
